Is Kantianism The Ultimate Form of Western Philosophy?, #2.

Engraving of Kant at his desk (Birck, 18^th century)

The essay that follows is being published in two installments; this is the second, and the first installment is HERE.

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Is Kantianism The Ultimate Form of Western Philosophy?, #2

In his famous letter to Marcus Herz of 21 February 1772, and then again 15 years later in the B edition of the CPR, Kant formulates this basic argument for transcendental idealism in the following ways:

As I thought through the theoretical part [of “The Limits of Sense and Reason”], considering its whole scope and and the reciprocal relations of its parts, I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I, as well as others, had failed to pay attention to and that, in fact, constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics. I asked myself: What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call “representation” to the object? If a representation is only a way in which the subject is affected by the object, then it is easy to see how the representation is in conformity with this object, namely as an effect in accord with its cause, and it is easy to see this modification of our mind can represent something, that is, have an object. Thus the passive or sensuous representations have an understandable relationship to objects, and the principles that are derived from the nature of our soul have an understandable validity for all things insofar as those things are supposed to be objects of the senses. In the same way, if that in us which we call “representation” were active with regard to the object, that is, if the object were created by the representation (as when divine cognitions are conceived as the archetypes of all things), the conformity of these representations to their objects could be understood. Thus the possibility of both an intellectus archetypi (on whose intuitions the things themselves would be grounded) and an intellectus ectypi (which would derive the data for its logical procedure from the sensible intuition of things) is at least intelligible. However, our understanding, through its representations, is not the cause of the object …. nor is the object the cause of the intellectual representations in the mind…. Therefore the pure concepts of the understanding must not be abstracted from sense perceptions, nor must they express the reception of representations through the senses; but though they must have their origin in the nature of the soul, they are neither caused by the object nor bring the object into being. In my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of intellectual representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not modifications of the soul brought about by the object. However I silently passed over the further question of how a representation that refers to the object without being in any way affected by it can be possible. I had said: The sensuous representations present things as they appear, the intellectual representations present them as they are. But by what means are these things given to us, if not by the way in which they affect us? And if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that that they are supposed to have with objects—objects that are nevertheless not possibly produced thereby? And the axioms of pure reason concerning these objects—how do they agree with these objects, since the agreement has not been reached with the aid of experience? In mathematics this is possible, because the objects before us are quantities and can be represented as quantities only because it is possible for us to produce their mathematical representations (by taking numerical units a given number of times). But in the case of relationships involving qualities—as to how my understanding may form for itself concepts of things completely a priori, with which concepts the things must necessarily agree, and as to how my understanding may formulate real principles concerning the possibility of such concepts, with which principles experience must be in exact agreement, and which nevertheless are independent of experience—this question, of how the faculty of understanding achieves this conformity with the things themselves, is still left in a state of obscurity. Plato assumed a previous intuition of divinity as the primary source of the pure concepts of the understanding and of first principles. [Malebranche] believed in a still-continuing perennial intuition of this primary being. Various moralists have accepted precisely this view with respect to basic moral laws. Crusius believed in certain implanted rules for the purpose of forming judgments and ready-made concepts that God implanted in the human soul just as they had to be in order to harmonize with things. Of these systems, one may call the former the influxum hyperphysicum and the latter the harmonium preastabilitatem intellectualem. But the deus ex machina is the greatest absurdity one could hit on in the determination of the origin and validity of our knowledge. It has—beside its deceptive circle in the conclusion concerning our cognitions—also this additional disadvantage: it encourages all sorts of wild notions and every pious and speculative brainstorm. (C 10: 129-135 [21 Feb. 1772], italics in the original)

Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the object must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us…. If intuition has to conform to the [physical] constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the [mentalistic] constitution of our faculty of intuition (Anschauungsvermögens), then I can very well represent the possibility to myself. (CPR Bxvi-xvii, [boldfaced emphasis] in the original)

