


The Philosophy of Limits and Life-Shaping Philosophy

Robert Hanna



(Philosophics, 2022)

In the early 1770s, the original, working title of what eventually became Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in the 1780s (Kant, 1781/1787/1997) was *The Limits of Sense and Reason*:

[I] was then making plans for a work that might perhaps have the title, "The Limits of Sense and Reason." I planned to have it consist of two parts, a theoretical and a practical. The first part would have two sections, (1) general phenomenology and (2) metaphysics, but this only with regard to its method. (Letter to Marcus Herz, 21 February 1772 [Kant, 1759-1799/1999: p. 132, Ak 10: 129])

But ironically, title-wise, "The Limits of Sense and Reason" is a far better guide to the aims and contents of the first *Critique* than its published title. For what Kant shows in that revolutionary book is that, (i) on the one hand, the unconstrained use of our innate capacity for reason (including conceptualization, judgment, and logical inference) leads to the failed attempt to know things in themselves or *noumena*, and to self-contradiction and paradox, and above all to the depreciation or even denial of empirical cognition—especially in natural science—and thus to skepticism, and to the Scylla of *extremist intellectualism*, whereas (ii) on the other hand, the unconstrained use of our innate

capacity for sensibility (including sense perception, episodic memory, and sensory imagination) leads to the failed attempt to reduce all knowledge to acquaintance with mere sensory appearances or *phenomena*, and to subjectivism, egoism, and relativism, and above all to the depreciation or even denial of non-empirical cognition—especially in logic, mathematics, and philosophy—and thus again to skepticism, this time to the Charybdis of *extremist anti-intellectualism*. The upshot is that unlimited reason and unlimited sense lead oppositely but equally to epistemic and metaphysical disaster.

Moreover, and even more importantly, Kant argues in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that only a judicious cognitive fusion of reason *and* sensibility, mutually limiting one another, driven by a reflective self-awareness of the origins, scope, and limits of our several innate capacities, together with a Socratic self-awareness of our own “human, all-too-human” nature—i.e., our finitude, fallibility, and thoroughgoing normative imperfection in every other respect—makes authentic human knowledge really possible. We know prospectively all, but certainly only, those manifestly real things that “human, all-too-human” creatures like us are inherently capable of knowing, and nothing beyond that, even despite our characteristic pretensions to such transcendent knowledge, and indeed even in the face of our passionate longing for such transcendent knowledge—as Jean-Paul Sartre so aptly put it, our passionate but ultimately self-defeating and useless *desire to be God* (Sartre, 1943/1956: p. 755). The result is a philosophically defensible version of rationalism that’s *properly mitigated* by empiricism, and the direct result of limiting reason by means of sensibility, and sensibility by means of reason (Hanna, 2001, 2006a).

Moreover, these Kantian insights about the necessity of acknowledging the origins, scope, and limits of our innate capacities, for the purposes of achieving an authentic human knowledge that expresses the complementarity of sensibility and reason, can be accepted quite independently of the much-controverted question of the intelligibility and truth of the metaphysics of *transcendental idealism* (see, e.g., Hanna, 2001, 2006a, 2015: esp. ch. 7). Therefore, bracketting the issue of transcendental idealism, Kant’s 18th century *philosophy of limits* can be smoothly exported to our contemporary 21st century philosophical situation. Indeed, in a series of recent essays, Joseph Wayne Smith has explored the limits of formal logic, statistical methodology in empirical science, the cognitive science of human rationality, and philosophy, all in a contemporary context (Smith, 2023-2024, 2024a, 2024b, 2024c). Considered superficially, one might think that this exploration is essentially negative and skeptical. But on the contrary, upon a closer examination, we can clearly see that although the investigation proceeds initially via skepticism, its upshot is essentially positive and anti-skeptical. In other words, it’s only by means of healthy, sane skeptical method, when taken together with Socrates’s Delphic-Oracle-inspired thesis that the ultimate aim of philosophy is to “know thyself,”

that authentic human knowledge can be finally achieved. As Smith puts it in the cases of logic and philosophy respectively:

