A Sixth Thesis on the Nature of Real Philosophy: Autobiographical Beginnings.

“Diogenes,” by Jean-Léon Gérôme (1860)

This essay is the third installment in a series; here are the two earlier installments:

(Paans, 2017). Paans, O. “Five Theses About Real Philosophy, #1.” Against Professional Philosophy. 8 May. Available online at URL = <https://againstprofphil.org/2017/05/08/five-theses-on-real-philosophy-part-1/>.

(Paans, 2020). Paans, O. “Five Theses About Real Philosophy, #2.” Against Profssional Philosophy. 15 April. Available online at URL = <https://againstprofphil.org/2020/04/15/five-theses-about-real-philosophy-2/>.

You can also download and read or share a .pdf of the complete text of this installment by scrolling down to the bottom of this post and clicking on the Download tab.

A Sixth Thesis on the Nature of Real Philosophy: Autobiographical Beginnings

1. Introduction

Some time ago, one of APP’s readers asked us how “real” philosophy as we define and practice it (two activities that are inextricably connected) is supposed to be different from other types of philosophy, and whether all philosophy that is not real philosophy should be regarded as “fake” or “inauthentic” philosophy (APP, 2016).

To some degree, we have collectively provided answers to these questions during the first eleven years of blogging at APP (APP, 2013-2024). Taken together, however, these answers did not add up to a coherent theory or approach. From these pieces, the sketchy and promising outlines of a methodological theory of real philosophy appear, but remain somewhat dim, as if stuck just beyond the point of sharpness. Partially, this is due to the medium of posting entries on a website.

Working in small, accumulative pieces has the advantage of being able to explore different facets of a topic side-by-side, to turn it over in one’s head, but does not reliably result in a bigger picture, let alone a fully developed theory. Another contributing factor to the vagueness is that it is hard to formulate an idea (“real philosophy”) in terms of determinate, well-defined terms, insofar as we are struggling with its definition (if any) ourselves. One’s inquiry may start with a clear idea or a seemingly well-defined intuition, but this once these impressions are externalized in sketchy accounts, broad strokes and assertions, they inevitably bear the mark of being tentative and exploratory. This series of essays should be read with those remarks and limitations in mind.

In this essay, the third installment in a series (see also Paans, 2017, 2020), I would like to amend the original list of five theses in the spirit of critical reflection-and-revision. I shall be adding one thesis that connects the first-person, lived, embodied viewpoint of the individual philosopher with the more methodological outlook of the original five theses.

Here are the five original theses:

Thesis #1: Real philosophy departs from a philosophical theory or worldview.

Thesis #2: Real philosophy engages intensely with historical or contemporary philosophical ideas—either in the negative (counterreaction) or positive (elaboration, explication) sense.

Thesis #3: Real philosophy contains a philosophical method that is developed by practicing it.

Thesis #4: Real philosophy develops a (tacit) commentary on the practice of philosophy as such.

Thesis #5: Real philosophy provides commentary on a broad range of topics simultaneously: ethics, political theory, metaphysics, epistemology, religion, and so-on.

And here is the new, sixth thesis:

Thesis #6: Real philosophy always involves one or more autobiographical clues, themes, and experiences of its author, and as such cannot be understood only as an exercise in logic or competent reasoning.

2. In Defense of the New, Sixth Thesis

As it stands, this new, sixth thesis needs a defence. For our starting point, let’s consider a few different conceptions of philosophy.

(i) In the broadly Hellenic conception, philosophy consists of exchanges of arguments between conversation partners. Logic and inferential reasoning is used to determine the truth, falsehood or area of applicability of statements, or to make useful distinctions. Given the Platonic and Aristotelian influences in Western Medieval philosophy and Islamic philosophy alike, this model of doing philosophy has remained very influential in the West.

(ii) In the Enlightenment conception, early modern thinkers like Leibniz, Locke, Hume, and Kant co-opted the methods of philosophy in the emerging descriptive (and normative) project of the natural sciences. At best, philosophy could help determine the limits of sense and reason (Kant’s term) or qualify statements with the help of logic.