Now there are only two ways in which a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects can be thought: either the experience makes these concepts possible, or these concepts make the experience possible. The first is not the case with the categories (nor with pure sensible intuition); for they are a priori concepts, hence independent of experience (the assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of generatio aequivoca). Consequently only the second way remains (as it were a system of the epigenesis of pure reason): namely, that the categories contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general from the side of the understanding…. If someone still wanted to propose a middle way between the only two, already named ways, namely, that the categories were neither self-thought a priori first principles of our cognition, nor drawn from experience, but were rather subjective predispositions of our thinking, implanted in us along with our existence by our author in such a ways that their use would agree exactly with the laws of nature along which experience runs (a kind of preformation-system of pure reason), then (besides the fact that on such a hypothesis no end can be seen to how far one might drive the presupposition of predetermined predispositions for future judgments) this would be decisive against the supposed middle way: that in such a case the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to their concept. For, for example, the concept of cause, which asserts the necessity of a consequent under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on a subjective necessity, arbitrarily implanted in us, of combining certain empirical representations according to a rule of relation. I would not be able to say that the effect is combined with the cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think of this representation otherwise than as so connected; which is precisely what the skeptic wishes most, for then all our insight through the supposed objective validity of our judgments is nothing but sheer illusion, and there would ne no shortage of people who would not concede this subjective necessity (which must be felt) on their own; at least one would not be able to quarrel with anyone about that which merely depends on the way in which his subject is organized. (CPR B166-168, … boldfacing in the original)

Unfortunately, the positive formulation of transcendental idealism at CPR Bxvi-xvii is not itself perfectly clear and distinct, to put it mildly, and could, at least in principle, express any one of the four following versions of The Conformity Thesis, where the options run from the strongest formulation to the weakest: (i) there is a physical-to-mental identity relation between the ontic structures of veridically apparent, phenomenal, or manifestly real physical spacetime, together with the causal-dynamic relations between veridically apparent, phenomenal, or manifestly real natural objects and natural states-of-affairs on the one hand, and the innate mentalistic structures of rational human sensibility, understanding, and reason on the other, or (ii) there is a mental-to-physical logical-supervenience-without-identity relation between the innate mentalistic structures of rational human sensibility, understanding, and reason on the one hand, and the ontic structures of veridically apparent, phenomenal, or manifestly real natural spacetime together with the causal-dynamic relations between veridically apparent, phenomenal, or manifestly real natural objects and natural states-of-affairs on the other, or (iii) there is a mental-to-physical isomorphism-without-either-identity-or-logical-supervenience relation between the innate mentalistic structures of rational human sensibility, understanding, and reason on the one hand, and the ontic structures of veridically apparent, phenomenal, or manifestly real natural spacetime together with the causal-dynamic relations between veridically apparent, phenomenal, or manifestly real natural objects and natural states-of-affairs on the other.

Or most weakly of all: (iv) there is a physical-to-mental strong modal actualist counterfactual dependency relation between the innate mentalistic structures of rational human sensibility, understanding, and reason on the one hand, and the ontic structures of veridically apparent, phenomenal, or manifestly real natural spacetime together with the causal-dynamic relations between veridically apparent, phenomenal, or manifestly real natural objects and natural states-of-affairs on the other, such that, necessarily, if the manifestly real natural world actually exists, then if rational human cognizers were also to exist, then they would be able to know the ontic structures of manifestly real natural spacetime directly through non-empirical intuition, and also would be able to know the causal-dynamic relations between manifestly real natural objects and natural states-of-affairs indirectly through concepts, judgments, and inferences. My own view is that the most philosophically defensible version of The Conformity Thesis is the conjunction of (iii) and (iv), which I call weak or counterfactual transcendental idealism.

In turn, it should especially be noted, according to weak or counterfactual transcendental idealism, anything X can be weakly or counterfactually transcendentally ideal or mind-dependent even if, and whenever, no rational human minds actually do exist. It has only to be necessarily true of X that were rational human minds to exist, then they would be able to know some fundamental stuctural things about X. Or in other words, the weak or counterfactual mind-dependence of Xis just that it is necessarily really possible for X to be knowable at least partially by minds like ours, were such minds to exist. But that can be true even if minds like ours do not actually exist, or indeed have never actually existed. In that way, it is perfectly really possible for the Big Bang to be weakly or counterfactually transcendentally ideal, without postulating either our metaphysically mysterious presence at the Big Bang or our anti-realistic retrospective “cognitive construction” of the Big Bang. Indeed, I think that weak or conterfactual transcendental idealism is necessarily equivalent to a moderate version of the famous or notorious Anthropic Principle in recent and contemporary physics, and also that contemporary physics is explanatorily incomplete without it (Hanna, 2022, 2024b: ch. 7).