In general, we have seen that the logico-semantical paradoxes remain unsolved, even by the paraconsistency school which has taken the paradoxical sentences to be “true contradictions.” And, even if the paraconsistent school is right about the limits of classical logic, their own position faces crippling objections, namely that they do not escape *all* the paradoxes, so that they therefore fail to produce a satisfactory general response to the logical challenge of the paradoxes, which the once radical move of positing “true contradictions” was supposed to solve. For the most precise of all sciences, this is indeed a major epistemological king hit. It is ironic, that increased technical sophistication in formal logic has led to a type of process of self-undermining, where all former “logical truths” and once taken-for-granted principles, such as even *modus ponens*, face counter-examples (McGee, 1985). An epistemological skeptic would see this as a major objection to the rationality of the discipline itself, and a major epistemological crisis that seemingly is intractable, at least from the perspective of Analytic philosophy.... However, as an alternative, the arguments given here can be taken to show the limits of the Analytical philosophical framework, and the need to move to a non-formalist approach to logic, as has been previously explored by Robert Hanna (Hanna, [2006b]), and today, by many others in the informal logic schools. Moreover and finally, this situation makes a strong case for philosophical limitationism and epistemic humility, according to which as Rae Langton puts it, “[t]here are inevitable constraints on what we can know, inevitable limits on what we can become acquainted with” (Langton, 1998: p. 2). (Smith, 2024a: p. 18)

My aim in this essay is to present a general philosophical argument for the position of *epistemic humility*, or to use in a modified sense a term that I’ve used in my environmental and ecological research on the limits to growth, *philosophical limitationism* (Smith & Positano, 2010; Catton & Dunlap, 1980). In general, as Rae Langton puts it, “[t]here are inevitable constraints on what we can know, inevitable limits on what we can become acquainted with” (Langton, 1998: p. 2).... The argument I’ve presented above would seem to indicate that philosophy cannot be a guide to the truth, or even approximate truth, about reality, for many reasons, not forgetting the issue of even getting to first base and deciding what counts as “truth,” namely, the problem of the criterion. We have seen how major philosophical research programs, such as physicalism, and analytic philosophy itself have ultimately failed, just as programs before them, such as logical positivism, came aground and were intellectually ship wrecked. Does this mean that philosophy is therefore bankrupt, in all its forms, and should therefore be abandoned? Or given this failure, should the intellectual bar be lowered instead? The short answer is no, because the very act of proposing the bankruptcy of philosophy, is itself a philosophical thesis, and puts one back upon the “wheel” of philosophy (Smith, 1988). Instead of embracing skepticism, we should boldly proclaim that the traditional quest to *defeat skepticism*, and thereby put human knowledge on a secure footing, as traditionally conceived, as Descartes hoped, should be discarded. Nor for that matter can justification be divorced

from a cultural context; it is not unreasonable to accept as defeasible most widely-held common sense beliefs, such as the existence of the external world, and consciousness, unless shown with compelling evidence and argument to be delusional. We have to start somewhere, so why not start with what is at hand, and then sort *that* out further if necessary? Moreover, Clifford's principle, that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" or argument (Clifford, 1879; Fogelin, 1994; pp. 114-115), should be rejected, since a strict application of this hyper-rationalism leads to justification skepticism. As Marcus Arvan pointed out in "Has Contemporary Philosophy Over-Fetishized Rigor?," the giants of past philosophy, like Kant, were not concerned with rigor for rigor's sake, but instead were concerned with formulating a new "big picture," and thereby charting a worldview that presents a revolutionary vision of existing problems (Arvan, 2012). The same point can be made about all the past greats of Western philosophy, including Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Mill, Rousseau, Hegel, and so on. It is highly unlikely that their work would be accepted for publication if it had been done in the context of contemporary professional academic philosophy, and sent to any Anglo-American Analytic philosophy journal, or peer reviewed by mainstream academic publishers.... Arvan then concludes that the over-emphasis on rigor can dull and suppress creative and revolutionary thought:

But now what fosters revolutionary thought in a philosopher? Not, I think, an emphasis on rigor. Rigor and Revolutionary Thought, it seems to me, inherently pull in opposite directions. The more rigorous an argument is—the more of a "sure thing" its premises are—the less revolutionary it is apt to be. Rigor narrows the way we think about things. Rigor tells us: "If you can't justify each of your premises to an intelligent, skeptical reader, your argument is a non-starter." Yet, again, how many Great Works of philosophy actually satisfy this stricture of Rigor? I wager: not many. (Arvan, 2012)

