(Dick, 1968)
Every animal sleeps, including non-rational, non-human animals; and during sleep, every animal dreams, although not constantly; but in any case, we rational human animals often fail to remember the contents of our dreams upon waking. And even when we do remember the contents of our dreams, unless we immediately record them upon waking, they typically fade and are forgotten very quickly, like words written on sand erased by incoming waves. In view of the universality of the animal experience of dreaming—and especially in view of the universality of the rational human experience of dreaming—in his essay, “Why Androids Don’t Dream of Electric Sheep–Or Anything Else,” Robert Hanna argues that we can definitively answer Philip K. Dick’s literary or rhetorical question, “do androids dream of electric sheep?” (Dick, 1968), in the negative.
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