In the Prolegomena Kant says that “life is the subjective condition of all our possible experience” (Prol 4: 335), and in the third Critique, he says that “mind for itself is entirely life (the principle of life itself)” (CPJ 5: 278). And according to Kant in the first Critique and in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, matter is essentially a nomologically-governed totality of dynamic attractive and repulsive forces. Moreover, in the unfinished Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics project contained in the Opus postumum, he argues in the so-called “Aether Deduction” that an a priori material condition of the possibility of experience is an actual and manifestly real material correlate of the supersensible substrate, namely, the universal dynamic aether, as the unified totality of attractive and repulsive forces, as the dual causal source of inert matter (natural mechanisms) and also natural purposes (living organisms) alike (OP 21: 206-233). Kant’s universal dynamic aether is, in effect, what we would now call “fields of force” or “energy flows.” Indeed, viewed retrospectively, with 20-20 philosophical hindsight, it’s clear that Kant’s dynamic aether theory is fully compatible with contemporary quantum field theory, modulo the standard competing interpretations of the quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics.

Therefore, Kant believes that (i) mind and life are metaphysically continuous with one another (The Strong Continuity of Mind and Life Thesis), (ii) life and the universal dynamic aether (aka energy) are also metaphysically continuous with one another (The Strong Continuity of Life and Energy Thesis), and (iii) because mind and life are metaphysically continuous with the universal dynamic aether or energy, therefore mind and life are both objectively real, causally efficacious natural facts (The Causal Efficacy of Mind and Life Thesis).[i]

Kant’s transcendental idealism, as we have seen, postulates an ontological dependency and asymmetric necessary conformity between the structures and relations of the veridically apparent, phenomenal, or manifestly real natural world on the one hand, and certain non-reducible, non-empirical structural properties of the rational human mind on the other. But transcendental idealism must also be understood to contain the further three-part ontological thesis formulated just above, to the effect that mind and life are metaphysically continuous and that both of them are actually immanent in the causally efficacious complex thermodynamics of material nature, namely, energy flows.

Throughout his philosophical career, Kant was deeply interested in the metaphysics of physics, and also strongly committed to the thesis that there’s an irreducible explanatory and ontological difference—that is, a non-identity and a non-supervenience—between mechanical (aka “dead”) causal-dynamic forces and non-mechanical (aka “living”) causal-dynamic forces (see, e.g., Mensch, 2013; Hanna, 2014). This can be clearly seen in his earliest published work in 1747, “Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces,” in the period between the A and B editions of CPR, in the 1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, and again in his final, unfinished work from the late 1790s, Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Naural Science to Physics, the drafts and notes for which are collected in the Opus postumum. For the Critical and post-Critical Kant, all matter known or knowable by a Newtonian mechanistic physics is inert, and also ontically constituted by the interplay of attractive and repulsive “dead” or mechanical forces.

But during the post-Critical period Kant holds that some manifestly real natural processes, namely, all and only those that are unknowable by a Newtonian deterministic, mechanistic physics, are also non-inert, and ontically constituted by “living” or non-mechanical forces. These two theses are logically and metaphysically compatible precisely because all material or physical properties for Kant are intrinsic relational properties of veridical appearances, phenomena, or manifestly real objects and not intrinsic non-relational properties of Really Real objects, things-in-themselves, or noumena. Amongst the manifestly real non-mechanical processes are organismic processes, and amongst the organismic processes are mental processes. Again, just as for Kant the explanatory and ontological difference between mechanical and organismic processes is intrinsically relational or immanently structural, and not intrinsic non-relational, so too for him the explanatory and ontological difference between organismic and mental processes is intrinsically relational or immanently structural, not intrinsic non-relational.