In other words, valorizing rigor yields philosophical *rigor mortis*. But since we are inevitably committed to some kind of philosophy if we are to continue living (and even the people in the night clubs pursuing sex, drugs and rock 'n' roll, have a "philosophy" of sorts, hedonism), one worthy choice would be to opt for a *life-shaping philosophy*, as proposed by [Robert] Hanna, which rejects the intellectual imperialism of professional academic Western philosophy, with its careerism, conformity, coercive authoritarianism, dogmatism, esotericism and hyper-specialization, and hyper-rationalism, because such a discipline is "fundamentally theoretically, emotionally, morally, and/or socio-politically at odds with the rest of humanity" (Hanna, [2022a]: p. 49), and replacing that crisis-ridden, self-stultifying philosophical paradigm with a realistically optimistic dignitarian humanist alternative (Hanna, [2020a]). This essay has offered further reasons for abandoning that received paradigm of philosophy and making that radical replacement. (Smith, 2024b: pp. 23-24)

Framed with the philosophy of limits, what would this "radical replacment" for "the received paradigm of philosophy," i.e., *life-shaping philosophy*, or LSP for short, look like? Early Marx's famous philosophical thesis, "[t]he philosophers have only *interpreted*

the world in different ways; the point is to *change it*" (Marx, 1964: p. 69), is *half-right* and *half-wrong*. Yes, leaving aside Marx himself and a few other philosophical activists (see, e.g., Hanna, 2020a), philosophers have only ever variously *interpreted* the world. But no, the point *isn't* that philosophers should act upon the world precipitately and unreflectively, as if they were being shot out of a revolutionist's rifle. That would be yet another failed attempt at an unlimited solution to a fundamental "human, all-too-human" problem whose actual solution requires the judicious introduction of limits. Instead, the point is that (i) philosophers should critically and reflectively *shape human thinking about the world*, so that (ii) people, not only individually but also social-institutionally, *can freely shape and change their own lives* for the better or even the best, and then finally (iii) all of them, philosophers and non-philosophers alike, *can act freely together* in order to change the world for the better or even the best. This is the basic rationale behind LSP.

More specifically, LSP is a collaborative and interdisciplinary philosophical enterprise that flows naturally from (i) two co-authored books by Michelle Maiese and me, *Embodied Minds in Action* (Hanna and Maiese, 2009) and *The Mind-Body Politic* (Maiese and Hanna, 2019), (ii) three essays co-authored by Otto Paans and me (Hanna and Paans, 2020, 2021, 2022), and (iii) a research topics collection for *Frontiers in Psychology*, co-edited by Maiese, Arran Gare, Joel Kiverstein, Joel Krueger, and me (Maiese et al., 2023). In turn, then, LSP segues into *The Shape of Lives To Come* project, or The SLTC project for short. The name of the project is a play on the title of H.G. Wells's 1933 classic futurological science-fiction novel, *The Shape of Things to Come*, shortly thereafter made into a spectacular 1936 movie produced by Alexander Korda, *Things to Come*. Riffing on the themes of Wells's novel, but also going substantially beyond his mechanistic worldview, what we're principally concerned with in The SLTC project is the present situation and future prospects of people's lives in a thoroughly nonideal natural and social world.

People are not only sapient, sentient, and principled persons—i.e., rational, conscious, and self-conscious free agents (Hanna, 2018a, 2018b), but *also* they're essentially embodied living organisms, card-carrying members of the biological species *homo sapiens*, and above all they're "human, all-too-human." The general theory of the present situation and future prospects of people's lives in a thoroughly nonideal natural and social world is what, in fewer words, we call *political philosophy of mind* (see also Gallagher, 2013; Slaby and Gallagher 2014; Slaby, 2016a, 2016b; Hanna, 2020b; and Maiese and Hanna, 2019). So, SLTC is a collaborative and interdisciplinary project in political philosophy of mind.

