Introduction

Among both Marxists and critics of Marxism there is a tendency to overlook and at times misinterpret the meaning and importance of leisure and play in Marx's thought. Critics of Marx have often labelled Marxism a philosophy of work, indicating that work is the only legitimate form of activity for people in Marx's view and condemning him for the narrowness of his conception of human activity.[1] While defenders of Marx's position have, especially since the publication of his early manuscripts in 1932, emphasized the creativity characteristic of unalienated work,[2] they have been understandably reluctant to interpret Marx's concept of *praxis* as a form of play. Indeed, many contemporary Marxists would want to criticize capitalistic forms of play and leisure, and this would make them all the more hesitant to discuss unalienated *praxis* in terms of play. With the exception of discussions of Marx within a psychoanalytic context[3] and scattered references to the problem in the recent literature on Marx,[4] there has been little in the way of a systematic investigation of the relationship between play and leisure and work in their unalienated as well as their alienated states in Marx's early writings.

There is, however, the foundation of a theory of play and leisure in these early writings, and it stands in need of explication and development. Especially in the 1844 manuscripts and the notes on Mill's *Elements of Political Economy*, Marx provides the basis for both a theory of the alienated character of play and leisure in capitalist society and an indication of the characteristics of unalienated play and leisure. In the first section of this paper, I shall construct Marx's implicit theory of alienated play and leisure in capitalist society, expanding on certain aspects of the problem

which have become especially important in contemporary American society and briefly sketching the relationship between alienated work and alienated leisure activity (play).[5] The second section contains a development of Marx's notion of unalienated leisure and play, also based primarily on his early writings, in which the unity of work and play in unalienated *praxis* will be emphasized. It will be shown that Marx's position involves an overcoming of the dichotomy between work and play found in capitalist society and a rethinking of the traditional categories in terms of which work and play as forms of human activity are understood. This discussion leads to the question of whether there is any meaningful distinction between work and play in their unalienated forms. In the third section, I shall consider some possible reasons for rejecting the view of the identity of unalienated work and play, including some which Marx himself seems to have had in mind when writing *Das Kapital*. It will be shown that these objections can be successfully met when one takes into consideration the dialectical notion of human needs present in Marx's early writings.

Alienated Play and Leisure

The uncovering of the alienated character of leisure in capitalist society was not a matter of primary concern for Marx for several reasons. First, it was not a pressing problem for the proletariat when seen in the light of the more crucial problem of alienated labor. Second, it would do little to advance the cause of the workers' revolution to analyze alienated leisure where it did exist as a problem—in the upper class. Simply as a matter of priorities, an inquiry into the alienated character of leisure was not of prime importance. The third reason for leaving this problem relatively uninvestigated provides the theoretical basis for the preceding two reasons: alienated leisure is primarily a derivative phenomenon, a secondary effect of more fundamental forms of alienation. It would be better, then, first to investigate the more basic problem, that of alienated labor.

The development of capitalist societies has not, however, followed exactly the course Marx had anticipated. For a number of reasons, the consideration of which is beyond the scope of this paper, the sharp polarization of capitalist society and the eventual revolution of the proletariat have not yet come to pass. In contemporary Western, highly industrialized societies, a gradual improvement in the wages and salaries of workers and a steady decrease in the number of hours of work per week have brought about an

increase in the amount of free time potentially available to most workers. This increase in potential free time has important consequences in regard to the problem of alienated labor in capitalist society. Rather than eliminating the problem of alienated labor, the gradual increase in free time serves to reinforce and perpetuate the fundamental alienation of labor. In this section of the paper, I shall outline the theory of alienated leisure and play which is implicit in Marx's early writings, developing the ways in which this is related to the problem of alienated labor and stressing the inadequacy of increased leisure as the answer to humanity's fundamental alienation in capitalist society.

There are at least seven conditions under which the worker's leisure can be said to be alienated or the worker can be said to be alienated from his or her leisure: (1) when one does not have any leisure; (2) when leisure is justified only if it results in increased productivity; (3) when the worker must sacrifice leisure for more money; (4) when leisure becomes dominated by private property, the need to *have* rather than *be*; (5) when leisure activity is transformed into consumer activity; (6) when leisure extends and reinforces the alienation of work, and (7) when it becomes a flight from the alienation of work. Let us examine each of these conditions in turn.

First, the complete absence of leisure, which arises in a situation where the worker has no time left over from work for anything more than fulfilling basic physiological needs, is indicative of a state of alienation in the sense that there is no possibility, even outside of one's job, of free, creative activity. The total absence of leisure is, properly speaking, indicative of alienation, not because it involves alienated *leisure*, but because it points toward the complete domination of alienated labor in the life of the individual. Instances of such a complete absence of leisure are presumably less common today than they were in Marx's time. The tendency to restrict and perhaps even completely eliminate leisure would be rooted in what Marx describes as the capitalist's desire to give to the worker only that which is necessary to maintain the worker during work, enough to insure that there is always an adequate supply of workers.[7] However, categories such as "necessary minimum" have a social and economic foundation, and their definition varies in accordance with changes in that foundation. In the last few decades in America, that necessary minimum has been raised significantly. This shift has resulted in a limited justification for greater leisure in comtemporary society—and this brings us to the second condition under which leisure is alienated.

When leisure is justified only insofar as it brings about an increase in worker productivity, it is seen not as having a value in itself or as a human value for the person involved, but as being of value only as a *means* to increase production. Implicit in calling this alienated leisure is the judgment that leisure activity should indeed have a value in itself, that it should not be simply a means to greater productivity. The "in itself" character of leisure activity is negated when it is justified only as a way to increase productivity, and the worker is alienated in this sense in his leisure activity because the intrinsic value of his or her activity is denied. Only its meaning and value in relation to increased productivity is recognized.

It should be noted, however, that individual workers may not always perceive the alienated aspect of leisure activity in such a situation, but that would be due either to fortuitous circumstances (e.g., when management extends a large amount of free time to the worker) or because of the worker's own expectations. For example, under certain circumstances, it may increase productivity if management provides both free time and a wide range of leisure activities for its workers insofar as this creates a more "hygenic" environment for the workers. In such a case, the worker may well be able to use that free time in such a way as to make it quite meaningful to herself or himself. However, several factors should be noted here. First, there is strong evidence to suggest that such a "hygenic" approach to worker satisfaction is only effective in producing short-term changes.[8] Second, insofar as his leisure activities are values in themselves for the worker, one is still faced with the problem of giving workers *social* expression in which only work is recognized as a genuine value-creating activity. Third, the *principle* which determines the allocation of free time for leisure remains in this instance one which does not recognize the intrinsic, human meaning of leisure activity, even though in some specific cases it may happen to permit its development. The fundamental structure of the situation remains the same, although under certain conditions it may allow for more individual creativity. Fourth, if a worker has come to expect very little of his leisure time, then alienation may not arise in this instance as a *perceived* problem; but it is nonetheless present, even though it is masked by the worker's false consciousness.[9]

The third condition under which leisure is alienated is when, even though it is potentially available, leisure time is sacrificed in order to earn more money. Marx argued that, in a society in which wealth is increasing, an increase in the level of wages leads to overwork on the part of the workers due

to their desire for the riches that the capitalist possesses.[10] There is now some doubt whether this is in fact the case, for the relationship between income effect and substitution effect in our own society is unclear.[11] However, too great a preference for leisure poses a danger for capitalist society, leading eventually to a decline in productivity and the gross national product. While the direction American society takes is yet to be determined, it is clear that *if* leisure time is sacrificed in order to do more alienated work in order to earn more money, then humanity becomes alienated from its leisure; *if* it is *not* sacrificed in this way, then it clearly presents a threat to the growth of a capitalist economy.

Taken together, these three conditions of alienated leisure refer primarily to ways in which the *quantity* of leisure time may be affected by alienated labor. In each instance, the principle governing the allocation of leisure time is one which negates the human meaning of leisure through a denial of the intrinsic value of the activity in question. The next four aspects of the phenomenon of alienated leisure are related more specifically to ways in which the *content* of leisure activities is shaped by alienated labor, although the question of the quanitity of leisure time will arise again in passing. By encouraging possessiveness, conspicuous consumption, the values of the marketplace such as competitiveness, and an illusory escape from the alienation of work, leisure activity becomes alienated in our society. Let us now turn to a consideration of these remaining conditions under which leisure can be said to be alienated.

In a commodity-based society, private property plays a central role. In the 1844 manuscripts, Marx argues that even people's *senses* are restructured in such a society. The emphasis is not on free, human *praxis*, but rather on mere *having*.

> Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only *ours* when we have it, i.e., when it exists for us as capital or when it is directly eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc., in short, *used* in some way...Thus *all* the physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by the simple alienation of *all* these senses, the sense of *having*.[12]

Leisure activity is not exempt from this transformation, and the tendency that Marx describes here seems to have reached a high point in our own society. For example, the sense of hearing—which may well be most fully satisfied aesthetically in listening to music—has for many today been replaced by the need to have incredibly sophisticated stereo systems, records and tapes. All too often, such systems far outstrip their owners' listening

ability; in those instances where it does not, there is often more concern about *how well* the sound is reproduced than about *what* is being played. The fetishism of equipment and gadgets which pervades many leisure activities today is but the extension of the fetishism of commodities and evidence of another condition under which leisure may be alienated: the domination of private property which tranforms leisure activity into mere *having*.

