Schulting, D. (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
Robert Hanna’s “Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and the Gap in the B Deduction” is about the nature of the relationship between (1) the doctrine of Non-Conceptualism about mental content, (2) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, and (3) the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or Categories, in the B (1787) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e., the B Deduction. Correspondingly, the main thesis of the paper is this: (1) and (2) yield serious problems for (3), yet, in exploring these two serious problems for the B Deduction, we also discover some deeply important and perhaps surprising philosophical facts about Kant’s theory of cognition and his metaphysics.
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