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There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even 7 Abstract in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states 8 9 have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the 10 intrinsically "orientable" spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content 11 12 entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into 13 so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the 14 existence of essentially non-conceptual content and my theory of its structure and 15 16 function have a Kantian provenance.

- 17 Keywords Non-conceptual mental content · Spatial representation ·
- 18 Concepts · Consciousness · Kant
- 19

Because of its three dimensions, physical space can be thought of as having three planes, which all intersect each other at right angles. Considering the things which exist outside ourselves: it is only in so far as they stand in relation to ourselves that we have any cognition of them by means of the senses at all. It is not therefore surprising that the ultimate ground on the basis of which we form our concept of directions in space, derives from the relation of these intersecting planes to our bodies.

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- Immanuel Kant¹

1FL01 ¹ Kant (1992b, p. 366, Ak 2: 378–379).

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Given that the existence of an information-link between subject and object is not by itself sufficient for identification, what makes it possible to have, in the standard cases of demonstrative identification, a mode of identification that is free of the conceptual element we have been considering? The answer is that in the standard cases, not only is there an information-link, but also the subject can, upon the basis of that link alone, *locate the object in space*.

-Gareth Evans²

36 1 Introduction

37 What is non-conceptual mental content, and how can we prove that it exists? This paper has two goals. The first is to develop a decisive Kantian argument for the 38 39 existence of non-conceptual content from our cognition of enantiomorphy, or what 40 Kant called "incongruent counterparts"-which is a special way that pairs of qualitatively identical perceivable objects can be differently embedded in the same 41 42 global orientable space. The second goal is to sketch the rudiments of a Kantian theory of the semantic structure and psychological function of non-conceptual 43 44 content.

45 2 Non-conceptualism, conceptualism, and Kant

46 Mental representations are the means by which rational and other conscious animals 47 refer to or describe items in their world for the purposes of cognition and intentional 48 action. Broadly speaking, the mental content of an animal's conscious mental state 49 is *what* that state refers to or describes, and *how* it does so.

The thesis of *Non-Conceptualism* about mental content says that representational content is neither wholly nor solely determined by our conceptual capacities, and that at least some contents are both solely and wholly determined by non-conceptual capacities and can be shared by human and non-human animals alike.³ This thesis is directly opposed to the thesis of *Conceptualism* about mental content, which says that content is solely or wholly determined by conceptual capacities, and that the psychological states of non-human animals lack mental content.⁴

57 There are at least two important reasons for being a non-conceptualist. First, if 58 our original encounter with the world is independent of concepts, then the prospects 59 for some form of direct perceptual realism look good. Second, if Non-Conceptu-60 alism is true, then the prospects for a bottom-up theory of human rationality, 61 according to which conceptual and other intellectual capacities, including those 62 associated with practical reasoning, are at least partially explained in terms of more

3FL01 ³ See, e.g., Bermúdez (2003a); Evans (1982, esp. chs. 4–6); and Gunther (2003a).

4FL01 ⁴ See, e.g., McDowell (1994); Brewer (1999); and Sedivy (1996).

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²FL01 ² Evans (1982, p. 150).

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primitive psychological capacities shared with many non-human animals, also lookgood.

In the recent and contemporary literature we can identify at least seven different arguments for Non-Conceptualism:⁵

- (1) From infant and non-human animal cognition: Normal infants and some nonhuman animals are capable of perceptual cognition, but lack possession of concepts. Therefore normal infants and some non-humans are capable of nonconceptual cognition with non-conceptual content.
- (2) From phenomenological fineness of grain: Our normal human perceptual
 experience is so replete with phenomenal characters and qualities that we
 could not possibly possess a conceptual repertoire extensive enough to capture
 them. Therefore normal human perceptual experience is always to some extent
 non-conceptual and has non-conceptual content (See Sect. III).
- 76 (3) From perceptual discrimination: It is possible for normal human cognizers to
 77 be capable of perceptual discriminations without also being capable of re78 identifying the objects discriminated. But re-identification is a necessary
 79 condition of concept-possession. Therefore normal human cognizers are
 80 capable of non-conceptual cognitions with non-conceptual content (See Sect.
 81 III).
- (4) From the distinction between perception (or experience) and judgment
 (or thought): It is possible for normal human cognizers to perceive something
 without also making a judgment about it. But non-judgmental cognition is nonconceptual. Therefore normal human cognizers are capable of non-conceptual
 perceptions with non-conceptual content.
- (5) From the knowing-how versus knowing-that (or knowing-what) distinction: It
 is possible for normal human subjects to know *how* to do something without
 being able to know *that* one is doing it and without knowing precisely *what* it
 is one is doing. But cognition that lacks knowing-that and knowing-what is
 non-conceptual. Therefore normal human subjects are capable of nonconceptual knowledge-how with non-conceptual content.
- (6) From the theory of concept-acquisition: The best overall theory of conceptacquisition includes the thesis that simple concepts are acquired by normal human cognizers on the basis of non-conceptual perception of the objects falling under these concepts. Therefore normal human cognizers are capable of non-conceptual perception with non-conceptual content.
- 98 (7) From the theory of demonstratives: The best overall theory of the demonstra 99 tives 'this' and 'that' includes the thesis that demonstrative reference is fixed
 100 perceptually, essentially indexically, and therefore non-descriptively by
 101 normal human speakers.⁶ But essentially indexical, non-descriptive perception
 102 is non-conceptual. Therefore normal human speakers are capable of non 103 conceptual perception with non-conceptual content.

6FL01 ⁶ See also Hanna (1993).

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⁵FL01 $\frac{1}{5}$ All of these arguments are covered in Gunther (2003a).

104 But in his recent paper, "Is There a Problem about Non-conceptual Content?," 105 Jeff Speaks argues that there is in fact *no* problem about non-conceptual content⁷ 106 because

107 (i) non-conceptualists have not established that the arguments they offer for the 108 existence of non-conceptual content are not perfectly consistent with suitably 109 refined versions of conceptualism,

110 and

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(ii) non-conceptualists have not established that perceptual states have represen-112 tational content whose semantic structure and psychological function are distinct from the semantic structure and psychological function of conceptual 113 114 content.

115 I both agree and disagree with Speaks's challenging argument. On the one hand, I quite agree that non-conceptualists have not *yet* established either that the 116 arguments they offer for the existence of non-conceptual content are not perfectly 117 consistent with suitably refined versions of conceptualism, or that perceptual states 118 119 have representational content whose structure and function are distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. But on the other hand, I sharply 120 121 disagree that as a consequence there is no problem about non-conceptual content. 122 This is because it seems to me that there are in fact perceptual states whose 123 representational content cannot-even in principle-be conceptual. If that is 124 correct, then at least some perceptual states have representational content whose 125 semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the 126 structure and function of conceptual content. Indeed, it seems to me that the special 127 character of non-conceptually contentful perceptual states entails that *all* perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense-although, to 128 129 be sure, the presence of this non-conceptual content does not necessarily exhaust the total content of such states. The thesis of the ubiquity of non-conceptual content is 130 131 consistent with the thesis that non-conceptual content is *combinable* with conceptual 132 content. Indeed, I believe that non-conceptual content not only can be combined 133 with conceptual content, but also *must* be so combined if perceptual judgments in particular, and logical and practical reasoning about the perceivable natural world 134 135 more generally, are to be possible. But in any case the nature of the uncombined or combined essentially distinct non-conceptual content of these perceptual states 136 needs to be explained. Therefore there is a problem about non-conceptual content. 137 138 Or so I will argue.