The fifth aspect of alienated leisure is closely related to the preceding one. Leisure activity becomes a consumer activity, whether it involves the consumption or possession of goods (as in the previous instance) or of services. There are a number of economic factors contributing to this tendency, and one of the most significant of these is the necessity to expand the market. Insofar as a steady growth of the Gross National Product is considered necessary,[13] and insofar as increased industrialization and automation result in increased productivity per worker, it becomes increasingly necessary to produce and market new goods and services. The realm of leisure activities offers one of the more profitable areas in which new markets can be developed. As a consequence of this, there is an ever-growing demand to transform leisure activity into consumer activity. Insofar as this is the case, leisure activity becomes alienated from its human meaning and value and becomes a specific type of economic activity whose meaning and value are determined by the forces of the marketplace.

Sixth, leisure can become alienating when it extends or reinforces the alienation already found in work. Several of the preceding conditions of alienated leisure relate directly to this, but additional examples of the way in which leisure extends the alienation of work abound. In sports, for example, many of the values of capitalist society are strikingly reflected, especially in organized sports on the professional level. The emphasis on competition, performance, efficiency, quantification, etc. reflects the organization of labor in our society and serves to reinforce it and those values compatible with a capitalist system.[14] Numerous studies have indicated that the leisure activities of workers often correlate with their work activities—e.g., boring and unimaginative leisure is often found among those whose work has the same characteristics.[15] In these and many other instances, leisure activities extend and reinforce more general patterns of alienation already present in society, especially those found in the work situation.

There are, however, occasions on which individuals attempt to overcome the alienation of their work situation through the creative use of leisure, and

this is the seventh condition under which leisure may be alienated. In his discussion of alienated labor in the first of the Paris manuscripts, Marx concludes:

> ...man (the worker) feels himself to be freely active only in his animal functions—eating, drinking and procreating, or at most also in his dwelling and in personal adornment—while in his human functions he feels himself to be only an animal. The animal becomes human and the human becomes animal.
>
> Eating, drinking and procreating are of course also genuine human functions. But in abstraction, separated from the remaining environment of human activities and turned into final and sole ends, they are animal functions.[16]

Implicit in this description is the thesis that a peculiar inversion takes place at times in capitalist society, an inversion which Marx discusses here in terms of animal and human activities. It had been described somewhat differently two paragraphs earlier in this same manuscript: "The worker, therefore, feels himself at home only when he is not working, whereas at work he feels homeless."[17] The inversion consists essentially in this: confronted with the absence of conditions for meaningful, creative and free action in the primary world of work, people seek to find that freedom, creativity and meaningfulness in an alternative world, that of play and leisure. There is a close parallel here with religion: both are attempts to create pseudo-worlds to which people can flee to find in an illusory fashion that which they cannot find in the everyday world of work. Where this tendency manifests itself most strongly in leisure, the pursuit of leisure assumes almost religious dimensions and a ritualistic quality.[18] Religion, on the other hand, exhibits a definite play-element, and this has been stressed in contemporary theology.[19] Religion and play share a common element: they both function as illusory paths people follow in the attempt to realize one's species-being. However, both paths are dead ends for Marx, for that realization can only be accomplished through productive activity and the transformation of the actual world for Marx.

The attempt to find in leisure the freedom, creativity, and meaningfulness that is unavailable in work leads inevitably to alienated leisure for several reasons, and the discussion of those reasons can serve to explicate the contemporary relationship between work and leisure. First, the attempt to find freedom and meaning in the world of leisure alone is an escape in that the achievements made in this are relegated to a sphere of unimportance.

Leisure, although free, is trivial precisely because it is set aside from the everyday world and not intended to transform it. The dichotomy between work and leisure in contemporary society serves to isolate the freedom and creativity characteristic of playful activities and leisure from the world of work and thereby to undermine the significance of the freedom and creativity of leisure activities. In this sense, the freedom of leisure is trivialized. Second, this process serves also to insulate work from demands that it be transformed. By viewing leisure as the primary sphere of freedom, one undermines the strength of demands that work be transformed into a freer and more creative activity. This reinforces the alienation present in work insofar as it discourages attempts to transform work and encourages the worker to seek freedom and creativity elsewhere.

In the preceding remarks, I have sketched the conditions under which leisure may be said to be alienated and, in the process, indicated the close connections between alienated labor and alienated leisure. It is now possible to pull these together in more systematic fashion. Alienated leisure in our society is a derivative phenomenon, growing out of alienated labor, in which the positive values usually associated with leisure (freedom, creativity, meaningfulness in itself) are either negated or are recognized only in an illusory fashion. They are negated in the absence of leisure, when leisure is justified only in terms of increased work productivity, when leisure is sacrificed for money, and when it becomes dominated by the values of capitalist society (private property, exchange value, etc.). The positive values are given illusory recognition when they are attributed to leisure at the expense of overcoming the alienation found in labor. The division which exists between work and leisure serves to perpetuate the alienation of both spheres, trivializing the freedom and creativity found in leisure and justifying the absence of those qualities in the world-transformative activity of work. Where leisure directly reflects the values of capitalist society, it further intensifies the alienation found in work. Although the alienation in leisure is the result of alienated labor, it comes to exist to a limited extent as an independent problem in a way similar to that of religion insofar as it becomes institutionalized. In this sense, the critique of alienated leisure must lead us back to the problem of alienated labor, for the key to the problem of alienated leisure is not to be found in leisure itself but in alienated labor and in overcoming the split between work and play.[20]

Implicit in the foregoing discussion of alienated play and leisure has been a notion of what human activity could become if the alienation of both

work and play in capitalist society were overcome. We must now turn to a closer consideration of unalienated human activity, investigating in particular the way in which Marx's notion of unalienated human activity (*praxis*) overcomes the dichotomy between work and play.

Unalienated Praxis: The Unity of Work and Play

In unalienated *praxis* the division between work and play is overcome. Traditionally, play and leisure activity have often been defined as activity done for its own sake,[21] and the implied contrast here is with work as an activity which is not done for its own sake but rather for the sake of something outside of itself. The basic presupposition of this distinction is that there are two distinct kinds of human activity, one whose value and meaning and purpose are intrinsic to the activity, the other being one in which these qualities are extrinsic. This is the distinction between activity done for its own sake and that which is only a means. Unalienated *praxis*, however, involves precisely the overcoming of the necessity for this distinction; it is free, creative human activity which has *both* intrinsic *and* extrinsic value, meaning and purpose. As Marx pointed out in the *Grundrisse*, "labour cannot become play, as Fourier would like."[22] Yet neither is it sufficient, as Marx pointed out in his critique of Max Stirner's position, to make work the free competition of workers among themselves, for in this sense "work *is* free in all civilized countries; it is not a question of freeing work, but of transcending [*aufheben*] it."[23] What will be called here "unalienated *praxis*" is free, creative human activity in which the split between intrinsic and extrinsic value, meaning, and purpose has been overcome. In contrast to this, alienated labor is activity which lacks intrinsic value, meaning and purpose; alienated leisure is activity which lacks extrinsic value, meaning and purpose. When alienation is overcome, each of these activities gains the qualities it was lacking in its alienated state and the two kinds of activity become one in unalienated *praxis*.

In his comments on Mill's *Elements of Political Economy*, Marx sketches his vision of genuine human production, work as "a *free manifestation of life* and an *enjoyment of life*."[24] His description, although lengthy, should be noted carefully, for it provides the foundation for the notion of unalienated *praxis*.

> Suppose we had produced things as human beings: in his production each of us would have *twice affirmed* himself and the other. (1) In my

> *production* I would have objectified by *individuality* and its *particularity*, and in the course of the activity I would have enjoyed an individual *expression of life*; in viewing the object I would have experienced the indiviudal joy of knowing my personality as an *objective, sensuously perceptible*, and therefore *indubitable* power. (2) In your satisfaction or your use of my product I would have had the *direct* and conscious satisfaction that my work satisfied a *human* need, thus that it objectified *human* nature, and that it created an object appropriate to the need of another *human* being. (3) I would have been the *mediator* between you and the species and you would have known and experienced me as a completion of your own nature and a necessary part of your self; I would have been affirmed in your thought as well as your love. (4) In my individual life I would have directly created your life; thus in my individual activity I would have immediately *confirmed* and *realized* my true *human* and *social* nature.
>
> Our productions would be so many mirrors reflecting our nature.
>
> This relationship would thereby become reciprocal, what happens on my side would happen on yours.[25]

Most, although not all, of the essential elements of Marx's idea of unalienated *praxis* are contained in this passage. This *praxis* is productive, free, a source of enjoyment, a mediation between people on the level of thought as well as of action, a mediation between individuality and human nature, and is rooted in human needs. To these six characteristics three more must be added: *praxis* is a mediation between humanity and nature, is rooted in imagination, and is many-sided. Let us examine each of these characteristics briefly, placing special emphasis on the way in which they are related to play.