Political philosophy of mind falls fully within the broad scope of the first three "E"s of the contemporary "4E" approach to human cognition, by affirming that all human

mindedness is *embodied*, *embedded*, and *enacted* (see, e.g., Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher, 2018). More precisely, the “4E”s are: (i) *embodied* (i.e., human minds are inherently realized in living organismic animal bodies), (ii) *embedded* (i.e., human minds are inherently external-context-sensitive or indexical), (iii) *enacted* (i.e., human minds are inherently dynamically and practically implemented), and (iv) *extended* (i.e., human minds inherently possess external vehicles of consciousness and/or intentionality, aka “the extended mind”). We reject the extended-mind component, for reasons explained in (Hanna, 2011). Moreover, although many 4E theorists are *anti*-representationalists, by contrast we affirm a *dual-content cognitive semantics* version of representationalism, based on the categorical distinction between *conceptual content* and *essentially non-conceptual content*, for reasons explained elsewhere (Hanna, 2015: esp. chs. 1-3).

Granting those preliminary assumptions, then the philosophical reasoning lying behind The SLTC project has 15 basic steps, as follows.

1. Human minds are sapient, sentient, necessarily and completely embodied, and identical to the global dynamic and intentional-action-guiding structures of suitably complex living human organisms (*the essential embodiment thesis*). (Hanna and Maiese, 2009; Hanna, 2011).
2. As essentially embodied and inherently dynamic, human minded animals are also inherently enactive and environmentally embedded (*the enactivity-and-embeddedness thesis*) (Hanna and Maiese, 2009).
3. As inherently enactive and environmentally embedded, human minded animals fundamentally engage with the world, other animals, and their own lives, in an inherently and naturally affective way, including desires, emotions, and feelings of all kinds (*the situated affectivity thesis*) (Hanna and Maiese, 2009; Maiese, 2011, 2014).
4. As inherently and naturally affective, human minded animals are, necessarily, sociable social animals (*the sociable sociality thesis*) (Maiese and Hanna, 2019).
5. Social institutions partially but not completely, yet still significantly, and also mostly pre-reflectively, causally determine, form, and irreducibly normatively guide (henceforth, for short, “shape”) our essentially embodied rational human minded animal lives, for worse or for better (*the social-institutional mind-shaping thesis*) (Maiese and Hanna, 2019: esp. ch. 2).

6. There exists a fundamental distinction between (i) *destructive, deforming* social institutions, that frustrate and warp true human needs, and (ii) *constructive, enabling* social institutions, that satisfy and sustain true human needs (*the two-kinds-of-social-institutions thesis*) (Maiese and Hanna, 2019: esp. chs. 2-3 and 6-8).

7. Enacting salient changes in the structure and complex dynamics of a social institution produces corresponding salient changes in the structure and complex dynamics of the essentially embodied minds of the participants, for worse or for better (*the enactive-transformative thesis*) (Maiese and Hanna, 2019: esp. chs. 2-3 and 6-8).

8. Although destructive, deforming social institutions shape our human minds and our human lives in an inherently bad/oppressive, unhealthy, and enslaving/heteronomous way, nevertheless it's also really possible to devolve such institutions and also simultaneously to create constructive, enabling social institutions that operate in an inherently good/non-oppressive, healthy, and emancipatory/autonomous way (*the social devolution-social creation thesis*) (Maiese and Hanna, 2019; Hanna, 2018c: esp. parts 2-3).

9. There exists a categorical metaphysical distinction between (i) *the mechanistic worldview*, which says that everything in the world is nothing but either a *formal automaton* (i.e., a Turing-computable and recursive information-processing system) or a *natural automaton* (i.e., a Turing-computable and recursive, entropic, and deterministic or indeterministic causal system), and (ii) *the neo-organicist worldview*, which says (iia) that everything in the world is essentially or fundamentally uncomputable, negentropic, processual, purposive, and self-organizing, (iib) that all mechanical systems are nothing but *systematic abstractions* from organic systems, and (iic) that there's a basic metaphysical and ontological continuity, running from the Big Bang singularity to uncomputable negentropic, time-asymmetric, non-equilibrium thermodynamic energy flows, to living organisms, to conscious minded animals, to conscious, self-conscious, caring, sensibly cognitive, and intellectually cognitive human minded animals with free will and practical agency—i.e., *rational* human minded animals—and finally to social institutions of all kinds. In turn, the full recognition, understanding, and internalization of the worldshaking dual fact that the mechanistic worldview is *false* and the neo-organicist worldview is *true* is (iii) what we call *the neo-organicist turn* (Hanna and Paans, 2020, 2021, 2022; Torday, Miller Jr, and Hanna, 2020; Hanna, 2024a).