(iii) In the Existential-phenomenological conception, philosophy regained a form of autonomy by reflecting on the first-person, lived experience of a person, generalizing these insights for humanity as such. Notably, this conception developed alongside the modern humanities, which were likewise looking for ways of understanding the world from an immersed perspective.

(iv) In the Analytic conception, philosophy collaborates with the formal and natural sciences, and deals with the nature of the natural universe, society, and ourselves by means of formal logic, linguistic and conceptual analysis, and inferential reasoning, as well as structured argumentation.

(v) And in the Postmodern conception, philosophy amounted to describing the limitations and conditions to which every utterance or “discourse” is irrevocably subject. It deals with mapping out formative influences on certain ways of thinking and reasoning, with the express aim of revealing and overcoming hidden biases and prejudices.

This list is by no means complete but suffices for making a few basic distinctions. All of these conceptions are in some form or the other still alive. In Anglo-Saxon post-Postmodern, post-Analytic philosophy, conceptions (i), (ii) and (iii) still determine to a large degree what is deemed acceptable, worthwhile and rational. In much so called “Continental” philosophy from the 1970s onwards until the 2010s, conceptions (i), (iii), and (v) have mixed and mingled in interesting—if not always fruitful—ways. Classical Existential-phenomenological philosophy in sense (iii) has almost completely vanished.

Yet, it is precisely at this point that things become philosophically interesting. We have discussed in a different place the so-called “no deep difference” thesis. The claim expressed by this thesis is that there is no sharp demarcation to be made between philosophy proper and the history of philosophy. Philosophical arguments do not unfold in a vacuum or an abstract realm of logically well-formed propositions alone. Instead, they respond to real-world events, the cultural climate from which they emerged and in which they hold persuasive potential. For instance, Plato’s sustained reflection on the character of a moral statesman (conceived as an ideal, virtuous, well-tempered philosopher-king) can be appreciated once we recall the reign of tyrants that Plato witnessed a few decades before writing the Republic. Likewise, we can better understand Thomas Hobbes’s political pessimism about human nature once we consider that he lived through the tumultuous 16^th century which saw the European continent torn apart by ethnic, national, political and religious conflicts. Much of Hegel’s cautious, dialectically developing political philosophy can be appreciated fully when considered against the background of mixed responses by the Prussian states to the French revolution and the subsequent Reign of Terror. And certain emancipatory aspects of Kant’s political thought acquire added depth if we consider Kant’s enthusiasm for the optimistic, egalitarian political project that underpinned the French revolution. The same case, mutatis mutandis, can be made for Marx’s and Engels’ socio-political thought: their socialist-communist project engaged with the real-life conditions of poverty, hunger, capitalist exploitation, and alienation that they witnessed. Correspondingly, the “philosophies of nature” that developed during the 19^th century developed in tandem with new scientific insights that situated humanity fully within the (evolutionary) natural order. The resulting shock and the weakening of organized religion led to the dissipation of shared moral standards and divine guarantees of a “good ending.” This cultural vacuum stimulated the exploration of subjective experience and further developed in the philosophy of the Existential-phenomenological tradition. The dissolution of traditional sociopolitical forces like religion, and agricultural, manual labour as well as communal ties and genealogies led to a reconceptualization of the individual.

As these examples demonstrate, philosophical ideas are expressed through individuals whose experiences, outlook, societal position, and cultural embeddings heavily influence what and how they think. For that reason alone, we should not just regard them as carefully constructed, rational arguments. These instruments are merely secondary: argumentation is used to defend and refine the original ideas. The positive and optimistic scientific outlook of 18^th-century science influences the entire way in which Kant approaches questions of metaphysics, morality and political thought. Likewise, the cultural pessimism and world-weariness prevalent in the days of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche suffuses their thinking. Indeed, their prickly and uncompromising style of thinking is only possible and fully intelligible when understood against the cultural background from which it emerged.