First, unalienated *praxis* is *productive*; but we must ask the question, *productive of what?* If the productivity of unalienated *praxis* is limited to the production of *physical objects*, then many forms of play (as well as other kinds of human activity) would be eliminated from this category, for they are not productive in this sense. However, such a narrow definition of productivity in terms of physical objects falls short of expressing the richness of Marx's notion of *praxis*. In the first of the 1844 manuscripts, Marx maintains that unalienated work (life activity, productive life) is "life creating life...free, conscious activity...man makes his life activity itself an object of his will and consciousness."[26] Unalienated *praxis* is productive, in the most fundamental sense of the term, of *human life itself*, and this is not ade-

quately understood as an aggregate of "things," but as an on-going process of creating relations.[27] If this is the case, then the productive character of unalienated *praxis* does not exclude those forms of play which do not produce physical objects, but only those activities which do not contribute to the production of human life. However, it should be noted that one of the difficulties of such an interpretation is that it appears to yield too easily to vague interpretations of *any* activity as being productive.[28] This objection can be met through a further specification of the notion of unalienated *praxis*, especially in terms of its foundation in human needs. This will be dealt with below.

Second, this *praxis* is *free*. Within this context, "free" does not mean arbitrary or capricious; rather, it is free because it is grounded in a consciousness of humanity's species-being, of its fundamental human nature.[29] Moreover, such "freedom" is not divorced from human needs, but rather grounded in them as part of our species-being. We are free insofar as we are able to realize our species-being. This is in sharp contrast to the freedom often found in play, for the freedom of play appears in many instances to be capricious. Building a sand-castle, for example, seems to be an example of arbitrary, creative, playful activity.[30] It could be argued, however, that the apparent arbitrariness of play is at times deceptive, that it masks hidden intentions and drives which cannot otherwise find expression;[31] yet insofar as the freedom found in play is arbitrary, it is clearly to be distinguished from that found in unalienated *praxis*. Moreover, the freedom found in play is distinguished from unalienated *praxis* insofar as it is bought at the expense of stepping outside of everyday existence; this involves not only a suspension of that everyday world, but also of one's own self through the assumption of a new role in the game.[32] In contrast to this, *praxis transforms* rather than *suspends* the everyday world and one's self. Its freedom is thus more firmly rooted in the world and the self than is the freedom usually encountered in play and is more openly involved in transforming both than is play.

Third, unalienated *praxis* is a source of *enjoyment*, and this is an element that it shares with play. In *Das Kapital* Marx links this enjoyment to work "as something that gives play to the worker's bodily and mental powers."[33] Such *praxis* is enjoyable *because* is is unalienated; Marx is not maintaining that such activity is unalienated simply because it is enjoyable. Although unalienated *praxis* shares in general with play the characteristic of being enjoyable, in unalienated *praxis* this quality is rooted in a very specific concep-

tion of the nature of unalienated activity and is dependent upon the presence of the other qualities here under discussion. Play, on the other hand, can be enjoyable for any number of possible reasons which have nothing to do with its foundation in our species-being.

Fourth, it is through unalienated *praxis* that *a mediation takes place between persons and their comrades.* This takes place both on the level of thought and on that of action, and involves mutual recognition of the other both as an individual and as a species-being. That recognition is manifested both on the level of material productive activity and on that of self-consciousness. Commenting on communism as the overcoming of private property, Marx stresses that:

> ...the *social* character is the universal character of the whole movement; society itself produces *man* as *man*, so it is *produced* through him. Both in their content and in their *mode of existence* activity and enjoyment are *social, social* activity and *social* enjoyment.[34]

In contrast to this, the mediation which occurs in play (when it does occur) is usually apart from the everyday world—a mediation between players *as players*, not as people. Insofar as this is the case, the mediation encountered in play is a mediation on the level of appearances.

Fifth, this *praxis* also brings about a *mediation between individuality and human nature (species-being)*, for it is the activity of an individual aware of one's own nature and acting to realize it in a concrete situation. "Individual life and species life are not *different things*," Marx argues in the 1844 manuscripts, for "though man is a unique individual...he is equally the *totality*, the ideal totality, the subjective existence of society thought and experienced for itself."[35] In thought as well as action, humanity realizes its social nature, and this involves making one's individuality real for others and simultaneously confirming one's humanity. This is another sense in which unalienated *praxis* is productive: it produces a mediation between individuality and human nature through the interaction of people with others on both the level of material production and that of symbolic interaction.[36] In contrast to this, play is often a stepping outside the confines of both individuality and human nature; it is a mediation of one role with another, but these need not be grounded either in genuine individuality or in human nature.

Sixth, unalienated *praxis* is rooted in *human needs*. In contrast to alienated labor, which "is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a *means* for satisfying other needs,"[37] unalienated *praxis* is itself our highest human

need. In contrast to the view of the wealthy person found in political economy, Marx offers his own definition of genuine wealth and poverty, relating it to a notion of human needs far beyond the traditional economic one:

> The wealthy man is at the same time one who *needs* a complex of human manifestations of life, and whose own self-realization exists as an inner necessity, a *need*. Not only the wealth but also the *poverty* of man acquires, in a socialist perspective, a *human* and thus a social meaning. Poverty is the passive bond which leads man to experience a need for the greatest wealth, the *other* person.[38]

This notion of the rootedness of unalienated *praxis* in human needs, which in some respects is quite close to Maslow's,[39] stands in sharp contrast to play which is usually seen as independent of the realm of needs. Play is usually interpreted as belonging to the realm of freedom, while the realm of necessity is in part constituted by the needs of people. Marx's notion of human needs, as will be shown in the third section of this paper, is one which attempts to overcome this dichotomizing thinking, but the further development of this theme must be set aside for the moment.

Seventh, such *praxis* is also a *mediation between humanity and nature*. This thesis is ambiguous as it stands, for "nature" can be either the external natural world or humanity itself as a natural being. The ambiguity is, however, intentional, for Marx is using nature in both senses.

> The universality of man appears in practice in the universality which makes the whole of nature into his inorganic body: (1) as a direct means of life, and equally (2) as the material object and instrument of his life activity.[40]
>
> In fact, however, when the narrow bourgeois form has been peeled away, what is wealth, if not the universality of needs, capacities, enjoyments, productive powers, etc., of individuals, produced in universal exchange? What, if not the full development of human control over the forces of nature—those of his own nature as well as those of so-called "nature"?[41]

Whereas in alienated labor we are alienated from the natural world and from our own nature, in unalienated *praxis* we are participating in the humanization of the natural world and the naturalization of our own nature. Communist society "is the accomplished essential unity of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature."[42] In contrast to this, play usually in-

volves no mediation between us and the external natural world except a transitory one on the level of appearances; transformations may be made temporarily during the game, but these dissolve after it is over.

Eighth, unalienated *praxis* is rooted in *human imagination*. This is already implicit in the notion of such *praxis* as free, conscious activity grounded in our species-being, but this aspect should be made explicit. Imagination is one of the things which characterizes human work as described in Marx's early writings.[43] and even in the philosophically less sophisticated discussion of the difference between the productivity of animals and that of human beings in *Das Kapital* the emphasis on imagination remains:

> ...what distinguished the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement, i.e., has already pre-existed ideally.[44]

The rootedness in imagination is a characteristic that unalienated *praxis* shares with play, as what Jacques Henriot called "the internal dimension of all *praxis*."[45] There are, however, important differences here which must not be neglected. Play may take place primarily or even solely in the realm of the imagination without resulting in a transformation of objective reality. When imagination looses its rootedness in the conditions of existence, when it attempts to *substitute* the imaginary for the real instead of using the imagination to reveal the real possibilities of *praxis*, then it loses its transformative power and becomes an escape. Religion is an example of the "spontaneous activity of the human imagination..."[46] It is an attempt to provide illusory answers to real questions. While Marx clearly recognizes the element of imagination in unalienated *praxis*, the imagination is both rooted in prior perception of an objective world and issues forth in activity that transforms those conditions; in both respects, this imagination is distinguished from that found in play.

Finally, unalienated *praxis* is *many-sided*. This many-sidedness has its philosophical foundation in several characteristics of our being. First, humanity's species-being is universal, making all of nature the object of its theoretical and productive activity.[47] Second, our needs are many-sided, as is evident from the passages quoted above on genuine wealth, and this calls forth a corresponding many-sided *praxis*. This is evident, for example, in the description of the communist worker given in *The German Ideology*: "In communist society, however, where nobody has an exclusive area of ac-

tivity and each can train himself in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production, making it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I like, without ever becoming a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critic."[48] It will not do, on the basis of this passage, to assert as McBride has done[49] that Marx's vision of unalienated man is one of "man as *player*," but the many-sidedness of unalienated *praxis* is related to the multiplicity of possible roles found in play. To state the proposition in a negative fashion, we can say that both unalienated *praxis* and play help prevent our identity from being determined in a one-sided way by a single role. However, whereas play introduces alternative roles which are separated from the everyday world and in principle not transformations of it, unalienated *praxis* transforms that everyday reality, giving a concrete foundation to our many-sidedness.