10. The *theory of thought-shapers* (TTS) applies the categorical metaphysical distinction between (i) *mechanical* (i.e., computable/recursive, entropic, and deterministic or indeterministic) systems, and (ii) *organic* (i.e., uncomputable/non-recursive, processual, negentropic, purposive, and self-organizing) systems, together with the neo-organicist turn, to fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind and cognition, with comprehensive application to the nature of human thinking in philosophy, the formal and natural sciences, the applied arts and fine arts, the applied sciences, the social sciences, morality, and sociopolitics (Hanna and Paans, 2021). (By *thought-shapers*, we mean any or all of the following kinds of essentially non-conceptual, non-discursive, non-propositional, *representational mental frames*: allegories, analogies, blueprints, catechisms, diagrams, displays, icons, images, lay-outs, metaphors, mnemonics, models, outlines, parables, pictures, scenarios, schemata, sketches, spreadsheets, stereotypes, symbols, tableaux, and templates.¹ Otherwise put, thought-shapers are *essentially non-conceptual contents* that can shape our thoughts *either* in bad, false, and wrong ways, *or* in good, true, and right ways.)

11. Correspondingly, TTS says that all human thinking is really possible only insofar as it's shaped by either (i) mechanical, constrictive thought-shapers in bad, false, and wrong ways, or (ii) organic, generative thought-shapers in good, true, and right ways.

12. Since language is a fundamental and indeed universal social institution, and since all human thinking proceeds by means of language, then the theory of thought-shapers falls directly under the mind-body politic; and if the mind-body politic is true, then both mind-shaping inside social institutions and also thought-shaping in individuals and groups, alike, are forms of human life-shaping.

13. All our essentially embodied rational human thoughts, affects, and intentional actions are shaped by items in the thoroughly nonideal natural and social world that exists beyond and outside our human minded animal bodies, especially including (i) the Earth, i.e., its global topology, causal dynamics, and universally-interconnected organic ecosystems (aka *eco-shaping*), (ii) social institutions (aka *mind-shaping*), and (iii) the essentially non-conceptual cognitive semantics of thought-shapers (aka *thought-shaping*), for worse or for better.

¹ This list isn't intended to be complete: on the contrary, it's open-ended. Moreover, allegories, catechisms, and parables differ slightly from the other items on the list (Hanna and Paans, 2021: section 1).

14. Unfortunately, as things currently are, this all-pervasive life-shaping is all-too-often for the worse.

15. But *if* the generalized life-shaping thesis is true, then it's *also* the case that enacting salient positive changes in social institutions and thought-shapers will radically transform our rational human minded animal lives for the better, or even the best.

The last three steps in the 15-step argument correspond directly to *three life-shaping theses*:

The generalized life-shaping thesis: All our essentially embodied rational human thoughts, affects, and intentional actions are shaped by items in the thoroughly nonideal natural and social world that exists beyond and outside our minded animal bodies, especially including eco-shaping, mind-shaping, and thought-shaping, for worse or for better.

The negative life-shaping thesis: Unfortunately, as things currently are, this all-pervasive life-shaping is all-too-often for the worse.

The positive life-shaping thesis: But *if* the generalized life-shaping thesis is true, then it's *also* the case that enacting salient positive changes in social institutions and thought-shapers will radically transform our rational human minded animal lives for the better, or even the best.

Indeed, it's precisely the positive life-shaping thesis that directly connects The SLTC project with the themes of Wells's futurological novel—even though, ironically enough, and unfortunately, Wells himself was committed to the mechanistic worldview. So as proponents of the neo-organicist turn, we've learned from Wells's mistakes.

Similarly, the positive life-shaping thesis should also be categorically distinguished from the contemporary view called *longtermism*, which, in turn, is a core thesis of the contemporary moral and sociopolitical program called *Effective Altruism*:

"Longtermism" is the view that positively influencing the long-term future is a key moral priority of our time. Three ideas come together to suggest this view. First, future people matter. Our lives surely matter just as much as those lived thousands of years ago—so why shouldn't the lives of people living thousands of years from now matter equally? Second, the future could be vast. Absent catastrophe, most people who will ever live have not yet been born. Third, our actions may predictably influence how well this long-term

future goes. In sum, it may be our responsibility to ensure future generations get to survive and flourish. (Moorhouse, 2021; see also MacAskill, 2022)

