In “Are You Really Free? Yes: A New Argument for Freedom,” Robert Hanna asks how human freedom is really possible in the natural world as correctly described by modern physics, chemistry, biology, and cognitive neuroscience?, or alternatively, given the truth of modern science, are you really free? Hanna answers this double question in the affirmative, and … [continue reading]

The basic link between Kant’s metaphysics of free will and his theory of practical agency is his theory of teleology, i. e., his theory of ends or purposes. In the first part of his essay “Freedom, Teleology, and Rational Causation,” Robert Hanna show how Kant’s theory of natural teleology, or the directedness of organismic life—biological … [continue reading]

Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. In the practical realm just as in the theoretical realm, everything comes down to human sensibility as an equally empirical and non-empirical primitive starting point that constitutively motivates, intentionally pervades, and intentionally structures our innately-specified yet also “human, all-too-human” capacities for theoretical and practical rationality, all … [continue reading]

Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Robert Hanna’s “Kant’s B Deduction, Cognitive Organicism, the Limits of Natural Science” explores the complexities of Kant’s B Deduction, proposing a “Bounded Scope Reading” where Categories apply exclusively to objects of experience, rather than the broader “Unbounded Scope Reading” that includes all objects of the senses. … [continue reading]

Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says that “appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding” (A90/B122) and also that “intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking” (A91/B123). This opens up the real possibility of what Kant calls “blind … [continue reading]

Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Robert Hanna’s “Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and the Gap in the B Deduction” is about the nature of the relationship between (1) the doctrine of Non-Conceptualism about mental content, (2) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, and (3) the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or … [continue reading]

Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. In “Kantian Non-Conceptualism,” Robert Hanna advances a rigorous defense of non-conceptual mental content, contending not only for its existence but for its foundational role in cognition. Against the dominant “Conceptualist” thesis—which holds that all mental content is structured by and accessible only through conceptual capacities—Hanna articulates and … [continue reading]

Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. In “Kant and Nonconceptual Content,” Robert Hanna argues that Immanuel Kant is a significant early proponent of nonconceptual mental content—Kant’s notion of intuitional cognitive content is fundamentally equivalent to contemporary notions of nonconceptual content. Hanna contends that Kant’s famous dictum “intuitions without concepts are blind” should be understood as … [continue reading]

(Byrne, 2006) Precisely how and precisely where is human conscious experiencelocated in the natural world? “The Extended Conscious Mind Thesis”says this: The constitutive mechanisms of human conscious experience includeboth extra-neural bodily facts and also extra-bodily worldly facts. In “Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness Is (Probably) Still in the Head,” Andy Clark has … [continue reading]

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) is arguably the single most brilliant, important, and difficult book in modern philosophy. Its main topic is the nature, scope, and limits of human cognition and reason; and its main conclusion is that necessary truth, a priori knowledge, and freedom of the will in a … [continue reading]