A parallel development can be discerned in classical and post-classical Analytic philosophy. The logic-and-mathematics inspired style of thinking, writing and arguing became only possible in an intellectual culture where the formal-&-natural sciences occupy the highest place in the tribunal of knowledge. Moreover, the emphasis on a “clean and orderly” world-picture directly resonates with the emergence of High Modernity. Each age has its own philosophy, expressed by individuals who live and realize the spirit of that epoch. The various conceptions of philosophy that I introduced above did not fall fully formed from the heavens. They constitute responses to events of that era, or either break away from or continue a tradition. In the case of postmodernism, its self-image is even a self-styled “break with the past,” as the ultimate gesture of defining its own project and style—a very postmodern thing to do, at any rate!

In all these cases, we witness points of encounter between an individual life and the broader sociopolitical culture in which it unfolds. In some cases, we can even identify formative events that lead an individual down an avenue of thought. In some cases, we have accurate portraits of how particular life-events of a certain individual lead to highly specific and original thoughts. In this category, we can mention the experience of guilt in St. Augustine’s Confessions, Boethius’s self-pity and subsequent acceptance of his fate in the Consolation of Philosophy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s violently changing moods in Reveries of a Solitary Walker, and Henry David Thoreau’s musings on nature, life and existence in Walden. History in this case is not written history or collective history. It is individual history, or, at least, a historical situation interpreted and narrated from a first-person viewpoint. Given this close entanglement of life events and philosophical thought, it follows that some ideas cannot be dislodged from the individual life out of which they emerged – at least not if one wants to investigate them in some intelligible, recognizable form. To tear them loose from the experiential fabric from which they emerged is to disfigure such ideas, notably by reducing them to sets of propositions, or by relegating the affective import they held for its author (and possibly readers) to the periphery. In short, to consider ideas in isolation is to treat them as organisms without an environment; as thoughts without a body; as if one could piece a living organism together by lining up all its organs in the right order—a horrible Frankensteinian project of assembling a philosophically undead creature.

That ideas are historically embedded seems clear, and in that respect, the no-deep-difference thesis is not radical or shocking. However, I would like to go one step further, and suggest that there are convergencies between the characters of individual thinkers, their experiences and the ideas that exercise their minds. Although it is sometimes possible to trace the origin of an idea back to a single life-event, or to explain its structure and import with reference to that event, we should be vigilant in moving too quickly here.

I am not saying that every philosophical idea can be traced back to a formative event in the life of its originator. To attempt such an explanation would be to impose a mythical reading on a biography. We should be very careful in forcefully asserting one-one, directly causal relationships between events and ideas, especially since we know that much of what our cognitive faculties process occurs preconsciously. The origins of a given idea might have been present in a thinker’s mind long before the event that catalysed them occurred. Yet, with hindsight, we merely observe visible effects, leading us often to jump to conclusions that merit a level of proof that can never be provided.

Let’s consider a few exemplary cases. From Kant’s biographers and colleagues, we learn that his family upbringing was Pietist in nature, with an emphasis on frugality, simplicity and duty. Likewise, we know that Kant’s formative years at the Fridericianum and the university were largely unhappy, due to the artificial, stifling and—in Kant’s subjective experience—hypocritical moral norms prevalent at these social institutions that chained and chafed him with their Pietist emphasis on authenticity and duty for duty’s sake. One may be forced to behave in certain ways, but if this training or conditioning only serves to press that person in a certain, predefined shape, we have not instilled moral conduct, but just drilled routines. Given this conception of morality, should we not regard Kant’s views on dignity, moral value and the categorical imperative as outcomes of this lived tension rather than abstract (and culturally dislodged) philosophical ideas? It is from this all-too-familiar tension that Kantian moral philosophy derives its acumen and timeless relevance. The conflict between imposed norms and individual values plays out in every life (except maybe in the lives of the most dogmatic and/or psychopathic among us). As such, the Kantian response is not only a useful solution to a moral problem, but also a philosophical pathway that has been lived and subjectively experienced by its originator, for whom this issue became an inescapable problem.