Throughout this analysis of the relationship between unalienated *praxis* and its relation to play, the emphasis has been on the ways in which such *praxis* is differentiated from play. However, these differences rest upon a specific concept of play—of play as it exists in our own society, of alienated play existing within the context of alienated labor. In unalienated *praxis* there is contained a genuine—if at this stage of history still only a theoretical—*Aufhebung* of the division between alienated labor and alienated play, one which negates the alienated aspects of each and retains and transforms their unalienated aspects into unalienated *praxis*. That which is negated in this *Aufhebung* of play is related directly to the character of play as mere appearance, the separation of play from our concrete species-being, and the non-dialectical relationship between play and the non-play world. Play is negated insofar as it is not productive of human life, its freedom is restricted to the realm of appearance, its enjoyability is not rooted in our life and species-existence, its mediations between people and their comrades and between the individual and one's species-being take place only on the level of appearance, it is not rooted in and transformative of human needs, it does not mediate between us and nature, it remains isolated in the imagination, and its many-sidedness is not integrated into the primary life-world. Play is affirmed insofar as it is creative of human life, is free, conscious activity, opens up new relations among people and transforms humanity's nature, transforms human needs and nature through imaginative, world-transformative activity, provides a continuing affirmation of the many-sidedness of human activity. In this sense, unalienated

praxis retains many of the characteristics traditionally associated with play, but fundamentally transforms them by destroying their isolation from humanity's primary species-activity. Unalienated *praxis* is neither work nor play—such categories are no longer appropriate since they belong to those ages in which work and play are alienated and thus separate—but rather a form of human activity which overcomes the traditional dichotomy between work and play.

On the Possibility of Unalienated Praxis

The description of unalienated *praxis* developed here makes explicit an ideal which is clearly present in Marx's early writings and which, although seldom made explicit later, also plays a dominant role in his later writings. However, this notion of unalienated *praxis* is a problematic one for a variety of reasons. Not only might one ask whether it is possible in principle to achieve such a condition of unalienated existence, but it is also possible to ask what sense it makes to talk about the characteristics of unalienated *praxis* at this point in history. Marx saw the real dangers involved in concentrating one's attention on visions of a future state—and not the least of these was that of mistaking the vision of the future for the present reality.[50] Is not the attempt to describe the characteristics of unalienated *praxis* itself an instance of alienation—of philosophical alienation? Is it not a flight into ideal, rather than real, solutions—an escape from the actual problems which confront us into a mere word game?

I would suggest that this is not necessarily the case—that, in fact, a close consideration of the nature of unalienated *praxis* is necessary for concrete, revolutionary *praxis* today. Such activity is always a movement toward a goal, and close scrutiny of such goals is a necessity. Particular emphasis on the question of play and leisure is especially appropriate today precisely because of the increase in potential non-work time and the attempts to meet the problem of alienated labor through an increase in leisure time. Such attempts will not solve the problem of alienation, for they simply replace alienated labor with alienated leisure. The alienation found in work and play can only be overcome in unalienated *praxis* in which the necessary division between work and play is itself overcome.

Yet this is mere idle speculation if such an overcoming is impossible. Among the arguments which could be raised against its possibility, there are three major ones which will be considered in this final section. These center

around the relation of human needs to work and play, the relation between the realm of necessity and that of freedom, and the relation between use-value and exchange-value. In each of these three areas, serious arguments can be raised from within Marx's own perspective against the possibility of unalienated *praxis*. I shall develop and evaluate each of these in turn, showing how they further advance our investigation into the notion of unalienated *praxis* as the unity of work and play.

Work, Play and Human Needs

Two arguments, both based on the nature of our needs, can be presented against the possibility of human activity becoming fully unalienated *praxis*. They differ from each other in regard to their specific conceptions of human work. First, it could be argued that work is an activity done under the constraint of our needs, while play takes place precisely when that realm of needs has been set aside. Huizinga has argued that all play theorists stress the disinterested character of play: "Not being 'ordinary' life it stands outside the immediate satisfaction of wants and appetites, indeed it interrupts the appetitive process."[51] Because it is a suspension of the order of everyday existence, play also suspends our need structure for a limited period of time. Thus it could be argued that work must be distinct from play, for work is always done in the service of our needs, while play takes place only when those needs have been temporarily suspended. Insofar as play involves a *temporary suspension* of needs, those needs remain a continuing characteristic of human existence and the overcoming of the division between work and play is impossible.

The second argument is similar to the first insofar as it centers around our needs, but maintains that unalienated *work* takes place only when basic needs have been met. Contrasting human productivity to that of animals, Marx appears to argue in favor of this position in the 1844 manuscripts when he maintains that animals "produce only under the domination of direct physical needs, while man himself produces when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom from such need."[52] Insofar as there must remain a realm dominated by direct physical needs, it could be argued that there must remain a realm of alienated work. Although these arguments differ on the relationship between work and man's needs, they are in agreement on one point: the freedom characteristic of play and unalienated *praxis* is only to be found in a realm beyond that of

our needs. It seems as though both Marx and many play theorists would agree that as long as we are creatures of needs, not all activity can become truly free and thus cannot become unalienated *praxis*.

Both these arguments are based on premises which do not withstand critical examination. The first argument presumes that play really does take place outside of the realm of needs, but the discussion of alienated leisure has shown the way in which the values and needs characteristic of capitalist society (i.e., the need for *having*) dominate contemporary play. Play often only *appears* to transcend the realm of needs, and psychoanalysis has contributed to unmasking this apparent freedom.[53] Both the first and second arguments share a common and inadequate premise: they both conceive of needs only as they exist within capitalist society, viewing those needs as forces which *dominate* us. Such a view is indeed justified under certain historical circumstances, but to take a specific stage in the development of our needs as the unchangeable essence of human needs is indeed to distort human reality and to negate the dialectical character of our development. In the following remarks, I shall outline Marx's position on humanity's needs, showing their dialectical character and the way in which that bears on the relation between work and play, and then consider needs in capitalist society as contrast to those to be found in future communist society, showing the way in which a dialectical conception of human needs provides a theoretical ground for the possibility of attaining unalienated *praxis*.

Human needs are always relational, natural needs expressing our relation to "nature," both in the sense of our natural essence and in the sense of the natural world which belongs to us.[54] This relation is a dialectical one in which history begins with the production of means to satisfy basic material needs, an increase in our powers, and the creation of new needs which arise in this process.[55] There is a continual interaction here, one in which the satisfaction of needs develops new powers and opens up new possibilities, new relationships between humanity and its natural world as well as other humans. Human needs are relational, expressing our relation to our comrades as well as to the natural world—a relation which is being continually transformed through productive activity. In this sense, people participate both directly and indirectly in the creation of each other in relation to their needs. By participating in the satisfaciton of the needs of others, by creating new needs in them, and by allowing their actions to respond to our needs, humanity is direclty creating itself through this need-transforming activity. Indirectly through the transformation of nature and the modes of produc-

tion and social institutions, we accomplish the same end. In this sense, our needs are not static, given in unalterable form, but the dynamic expression of our transformative activity as related to both the natural world and our comrades.

In that section of the 1844 manuscripts dealing with private property and communism, Marx describes the development of humanity's sexual need, showing the way in which the progress of civilization consists in the progressive *humanization* of natural needs and the *naturalization* of species needs. The passage provides an excellent example of Marx's dialectical conception of human needs and his vision of those needs in their fullest development.

> The immediate, natural and necessary relation of human being to human being is the *relation* of *man* to *woman*. In this *natural* species-relationship man's relation to nature is directly his relation to man, as his relation to man is directly his relation to nature, his own *natural* determination. Thus, in this relation is *sensuously revealed*, reduced to an observable *fact*, the extent to which human nature has become nature for man or to which nature has become human nature for him. From this relationship man's whole level of development can be assessed. It follows from the character of this relationship how far *man* has become, and has understood himself as, a *species-being*, a *human-being*. The relation of man to woman is the *most natural* relation of human being to human being. It indicates, therefore, how far man's *natural* behavior has become *human*, and how far his *human* essence has become a *natural* essence for him, how far his *human nature* has become *nature* for him. It also shows how far the *need* of man has become a *human* need, how far the *other* man as a human being has become a need for him, how far he is in his most individual existence at the same time a social being.[56]

This mediation between people and nature is fundamentally social, one which reaches its culmination in a state where people's "...*natural* existence has become (their) *human* existence," resulting in a society which "is the accomplished essential unity of man with nature."[57] Marx's notion of human needs, as developed in his 1844 writings, is one which envisions the eventual, full reconciliation between the natural and the human. We do not become creatures without needs (that would be the humanism without the naturalism, man without nature), nor do we become purely creatures of needs (that would be naturalism without humanism, nature without species-

being); rather, we become beings whose natural needs have become fully *human*. Whereas our natural needs *dominate* us when they are merely natural, they cease to dominate when they are at one with conscious species-existence; they become richer, more complex, fully human. The need, for example, for an object of sexual gratification becomes the fully developed need for another *person* as both a natural and a human being; this does not exclude the sexual aspect at all, but merely excludes being dominated by it (or any other one-sided need which turns the other person into an object).

