The descriptive sub-title of this blog—Against Professional Philosophy—originally created and rolled out in 2013, is “A Co-Authored Anarcho-Philosophical Diary.”
Now, nine years later, after more than 300,000 views of the site, this new series, A Philosopher’s Diary, finally literally instantiates that description by featuring short monthly entries by one or another of the members of the APP circle, in order to create an ongoing collective philosophical diary that records the creative results of critical, synoptic, systematic rational reflection on any philosophical topic or topics under the sun, without any special restrictions as to content, format, or length.
This fourth installment, by Michelle Maiese, is about the important moral distinction between personal choices and persons per se, and how our universal obligation to respect human dignity fundamentally applies to the latter, but not to the former.
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Respect For Choices vs. Respect For Persons
In the Spring of 2022, after the federal mask mandate for air travel had been ended (thanks to a POTUS-appointed federal judge rather than the CDC or on the recommendation of public health experts), I noticed an interesting phenomenon: airline crew started announcing that masks were optional and urging all passengers to respect one another’s choices.
Now, on the one hand, I understand why they made such announcements. Arguments, and in some cases, brawls, among passengers (and between flight crew and anti-maskers) had been causing problems for air travel since the mandate had been introduced. Numerous flights had been delayed or cancelled as a result. So what flight attendants were really trying to communicate was, “Hey, folks, behave yourselves. Be respectful toward your fellow passengers and flight crew.”
But on the other hand, I found myself wondering why I need to respect people’s choices if I think those choices are foolish, thoughtless, or, in some cases, downright selfish. What about the guy without a mask with a persistent cough who is sitting next to an 80-year old passenger on a 6 hour flight from the East coast to the West coast? What about the woman who discovers that she’s sitting next to someone with several pre-existing health conditions and yet decides that masks are uncomfortable and it’s that passenger’s responsibility to keep themself safe? Why is it not reasonable for me to be critical of their choice?
In fact, I find myself taking up a critical evaluative attitude toward my own and others’ choices quite frequently. I tell myself that “I should not have said that” or “I should do more to help.” I find myself making judgments about others’ actions or their failure to act; in some cases, I find their behavior to be harmful or their words to be insensitive and callous. Sometimes my judgments are in error, no doubt, because I lack all the relevant information or do not think carefully enough about the facts of the case. Nonetheless, in other cases, my judgments are likely to be tracking the truth; that is, in suhc cases, my belief that a particular choice was foolish, misguided, or morally wrong is warranted, supported by the available evidence, and completely reasonable.
However, we live in a society in which more and more people believe that judging others’ behavior is wrong, and that we typically have no business making judgments about what others do. Some folks say, “I don’t judge” and lay claim to that stance as a badge of honor. But I doubt the sincerity of this claim. Not only do we continuously judge the actions of other agents and ourselves, but also often have good reasons for doing so. When judgments are backed by reasons and well supported by evidence and facts, these judgments are warranted. What is more, there are many cases in which withholding judgment in an effort to remain neutral and “non-judgmental” is itself morally problematic.
For example, if someone drives into peaceful protestors with their car, injuring many and killing a few, the supposition that that this a choice that I need to respect is morally scandalous and utterly ridiculous to boot.
Likewise, if a young person joins a white nationalist group and persecutes people of color online, need I respect this choice? If someone chooses to order veal at a restaurant after learning that the young calves are in effect tortured in order to produce such tender meat, do I need to respect their choice? If someone chooses to have an extramarital affair and lies to their spouse about it, should I respect this choice? And what if someone chooses to get all their information about current events from Fox News?
Perhaps some may say that I am judgmental or self-righteous, or that I am in no position to judge others since I am not perfect. The first thing to note is that, as I already mentioned, I also judge myself when I make mistakes, lose my temper, or when my selfishness or short-sightedness causes harm to others. I am far from perfect; and when I behave badly, I also expect others to judge my choices accordingly. The second, even more significant, thing to consider is that there is an important distinction between respecting choices and respecting persons.