139 My argument also has another strand. Because the argument for the existence of 140 non-conceptual content has a distinctively Kantian provenance, a second conclusion of my paper will be that contemporary non-conceptualists must now go "back to 141 142 Kant" if they are to respond adequately to Speaks's important challenge. This is 143 deliciously ironic, because Kant is almost universally regarded as the *founding* father of conceptualism and the nemesis of non-conceptualism. York Gunther puts 144 145 this view perfectly:

⁷ Speaks (2005). 7FL01

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In his slogan, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind," Kant sums up the doctrine of conceptualism.⁸

But as I have argued in an earlier essay, not only does this famous slogan *not* mean what conceptualists think it means, but also and on the contrary Kant is most accurately regarded as not only the founder of conceptualism but also and perhaps even more importantly as the founder of *non*-conceptualism:⁹

- 152 Objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to the 153 functions of the understanding. (*CPR* A89/B122)
- 154 That representation which can be given prior to all thinking is called intuition.155 (*CPR* B132)
- Appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity...Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking. (*CPR* A90/B123)
- 160 Concept differs from intuition by virtue of the fact that all intuition is singular.
- He who sees his first tree does not know what it is that he sees. (*Vienna Logic*Ak 24: 905)

In my opinion, what Kant's famous slogan about blind intuitions and empty 163 164 thoughts actually means is that intuitions and concepts must always be combined 165 together for the special purpose of making objectively valid judgments. But outside that context it is also perfectly possible for there to be directly referential intuitions 166 without concepts ("blind intuitions," e.g., someone's first cognitive encounter with 167 a tree), and also to have thinkable concepts without intuitions ("empty concepts," 168 e.g., concepts of things-in-themselves). Indeed, it is precisely the fact of blind 169 170 intuitions that drives Kant's need to argue in the B edition Transcendental Deduction that all and only the objects of possible human experience are necessarily 171 conceptualizable under the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, and 172 173 necessarily constrained by the transcendental laws of a pure science of nature. Otherwise blind intuitions might pick out objects of human experience that are 174 175 partially or wholly unconceptualizable, and nomologically intractable. In this way, Kant's theory of concepts and judgment in the Transcendental Analytic provides 176 foundations for conceptualism. But equally and oppositely, Kant's theory of 177 178 intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic also provides foundations for non-179 conceptualism.

- I will not re-argue those historical claims here. As I have said, the first goal of
 this paper is to develop a Kantian argument for the existence of non-conceptual
 content from our cognition of enantiomorphy. I will lay out that argument in Sects.
 III–IV.
- In the larger project of which this paper is a part, however, I want to show how a
 broadly Kantian strategy for demonstrating and explaining the existence, semantic
 structure, and psychological function of non-conceptual content provides

9FL01 ⁹ Hanna (2005).

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⁸FL01 ⁸ See Gunther (2003b, p. 1).

foundations for a bottom-up theory of human rationality. In an earlier book,¹⁰ I tried 187 to show how a broadly Kantian theory of the nature of logic provides top-down 188 189 constraints on a theory of human rationality. The basic thesis of the new project is 190 that non-conceptual content and non-conceptual cognition jointly provide for what is, in effect, the rationality of the body, which is to say that they jointly constitute 191 192 the semantic and psychological platform on which the everyday discursive and a priori superstructure of human rationality is built. If all this is correct, then human 193 rationality is an inherently *embodied* rationality that is also inherently constrained 194 and governed by universal a priori logical and practical norms. I will sketch the 195 196 outlines of this account in Sect. V.

197 3 Varieties of non-conceptualism

In this Sect. I want to take a brief critical look at the dialectical structure of the
contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, and consider some different
types of non-conceptualism.

201 Most or least a great many contemporary non-conceptualists define the thesis of 202 non-conceptualism in the following way:

The central idea behind the theory of non-conceptual mental content is that some mental states can represent the world even though the bearer of those states does not possess the concepts required to specify their content.¹¹

Correspondingly, conceptualism then says that no mental states can represent the world unless the bearers of those states—who are human cognizers exclusively possess the concepts required to specify their content. Now the argument against conceptualism most favored by contemporary non-conceptualists is the Fineness of Grain Argument, or FoGA:¹²

- (1) Perceptual content is so replete with content (say, color-content or shape content) that there cannot possibly be enough concepts in our existing
 conceptual repertoire to capture all the different sorts.
- 214 (2) But we nevertheless frequently make effective finegrained discriminations
 215 between the different sorts of perceptual content, even in the absence of
 216 possessing concepts for those sorts of content.
- (3) Conceptualism is committed to the thesis that for every genuine discriminable
 difference in perceptual content, we must possess concepts that pick out the
 relevantly different kinds.
- 220 (4) Therefore conceptualism is false, and non-conceptualism is true.

Conceptualists, led by John McDowell, have replied to the FoGA by using what is now called "the Demonstrative Strategy," or DS¹³ The DS directly addresses step

11FL01 ¹¹ Bermúdez (2003a, p. 1).

12FL01 ¹² See, e.g., Evans (1982, p. 229); Peacocke (2001); and Peacocke (1998).

¹³ See, e.g., McDowell (1994, pp. 56–60, and 170–173). The Demonstrative Strategy is also endorsed by
 ¹³ Brewer in his (1999) and by Sedivy in her (1996).

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¹⁰FL01 ¹⁰ Hanna (2006a).

(2) and says that for every case of effective finegrained discrimination in which
corresponding concepts are apparently lacking, it is possible to construct a
demonstrative concept of the form "THIS SHADE," "THAT SHAPE," etc., that
correctly picks out the relevant determinates under some determinable concept
already possessed by the cognizer. If so, then step (2) is false and the FoGA is
unsound. In reply to that reply, non-conceptualists have argued as follows:

- (1) The possession of demonstrative concepts, in addition to satisfying both of what Gareth Evans called Russell's Principle (i.e., no singular thought about an object without the subject's possession of an identifying conception of it)¹⁴ and the Generality Constraint (i.e., no singular thought about an object without the subject's possession of the conceptual resources sufficient for entertaining many different possible thoughts about the same object),¹⁵ also requires the ability to re-identify instances of those concepts.
- (2) But we frequently make finegrained demonstrative perceptual discriminations
 between different sorts of perceptual content without any further ability to
 re-identify them.
- (3) Therefore the Demonstrative Strategy fails, conceptualism is false, and non conceptualism is true.¹⁶

But in criticism of that counter-reply, it has been recently argued by Philippe Chuard that demonstrative *concepts* can be applied in finegrained demonstrative perceptual discriminations without any further ability to re-identify instances of those concepts.¹⁷ So concept-possession does *not* require the ability for re-identification, the Demonstrative Strategy holds, the non-conceptualists are back at square one, and Great Confusion results.