In contrast to this state in which natural needs become fully human and human needs become natural, humanity in capitalist society is alienated from its natural as well as its human needs. In a passage cited above, it was shown that the worker in capitalist society was alienated from needs in leisure as well as in work: "the animal becomes human and the human becomes animal."[58] The worker tries to *substitute* "animal" needs (i.e., his or her natural needs existing in isolation from the context of full human activity) for human needs, and "human" needs (i.e., the need to create oneself and others as members of the species) are pursued in an unfree, animal way. Instead of an on-going mediation of the natural and the human, we encounter an *inversion* of them. Seen from a different perspective, needs in capitalist society are alienated in another sense: the abstract need for money comes to replace our natural and human needs. "The need for money is, therefore, the real need created by the modern economic system, and the only need which it creates."[59] The needs of the other person become something to be exploited, a weakness which can be the key to getting money from him or her. Production becomes centered around exchange-value, losing its foundation in use-value and human needs. In both the case of the worker and that of the capitalist, humanity in capitalist society is prevented from the full development of its human and natural needs, from the full mediation between the natural and the human which constitutes an index of our whole level of development.

Thus Marx's conception of human needs is a dialectical one, sharply distinguishing between needs as they exist in capitalist society and those needs as they will exist in communist society. To argue that we will always be at least in part dominated by needs and that therefore not all our activity can become free, unalienated *praxis* is to argue on the basis of a conception of needs as they exist in capitalist society. When, however, these needs have been transformed in a communist society, as Marx envisioned it in his early writings, this argument no longer holds, for in ceasing to dominate humani-

ty, these needs lose their hold as an externally-imposed necessity.

The Realm of Freedom and the Realm of Necessity

In these early writings, Marx developed a dialectical concept of needs, of the process of humanization and naturalization of our natural and specifically human needs, which surpassed previous theories of human needs and opened the way for an understanding of how the dichotomy between necessity and freedom could be overcome. This dichotomy, reflected in that between work and leisure, was one which existed only at specific stages in our development, stages characterized by scarcity. Such scarcity may be either the result of natural conditions or created by us, and the critique of capitalist society lays bare the ways in which "artificial" scarcity is created through the exploitation of our needs as well as the ways in which conditions of natural scarcity are perpetuated through the modes of production and distribution of that society. Moreover, throughout Marx's consideration of the question of needs, the traditional dichotomy between material and social needs is overcome. Especially in the 1844 manuscripts and *The German Ideology* the social and historical character of our needs is stressed, and the measure of the level of a society's development is the degree to which our natural needs become fully human and our human needs become fully natural.

All this seems to be contradicted in Marx's well-known discussion of the relationship between the realm of freedom and that of necessity in *Das Kapital*. Discussing the question of what constitutes the real wealth of society, Marx describes his vision of the relationship between freedom and necessity.

> In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where working which is determined by necessity and external purposefulness ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his needs, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of natural necessity expands as a result of his needs; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these needs also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with nature, bringing it under their common control,

> instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite.[60]

In this analysis, Marx himself fails to overcome the categories of the society that he was criticizing and thereby falls into traps that he himself had earlier elucidated. He is, first of all, *reifying* a particular social relationship—in this instance, he takes the limits of a particular stage of production to be "the nature of things" (*der Natur der Sache nach*). The implication that there is an unchangeable character in this relationship ignores the dialectically developing social and economic foundation of the "nature of matter." Second, this description implies a dichotomy between material production and the realm of freedom—genuine human productivity. Yet such a position is also non-dialectical: it is the transformation of *all* production, including material production, into genuine human production which constitutes our authentic possibilities, and such a transformation marks the emergence of a genuine communist society. One of the strengths of Marx's criticisms of German philosophy, materialism, and previous economic theory was precisely his insight into the ultimate untenability of the distinction between the material realm and that of freedom; yet it is precisely this insight which he abandons here. Third, in his comparison of the civilized human with the savage, Marx neglects the *historical* dimension of the transformation of needs which he had established at great length in the 1844 manuscripts and *The German Ideology*. The assertion, "*just as* the savage...*so must* civilized man..." (italics added) clearly negates the genuinely historical character of the development of our needs—civilized humanity's relation to nature is *not* to be understood "just as" the savage's unless one is willing to maintain a non-dialectical and ahistorical view of our relation to nature. Fourth, Marx's assertion that "this realm of natural necessity expands as a result of his needs" fails to take into account the dialectical transformation of this necessity which Marx himself has described in the *Grundrisse*, where he argues that the development of capitalism provides the material conditions under which labor "...appears no longer as labour, but as the full development of activity itself, in which *natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared*; because *a historically*

created need has taken the place of the natural one."[61] This reflects a point already made in Marx's criticism of Feuerbach's concept of nature in *The German Ideology*: nature, and thus natural necessity, are always mediated by people in history, and the direction of this process is toward the transformation of natural necessity into creative determination by human *praxis*. Fifth, there is a second formulation of the dichotomy between freedom and necessity in this passage: that between that which is an end in itself (*Selbstzweck*) and external purposes (*äußere Zweckmäßigkeit*). This formulation is even less tenable,[62] for it is precisely the mediation between intrinsic and extrinsic purposes and values which constitutes the on-going process of unalienated *praxis*. Marx's position in this passage denies the eventual possibility of such a mediation, and this denial is reflected in the suggestion that the working-day be shortened. He is clearly advocating the perpetuation of two separate realms: the realm of necessity is not to be fundamentally transformed, but only decreased.

Ernest Mandel has shown that the view of the relationship between the realm of freedom and that of necessity that Marx developed in *Das Kapital* was already present in the *Grundrisse*. Basing his analysis on the latter work, Mandel argues that the "transformation of the quantitative ratio between work and leisure...will give rise to a qualitative revolution, on the condition that it be integrated into a process of progressive disalienation of labor, consumption, and man himself, through the progressive withering away of commodity production, classes, the state, and the social division of labor."[63] The precise nature of this qualitative revolution remains, however, rather vague, for Mandel maintains at the same time that it is an illusion to think that, "industrial work can ever become 'free' work."[64] Mandel avoids the fundamental issue of the relationship between freedom and necessity and the possibility of unalienated *praxis* by substituting quotation marks for conceptual clarity in this instance. If this qualitative revolution takes place under the conditions enumerated by Mandel, then in what sense would work not be "free"? Certainly it would not be free in the sense of being arbitrary, but it would be free in the sense that it would not be done under the domination of external necessity as is forced labor. As was shown above in the discussion of the characteristics of unalienated *praxis*, the freedom found in this mode of activity is not the arbitrary freedom of play, but the freedom found in our conscious choice to express our individuality and species-being through productive activity.

The problem here is not, in the final analysis, as much a problem with

Mandel's interpretation of Marx's position in the *Grundrisse* as it is with Marx's doctrine of the two realms. The distinction between the realm of freedom and that of necessity negates the notion of unalienated *praxis* as the overcoming of the dichotomy between work and play. Based upon an ahistorical and non-dialectical conception of human needs and natural necessity, it minimizes but nonetheless perpetuates the alienation of labor as something done out of necessity, for extrinsic purposes alone. Marx clearly considers a full humanization of natural necessity to be impossible in principle insofar as he adheres to the doctrine of the two realms. Activities done for their own sake remain in a separate realm from those done for extrinsic purposes, and these two realms can never be fully mediated.

The contrast between the realm of necessity and that of freedom is the division between activity done for externally imposed purposes and that done for its own sake. This is parallel to the difference between the extrinsic purpose and value of an act versus its intrinsic purpose and value. This distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic purpose and value is dealt with on another level in Marx's later writings: that of the difference between use-value and exchange-value. Before concluding this analysis of play and leisure and their relationship to work, we must thus consider the problem of the relationship between use-value and exchange-value insofar as it bears on the question of the relationship between work and leisure.

Use-Value and Exchange-Value

Although a complete explication of Marx's use of the terms "use-value" and "exchange-value" lies beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible to sketch the broad outlines of his criticism of capitalist society in terms of these categories and then to relate this criticism to the problem of alienated labor and leisure and their overcoming in unalienated *praxis*.