Another case would be the life and thought of Arthur Schopenhauer. As a young man, he experienced deep unhappiness, being pressed into taking up a job as clerk in a Hamburg trading business. His family was cold, distant, and dysfunctional. Due to a stroke of luck, Schopenhauer could pursue his passion for philosophy, only to find that the world had no interest in his ideas, and that the academic world ignored him. Yet, for over 30 years, he whittled away at his philosophy, sharpening many of its aspects and collecting scientific evidence to support his metaphysical system. Is it a surprise that the notion of Will is so central to his philosophy? The character of the man should prompt us to wonder whether his wrote a philosophy of the Will or a Wilful philosophy. Despite all these tribulations, his philosophy came up triumphantly at the end of his life, exerting an enormous—if diffuse—influence on thinkers and writers as diverse as Beckett, Freud, Nietzsche, Houllebecq, Mann, and Wittgenstein – as if an amorphous drive pushed it to the philosophical surface at the end of the 19^th century, exerting its influence beyond the life of the man who wrote it.

Underneath its metaphysical structure lies an impetus, a drive and almost obsessive effort to be seen, to be recognized, and indeed, to manifest itself. Schopenhauer lived exactly what he wrote: he was as much an embodiment of the Will as a caricature of it. We must ask the question: could another person have written such a philosophy, an effort characterized by such sheer effort, doggedness, obsession, bitterness and brilliance? I think not: the singular combination of talent, character and drive resulted in a philosophy that is distinctive and valuable because of the psychological constitution of its author, not despite it. Once more, the metaphysics of will is not “just another theory”, but a singular response to a life-situation that became inescapable, only to be expressed through the filter and talent of a singular character.

And here is a final case. If we consider Michel Foucault’s life, and the personal problems he experienced with his authoritarian father, who disapproved of his homosexuality, would we not do well to consider his fascination with “normality” against this tragic personal background? Throughout Foucault’s oeuvre, the question “what is considered normal and how is it enforced and/or regulated?” plays a decisive role. Not only social institutions play roles in enforcing and codifying normality (and morality, as Kant noted), but so do practices, rituals, rites of passage, utterances, and habits. It was Foucault who—with his life experiences, and in a time where homosexuality was rejected and accepted, depending on where you were born and living—articulated a philosophy of regulation and ritual, of fitting in and standing out, of structures of exclusion as well as structures of surveillance. All these themes played out in his life, from analysing prisons and clinics, to participating in the tea ceremony and studying Zen while in Japan, to engaging with the BDSM community in San Francisco, and to experimenting with LSD. Later in life, Foucault shifts his attention towards “practices of the self”: the multifarious ways in which individuals regulate their own behaviour, either of their own accord, or when (self-suggestively) compelled to do so. The Foucauldian project is not just one of analysis and comparison, but once again a life document of engaging a problem so deep and confronting that it becomes the focus of intense scrutiny and an impetus to come to terms with it. In this case “coming to terms” does not mean solving it or accepting it; instead, it entails structuring it, trying to grasp in in such a way that it can be integrated in one’s life in such a way that it accretes additional meaning beyond its formative impact. In doing so, Foucault transformed the way we engage with the world through practice. He lived and enacted his philosophy as much as he wrote it.

Are the ideas that stem from such an encounter between individual life and culture simply to be regarded as arguments or balancing exercises on the “icy slopes of logic”? Are they neat and efficient expositions of an assertion? Not at all. Even only a cursory glance at philosophers’ lives and texts will convince the reader of any real philosopher that what is produced is a thick contexture in which many ideas, viewpoint, norms and values intermingle.

This autobiographical character sets real philosophy apart from the Enlightenment conception of the sciences. From its very beginning, there is a core in every philosophical project that resonates with the life of its author. This core is not a by-product or superfluous, undesirable residue of subjectivity. Instead, it is the animating kernel that gives real philosophy its liveliness and relevance through the ages. It provides the philosophies of the past with a resonance that surprises and fascinates in equal measure. One can read Marcus Aurelius, Lao Zi, Seneca, Sun Tzu, Boethius, Kenkō, Meister Eckhart, De Montaigne, Pascal, Kant, or Schopenhauer not as contemporaries, but as fellow travellers. Like us, they too struggled with what we unhelpfully call the “human condition,”, i.e., the existence of evil, grief, finitude, meaning, and feelings of awe and wonder. We read them as fellow human beings or “citizens of the cosmos,” locked in a predicament that essentially resembles ours, even if their temporal and cultural distance introduces differences.