247 In light of that greatly confusing and equally disappointing result, I want to suggest the following critical diagnosis. I think that it is a big mistake to define Non-248 Conceptualism in terms of failures of concept-possession. Instead, Non-Conceptu-249 250 alism should be defined as the thesis that there exist perceptual mental contents, had 251 by human and non-human animal cognizers alike, whose semantic structure and psychological function are distinct from the structure and function of conceptual 252 253 content—or equivalently, that there exist what Speaks has aptly dubbed *absolutely* non-conceptual contents: 254

- A mental state has *absolutely non-conceptual content* iff that mental state has a different kind of content than do beliefs, thoughts, etc.¹⁸
- 257 This thesis is what I call *Absolutist Non-Conceptualism*.
- It should also be explicitly noted that there are two subtly different versions of the thesis that absolutely non-conceptual content exists:
- 14FL01 ¹⁴ Evans (1982, pp. 44 and 74).
- 15FL01 ¹⁵ Evans (1982, pp. 100–105).
- 16FL01 ¹⁶ See Kelly (2001a, b).
- 17FL01 ¹⁷ See Chuard (2006).
- 18FL01 ¹⁸ Speaks (2005, p. 360).

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- 260 weak Absolutist Non-Conceptualism. (1)
- 261 and

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(2)strong Absolutist Non-Conceptualism.

According to weak Absolutist Non-Conceptualism, there exist perceptual mental 264 contents, had by human and non-human animal cognizers alike, whose structure and function are *contingently* distinct from the structure and function of conceptual 266 content. I will call the content posited by weak Absolutist Non-Conceptualism contingently absolutely non-conceptual content. By contrast, according to strong Absolutist Non-Conceptualism, there exist perceptual mental contents, had by human and non-human animal cognizers alike, whose structure and function are 269 270 essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. I will call the content posited by strong Absolutist Non-Nonceptualism essentially absolutely 272 non-conceptual content, or for short, essentially non-conceptual content.

273 This distinction is crucially important for clarifying what Michael Tye has 274 recently dubbed robustly non-conceptual content. According to Tye,

275 (i) a contentful non-conceptual state is a contentful state the tokening of which 276 does not involve the exercise of concepts,

- 277 and
- 278 experiences [with non-conceptual content] are non-conceptual states having (ii) 279 coarse-grained contents (robustly non-conceptual contents, as I shall call them).19 280

In other words, the robustly non-conceptual content of a perceptual state is the 281 282 content of a *Russellian* proposition and not a *Fregean* proposition. Or in still other 283 words, the robustly non-conceptual contents of perceptual state are just the worldly objects, properties, and relations represented by that state. 284

285 The obvious problem with Tye's robustly non-conceptual content is that although it is not specified by concepts in the actual perceptual states in which they occur, 286 287 there is no in principle reason why it could not be conceptually specified in states other than those actual perceptual states. In other words, robustly non-conceptual 288 289 content is at most *contingently* absolutely non-conceptual, and not *essentially* non-290 conceptual. Tye admits as much in a very revealing footnote in the middle of a 291 critical discussion of the FoGA and the DS:

292 I want to stress that the above discussion of demonstratives does not undercut 293 the view that fineness of grain in visual experiences can be presented 294 conceptually in demonstrative judgments or thoughts made on the basis of 295 experience. What I have argued is that the visual experiences themselves do not represent details via demonstrative concepts.²⁰ 296

¹⁹ Tye (2006, pp. 507–508). 19FL01

²⁰ Tye (2006, p. 525). 20FL01

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As far as I am concerned, this gives the game away. For Tye has explicitly admitted that his robustly non-conceptual content could still be *conceptually presented*. So robustly non-conceptual content is ultimately just more grist for the conceptualist's mill. What the essentialist non-conceptualist is saying, by sharp contrast, is that there are perceptual contents that *cannot* be conceptually presented because they are *inherently* non-conceptual. Rough-grained or Russellian contents alone will not do. It has to be *impossible* to give an adequately individuating conceptual specification of an essentially non-conceptual content.

Now Speaks also very usefully distinguishes between absolutely non-conceptual content and *relatively* non-conceptual content:

307 A mental state of an agent A (at time t) has relatively non-conceptual content 308 iff the content of that mind includes contents not grasped (possessed) by A 309 at $t.^{21}$

310 In other words, perceptual content that is relatively non-conceptual differs from conceptual content only in that an agent does not at that time meet the grasping-311 conditions or possession-conditions for that content. So relatively non-conceptual 312 313 perceptual content might still be conceptual content in a merely or at least partially ungrasped or unpossessed form. Therefore, arguments for the existence of relatively 314 315 non-conceptual perceptual content do not entail the existence of essentially nonconceptual perceptual content. For this reason, the standard version of non-316 317 conceptualism cited at the beginning of this section, which says that

[t]he central idea behind the theory of non-conceptual mental content is that
some mental states can represent the world even though the bearer of those
states does not possess the concepts required to specify their content,

and which therefore holds that that there exist perceptual mental contents, had by
 human and non-human animal cognizers alike, even though the conscious subjects
 of those contents do not possess the concepts required to specify them, is what I call
 Relativist Non-Conceptualism.

325 Learning from Tye's error, we can now see that it was a big mistake to have 326 deployed the FoGA against conceptualism. This is because the FoGA mistakenly sidetracks the debate into a discussion about perceptual experiences involving 327 328 failures of concept-possession, which not only deflects attention away from what I 329 take to be the real issue about non-conceptual content—the existence or nonexistence of essentially non-conceptual content-towards Relativist Non-Concep-330 331 tualism, but also is a discussion that the conceptualist can *always* win, just by pointing out that a cognitive state that involves a failure of concept-possession 332 333 might still have *content* that is conceptual, and by strategically weakening and reformulating the possession-based version of the conceptualist thesis as follows: 334

No mental states can represent the world without *some possible* (i.e., not necessarily any contemporary or conspecific actual) cognizer's *dispositional*

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²¹FL01 ²¹ Speaks, "Is There a Problem about Non-conceptual Content?," p. 360.

(i.e., not necessarily manifest or occurrent) possession of the concepts required to *minimally* (i.e., not necessarily fully) specify their content.

I will call this two-part strategically weakened and re-formulated version of conceptualism, *Highly Refined Conceptualism*. This entails, for example, that even if it can be shown that some human or non-human cognizers do actually achieve demonstrative perceptual reference to some objects without actually possessing or even being capable of possessing a sortal term for the identification of those objects,²² conceptualism is not undermined. For according to Highly Refined Conceptualism, the content of that state could *still* be conceptual, precisely because

(a) the failure of conceptual possession-conditions for a given cognitive state does
 not in itself entail that the content of this state is not conceptual,

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(b) the truth of Conceptualism requires only that some possible non-contemporary
 or non-conspecific cognizer dispositionally possess the concepts needed to
 minimally specify the content of that state, which is a condition that is
 extremely easy to satisfy.

Given the possibility of Highly Refined Conceptualism, I think that Relativist Non-Conceptualism is probably *hopeless*. So instead of arguing for cognition without concept-possession, non-conceptualists should argue directly against the DS and against Conceptualism—whether unrefined or Highly Refined—by arguing for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content. I will do this in the next section by developing a *Kantian* argument for that thesis.