In a capitalist society, a thing has value only insofar as it exists as a commodity. As such, it exhibits a two-fold value structure: use-value, which is an expression of quality, and exchange-value, which is an expression of quantity. In a commodity-based society, the only way in which use-value can achieve social expression is as an exchange-value. Such an expression of its value is, however, inadequate and alienating for several reasons. First, the expression of value becomes purely *quantitative* and *abstract* since it is measured purely in terms of its equivalence to money as a universal medium of exchange and is a measure of the amount of labor contained in the pro-

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duct. This negates the qualitative dimension of the product as an expression of the individual's creative activity. Second, the worker produces objects which do not meet his or her own needs (i.e., lack a direct use-value), but which have an exchange-value which will allow the worker to purchase things to satisfy needs. Thus the activity of producing has only an extrinsic value and purpose for the worker, but is not intrinsically valuable or meaningful for her or him. Moreover, the productive forces of society as a whole become directed toward the creation of exchange-values, diverting production away from any necessary concern with fulfilling *human* needs, use-values. Third, insofar as exchange-value is expressed in prices, these can vary according to fluxuations in the market, etc., putting the worker further at the mercy of a form of value relation which dominates him or her. Fourth, since the owners of the means of production make a profit from the surplus value of the worker's labor because the worker has to sell it as a commodity, the worker is alienated from the surplus value created by labor and becomes increasingly dominated ty the accumulation of dead labor in capital. The alienation of labor in capitalist society becomes most evident when the workers, instead of producing in terms of use-value, produce only in terms of the exchange-value of their labor as a commodity. Exchange-value becomes an alien power dominating people, ruling their productive activities, destroying the foundation of those activities by negating their intrinsic value, and transforming our human needs into the abstract need for money and the needs of others into sources for exploitation. The *critical* dimension of this position is clear: the domination of exchange-value in capitalist society separates us from the truly human value and meaning of our activity, our selves, our product, and our comrades which is revealed in use-value, substituting a quantitative, abstract and inhuman form of value for it.

Implicit in the critical function of the distinction between use-value and exchange-value is a notion of what constitutes genuine use-values. Marx never presented an adequate, systematic exploration of this question on its own terms, primarily because his analysis of use-values was directed toward those values as found in capitalist society. In such a society, "activity, regardless of its individual manifestation, and the product of activity, regardless of its particular make-up, are always *exchange-values*, and exchange-value is a generality, in which all individuality and particularity are negated and extinguished."[66] Use-value can only be expressed in terms of exchange-value, and because of this a mystification of the true situation

develops in which the "social character of activity, as well as the social form of the product, and the share of the individuals in production here appear as something alien and objective, confronting the individuals, not as their relation to one another, but as their subordination to relations which subsist independently of them and which arise out of collisions between mutually indifferent individuals."[67] Relations between persons are transformed into relations between things, and this reified relationship is expressed in terms of exchange-value. The dominance of exchange-value in capitalist society is such that use-value can only be expressed socially as exchange-value, thereby losing its specifically human quality. For this reason, it is impossible to consider use-value apart form exchange-value in capitalist society.

Nonetheless, if Marx's critique of capitalist society is to retain its force, he must develop a notion of what constitutes genuine use-values, even though these are not found in their pure form in capitalist society. In *Das Kapital* he defines a use-value as something which satisfies a human need,[68] and this definition offers a foundation for a critical theory of use-values. By being linked to human needs, use-values are integrated into the dialectic of human needs and productive activity discussed above. Seen within this context, use-value would become an expression of a given product's value in relation to the self-transformative process of human work, its value in relation to the full humanization and naturalization of humanity. In this sense, use-value expresses the individual producer's relationship toward oneself as a productive member of the species, toward one's product as a manifestation of one's own humanity and a confirmation of the humanity of one's comrades, toward one's comrades as the ground for the realization of one's own humanity as well as its confirmation, and toward one's own activity as in itself the expression of species-being. This would constitute an adequate notion of use-value and provide a foundation for its critical application to capitalist society, for it calls attention to those elements which are *not* adequately expressed in exchange-value and thereby provides the foundation of a critique of exchange-value as the form of value in capitalist society.

The overcoming of capitalist society involves the eventual overcoming of exchange-value as the form of value, although this may remain in the transition stage of socialism.[69] Bertell Ollman has argued that, while appropriate to capitalist society and analyses of it, "neither use-value nor exchange-value ever come into Marx's descriptions of communism, where each individual, as a conscious and fully cooperating member of the community, produces what he wants and consumes what he needs."[70] Although it is true

that Marx does not use the category of use-value in his scattered descriptions of communist society, it is not clear that this is an adequate reason for rejecting its applicability to such a society. If use-value is defined in terms of human needs, and if these needs are different at different stages in our development, then the definition of "use-value" would appear to vary according to the stage of development to which it is applied. a use-value for a person in communist society would be different from a use-value for one in capitalist society. Nonetheless, one can agree with Ollman in this respect: the form of value in communist society will be one in which the split between use-value and exchange-value will be overcome. The overcoming of this duality will preserve the social character of exchange-value and its rootedness in others' needs, but will negate its purely quantitative, abstract and reified aspects. Simultaneously, it will retain the characteristics of use-value developed in the preceding paragraph, grounding use-values in the authentically human needs of unalienated humanity rather than in the narrow, one-sided needs of humanity in capitalist society. In this sense, a new value form is created, retaining aspects of both use-value and exchange-value as they existed in capitalist society while overcoming the alienating dimensions of both. Insofar as two of the needs which develop in communist society are the need for the other person as a full human being[71] and the need for self-realization through unalienated *praxis*,[72] these are "use-values." Whether one wants to retain the term "use-value" to designate these values as they exist in a transformed state in communist society, or to call them by a new name (as Ollman does), it is nonetheless evident that unalienated *praxis* becomes fully grounded in unalienated human needs, and this new foundation overcomes the split between use-value and exchange-value.

The split between use-value and exchange-value in capitalist society points to a problem: a division between the intrinsic value (meaning and purpose) of human activity and its extrinsic value. Use-value is an expression in capitalist society of the intrinsic value of human activity and the products of such activity. Although in capitalist society such use-value may be narrowly construed because of the stage of development of our needs, it need not remain so in later stages of development. In a similar way, extrinsic value, based on exploitation and domination in capitalist society, may be transformed in a communist society in such a way as to be congruent with the intrinsic value, its fruition rather than its negation. In the concluding paragraph of the third of the 1844 manuscripts, Marx presents a picture of

unalienated exchange (and, implicitly, of what is called here "extrinsic value") which should be considered in conjunction with the description of unalienated production quoted above from Marx's comments on Mill's *Elements of Political Economy*.

> Let us assume *man* to be *man*, and his relation to the world to be a human one. Then love can only be exchanged for love, trust for trust, etc. If you wish to enjoy art you must be an artistically cultivated person; if you wish to influence other people you must be a person who really has a stimulating and encouraging effect upon others. Every one of your relations to man—and to nature—must be a *specific expression* of your *real individual* life that corresponds to the object of your will. If you love without evoking love in return, i.e., if your love as love does not produce an opposite love, if you are not able, by the *manifestation* of yourself as a loving person, to make yourself a *beloved person*, then your love is impotent and a misfortune.[73]

The problem to which Marx is pointing here, and the problem which is expressed in capitalist society in terms of use-value and exchange-value, is that our activities and products have both an intrinsic and an extrinsic value and meaning. Actions are done for their own sake as well as for the sake of others. In capitalist society the intrinsic value and meaning of activities are systematically negated, and their extrinsic meaning and value finds expression not as a value relation between persons but rather as one between things which dominate the individuals involved. This form of value relations is one which alienates people from the intrinsic and extrinsic value and meaning of their acts and products.

This separation of intrinsic and extrinsic value and meaning is directly related to the problem of the relationship between work and leisure in their alienated forms. In effect, alienated work is work done only for exchange-value, activity whose value and meaning are extrinsic to the act itself. Alienated leisure is activity done for its own sake, but which can only find its expression as value in society insofar as it is converted into an exchange-value. If it becomes an exchange-value, however, its specificity and its quality as a free, creative act of a unique indidual are negated; if, on the other hand, it does not become an exchange-value, then it becomes valueless and trivial in a capitalist society.

The problem of overcoming the dichotomy between work and leisure, when stated in these terms, is to overcome the split between intrinsic and extrinsic meaning and value, not by giving leisure activities an exchange-value

or giving work a use-value, but rather by overcoming these value-forms as such in society. In this sense, the dichotomy between work and leisure is one that is expressed in capitalist society in terms of the split between exchange-value and use-value. Neither dichotomy is to be overcome through the assertion of one side of the opposition, but rather through a dialectical overcoming of the opposition itself. Just as the division between use-value and exchange-value is to be overcome through the creation of a new value-form which gives authentic expression to the human relations of unalienated *praxis*, so too work and leisure are overcome through a form of human activity which transcends the alienated aspects of both.

Conclusion

In the preceding analysis, I have tried to show that, although he did not develop it systematically, there is present in Marx's writings both a critical theory of the alienated character of play and leisure in capitalist society and a theory of the overcoming of such alienation. The alienation found in leisure is not to be overcome within the sphere of leisure itself, but rather must involve the overcoming of the very division between work and leisure. When this dichotomy is overcome, a new form of human activity emerges—one which is not adequately designated as either "work" or "play." It has been described here as unalienated *praxis*. In the second section of this paper, the main characteristics of this form of human activity have been developed, and special emphasis has been placed on the transformation of human needs within the process of the emergence of such unalienated *praxis*. In the light of this notion of human needs, it was shown that the overcoming of the division between work and play is not a theoretical impossibility, that there need not remain a perpetual division between the realms of freedom and necessity, and that a new form of value is possible which would overcome the split between use-value and exchange-value. Even where Marx moved away from this vision of unalienated humanity (as, for example, in his discussion of the realms of freedom and necessity), it was shown that this was not necessary if one took the dialectical character of human needs fully into account.