More specifically, longtermism says (i) that the merely possible lives of far-off future people—i.e., abstract objects satisfying the conceptual description “human person”—matter just as much as the actual, concrete lives of currently living people, (ii) that the abstract, far-off, merely possible future of humankind or strong-artificial-intelligence (strong AI) duplicates of humankind is just as morally and sociopolitically important as the present situation and the immediate emerging future of actual, concrete humankind, and (iii) that our current choices and actions ought to be directed just as much to influencing the abstract, far-off future of humankind, or of strong AI duplicates of humankind, as they are to influencing the present situation and the immediate emerging future of actual, concrete humankind. In short, longtermism is another paradigm case of seeking an unlimited solution to a fundamental “human, all-too-human” problem whose actual solution requires the judicious introduction of limits.

Therefore, in our view, all three of these longtermist theses are *false*: on the contrary, (i*) the actual, concrete lives of currently living people *matter categorically more than* the merely possible, purely abstract lives of far-off future people, (ii*) the present situation, together with the immediately emerging near-future situation of actual, concrete humankind, are *categorically more morally and sociopolitically important than* the merely possible, abstract, far-off future of humankind or of strong AI duplicates of humankind, and (iii*) our current choices and actions *categorically ought to be primarily directed* to influencing the present situation and the immediate emerging near-future situation of actual, concrete humankind, and *only secondarily directed* to influencing the merely possible, abstract, far-off future of humankind, but *not in any way directed* to influencing the merely possible, abstract, far-off future of strong-AI duplicates of humankind—simply because strong AI duplicates of humankind are in fact synthetic a priori *impossible* (Hanna, 2024b). Moreover, there are other strong arguments against Effective Altruism—or, as we think of it, “defective altruism” (Hanna, 2022; see also Ackermann, 2022); but for the specific purposes of The SLTC project, what’s essential is the categorical difference between the positive life-shaping thesis and longtermism when they’re both framed within the philosophy of limits.

In view of all that, then our core aim in The SLTC project is to present, elaborate, and defend the 15-step argument sketched above, and especially to demonstrate the three life-shaping theses by means of four detailed case studies that apply the negative and positive life-shaping theses to these four vitally important, pressingly urgent, and globally widespread contemporary real-world problems, aka *mega-problems*:

- the mega-problem of guns, gun violence, and in particular of living in the world's one and only gunocracy, i.e., the USA ("gun crazy"), and, as an effective solution to the mega-problem, *enacting gun abolitionism* (see, e.g., Hanna, 2023a, 2023b)
- the mega-problem of our obsessive use of digital technology ("techno-crazy"), and, as an effective solution to the mega-problem, *enacting neo-organic self-cultivation* (see, e.g., Hanna, 2024b)
- the mega-problem of killing ourselves and the Earth by treating it as mere mechanical commodity for advanced technocratic capitalism ("ecocide"), and, as an effective solution to the mega-problem, *enacting the cultivation of our global garden* (see, e.g., Hanna and Paans, 2022), and finally,
- the mega-problem of the industrialization and mechanization of everyday life ("The New Wheel of Ixion"), and, as an effective solution to the mega-problem, *enacting everyday life's reclamation and revivification* (see, e.g., Hanna and Paans, 2022)

Correspondingly, our wholehearted hope is that at least some of the detailed effective solutions we propose in response to these four mega-problems will actually be implemented in the real world as soon as it's humanly possible to do so. In this way, LSP and The SLTC project, both framed within the philosophy of limits, would thereby make it really possible for philosophers to change that real world for the better or even the best, by helping us all, philosophers and non-philosophers alike, to shape and change our own lives for the better or even the best.

REFERENCES

(Ackermann, 2022). Ackermann, R. "Inside Effective Altruism, Where the Far Future Counts a Lot More Than the Present." *MIT Technology Review*. 17 October. Available online at URL = <<https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/10/17/1060967/effective-altruism-growth/>>.

(Arvan, 2012). Marcus Arvan, "Has Contemporary Philosophy Over-Fetishized Rigor?" *The Philosophers' Cocoon*. 15 May. Available online at URL = <<https://philosopherscocoon.typepad.com/blog/2012/05/has-contemporary-philosophy-over-fetishized-rigor.html>>.