If I judge that it’s rude for someone to travel maskless on an airplane in particular circumstances, or that it’s foolish to look to Fox News as a reliable source of information, or that it’s morally wrong to eat veal, I thereby judge that person’s actions as rude, foolish, or morally wrong. In short, I do not respect or approve of their choice. Nonetheless, I can continue to respect them as a person, i.e., someone with inherent dignity who ought never to be treated as a mere means to an end or as a mere thing. Respecting them as autonomous person in fact requires that I treat them as a rational agent who is responsible for their choices. Proper respect for myself as a person likewise requires that I acknowledge that some of my own actions are rude, foolish, or immoral. To let myself off the hook by refraining from any such negative evaluative judgments is to fail to live up to my potential as a rational person, and thereby to fail to show proper respect for myself.
One integral part of respecting another agent as a person is being prepared to engage them in rational dialogue and to provide them with reasons for changing the way that they behave or think. If I tell a friend that their actions or words were hurtful, or make it clear that I think they have done something morally wrong, then I am calling on them to recognize that they have adequate reason to apologize, to change their behavior going forward, and so-on.
It’s nevertheless also true that negative evaluative judgments about people’s choices are not always expressed in ways that show sufficient respect for persons. If I begin cursing at my uncle who orders veal at a restaurant, I fail to engage him in rational dialogue and do not show proper respect for him, his feelings, or the relationship that exists between us. However, if I calmly explain to him why I think his choice is morally problematic and offer reasons as to why I think veal production is morally wrong, I thereby communicate that I respect him as a rational person. It is possible, of course, that his feelings will still be hurt, the conversation will become highly awkward, or that the relationship will become strained. It is not pleasant to be informed that another person judges your choices to be morally wrong, and there may be overriding consequentialist considerations that make it ill-advised for me to tell my uncle what I think about his choice. This hardly shows that my lack of respect for his choice is out of line.
Rather, to suppose that it is illegitimate for me to make negative judgments about others’ choices is to accept a kind of quietist relativism according to which all choices and actions are equally appropriate, reasonable, and/or morally acceptable. This is precisely the sort of position at play, for example, when former US President Donald Trump (speaking about white nationalists and those protesting racial injustice in Charlottesville, VA in 2020) suggested that there are “good people on both sides.” More recently, this sort of “both-side-ism” has been expressed by House Republicans in Ohio, who have advanced legislation to teach “both sides” of the Holocaust. It also is reflected in Texas educators’ recent proposal to refer to slavery as “involuntary relocation.” Evidently, it seems to them that use of the term “slavery” unfairly impugns the legitimate perspectives and concerns of past people who owned slaves. How dare we criticize the actions of these past people and communicate our disapproval of their choices? “Who are we to judge??”
Of course, “both-side-ism” is not restricted to Republican or other Right wing politicians. It’s also at play when pro-choice advocates say that men are in no position to make judgments about the morality of abortion, or when my undergraduate students angrily challenge Peter Singer’s claim that affluent people have a moral obligation to help starving people: “What right does he have to tell me that it’s wrong if I buy myself expensive clothes instead?”
The correct answer is that we all have a right to judge. Some choices are less prudent or morally acceptable than others, and some courses of action are downright morally objectionable. It is perfectly OK to evaluate others’ choices and actions, and of course incredibly important that we strive to base such judgments on reasons, evidence, and facts, taking into account relevant contextual features. In some cases, our judgments may themselves be faulty or inaccurate, and thus themselves the proper target of negative judgments. But this hardly shows that the choices of those on “both sides” are equally good, or that we have no right to make negative evaluative judgments about people’s choices and behavior.
So, to the maskless guy hacking up a lung on the plane, I can say, “No, I do not respect your choice. But I still respect your personhood.”
Obviously, as I hinted-at in passing three paragraphs above, the important distinction between respect for choices and respect for persons also applies to the morality of abortion (see, e.g., Hanna, 2018: ch. 3) and its sociopolitics, an obvious fact that’s especially urgent in the wake of the US Supreme Court’s recent decision to overturn Roe v. Wade. But that’s a long-&-winding philosophical story for another diary entry and another day.
REFERENCE
(Hanna, 2018). Hanna, R. Kantian Ethics and Human Existence: A Study in Moral Philosophy. THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 3. New York: Nova Science. Also available online in preview HERE.
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