Argumentation is an instrument of philosophy, but arguing does not constitute its essence. Instead, to make the nature and structure of problems intelligible, a language that is precise as well as evocative is required, positioning philosophy in the adventurous lands between science and literature; poetry and prose; logic and mysticism. Departing from this indistinct but open position, philosophers of all ages and places have explored the world, tethered to their lives, yet united by a desire to achieve a form of insight that overcomes the proximities of culture and essential embodiment.

When Greek philosophy moved away from direct engagement with the world and retreated to distant contemplation, it demarcated the most basic oscillation that one can discern in philosophy, namely the productive movement between immersing oneself in life to understand it, and then retreating from it in order to contemplate what one encountered. In real philosophy, we can identify how it influenced the enactive attitudes of the individual who recorded them for posterity.

Is it a wonder, then, that Daoist philosophers emphasize the importance of respiration. Air goes in, and air goes out; every phase of immersion is followed by distancing; every unification leads to new distinctions; and after every time Zarathrustra climbs the mountain, he must descend again. This movement characterizes all real philosophy.

3. Conclusion

To separate philosophy from the individual lives of philosophers is a first-class mistake, and not just a methodological one. It amounts to killing and eviscerating the animating, autobiographical core that underlies real thinking. In insisting on such a separation, one admits of misunderstanding the nature of philosophy itself. Philosophers are 3E: essentially embodied, enactive, and embedded—and so are their philosophies. Those who choose to stay on the icy slopes of logic may soon find that it is an inhospitable environment, which is neither conducive to philosophical thinking nor to life itself.

4. Postscript

Just before this post was finished, Donald J. Trump was elected as 47^th President of the USA. The German government fell. Meanwhile, populist right-wing parties are on the rise throughout the European continent, putting the Post-WWII order in question. The great conflicts that mark the world (the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Sudan conflict), as well as widespread global instability led to feelings of apprehension. Our philosophy is also written from an embodied, enactive, embedded and (at least in my opinion) extended viewpoint.

Is it possible to judge the spirit of the times by the ideas it produces? If we can retrospectively identify the biographical circumstances of historical philosophers, what does this tell about us when we survey the ideas that play around in our minds? Is it possible to conduct a history of the present? And if we join all these ideas into on overarching picture, what can we say about our times? Could the owl of Minerva fly at noon instead of only at dusk?

As it stands, such a philosophy of the present is written right now. One thing can at least be said, and that is that the following influences will be salient for historians:

(i) The professionalization, academicization, and authoritarian moralization of philosophy (and thinking in general), either in the sense that it seems stuck in political-correct agendas, or else in narrow and increasingly irrelevant specializations. But most dangerously, in creating a type of thinking that is as anodyne as it is stifling.

(ii) The mechanistic worldview in all its manifestations, up to and including ruthless instrumentalization of individual lives, 24/7 connectivity, exploitative and unsustainable economic operation, and myopic scientism.

(iii) The emergence of authoritarianism as a political model around the globe, up to and including attempts to establish itself as a normalized and justified mode of political organization.

(iv) The unfolding of a global ecological collapse that is as unpredictable as it is distributed. For once, we will all be in the same boat, although a new class segmentation is on the horizon, dividing humanity into those who must bear the full weight of the changes that will occur and those who can evade or otherwise neutralize them.

How all this will impact contemporary philosophy cannot be said with certainty. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that those constricting factors will be avoided by engaging in real philosophy. Thoughts may not be entirely free, but at the very least, they can be cultivated so as to assert a form of autonomy that is now more necessary than ever.

REFERENCES

(APP, 2013-2024). Z, aka Hanna, R., et al., Against Professional Philosophy. Available online at URL = <https://againstprofphil.org/>.

(APP, 2016). Boethius, L_E, OP, X1, Y, & Z, aka Hanna, R. “Philosophical Works, Philosophical Theories, Real Philosophy, and REAL Philosophy,” Against Professional Philosophy. 9 June. Available online at URL = <https://againstprofphil.org/2016/06/09/philosophical-works-philosophical-theories-real-philosophy-and-real-philosophy/>.

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