359 Another very troubling and often unnoticed feature of the contemporary debate 360 about non-conceptual content is the lack of any generally accepted theory of the nature of concepts.²³ But how can we critically evaluate the claim that non-361 conceptual content exists and has such-and-such a semantic structure and 362 363 psychological function, if we do not actually know what a *concept* is? In order to avoid that problem, in what follows I will assume that whatever counts as a concept 364 365 or a conceptual content must satisfy the following complex minimally necessary 366 condition or constraint:

At the very least, the function of a concept is to provide for definite or indefinite categorization, classification, discrimination, or identification of objects, and it must also be possible to linguistically convey the content of a concept to someone else who is not directly acquainted with or confronted with the object or objects represented by that conceptual content—e.g., it must be possible to linguistically convey that conceptual content to someone else over the telephone.²⁴

22FL01 ²² See, e.g., Campbell (2002, ch. 4).

23FL01 ²³ See, e.g., Bermúdez (2003a, Section 6); Fodor (1998); Peacocke (1992); and Prinz (2002).

24FL01 ²⁴ Many thanks to Jane Heal for suggesting to me this informal "over-the-telephone test" for 24FL02 conceptuality.

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374 For obvious reasons, I will call this the Minimal Constraint. The Minimal 375 Constraint includes three conjoined necessary sub-conditions on anything's being a 376 conceptual content:

- (1)that the content be intrinsically descriptive,
- that the content be intrinsically intersubjectively shareable, (2)

379 and

> that the content be intrinsically such that the conscious cognizer need not be (3) directly acquainted with or confronted by whatever is represented by it.

It should be noted explicitly here that the Minimal Constraint does not entail that 382 383 there are no such things as non-linguistic concepts. On the contrary, it seems very 384 plausible to hold that pre-linguistic human children and many non-human animals 385 can deploy concepts as object-categorizing, object-classifying, object-discriminating, and object-identifying cognitive devices, that these concepts can be deployed in 386 387 the absence of the objects represented by them, that these concepts are intersubjectively shareable by other non-human animals and by human animals 388 389 alike, and also that these concepts are immediately present in their mental lives both causally and phenomenologically, but not by means of linguistic vehicles. So on my 390 391 view of concepts, there are indeed some non-linguistic concepts, in the sense that the conscious states of some animals contain psychologically real conceptual 392 contents that lack linguistic vehicles.²⁵ But even assuming I am correct here, this 393 fact does not in any way rule out the possibility of the sort of relatively weak but 394 still quite substantive necessary connection between concepts and language²⁶ that 395 396 the Minimal Constraint provides. The Minimal Constraint entails only that no concept is such that it *cannot*, even in principle, be communicated by means of *some* 397 possible natural language to someone else who is not directly acquainted with or 398 399 confronted by the object or objects represented by that concept. Thus the possible 400 natural linguistic expressibility of every concept *suffices* to guarantee the inherently 401 intersubjective and non-solipsistic character of concepts, even for pre-linguistic 402 humans and non-humans. In this way, on our proposed view of concepts, and as against the later Wittgenstein, if a lion *could* talk, we *would* be able to understand 403 404 him. So in this sense, all pre-linguistic human conceptualizers and non-human 405 conceptualizers are proto-linguistic creatures. To use another Wittgensteinian 406 metaphor, they do not live in the center of the city of language—but they do live in 407 the suburbs.

408 In any case, the basic idea behind the Minimal Constraint is to map the contrast 409 between essentially non-conceptual content and conceptual content onto the

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²⁵FL01 ²⁵ See also Bermúdez (2003a). Like Bermúdez, I hold that there are non-linguistic concepts and 25FL02 thoughts; but unlike Bermúdez, who is a relativist non-conceptualist, I do not identify non-conceptual content with the content of mental states not involving concept-possession. 25FL03

²⁶FL01 ²⁶ See also Carruthers (1998). Like Carruthers, I hold that there is a substantive connection between 26FL02 conceptual thought and language; but unlike Carruthers, who is a higher-order thought theorist about consciousness, I do not think that the substantive connection between conceptual thought and language 26FL03 26FL04 inherently constrains the nature of consciousness, which has a non-conceptual basis in sensorimotor 26FL05 subjectivity.

410 classical contrast between knowledge by acquaintance, or immediate experience of 411 the world and oneself, and knowledge by description, or mediated thought about the 412 world and oneself. Or otherwise put, I am proposing to identify conceptual contents 413 with *descriptive* representations, one of whose psychological functions it must be (even in the case of concepts with hybrid or mixed content, such as natural kind 414 415 concepts, normative concepts, etc.) to categorize, classify, discriminate, and identify 416 things, without our necessarily having to be acquainted with or confronted by those 417 things. Knowledge by description expresses an objective, third-personal, commu-418 nicable content. Knowledge by acquaintance, by contrast, expresses an egocentric, 419 first-personal content that is not ineffable, but rather communicable only to the extent that another ego or first person is in a cognitive position to be directly 420 confronted by the same object. The crucial point is then that the very idea of 421 422 conceptual content entails the possibility of *correct mental representation without* 423 direct confrontation.

424 Concepts and conceptual content can obviously include much more than what is provided by the Minimal Constraint. For example, many concepts have a content 425 whose underlying structure is determined by the logical syntax of predicates, sortal 426 terms, and logical constants in elementary logic, or in some conservative extension 427 or deviant of elementary logic. This sort of conceptual content, in turn, seems to 428 429 imply the existence of a capacity for self-conscious rationality in order to recognize and deploy it.²⁷ But while this would seem to be a sufficient condition of some 430 content's being a concept, it does not also seem to be necessary. Not every concept-431 432 user—e.g., human toddlers and lions—is a *logical animal*. By contrast, the Minimal 433 Constraint provides a suitably low-bar and neutral but still non-trivial necessary 434 condition on concepts and conceptual content that could be accepted by every 435 theory of content.

This is not, however, to say that there cannot be theories of content that reject the Minimal Constraint. By an *amorphous* theory of mental content I mean any theory that assigns no definite underlying semantic structure to content.²⁸ And by a *vacuous* theory of conceptual content I mean any theory that straightaway identifies all mental content, propositional content, thought-content, and belief-content with conceptual content, by more or less implicitly arguing in the following way:

- 442 (1) All content must be normative and rule-governed.
- 443 (2) Only conceptual representations can be normative and rule-governed.
- 444 (3) Therefore all content must be conceptual, and nothing will ever count as real
 445 mental content unless it is conceptual.²⁹

446 Of course it is possible to hold amorphous or vacuous theories of content. But it 447 seems to me that if these theories are simply assumed to be true, then they pre-448 emptively make a genuine debate with non-conceptualism impossible by ruling out 449 any way of marking an intrinsic difference between conceptual content and non-450 conceptual content. If, by a priori fiat, no kind of mental content can ever be

28FL01 ²⁸ See, e.g., Stalnaker (1998).

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²⁷FL01 ²⁷ See Hanna (2006a, chs. 2–3).

²⁹FL01 ²⁹ This, e.g., is Speaks's own view of the nature of conceptual content.