(Catton & Dunlap, 1980). Catton, W. R. & Dunlap, R. "A New Ecological Paradigm for Post-Exuberant Sociology." *American Behavioral Scientist* 24: 15-47.

(Clifford, 1879). Clifford, W.K. "The Ethics of Belief." In W.K. Clifford, *Lectures and Essays*. London: Macmillan. Pp. 163-205.

(Fogelin, 1994). Fogelin, R. *Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

(Gallagher, 2013). Gallagher, S. "The Socially Extended Mind." *Cognitive Systems Research* 25: 4-12.

(Hanna, 2001). Hanna, R. *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford Univ. Press. Available online in preview at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/25545883/Kant_and_the_Foundations_of_Analytic_Philosophy>.

(Hanna, 2006a). Hanna, R. *Kant, Science, and Human Nature*. Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford Univ. Press. Available online in preview at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/21558510/Kant_Science_and_Human_Nature>.

(Hanna, 2006b). Hanna, R. *Rationality and Logic*. Cambridge: MIT Press. Available online in preview at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/21202624/Rationality_and_Logic>.

(Hanna, 2011). Hanna, R. "Minding the Body." *Philosophical Topics* 39: 15-40. Available online in preview at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/4458670/Minding_the_Body>.

(Hanna, 2015). Hanna, R. *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge*. THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 5. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Also available online in preview at URL = https://www.academia.edu/35801833/The_Rational_Human_Condition_5_Cognition_Content_and_the_A_Priori_A_Study_in_the_Philosophy_of_Mind_and_Knowledge_OUP_2015 >.

(Hanna, 2018a). Hanna, R. *Deep Freedom and Real Persons: A Study in Metaphysics*. THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 2. New York: Nova Science. Available online in preview at URL = https://www.academia.edu/35801857/The_Rational_Human_Condition_2_Deep_Freedom_and_Real_Persons_A_Study_in_Metaphysics_Nova_Science_2018 >.

(Hanna, 2018b). Hanna, R. *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence: A Study in Moral Philosophy*. THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 3. New York: Nova Science. Available online in preview at URL = https://www.academia.edu/36359647/The_Rational_Human_Condition_3_Kantian_Ethics_and_Human_Existence_A_Study_in_Moral_Philosophy_Nova_Science_2018 >.

(Hanna, 2018c). Hanna, R. *Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism: A Theological-Political Treatise*. THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 4. New York: Nova Science. Available online in preview at URL = https://www.academia.edu/36359665/The_Rational_Human_Condition_4_Kant_Agnosticism_and_Anarchism_A_Theological_Political_Treatise_Nova_Science_2018 >.

(Hanna, 2020a). Hanna, R. "How to Philosophize with a Hammer and a Blue Guitar: Quietism, Activism, and The Mind-Body Politic." *Borderless Philosophy* 3: 85-122. Available online at URL = <https://www.cckp.space/single-post/2020/06/04/BP3-2020-How-to-Philosophize-with-a-Hammer-and-a-Blue-Guitar-Quietism-Activism-and-The-Mind-Body-Politic-pp-85-122>>.

(Hanna, 2020b). Hanna, R. "On Rutger Bregman's *Humankind*: Optimism For Realists, Or, Neither Hobbes Nor Rousseau." Unpublished MS. Available online at URL = https://www.academia.edu/43631182/On_Rutger_Bregmans_Humankind_Minor_revisions_22_September_2020 >.

(Hanna, 2022a). Hanna, R. "Six Studies in The Decline and Fall of Professional Academic Philosophy, And a Real and Relevant Alternative." *Borderless Philosophy* 5: 48-130. Available online at URL = <<https://www.cckp.space/single-post/bp-5-2022-robert-hanna-six-studies-in-the-decline-and-fall-of-professional-philosophy-48-130>>.

(Hanna, 2022b). "Defective Altruism." Unpublished MS. Available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/88480665/Defective_Altruism_October_2022_version>.

(Hanna, 2023a). Hanna, R.) "Gun Crazy: A Moral Argument For Gun Abolitionism." Unpublished MS. Available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/61516955/Gun_Crazy_A_Moral_Argument_For_Gun_Abolitionism_January_2023_version>.