Hence the post-Critical Kant is neither a mechanist-materialist who thinks that physical matter is dead or inert in itself, nor a hylozoist, who thinks that physical matter itself is alive or vital in itself, nor is he a substance dualist or property dualist, who thinks that the mind or mental properties are something in themselves, over and above organismic or any other natural processes. For Kant, some kinds of physical matter are indeed relatively inert and relatively mechanical, in the sense that (as we would now say) they’re necessarily determined by the Conservation Laws, including the 1^st Law of Thermodynamics, the 2^nd Law of Thermosynamics, and Turing-computable algorithms, relative to all the settled quantity-of-energy facts about the past. But there’s no intrinsic non-relational difference, on the one hand, between physical matter, as constituted by the universal dynamic aether, and living organisms, just as there’s no intrinsic non-relational difference, on the other hand, between non-minded living organisms and minded living organisms. The natural science of biology studies the non-inert, organismic complex thermodynamic processes, whereas the natural science of chemistry studies all the non-inert complex thermodynamic processes per se, whether organic or inorganic. And the natural (and for Kant, also anthropological-pragmatic) science of empirical psychology studies all the organismic conscious or mental processes. Precisely how correctly to characterize the epistemic and explanatory status of biology, chemistry, and empirical psychology, and precisely how correctly to relate them to one another and also to physics and mathematics, was a source of deep and lifelong philosophical concern and puzzlement to Kant (see, e.g., MFNS 4: 468-472, and CPJ 5: 373-375, and 400).

Back now, finally, to Kant’s dogmatic slumbering and his awakening from it by means of remembering Hume, originally admitted by him in 1783. In a much later 1798 letter to Christian Garve, the post-Critical Kant also claims that it was “the antinomy of pure reason” that awoke him from his dogmatic slumber:

It was not the investigation of the existence of God, immortality, and so on, but rather the antinomy of pure reason …. that … awoke me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of reason itself, in order to resolve the scandal of ostensible contradiction with itself (C 12: 257-258 [21 Sept. 1798]).

What Kant wrote to Garve in 1798 may seem, initially, at odds with what he said in 1783 about Hume’s wake-up call and in the Reflexionen about his philosophical breakthrough in the year 1769, in part because it’s then natural to think that Kant’s awakening from his Leibnizian and Wolffian dreams actually originally occurred in his 1766 essay Dreams of a Spirit Seer. And of course that chronology fits the “dogmatic-slumber-filled-with-classical-Rationalist-metaphysical-dreams-followed-by-Humean-Critical awakening” metaphor to a T. Nevertheless, on further reflection, we can see that the 1798 remark is in fact perfectly consistent with his earlier claim in 1783 that it was Hume’s skeptical Empiricism about content, truth, and justification of human cognition, especially as applied to the classical Rationalist metaphysical concept of causation and causal necessity, when taken together with Kant’s own transcendental idealism circa 1768-1772 about the necessary conformity of the ontic structures of manifestly real spacetime and the causal-dynamic relations between manifestly real natural objects and states-of-affairs, to the innate mentalistic structures of human sensibility, understanding, and inferential reason, that initiated the Critical Philosophy. This is because the antinomy of pure reason, as discovered in 1766, also showed him the self-annihilating character of classical metaphysical and especially classical Rationalist metaphysical reasoning, and thereby the possibility of the critique of pure reason. So in fact, Kant was awakened and correspondingly enlightened three times during his immensely philosophically creative six-year period from 1766-1772.

Therefore his revolutionary anthropocentric turn to the mitigated rationalism or real metaphysics of transcendental idealism in fact has three conjoined and equally important philosophical sources: first, the self-annihilating character of all classical metaphysical reasoning, especially classical Rationalist metaphysical reasoning, demonstrated by the antinomy of pure reason, and thereby the possibility of the critique of pure reason, discovered by Kant in 1766, second, Hume’s skeptical Empiricism about the content, truth, and justification of human cognition, especially as applied to the classical Rationalist metaphysical concepts of causation and causal necessity, remembered by Kant in 1771 or 1772, and third, Kant’s own revolutionary thesis in real metaphysics, i.e., transcendental idealism, about the necessary conformity of the ontic structures of veridically apparent, phenomenal, or manifestly real natural spacetime and the causal-dynamic relations between manifestly real natural objects and states-of-affairs, to the innate mentalistic structures of human sensibility, understanding, and inferential reason, discovered and formulated by him between the “Directions in Space” essay in 1768 (see also Hanna, 2016) and “the year of great light,” 1769, and 1772, the year of Kant’s famous letter to Herz.

