In ” Radical Enlightenment: Existential Kantian Cosmopolitan Anarchism, With a Concluding Quasi-Federalist Postscript,” Robert Hanna argues that that a highly original, politically radical, and if not revolutionary, then at least robustly State-resistant, State-subversive, and even outright civilly-disobedient cosmopolitan, existentialist version of anarchism that Hanna calls existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism, very naturally flows from Kant’s moral … [continue reading]

Marvin the Paranoid Android (Wikipedia, 2025) In “The Refutation of Compatibilism and Soft Determinism, Together With A New Proof That Incompatibilistic Real Free Agency Really Exists and That You Really Have It,” Robert Hanna argues against the thesis that you’re both naturally determined and a free agent, and also the thesis that this philosophical position, … [continue reading]

In “Will-Power: Essentially Embodied Agentive Phenomenology, By Way of O’Shaughnessy,” Robert Hanna focuses on three issues. First, he briefly describes the causally efficacious power of the minded animal will (or what Kant calls Willkür, aka “the power of choice”) in basic intentional actions, that is, intentional body movements, against the metaphysical backdrops of his essential … [continue reading]

In “Are You Really Free? Yes: A New Argument for Freedom,” Robert Hanna asks how human freedom is really possible in the natural world as correctly described by modern physics, chemistry, biology, and cognitive neuroscience?, or alternatively, given the truth of modern science, are you really free? Hanna answers this double question in the affirmative, and … [continue reading]

The basic link between Kant’s metaphysics of free will and his theory of practical agency is his theory of teleology, i. e., his theory of ends or purposes. In the first part of his essay “Freedom, Teleology, and Rational Causation,” Robert Hanna show how Kant’s theory of natural teleology, or the directedness of organismic life—biological … [continue reading]

Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. In the practical realm just as in the theoretical realm, everything comes down to human sensibility as an equally empirical and non-empirical primitive starting point that constitutively motivates, intentionally pervades, and intentionally structures our innately-specified yet also “human, all-too-human” capacities for theoretical and practical rationality, all … [continue reading]

Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Robert Hanna’s “Kant’s B Deduction, Cognitive Organicism, the Limits of Natural Science” explores the complexities of Kant’s B Deduction, proposing a “Bounded Scope Reading” where Categories apply exclusively to objects of experience, rather than the broader “Unbounded Scope Reading” that includes all objects of the senses. … [continue reading]

Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says that “appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding” (A90/B122) and also that “intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking” (A91/B123). This opens up the real possibility of what Kant calls “blind … [continue reading]

Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Robert Hanna’s “Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and the Gap in the B Deduction” is about the nature of the relationship between (1) the doctrine of Non-Conceptualism about mental content, (2) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, and (3) the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or … [continue reading]

Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. In “Kantian Non-Conceptualism,” Robert Hanna advances a rigorous defense of non-conceptual mental content, contending not only for its existence but for its foundational role in cognition. Against the dominant “Conceptualist” thesis—which holds that all mental content is structured by and accessible only through conceptual capacities—Hanna articulates and … [continue reading]