To show that such an overcoming of the dichotomy between work and leisure is not theoretically impossible is not, clearly, to show that in fact this dichotomy will be overcome. Theory alone does not solve real problems, but a theoretical analysis such as this can at least show that certain

theoretical objections to the possibility of overcoming this dichotomy are not well-founded and that attempts to solve the problem of alienation in capitalist society cannot succeed by looking to the realm of leisure alone. While the gradual increase in the amount of free time potentially available to workers in advanced industrial societies seems to hold the promise of a realm of freedom in which the alienation which dominates their existence can be overcome, this is a false hope. Leisure by its very nature in capitalist society is alienated, and the flight to leisure merely extends and reinforces that alienation. Only through an overcoming of the dichotomy between work and leisure can the alienation found in either realm be overcome, and social policies which perpetuate this dichotomy fail to solve the fundamental problem of alienation in contemporary capitalist society. While a critical analysis can show that the increase of leisure time does not offer a solution to the problem of alienation, it remains the task of revolutionary *praxis* to determine whether in fact we shall overcome this alienation through an overcoming of the dichotomy between work and leisure.

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Notes

[1]This is evident, for example, in the critique of the Marxist position given in Josef Pieper's *Leisure. The Basis of Culture*, translated by Alexander Dru (New York: New American Library, 1963), especially in the section, "Excursus on the Proletariat and Deproletarianization." For a more recent presentation and defense of Pieper's position, see John Underwood Lewis, "Leisure, Wonder and Awe," *Philosophy Today*, XVII, 3/4 (Fall, 1973), 197-204; for a critique of Pieper's position, see my article, "On Work and Play: Overcoming a Dichotomy," *Man and World*, VIII, No. 3 (August, 1975), 327-46.

[2]Gajo Petrović, typifying this tendency to stress creativity, maintains that for Marx, "man is free only insofar as the creative in him determines his actions." *Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 128. For a review of some of the problems arising from this emphasis on the early writings of Marx, see especially Ernest Mandel, *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx*, translated by Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), esp. pp. 154-86; Louis Althusser, "On the Young Marx," *For Marx*, translated by Ben Brewster (New York: Random House, 1970) pp. 49-86; Jürgen Habermas, "Literaturbericht zur philosophischen Diskussion um Marx und den Marxismus (1957)," *Theorie und Praxis* (Frankfort aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), pp. 387-463. Unfortunately, Habermas's essay is not included in *Theory and Practice*, the English translation of that work.

[3]Both Herbert Marcuse in *Eros and Civilization* (New York: Random House, 1955) and Norman O. Brown in *Life Against Death* (New York: Random House, 1960) have stressed the theme of play. For a critique of the "infantile" character of such play, see especially Herbert Fingarette, "All Play and No Work," *Humanitas*, V, 1 (Spring, 1969), 5-19 and Erich Fromm, *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1970), 25-31.

[4]Kostas Axelos, for example, takes up the question in his *Marx. Penseur de la Technique* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1961), p. 233, where he poses the question: "Ou bien, l'activité de l'homme, son activité polytechnicienne, sera-t-elle de l'ordre du Jeu?...Y aura-t-il une activité humaine globale, où se fondront dans leur unicité le travail productif et créateur, l'activité poetique, les occupations de récréation, et cette activité une sera-t-elle Jeu?" Axelos does not, however, resolve these questions in regard to Marx, but rather suggests that, with the exception of the passage in *Capital* (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 178, where Marx speaks of man enjoying work "as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers," Marx has nothing to say on the future in terms of play. Axelos clearly ignores Marx's critique of Fourier's position in the *Grundrisse* where he states that, "Labour cannot become play, as Fourier would like." Karl Marx, *Grundrisse. Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*, translated by Martin Nicholaus (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 712. As will be shown below, although Marx has little to say explicitly about play, there is indeed a much more developed theory implicit in Marx's position than Axelos presents. (For Axelos' own theory of play, see especially his *Le Jeu du Monde* [Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1969].)

In contrast to Axelos' position, see Mandel's lucid discussion of the problem of alienated leisure as it exists in the *Grundrisse* in his *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx*, pp. 104-15. In the third section of this article, I shall consider some of the problems arising from Marx's position in the *Grundrisse*, but the first two sections are primarily concerned with Marx's earlier position.

[5]In general, I shall use the word "play" to designate activity done during leisure time. As will become evident later in this paper, play is being defined as activity whose meaning, purpose and value are *intrinsic*—activity done for its own sake—and this stands in contrast to alienated labor, whose meaning, purpose and value are *extrinsic* to the activity itself. However, it should be noted that these categories are descriptive of play and alienated labor primarily as they exist in capitalist society, and the thrust of this paper is to argue that this distinction is without foundation in a future communist society as Marx envisioned it.

In advancing this definition of play, I have not been concerned in this paper with relating it to the contemporary philosophical discussion of the nature of play, since this would take us far afield of our task here. However, the reader may well consult the following: Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in Culture* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), esp. pp. 1-27; Ingeborg Heidemann, *Der Begriff des Spieles* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968); and Jacques Henriot, *Le Jeu* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969).

[6]Although the average work week has declined rather steadily since 1850, it is by no means self-evident that this has actually resulted in an increase in leisure time or that it will do so in the future, although the *potential* for increased leisure time is certainly increasing. For an analysis of some of the problems connected with this, see especially: Sebastian de Grazia, *Of Time, Work, and Leisure* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962), esp. pp. 57-84; Harold L. Wilensky, "The Uneven Distribution of Leisure: The Impact of Economic Growth of 'Free Time'," *Social Problems*, 9, 1 (Summer, 1961), pp. 32-56; John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New*

Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), esp. pp. 363-69; Reginald Carter, "The Myth of Increasing Non-Work vs. Work Activities," *Social Problems*, 18, 1 (Summer, 1970), 52-67. This discussion fails, however, to take into account a critical theory of man's needs as developed in capitalist society (considered below), and in general does not consider the necessity of developing a new category which transcends the work-play dichotomy.

[7]Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, translated and edited by T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), pp. 138, 170 = *Marx Engels Werke* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968), Erzänzungsband, Erster Teil, pp. 524, 548-49. References to the English translations of Marx's works (except the *Grundrisse*) will be followed by the reference to the German edition (abb. MEW). Where necessary, changes in the translation have been made.

[8]Discussing the problem within the context of Maslow's theory of needs, Frederick Herzberg argues that, "A 'hygenic' environment prevents discontent with a job, but such an environment cannot lead the individual beyond a minimal adjustment consisting of the absence of dissatisfaction." *Work and the Nature of Man* (New York: New American Library, 1973), p. 98.

[9]Contemporary American empirical sociology has tended to identify alienation with *feeling* alienated. This is evident, for example, in Melvin Seeman's, "On the Meaning of Alienation," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1959), 753-58, and in the research it inspired. For a critique of this interpretation of alienation, see Wayne Plasek, "Marxist and American Sociological Conceptions of Alienation: Implications for Social Problems," *Social Problems*, 21 (1974), 316-27; Joachim Isreal, *Alienation from Marx to Modern Sociology* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), esp. pp. 205-37. The ontological aspect of Marx's theory of alienation is stressed by István Mészáros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) and by Bertell Ollman, *Alienation. Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

[10]Marx, *Early Writings*, pp. 71, 73 = MEW, EB I, pp. 473, 474.

[11]Cf. Wilensky, "The Uneven Distribution of Leisure," and Carter, "The Myth of Increasing Non-Work Activities."

[12]Marx, *Early Writings*, p. 159 = MEW, EB I, p. 540.

[13]For a critique of the value of an ever-increasing Gross National Product, see Walter A. Weisskepf, *Alienation and Economics* (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 152-80.

[14]Cf. Bero Rigauer, *Sport und Arbeit* (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), esp. pp. 66 ff.

[15]Among the works done within the tradition of contemporary American empirical sociology, see Robert J. Havinghurst and Kenneth Geigenbaum, "Leisure and Life-Style," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV, 4 (January, 1959), 396-404; Joel E. Gerstl, "Leisure, Taste and Occupational Milieu," *Social Problems*, 9, 1 (Summer, 1961), 56-68. For a detailed examination of the ways in which the values of contemporary capitalist society permeate television, see especially *Die Unterhaltung der deutschen Fernsehfamilie. Ideologiekritische Untersuchungen*, edited by Friedrich Knilli (Munich: Karl Hanser Verlag, 1971). These analyses, although directed primarily toward German television, consider a number of programs originally produced in the U.S.A. (e.g., "I Spy" and "High Chapparal"). For an analysis, from a similar viewpoint, of such things as juke boxes, pin-ball machines, bowling, motorcycles, etc., see *Segmente der Unterhaltungsindustrie* (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974).

[16]Marx, *Early Writings*, p. 125 = MEW, EB I, 514—15.

[17]*Ibid.* = *ibid.*, p. 514.

[18]Huizinga stresses the originally ritualistic character of play in *Homo Ludens*, pp. 17 ff; also see Eugen Fink, *Spiel als Weltsymbol* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960), pp. 215 ff.