These three sources combined to produce in Kant—a middle-aged, mid-career, and middling-successful academic philosopher who was 42 in 1766 and 48 in 1772, a smallish (5 feet 2 inches tall) confirmed bachelor with mild angina pectoris, aka “chest pains,” and a hypochondriac—a personal intellectual and spiritual rebirth comparable to those of Augustine, Luther, and Pascal (Kuehn, 2001: chs. 4-6, esp. pp. 148-154 and 238). But unlike the earlier thinkers, Kant’s personal rebirth was not caused by discovering or re-discovering God: on the contrary, it was brought about by discovering or re-discovering the rational human condition:

If there is any science humankind really needs, it is the one I teach, of how to occupy properly that place in [the world] that is assigned to humankind, and how to learn from it what one must be in order to be human. (Rem 20: 45)

This humanistic discovery or re-discovery, in turn, was triggered, circa 1764, by reading Rousseau:

Rousseau brought me around…. I learned to honor human beings and I would think myself less useful than the common worker if I did not believe that this consideration of everything else could have worth in establishing the rights of humankind. (Rem 20: 44)

This Rousseauian revolution initiated the process of thinking that eventually led to Kant’s radical Critical and post-Critical conception of human dignity or worth (Würde) (see, e.g., GMM 4: 434-435): the absolute, non-denumerably infinite, intrinsic, objective value or worth of human persons (Hanna, 2023). Indeed, it’s plausible to think that just as re-reading Hume woke Kant from his dogmatic Leibnizian-Wolffian slumbers about metaphysics and epistemology, so too reading Rousseau woke Kant from his dogmatic Hobbesian pessimist slumbers about humanity and morality (Hanna, 2017). Moreover, just as Hume’s wake-up call didn’t convert Kant to Hume’s classical Empiricism, but instead led to Kant’s brilliantly unique doctrine of transcendental idealism, so too Rousseau’s wake-up call didn’t convert Kant to Rousseau’s unrealistic optimism about human nature, but instead led to Kant’s brilliantly unique doctrine of realistically optimist dignitarian humanism (Hanna, 2023, 2024c).

So my answer to the question, on what rational grounds can Kantianism justify its claim to be the ultimate form of Western philosophy?, which is also understood to be equivalent to the question, what is Kant’s Critical philosophy and how can it be rationally justified?, is this. The essence of Kant’s Critical and post-Critical philosophy is a three-part doctrine consisting of (i) weak or counterfactual transcendental idealism, together with empirical or manifest realism, (ii) anti-mechanism or organicism, and (iii) realistically optimist dignitarian humanism. In my opinion, all of these doctrines are true, and in turn, their conjunction jointly constitutes the ultimate form of Western philosophy. From here on in, then, we can endlessly refine Kantianism in this triadic sense, and endlessly argue against its anti-Kantian challengers, but we can never rationally reject or transcend it.[ii]

NOTES

[i] In the 21^st century, these three theses have finally returned to the philosophical scene: see, e.g., (Thompson, 2007; Hanna and Maiese, 2009; Kirchoff and Froese, 2017; Torday, Miller Jr, and Hanna, 2020; Kauffman and Roli, 2023; and Hanna, 2024b).

[ii] I’m grateful to Muhammed Asghari and Scott Heftler for thought-provoking conversations on and around the main topics of this essay.

REFERENCES

For convenience, I cite Kant’s works infratextually in parentheses. The citations include both an abbreviation of the English title and the corresponding volume and page numbers in the standard “Akademie” edition of Kant’s works: Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Königlich Preussischen (now Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. Reimer [now Walter De Gruyter], 1902). For references to the first Critique, I follow the common practice of giving page numbers from the A (1781) and B (1787) German editions only. Because the Akademie (Ak) edition contains only the B edition of the first Critique, I have also consulted the following German composite edition: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. W. Weischedel, Immanuel Kant Werkausgabe III (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968). I generally follow the standard English translations, but have occasionally modified them where appropriate. For references to Kant’s Reflexionen, namely, entries in Kants handschriftlicher Nachlaß—which I abbreviate as “R”—I give the entry number in addition to the Akademie volume and page numbers. The translations from the Reflexionen are my own. Here’s a list of the relevant abbreviations and English translations of the works I’ve cited in this essay, together with the year of each work’s first publication in German, its Ak volume number, and (if relevant) its Ak page-range:

C Immanuel Kant: Correspondence, 1759-99. Trans. A. Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999.

