(Neill, 2019)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. A Critique of the Bostrom Simulation Argument
3. Other Work on The Simulation Hypothesis
4. Part A: The Glitch Hypothesis
5. Part B: The Absurdity of Section 4 and Professional Academic Philosophy
The essay below will be published in four installments: this one, the second, contains section 3.
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3. Other Work on The Simulation Hypothesis
We now briefly discuss two important works dealing with The Simulation Hypothesis and distinguish our paper from them.
First, Rizwan Virk, in his 2019 book The Simulation Hypothesis: An MIT Computer Scientist Shows Why AI, Quantum Physics, and Eastern Mystics All Agree We Are in a Video Game (Virk, 2019), has as his central thesis that our physical reality is not a solid, material universe, but a digital construct, similar to a massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) like World of Warcraft or the simulated world depicted in The Matrix. He posits that we are characters within this simulation, controlled by a giant artificial intelligence, with our lives rendered as “pixels” governed by an internal clock. This simulation is so advanced that it is indistinguishable from physical reality, aligning with Bostrom’s Simulation Argument, which suggests that at least one advanced civilization could create such simulations, making it statistically likely we are in one.
Virk’s argument rests on three main pillars.
3.1 Computer Science and Video Game Technology
Drawing from his experience as a game developer (e.g., Tap Fish, Penny Dreadful: Demimonde), Virk compares modern video game mechanics to reality. He notes that games use “rendering” techniques, where only the observed environment is fully realized, similar to how quantum mechanics suggests particles exist as probabilities until observed (e.g., wave function collapse in the double-slit experiment).
3.2 AI, Virtual Reality, and Quantum Computing
He argues that rapid advancements in AI, virtual reality (VR), and quantum computing could soon enable simulations indistinguishable from reality. If this trend continues, future civilizations could create simulations containing conscious beings, suggesting we might already be in one.
3.3 Quantum Physics
Virk cites quantum phenomena, such as nonlocality (entanglement) and the observer effect, to support the idea that reality behaves like a simulation. For instance, the double-slit experiment shows that particles act differently when observed, akin to a game rendering only what a player sees.
Virk cites the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, suggesting that reality could branch into multiple timelines, like save states in video games, and contrasts this with The Simulation Hypothesis’s idea that reality is computed on-demand, not pre-existing as infinite physical worlds.
Virk also connects The Simulation Hypothesis to ancient philosophies, particularly the Hindu concept of māyā (reality as an illusion) and Buddhist ideas of interconnectedness. He argues that these traditions, which view reality as a constructed illusion, align with modern simulation theory. He also draws on Western philosophy, like Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, and speculative fiction, such as Philip K. Dick’s works, to suggest that the idea of a simulated reality has deep historical roots.
Virk acknowledges The Simulation Hypothesis is unfalsifiable but argues it is plausible, citing potential “artifacts” like the Mandela Effect as hints of a simulated reality. His approach is speculative, relying on logical arguments over empirical proof.
Second, David Chalmers, Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy (2022), accepts The Simulation Hypothesis as a serious metaphysical possibility. He argues that we cannot definitively rule out the idea that our reality is a simulation, and he treats it as a plausible scenario rather than a mere thought experiment. The hypothesis posits that our perceived reality might be a computer-generated virtual world, akin to a very advanced video game or simulation, run by an advanced civilization or computational system.
Chalmers builds on Bostrom’s trilemma, accepting this framework as logically sound and finds it compelling. He leans toward the third option—that we might be in a simulation—because it aligns with the probabilistic reasoning that if many simulations exist, it’s statistically more likely we are in one.
Chalmers introduces his concept of “Reality+,” which is central to his acceptance of The Simulation Hypothesis. He argues that virtual realities (including simulations) can be genuine realities for those who inhabit them, and thereby makes three main points.
3.3 Virtual Objects and Experiences are “Real”
A table in a virtual world is “real” within that context, just as a physical table is real in our perceived world. Virtual objects have causal powers and functional roles within their environment.
3.4 Simulated Consciousness is “Real” Consciousness
If a simulation includes conscious beings (like us), their experiences and mental states are just as “real” as those in a non-simulated world. Chalmers rejects the idea that simulated consciousness is “less real.”
3.5 No Privileged Base Reality
Chalmers argues there’s no philosophical reason to privilege a non-simulated “base reality” over a simulated one. A simulation can be a fully-fledged reality for its inhabitants, provided it’s sufficiently detailed and consistent.
Correspondingly, Chalmers accepts a form of epistemological skepticism about our ability to know whether we’re in a simulation. He argues this:
We lack definitive evidence to distinguish between a simulated reality and a non-simulated one, as a perfect simulation would be indistinguishable from “base reality” to its inhabitants.
This skepticism doesn’t undermine our knowledge within the simulation. Even if we’re simulated, our experiences, beliefs, and interactions remain valid within the context of our reality.
Chalmers remains neutral on whether we are actually in a simulation but accepts it as a serious possibility. He argues this:
The Simulation Hypothesis is compatible with many philosophical frameworks, including his own views on consciousness.
It doesn’t require us to abandon our understanding of reality; instead, it expands what counts as real to include virtual worlds.
Chalmers accepts The Simulation Hypothesis as a plausible but unfalsifiable possibility, embracing epistemological skepticism about distinguishing simulated from base reality. He suggests that anomalies or glitches could theoretically provide clues, but doesn’t propose specific tests. We however take the existence of glitches as making a case for The Simulation Hypothesis, as far as a prima facie plausible case can be made, and we call this The Glitch Hypothesis.
By contrast to both Virk and Chalmers, we acknowledge the speculative nature of The Glitch Hypothesis but argue it’s empirically testable through patterns in quantum measurements, cosmic structure, and consciousness thresholds. We will point to “artifacts” like quantum paradoxes and fine-tuned constants as evidence of coding errors. Unlike Chalmers, who emphasizes the philosophical legitimacy of virtual realities, we propose that reality’s inconsistencies—quantum-relativity conflicts, consciousness paradoxes, and Murphy’s Law—reflect a buggy codebase, offering testable predictions for simulation archaeology. The Glitch Hypothesis will now be detailed, in Part A, and Part B of this Janus-faced paper, will give the case against this more plausible version of The Simulation Hypothesis.
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