451 structurally distinguished from any other kind, and if, again by a priori fiat, only 452 conceptual content will ever count psychologically as real content, then obviously 453 essentialist non-conceptualism is false. But that is like winning a race by having 454 your most challenging opponent disqualified by friends on the Rules Committee. 455 Essentialist non-conceptualism has at least to be allowed to *compete*. So for the 456 purposes of my argument, I am going to assume that it is at least an *open* question 457 whether amorphous and vacuous theories of content are true.

Against the backdrop of the Minimal Constraint, I will now present a Kantian argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content.

460 4 Incongruent counterparts revisited: The Two Hands Argument

461 The argument presented below for the existence of essentially non-conceptual 462 content, which I will call *The Two Hands Argument* (or the THA), is closely 463 historically related to a famous argument used by Kant in both his pre-critical and 464 critical periods, known as "the argument from incongruent counterparts."³⁰ He 465 defines the notion of incongruent counterparts as follows:

466 I shall call a body which is exactly equal and similar to another, but which 467 cannot be enclosed in the same limits as the other, its *incongruent counterpart*. Now, in order to demonstrate the possibility of such a thing, let a body be 468 469 taken consisting, not of two halves which are symmetrically arranged relatively to a single intersecting plane, but rather, say, a human hand. From 470 all the points on its surface let perpendicular lines be extended to a plane 471 surface set up opposite to it; and let these lines be extended the same distance 472 473 behind the plane surface, as the points on the surface of the hand are in front of 474 it: the ends of the lines, thus extended, constitute, when connected together, the surface of a corporeal form. That form is the incongruent counterpart of 475 the first. In other words, if the hand in question is a right hand, then its 476 counterpart is a left hand. The reflection of an object in a mirror rests upon 477 478 exactly the same principles. For the object always appears as far behind the mirror as it is in front of it. Hence, the image of a right hand in the mirror is 479 always a left hand. If the object itself consists of two incongruent counterparts, 480 as the human body does if it is divided by means of a vertical intersection 481 running from front to back, then its image is congruent with that object. That 482 483 this is the case can easily be recognized if one imagines the body making half a rotation; for the counterpart of the counterpart of an object is necessarily 484 congruent with that object.³¹ 485

486 More briefly put, incongruent counterparts are perceivable mirror-reflected 487 spatial duplicates that share all the same monadic properties, have exactly the same 488 shape and size, and correspond point-for-point, but are in different places and 489 cannot be made to coincide by rigid translation within the same global orientable

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³⁰FL01 ³⁰ See, e.g., Buroker (1981); and Van Cleve and Frederick (1991).

³¹FL01 ³¹ Kant (1992b, p. 370, Ak 2: 382).

490 space (an orientable space is a space with intrinsic directions). Even more briefly 491 put, incongruent counterparts are enantiomorphs. Enantiomorphs are *qualitatively* 492 *identical* but *topologically non-identical*. On Kant's view, the non-identity of 493 incongruent counterparts, or enantiomorphs, is non-logically or synthetically 494 necessary and a priori.

495 By contrast, *homomorphs* are pairs of perceivable objects that share all the same 496 monadic properties, have exactly the same shape and size, and correspond point-for-497 point, but are in different places and *can* be made to coincide by rigid translation within the surrounding space. So they are both qualitatively and topologically 498 499 *identical*. Although Kant was not in a position to know this, homomorphism for mirror-reflected objects is in fact logically possible if the local Euclidean space in 500 which the paired objects are embedded, like that of the Möbius Strip or Klein Bottle, 501 502 is also *non-orientable* or without intrinsic directions. Roughly speaking, letting your fingers do the walking, you send out your right hand for a long walk along the 503 504 surface of the Möbius Strip, and it comes back as your left hand. Curiouser and 505 curiouser!

But I think that this logical possibility is no objection to Kant's thesis. This is 506 507 because, for Kant, it is a necessary condition of a proposition's being synthetically necessary that its denial be logically consistent and thus that its falsity be logically 508 possible.³² Thus his thesis is *not* that enantiomorphism can be correctly represented 509 (or, equivalently, that mirror-reflected counterparts are incongruent, or topologically 510 511 non-identical) in all logically possible spaces. For, as we have just seen, there are 512 some logically possible spaces in which mirror-reflected counterparts are congruent. 513 Rather Kant's thesis is that enantiomorphism can be correctly represented in all and 514 only humanly perceivable globally or locally Euclidean orientable spaces, and furthermore that if a single hand were to exist alone in any possible world framed by 515 such a space, then necessarily it would be either a left hand or a right hand.³³ 516

517 Kantian arguments from the existence or possibility of incongruent counterparts 518 are all based on the primitive consciousness or subjective experience of 519 enantiomorphic topological features of the natural perceivable world and our own 520 bodies.³⁴ As I will suggest later, however, it is also arguable that there are precise 521 *temporal* analogues of incongruent counterparts in our primitive subjective 522 experience of events in the natural perceivable world, and of the behavioral 523 movements of and dynamic processes occurring within our own living bodies.

524 Interestingly, Kant uses the argument from incongruent counterparts in four 525 different ways.

First, he uses it in his pre-critical period to disprove the relational theory of space which says that space is nothing but a set of extrinsic relations that is supervenient on pre-existing things (e.g., Leibnizian monads) and their intrinsic non-relational properties—and to establish the existence of absolute Newtonian space as a total unified space to which material bodies extended in space are intrinsically related, and

33FL01 ³³ See Kant (1992b, p. 371, Ak 2: 383); and Nerlich (1995).

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³²FL01 ³² See Hanna (2001, ch. 4).

 ³⁴ One can also use the possibility of incongruent counterparts as a special kind of phenomenal inversion
 ³⁴ FL02 in order to argue for failures of materialist supervenience. See Lee (2006).

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also to demonstrate that the actual space of perceivable material bodies is intrinsically
 directional (i.e., orientable) and egocentrically centered.³⁵

Second, he uses it at the very beginning of his critical Period to prove that the representation of space is essentially intuitional and not conceptual.³⁶

Third, he uses it in the middle of his critical period to prove that space and time are transcendentally ideal.³⁷

And fourth and finally, he also uses it in his post-critical period to establish the thesis that all rational thinking requires an intuition-based "orientation" in order to be adequately grounded.³⁸

540 Kant's fourfold use of the argument from incongruent counterparts is not only interesting: it is also philosophically important. One conclusion we can draw from it 541 542 is that since Kant's pre-critical version of the argument entails Newtonian realism about space while his critical version of the argument entails transcendental 543 idealism about space, these two arguments cancel out, and show us that the 544 545 argument from incongruent counterparts is in fact *neutral* with respect to realism and idealism about space. This is the clue I shall follow up directly in the THA. 546 While the THA has a distinctively Kantian provenance, I think that it is also 547 548 defensible on grounds that are altogether logically independent of the question of whether transcendental idealism is true or false. 549

550 4.1 The Two Hands Argument

- Incongruent counterparts are logically and metaphysically possible. (Premise,
 supported by Kant's theory of incongruent counterparts and human geometrical intuition.)
- (2) Incongruent counterparts, by definition, are enantiomorphs. This entails that
 they are perceivable mirror-reflected property-for-property spatial duplicates
 that have exactly the same shape and size, and correspond point-for-point. In
 short, incongruent counterparts are *qualitatively identical*. (From (1).)
- (3) So by definition, there is no *descriptive* difference between incongruent
 (559 counterparts. (From (2).)
- 560 (4) Either of my hands and its corresponding mirror-image are actual examples of
 561 incongruent counterparts, and my own actual right and left hands are
 562 approximate incongruent counterparts. (Premise, supported by Kant's theory
 563 of incongruent counterparts and human geometrical intuition.)
- (5) Therefore there is no descriptive difference between either one of my handsand its incongruent counterpart. (From (3) and (4).)
- 566 (6) Therefore there is no conceptual difference between either one of my hands
 567 and its incongruent counterpart. In particular, the difference between either
 568 one of my hands and its incongruent counterpart could never be conveyed to

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³⁵FL01 ³⁵ See Kant (1992b). See also Hanna (2000).