CPJ Critique of the Power of Judgment. Trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000. (1790, Ak 5: 165-485)

CPR Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997. (1781 or A edition: Ak 4: 1-251; 1787 or B edition: Ak 3)

MFNS Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Trans. M. Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004. (1786, Ak 4: 465-565)

OP Immanuel Kant: Opus postumum. Trans. E. Förster and M. Rosen. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993. (1796-1803, Ak 21-22)

Prol Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Trans. G. Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004. (1783, Ak 4: 253-383)

R Reflections, aka Reflexionen (n.d., Ak 14-23)

Rem “Remarks on the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime.” Trans. M. Cooley and P. Frierson. Available online at URL = <http://people.whitman.edu/~frierspr/kants_bemerkungen1.htm>. (circa 1764, Ak 20)

(Benacerraf, 1973). Benacerraf, P. “Mathematical Truth.” Journal of Philosophy 70: 661-680.

(Compton-Burnett, 1947). Compton-Burnett, I. Manservant and Maidservant. London: Victor Gollancz.

(Hanna, 2008). Hanna, R. “Kant in the Twentieth Century.” In D. Moran (ed.), Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. London: Routledge. Pp. 149-203 Also available online in preview at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/2915828/Kant_in_the_Twentieth_Century>.

(Hanna, 2014a). Hanna, R. “Kant’s Anti-Mechanism and Kantian Anti-Mechanism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science 45. Available online at URL = <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369848614000107>.

(Hanna, 2015). Hanna, R. Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge . THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 5. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Available online in preview HERE.

(Hanna, 2016). Hanna, R. “Directions in Space, Non-Conceptual Form, and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism.” In D. Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 99-115. Also available online in preview HERE.

(Hanna, 2017). Hanna, R. “Exiting the State and Debunking the State of Nature.” Con-Textos Kantianos 5: 167-189. Available online at URL = <https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/KANT/article/view/89975>.

(Hanna, 2022). Hanna, R. “Can Physics Explain Physics? Anthropic Principles and Transcendental Idealism.” In L. Caranti (ed.), Kant and The Problem of Knowledge in the Contemporary World. London: Routledge. Pp. 136-145. Also available online in preview HERE.

(Hanna, 2023). Hanna, R. , “In Defence of Dignity.” Borderless Philosophy 6: 77-98. Available online at URL = <https://www.cckp.space/single-post/bp6-2023-robert-hanna-in-defence-of-dignity-77-98>.

(Hanna, 2024a). Hanna, R. “Kantian Futurism.” Journal of Philosophical Investigations 18, 47: 1-8. Available online at URL = <https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_18254.html?lang=en>.

(Hanna, 2024b). Hanna, R. Science for Humans: Mind, Life, The Formal-&-Natural Sciences, and A New Concept of Nature. Berlin: Springer Nature. Available online in preview HERE.

(Hanna, 2024c). Hanna, R. “On Rutger Bregman’s Humankind: Optimism For Realists, Or, Neither Hobbes Nor Rousseau.” Unpublished MS. Available online HERE.

(Hanna and Maiese, 2009). Hanna, R. and Maiese, M., Embodied Minds in Action. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Available online in preview HERE.

(Kauffman and Roli, 2023). S. Kauffman and A. Roli,“What is Consciousness? Artificial Intelligence, Real Intelligence, Quantum Mind and Qualia.” Biological Journal of the Linnean Society 139: 530–538. Available online HERE.

(Kirchoff and Froese, 2017). Kirchhoff, M. and Froese, T. “Where There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis.” Entropy 19: 1-18. Available online HERE.

(Kuehn, 2001). Kuehn, M. Kant: A Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

(Mensch, 2013). Mensch, J. Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of the Critical Philosophy. Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press.

(Thompson, 2007). Thompson, E. Mind in Life. Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press.

(Torday, Miller Jr, and Hanna, 2020). Torday, J.S. Miller Jr, W.B., and Hanna, R. “Singularity, Life, and Mind: New Wave Organicism.” In J.S. Torday and W.B. Miller Jr, The Singularity of Nature: A Convergence of Biology, Chemistry and Physics. Cambridge: Royal Society of Chemistry. Ch. 20, pp. 206-246.

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