[19]For an interpretative review of the recent literature in the theology of play, see David L. Miller, "Introduction to the Colophon Edition," *Gods and Games* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. xv-xxx.

[20]Helmuth Plessner has pointed to the way in which play became a problem only with the development of industrial work in "Speil und Sport," *Diesseits der Utopie* (Düsseldorf/Köln: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1966), pp. 160-72; C. Wright Mills has made a similar point in his excellent short essay, "The Unity of Work and Leisure," *Power, Politics, and People*, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Ballantine Books, n.d.), pp. 347-52.

[21]This view goes back at least to Aristotle, *Politics*, VIII, 3, 1337b ff., where *leisure* is done for its own sake, but play as amusement or relaxation is not done for its own sake. As stated above (fr. 5), I am not using "play" in either of those senses, but to designate leisure activity.

Herbert Marcuse in, "On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labor in Economics," translated by Douglas Kellner, *Telos*, 16 (Summer, 1973), p. 15, has argued Aristotle's thesis that play as amusement of relaxation is for the sake of work, but does not explicitly consider the difference between leisure and play. For a discussion of this topic in Aristotle, see de Grazia, *Of Time, Work, and Leisure*, pp. 9 ff.

[22]*Grundrisse*, p. 712; also see p. 611.

[23]Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie. Marx Engels Werke* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1969), p. 186. Marx develops a similar position when he argues that communism is not to be viewed either as egoism or self-sacrifice, but rather that this dichotomy is abolished in communism (*ibid.*, p. 229; also see *Grundrisse*, p. 325).

[24]Karl Marx, *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, edited and translated by Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 281 = MEW, EB I, p. 462.

[25]*Ibid.* = *ibid.*, pp. 462-63.

[26]*Early Writings*, p. 127 = MEW, EB I, p. 5 16.

[27]Bertell Ollman in his *Alienation* has stressed the primacy of relation in Marx's philosophy.

[28]Cf. *Grundrisse*, p. 273.

[29]Cf. *Early Writings*, p. 126 = MEW, EB I, p. 516.

[30]The example of building castles and playing children is a prominent one in philosophical discussions of play—found in Heraclitus, Nietzsche and Heidegger. For a critical discussion of this, see Ingeborg Heidemann, "Zur ästhetischen Deutung der Welt. Heraklit: Fragment 52—αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων, πεττεύων παιδὸς ἡ βασιληίη," *Festschrift Carl Diem zur Vollendung des 80. Lebensjahres*, edited by Werner Körbs, Heinz Mies, Klemens C. Wildt (Frankfurt aM, 1962), pp. 17-27.

[31]The influence of psychoanalysis is decisive here on two levels: (1) uncovering the hidden meaning of play activity by treating it as a particular type of symbolic activity, and (2) by establishing play situations (therapy, free association, etc.) as ways of getting at the un-

conscious. Note, for example, the changed significance of playing at the seashore and building castles for Carl Jung in *Memories, Dreams, and Reflections*, translated by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 173 ff.

[32]Huizinga, for example, explores the ways in which play involves a suspension of the everyday world, but he does not explore the resultant discontinuity of the self.

[33]*Capital*, I, p. 178 = MEW, XXIII, p. 193.

[34]*Early Writings*, p. 157 = MEW, EB I, p. 537.

[35]*Ibid.*, p. 158 = *ibid.*, p. 539.

[36]Jürgen Habermas maintains that Marx, "deludes himself about the nature of reflection when he reduces it to labor...he eliminates reflection as such as a motive force of history...*Marx conceives of reflection according to the model of production*." (*Knowledge and Human Interests*, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro [Boston: Beacon Press, 1972], pp. 43, 44.) Although a full treatment of this problem must await another day, I would maintain in contrast to Habermas's position that Marx indeed does recognize the role of reflection within the framework of unalienated *praxis*, but finds that it is indeed absent in *alienated* labor. This results in the separation of imagination from *praxis*.

[37]*Early Writings*, p. 125 = MEW, EB I, p. 514.

[38]*Ibid.*, p. 155 = MEW, EB I, p. 544.

[39]Cf. Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, Second Edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

[40]*Early Writings*, p. 126 = MEW, EB I, pp. 515-16.

[41]*Grundrisse*, p. 488.

[42]*Early Writings*, p. 157 = MEW, EB I, p. 538.

[43]*Ibid.*, p. 128 = MEW, EB I, pp. 516-17.

[44]*Capital*, I, p. 178 = MEW, XXIII, p. 193. The English edition omits the final clause, "i.e., has already pre-existed ideally."

[45]Jacques Henriot has argued that, "En raison de son caractère essentiellement dialectique, la *praxis* ne peut 'se produire' que par suite d'un jeu creusé entre le monde et l'homme, entre l'homme et lui-même, prenant conscience de soi et du monde." *Le Jeu* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), p. 102.

[46]*Early Writings*, p. 125 = MEW, p. 514.

[47]*Early Writings*, p. 128 = MEW, EB I, p. 516.

[48]*Die deutsche Ideologie*, MEW, III, p. 33. David McLellan, in "Marx's View of the Unalienated Society," *The Review of Politics*, 31, 4 (October, 1969), pp. 462-63, has pointed out that this description applies only to the rural worker at best, and that it was probably a jibe against Stirner. Shlomo Avineri, in "Marx's Vision of Future Society," *Dissent* (Summer, 1973), pp. 326-27, has pointed out the similarity between Marx's description and Fourier's plan for an average day, and echoes McLellan's charge of provincialism. Later in *Die deutsche Ideologie*, I think Marx gives a clear indication of his intent in this passage, stressing the foundation of such activity in human needs and the way in which the variety of such activities overcomes the gap between theory and *praxis* and lends universality to theory. "Bei einem In-

dividuum z. B., dessen Leben einen graßen Umkreis manniffaltiger Tätigkeiten und praktischer Beziehungen zur Welt umfaßt, das also ein vielseitiges Leben führt, hat das Denken denselben Charakter det Universalität wie jede andere Lebensäußerung dieses Individuums. Es fixiert sich daher weder als abstraktes Denken, noch bedarf es weitläufiger Reflexionskunststücke, wenn das Individuum vom Denken zu einer andern Lebensäußerung übergeht. Es ist immer von vornherein ein nach *Bedürfnis* verschwindendes und sich reproduzierendes Moment im Gesamtleben des Individuums." MEW, III, p. 246.

[49]William Leon McBride, "Jean-Paul Sartre: Man, Freedom, and *Praxis*," in *Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty*, edited by George Schrader, Jr. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), p. 287.

[50]These problems are well presented in Jean-Yves Calvez's discussion of philosophical alienation in his *La Pensée de Karl Marx* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1956), pp. 103-57.

[51]Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, p. 9. A similar separation of play from the world of natural wants is developed by Gustav Bally, *Vom Spielraum der Freiheit* (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co., 1966).

[52]*Early Writings*, p. 128 = MEW, EB I, p. 517.

[53]See the discussion of unalienated *praxis* as free above, and fns. 30-31.

[54]*Early Writings*, pp. 206-07 = MEW, EB I, p. 578.

[55]*Die deutsche Ideologie*, MEW, III, pp. 28 ff.

[56]*Early Writings*, p. 154 = MEW, EB I, p. 535.

[57]*Ibid.*, p. 157 = *ibid.*, p. 538.

[58]*Ibid.*, p. 125 = *ibid.*, pp. 514-15.

[59]*Ibid.*, pp. 168, 192 = *ibid.*, pp. 547, 565-6.

[60]*Capital*, III, 820 = MEW, XXV, p. 828.

[61]*Grundrisse*, p. 325. Italics added.

[62]The idea of the realm of freedom "blossoming forth" from that of necessity could be fully dialectical, but within this context is clearly not. The "blossoming forth" metaphor recalls Hegel's description of the dialectic (G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, translated by J. B. Baillie [New York: Macmillan, 1949], p. 68), but Marx's description is not carried through in a fully Hegelian manner, for the two realms remain necessarily separate.

In his article, "On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labor," Marcuse defends this distinction between two realms, but as Douglas Kellner, in his "Introduction to 'On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labor'," *Telos*, 16 (Summer, 1973), pp. 3 ff., has pointed out, Marcuse was later to abandon this position as he became increasingly under the influence of the Frankfurter school.

[63]Mandel, *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx*, p. 113.

[64]*Ibid.*

[65]Mandel himself later admits the possibility of unalienated *praxis* in his excellent review of the secondary literature (pp. 187 ff.), but nonetheless maintains the separation of the two realms.

[66]*Grundrisse*, p. 157.

[67]*Ibid.*

[68]*Capital*, I, pp. 35 ff., 177 = MEW, XXIII, pp. 49 ff., 192 f.

[69]On the question of whether it is possible to go beyond this transitional stage, see especially Avineri, "Marx's Vision of Future Society."

[70]Ollman, *Alienation*, p. 187.

[71]*Early Writings*, p. 154 = MEW, EB I, p. 535.

[72]*Ibid.*, pp. 164-65 = *ibid.*, p. 544.

[73]*Ibid.*, pp. 193-94 = *ibid.*, p. 567.