³⁶FL01 ³⁶ See Kant (1992c).

³⁷FL01 ³⁷ See Kant (1977, §13, pp. 29–30, Ak 4: 285–286). See also Hanna (2006b, ch. 6).

³⁸FL01 ³⁸ See Kant (1991).

someone else who was not directly confronted with these objects—e.g., it is impossible to convey the precise difference between one of my hands and its incongruent counterpart to someone else by means of language over the telephone. (From (5) and the Minimal Constraint.)

- (7) But I can directly perceive the difference between either of my hands and its incongruent counterpart, and can also directly perceive the difference between my right and left hands. (Premise, supported by Kant's theory of incongruent counterparts and phenomenological introspection.)
 - (8) Therefore essentially non-conceptual content exists. (From (6), (7), and the notion of essentially non-conceptual content.)

579 Before going on, I want to respond to an obvious objection based on the 580 Demonstrative Strategy. The objection says that even if the THA is sound, it is 581 nevertheless possible to form the demonstrative concepts *this right hand* and *this left 582 hand*, and then use those concepts to tell my two hands apart from one another. 583 Hence the cognition of incongruent counterparts can still be conceptual.

This objection trades on an important confusion in the very idea of a "demonstrative concept." As Sean Kelly has correctly pointed out, "the demonstrative concept is something of a chimera: it has the head of a singular term but the body of a general concept."³⁹ In fact, the content *this F* is nothing more and nothing less than a 2-part hybrid content consisting of

- 589 (i) the essentially indexical demonstrative this,⁴⁰
- 590 and
- 591 (ii) the concept F.

592 2-part hybrid contents consisting of a demonstrative and a concept are both essentially indexical and *also* conceptual, in the same way that a griffin has *both* an 593 eagle's head and *also* a lion's body. But a griffin is not a special kind of lion: it is a sui 594 595 generis biological composite. It does not follow that a griffin is a special kind of lion, 596 just because it includes a lion part. So too a hybrid content is a sui generis semantic 597 composite. Correspondingly then, it does not follow that a 2-part hybrid content is a special kind of concept, just because it includes a conceptual part. Therefore it is 598 fundamentally misleading to call this F a "demonstrative concept," just as it would be 599 600 fundamentally misleading to call a griffin an "eagle-headed lion."

By the same token, it is fundamentally misleading to call the content *this right hand* a "demonstrative concept." In fact, the content *this right hand* is nothing more
 and nothing less than a 3-part hybrid content consisting of

- 604 (i) the essentially indexical demonstrative this,
- 605 (ii) the essentially non-conceptual content right,
- 606 and
- 607 (iii) the concept hand.

39FL01 ³⁹ Kelly (2001a, p. 398).

40FL01 ⁴⁰ See Perry (1979). See also Hanna (1993).

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608 Obviously it does not follow that a 3-part hybrid content is a special kind of 609 conceptual content, just because it has a conceptual part. Therefore the objection 610 fails.

1 5 Some consequences of the Two Hands Argument

According to the THA, the content of perceptual states that pick out a perceivable natural object-such as a human hand-that has an actual or possible incongruent counterpart, is essentially non-conceptual. But it is clearly and distinctly conceiv-615 able, and therefore logically possible, that *any* perceivable natural object, and also 616 any external part of anyone's body, has an actual or possible incongruent 617 counterpart. Here we need only imagine the natural object or body part placed in front of a mirror in order to recognize this possibility. This also inherently carries 618 with it the possibility of *massive reduplication*,⁴¹ such that necessarily, for any 619 perceivable natural object and any finite set of such objects embedded in any actual 620 local space in our orientable spatial world, a mirror reflection of that object or set of 621 622 objects and the surrounding local space in which they are embedded is always possible. So the cognitive need for essentially non-conceptual content is ubiquitous 623 624 in our world, in order for us to be able to discriminate between things and their 625 incongruent counterparts.

Of course it is true that some perceivable natural objects are events and not 626 627 merely static material substances. But every such event E has two possible counterparts that are exactly the same event, only occurring either earlier or later 628 629 than E actually occurs. Let us assume for the purposes of argument that time is subjectively experienced as asymmetric in its direction of flow, and that there are 630 good reasons provided by contemporary natural science for thinking that real natural 631 time has thermodynamic irreversibility.⁴² We can then easily recognize how the 632 633 earlier possible counterpart event E_{earlier} is the precise temporal analogue of one of my hands and the later possible counterpart event E_{later} is the precise temporal 634 analogue of the incongruent counterpart of that hand. But, in real natural time as 635 perceived by us, just which of the counterparts is earlier than E and just which is 636 637 later than E, such that I could uniquely identify it as happening before E or as 638 happening after E, cannot be determined by descriptive means alone—I could not 639 convey this to someone by means of language over the telephone. Therefore all perceptual states directed at perceivable natural objects or body parts, whether they 640 641 are representations of static material substances, or whether they are representations 642 of natural events occurring outside or within my own living body, must have 643 essentially non-conceptual content.

644 Generalizing now, I want to claim that essentially non-conceptual content is 645 mental content that is inherently sensitive to the egocentrically centered orientation, 646 dynamics, intrinsic topology, and intrinsic temporality of material objects and of 647 conscious subjects themselves in the embodied perception of any distal object or

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⁴¹FL01 ⁴¹ See Strawson (1959).

⁴²FL01 ⁴² See, e.g., Prigogine (1980); and Savitt (1995).

648 any part of their living bodies that has an actual or possible incongruent counterpart. 649 If this is correct, then it leads to an even more profound consequence of the THA. 650 Because only essentially non-conceptual content can adequately represent the unique location of material objects and of the embodied subject from the subject's own unique spatial and temporal standpoint, it seems that only essentially non-652 653 conceptual content is structurally and functionally suited to the finegrained 654 sensorimotor control of the body in human and non-human perceptual cognition 655 and intentional action.

656 For example, it seems that only essentially non-conceptual content is structurally 657 and functionally suited to mediate my conscious ability to get my key quickly and smoothly out of my pocket and directly into the keyhole of the front door of my 658 659 house—even in the dark, and with a drink or two in me. So it seems that essentially 660 non-conceptual content inherently involves what Adrian Cussins calls "basic spatial and temporal tracking and discriminatory skills which are required to find our way 661 662 around the environment," what Shaun Gallagher calls "body schemas," and what Alva Noë calls "sensorimotor knowledge."⁴³ This is ironic in the case of Noë, since 663 he explicitly describes himself as a *conceptualist*. But I think that he has assumed 664 665 the truth of a vacuous theory of conceptual content (see Sect. III) and thus overextended conceptual content into the domain of the essentially non-conceptual. 666

667 Be that as it may, I think that the primary psychological function of essentially non-conceptual perceptual content is uniquely and accurately to locate either 668 669 (i) causally efficacious, practically relevant or even usable, static or dynamic actual 670 perceivable natural objects at a distance from the embodied cognitive and 671 intentional agent (distal location), or (ii) the embodied cognitive and intentional agent herself (reflexive location), in their egocentrically centered spatiotemporal 672 contexts. But what ultimately unifies these capacities is the uniquely Kantian idea, 673 developed in the Transcendental Aesthetic, that the representation of space and the 674 675 representation of time are the necessary a priori subjective forms of sensibility.⁴⁴ 676 Here we must remember that for Kant the domain of sensibility or Sinnlichkeit includes not just sense perception, but also phenomenal consciousness or "inner 677 sense," the imagination, pleasure and pain, and desire. So what I am saying is that 678 679 we should think of the representation of space and the representation of time as the necessary a priori subjective forms of egocentrically centered human and non-680 681 human animal embodiment.

682 Now essentially non-conceptual content is either accurate or inaccurate, and as I have suggested, inherently poised for use in the intentional actions of conscious 683 684 animals. Thus essentially non-conceptual content is inherently normative and practical. But for conscious animals like us, essentially non-conceptual content is 685 686 also inherently poised for use in logical cognition (including judgment and inference) and in self-conscious, deliberative, causally and morally responsible 687 688 action. Therefore, in conscious animals like us, essentially non-conceptual content 689 is also *rationally* normative and practical.



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⁴³ See Cussins (2003, p. 147); Gallagher (2005, esp. chs. 1–6); and Noë (2004). 43FL01

⁴⁴ See Hanna (2005, Sections IV and V). 44FL01

690 Granting this, then another important consequence of the THA is that basic levels 691 of mental activity and representation generally assumed to belong to "the cognitive 692 unconscious"⁴⁵ are in fact non-conceptually *conscious*. Consciousness goes all the 693 way down to the ground floor of cognition via what we might call the "ladder" of 694 essentially non-conceptual content. This is what I call the Deep Consciousness 695 Thesis. If the Deep Consciousness Thesis is true, then can see the beginnings of a 696 solution to what Ray Jackendoff aptly calls the mind-mind problem, which is how it is ever possible for there be genuine two-way causal or semantic interaction across 697 698 the theoretical and normative gap between the Conscious Mind (or first-personal 699 information processing) and the Computational Mind (or *subpersonal* information processing)⁴⁶ The Kantian non-conceptualist solution to the mind-mind problem, 700 along with the Deep Consciousness Thesis, is that subpersonal processing is still in 701 702 fact first-personal, conscious processing even though it is non-conceptual and nonself-conscious.47 703

This doctrine may seem shockingly unorthodox. But properly understood, it is much less shocking than it may seem. One fundamental source of philosophical confusion in this area is that the very idea of consciousness, or "the first-personal," is deeply ambiguous as between

708 (a) self-consciousness or self-reflection,

which is the ability of a conscious creature like us to have conscious meta representational states or conscious thoughts about itself, and what Evan Thompson
 aptly calls

712 (b) sensorimotor subjectivity,⁴⁸

713 which is the more primitive ability of conscious suitably neurobiologically complex living organisms like us to have what Thomas Nagel also aptly calls a 714 "single point of view."⁴⁹ In turn, I hold, this ability of a conscious living organism 715 716 like us to have a single point of view is grounded in egocentrically centered 717 embodiment, and a *primitive bodily awareness* that includes proprioception (the sense of one's own body parts and limbs), kinaesthesia (the sense of bodily 718 719 movement), the sense of orientation and balance, bodily pleasures and pains, tickles 720 and itches, the feeling of pressure, the feeling of temperature, the feelings of vitality 721 or lethargy, and so-on.

The crucial point here is that self-consciousness or self-reflection requires sensorimotor subjectivity, but sensorimotor subjectivity does not require selfconsciousness or self-reflection. For example, at least some non-human animals e.g., Nagel's bat—and all normal human infants have sensorimotor-subjective states that are not also self-conscious or self-reflective. And again, when I am skillfully

46FL01 ⁴⁶ See, e.g., Jackendoff (1987).

- 48FL01 ⁴⁸ See Thompson (2005).
- 49FL01 ⁴⁹ Nagel (1979, pp. 166–167).

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⁴⁵FL01 ⁴⁵ See, e.g., Kihlstrom (1987).

⁴⁷FL01 ⁴⁷ See Bermúdez (2003c). Bermúdez holds that subpersonal states have non-conceptual content, but 47FL02 would not agree that they are also conscious.

727 driving my car but thinking about philosophy, the conscious states that skillfully 728 control my driving are sensorimotor-subjective but not in any way self-conscious or self-reflective. Since, presumably, everyone would agree that normal human infants 729 730 and at least some non-human animals are conscious animals but not also self-731 conscious or self-reflective animals, and also that it is possible to drive a car 732 consciously but not self-consciously or self-reflectively, then at least implicitly 733 everyone *already* concedes a distinction between sensorimotor subjectivity and 734 meta-representational or self-conscious subjectivity. Hence it is not so very 735 shocking after all for me to hold that all mental states, even tacit computational 736 information processing states, are also occurrently conscious. All I am saying is that 737 even tacit computational information processing involves *sensorimotor subjectivity*, 738 but not meta-representational or self-conscious subjectivity.

Sensorimotor subjectivity is non-conceptual consciousness precisely because all sensorimotor-subjective states contain essentially non-conceptual information. By contrast, as Kant explicitly held in the Transcendental Analytic, self-consciousness is *conceptual consciousness* precisely because to be self-conscious is to be able to make reflexive judgments about one's own mental states and to possess (even if only in the Highly Refined sense) a concept of oneself.

If we were sufficiently careful about the distinction between sensorimotor 745 746 subjectivity and self-consciousness, then I think that even the deeply puzzling and much-discussed phenomenon of blindsight⁵⁰-in which some brain-damaged 747 subjects who introspectively report an inability to see are also able to point 748 749 accurately to objects in the self-professedly blind parts of their visual fields-could 750 be explained. For we could then say that the finegrained sensorimotor connection 751 between what blindsighters perceive in space and their ability to point to it is guided 752 by sensorimotor-subjective vision, even though they lack self-conscious vision for that cognitive and practical task. Otherwise put, in blindsight the frontline 753 754 information-processing mechanisms of the eyes and related areas of the wider brain-755 body system are undamaged (blindsighters, after all, have their eyes open and are 756 working under well-lit conditions) and continue to transmit sensorimotor-subjective 757 visual information, even though the corresponding downstream mechanisms for processing self-conscious visual information have broken down. Blindsighters 758 759 would then be best characterized as *sighted* in one sense of conscious vision, but 760 blind in another sense of conscious vision. That is: blindsighters experience self-761 conscious blindness via the more sophisticated downstream processing mechanisms of the brain-body system, but also experience sensorimotor-subjective *sight* via the 762 763 simpler processing mechanisms of the eyes. The notion of divided consciousness is 764 already theoretically familiar from well-known experiments involving divided 765 attention tasks and the dissociated cognitive abilities of neo-commissurotomy patients, so it should not therefore be very difficult to extend the same general idea 766 767 to blindsight.

768 This in turn would neatly avoid the obvious paradox that in blindsight brute, non-769 conscious, non-unified, purposeless mental processing somehow exerts finegrained 770 control over our conscious cognition and intentional body movements. It seems to

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⁵⁰FL01 ⁵⁰ See, e.g., Weiskrantz (1986).

771 me very implausible to hold that blindsighted people are *mere robots* in the blind 772 areas of their self-conscious visual fields. On the contrary, it seems to me far more 773 plausible that blindsighted people are genuinely visually conscious in those areas, 774 but in a way that is in some respects intrinsically phenomenologically, semantically, 775 and neurobiologically different from the visual consciousness of normal self-776 consciously sighted people. (This Kantian non-conceptualist explanation of 777 blindsight, correspondingly, suggests a new way of explaining the equally puzzling 778 phenomenon of "filling-in."⁵¹)

779 For the Kantian non-conceptualist, sensorimotor subjectivity and essentially non-780 conceptual content go intrinsically together, hand-in-glove, and this is the deepest insight of the Transcendental Aesthetic. So in the case of blindsight, what Kant 781 782 would have called "intuitions" or Anschauungen are literally blind in the self-783 conscious sense (the subject *believes* herself to be blind), yet intrinsically involve a sensorimotor subjectivity in "inner sense" and are also directly referential 784 conscious mental representations. The blindsighted subject authentically sees the 785 786 world in a sensorimotor-subjective and essentially non-conceptual sense, but also 787 fails to see the world in a self-conscious, thought-based, and conceptual sense. By 788 an illuminating contrast, while Nagel's bat is also blind, also has a sensorimotor 789 subjectivity, and *also* is capable of directly referential cognition, it does not actually 790 see the world in a sensorimotor-subjective sense but rather hears the world via sonar 791 instead.

Non-conceptualists have within their grasp a decisive reply to Speaks's important 792 793 challenge. If, as I have argued, the THA is sound, then essentially non-conceptual 794 perceptual content exists, essentialist non-conceptualism is true, and conceptualism 795 is false. But once they have made this decisive reply to Speaks, then I believe that non-conceptualists will also be committed to the deeper and larger task of 796 explaining the nature of essentially non-conceptual content by relating it to human 797 conceptual cognition, judgment, intentional action,⁵² logical rationality,⁵³ and 798 799 practical rationality alike.

This explanation in turn, I think, must also invoke a broadly Kantian cognitivesemantic framework. Indeed even Speaks, who of course is skeptical about the existence of absolutely non-conceptual perceptual content, thinks that progress on the question of the relations between thought and perception cannot be made until we resuscitate and re-think some basic Kantian themes:

⁵³FL01 ⁵³ See Hanna (2006a).

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⁵¹ Filling-in is the puzzling fact that our visual field presents itself as rich and continuous even though we 51FL01 51FL02 have blind spots on our retinas. Various solutions to the puzzle have been offered. See, e.g., Pessoa et al. (1998). The Kantian non-conceptualist solution is that filling-in is essentially the reverse of blindsight: 51FL03 51FL04 whereas in blindsight the subject has sensorimotor-subjective vision without self-conscious vision (=sensorimotor-subjective vision via the simpler processing mechanisms of the eyes, together with self-51FL05 51FL06 conscious blindness via the more sophisticated processing mechanisms of the downstream brain-body system), by contrast in filling-in subjects have self-conscious vision without sensorimotor-subjective 51FL07 51FL08 vision (=self-conscious vision via the more sophisticated processing mechanisms of the downstream brain-body system, together with sensorimotor-subjective blindness via the simpler processing 51FL09 mechanisms of the eyes). 51FL10

⁵²FL01 ⁵² See, e.g., Mele (1987); and Hanna and Maiese (forthcoming).

I do think that there is a natural understanding of the questions about nonconceptual content which I have not discussed, but which seems to be in the background of McDowell's discussions of the issue. I have in mind his many discussions of the involvement of a faculty of spontaneity in perception. This is the Kantian question of how far one's conceptual capacities—one's abilities to have thoughts involving certain kinds of concepts—go toward shaping the contents of one's experience. But is this a matter of the new concepts entering into the content of one's perceptions, or of one simply being able to infer more sophisticated beliefs from a more or less stable perceptual content? This does strike me as an interesting and fundamental question with broad consequences for our understanding of the nature of intentionality.⁵⁴

816 Here is a sketch of how a Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content 817 could begin to answer this "interesting and fundamental question." Such a theory would hold that essentially non-conceptual content has its own "lower-level 818 spontaneity" (what Kant calls the spontaneity of the synthesis speciosa or 819 "figurative synthesis" of the imagination)⁵⁵ and hence its own lower-level 820 normativity, that is based on spatiotemporally structured and egocentrically oriented 821 instrumental-or hypothetically practical-rules for the skillful manipulation of 822 tools and of the proximal or distal environment, and for the skillful finegrained 823 824 sensorimotor control of one's own body in basic intentional actions. Such a theory 825 would also hold that this lower-level spontaneity of our non-conceptual cognitive 826 capacities is irreducible to the "higher-level spontaneity" (what Kant calls the spontaneity of the synthesis intellectualis or "intellectual synthesis" of the 827 understanding and reason)⁵⁶ of our conceptual capacities and our self-conscious-828 ness, and thus that its lower-level normativity is irreducible to the higher-level 829 830 normativity of our conceptually funded rationality, which is based on noninstrumental-or categorically practical-rules of logic and morality. And finally 831 such a theory would also hold that the lower-level spontaneity and lower-level 832 833 normativity of essentially non-conceptual content is the necessary ground of the higher-level rational spontaneity and normativity of conceptual content, and that 834 835 both kinds of content are *complementary* to one another in the constitution of atomic or basic perceptual judgments, or what Kant calls "judgments of experience."⁵⁷ 836

837 6 Conclusion

838 If what I have argued is correct, then it follows that essentially non-conceptual 839 content, unified by the Kantian necessary a priori subjective forms of sensibility, not 840 only exists, but also is the original and necessary two-way ladder by which the 841 world is consciously delivered up from embodied animal experience to self-

- 56FL01 ⁵⁶ See Kant (1997, pp. 256–257, B151–152).
- 57FL01 ⁵⁷ See Hanna (2006b, chs. 1–2).

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⁵⁴FL01 ⁵⁴ Speaks (2005, pp. 389–390).

⁵⁵FL01 ⁵⁵ See Kant, I., *Critique of pure reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
55FL02 Press, 1997), p. 256, B151.

conscious thought and action-oriented deliberation, and then is downwardly 842 843 transformed by our thinking and action under universal a priori norms. Otherwise 811 put, the Sellarsian "space of reasons" is nothing more and nothing less than a discursive-that is, a conceptual, judgment-driven, and linguistic-and a priori normative superstructure built on the platform of essentially non-conceptual embodied animal experience.

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