(Hanna, 2023b). Hanna, R. "*Videre aude!* The Weapons Effect and The Banksy Effect." Unpublished MS. Available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/81326698/Videre_aude_The_Weapons_Effect_and_The_Banksy_Effect_March_2023_version>.

(Hanna, 2024a). Hanna, R. *Science For Humans: Mind, Life, Physics, and The New Concept of Nature*. New York: Springer Nature. Forthcoming.

(Hanna, 2024b). Hanna, R. "The Myth of AI, Existential Threat, Why The Myth Persists, and What is to be Done About It." *Borderless Philosophy* 7: forthcoming. Available online in preview at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/114820700/The_Myth_of_AI_Existential_Threat_Why_The_Myth_Persists_and_What_is_to_be_Done_About_It_Forthcoming_in_Borderless_Philosophy_7_2024>.

(Hanna and Maiese, 2009). Hanna, R. and Maiese, M. *Embodied Minds in Action*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Available online in preview at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/21620839/Embodied_Minds_in_Action>.

(Hanna and Paans, 2020). Hanna, R. and Paans, O. "This is the Way the World Ends: A Philosophy of Civilization Since 1900, and A Philosophy of the Future." *Cosmos & History* 16, 2 (2020): 1-53. Available online at URL = <<http://cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/viewFile/865/1510>>.

(Hanna and Paans, 2021). Hanna, R. and Paans, O. "Thought-Shapers." *Cosmos & History* 17, 1: 1-72. Available online at URL = <<http://cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/923>>.

(Hanna and Paans, 2022). Hanna, R. and Paans, O. "Creative Piety and Neo-Utopianism: Cultivating Our Global Garden." *Cosmos & History* 18, 1: 1-82. Available online at URL = <https://cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/1017>>.

(Kant, 1759-1799/1999). Kant, I. *Immanuel Kant: Correspondence, 1759-99*. Trans. A. Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. [1749-1800, Ak 10, 11, 12]

(Kant, 1981/1787/1997). Kant, I. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. [1781, 1787, Ak 3, 4: 1-252]

(Langton, 1998). Langton, R. *Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

(MacAskill, 2022). MacAskill, W. *What We Owe the Future*. New York: Basic Books.

(Maiese, 2011). Maiese, M. *Embodiment, Emotion, and Cognition*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

(Maiese, 2014). Maiese, M. "How Can Emotions Be Both Cognitive and Bodily?" *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 13: 513–531.

(Maiese and Hanna, 2019). Maiese, M. and Hanna, R. *The Mind-Body Politic*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available online in preview at URL = https://www.academia.edu/38764188/The_Mind-Body_Politic_Preview_Co-authored_with_Michelle_Maiese_forthcoming_from_Palgrave_Macmillan_in_July_2019_>.

(Maiese et al., 2023).) Maiese, M., Gare, A., Kiverstein, J., Krueger, J. and Hanna, R. "Editorial: The Shape of Lives to Come." *Frontiers in Psychology*. 22 March. Available online at URL = <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1154577/full>>.

(Marx, 1964). Marx, K. *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology & Social Philosophy*. Trans. T.B. Bottomore. New York: McGraw-Hill.

(McGee, 1985). McGee, V. "A Counterexample to Modus Ponens." *Journal of Philosophy* 82: 462-471.

(Moorhouse, 2021). Moorhouse, F. "Longtermism: An Introduction." 27 January. *Effective Altruism*. Available online at URL = <https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/longtermism>>.

(Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher, 2018). Newen, A., De Bruin, L., and Gallagher, S. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

(Philosophics, 2022). "Limits of Reason and Critical Thinking." *Philosophics*. 27 September. Available online at URL = <https://philosophicsblog.wordpress.com/2022/09/27/limits-of-reason-and-critical-thinking/>>.

(Sartre, 1943/1956). Sartre, J.-P. *Being and Nothingness*. Trans. H. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library.

(Slaby, 2016a). Slaby, J. "Mind Invasion: Situated Affectivity and the Corporate Life Hack." *Frontiers in Psychology* 7: 1-13. Available online at URL = <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00266/full>>.

(Slaby, 2016b). Slaby, J. "Relational Affect." Available online at URL = https://www.academia.edu/25728787/Relational_Affect>.

(Slaby and Gallagher, 2014). Slaby, J. and Gallagher, S. "Critical Neuroscience and Socially Extended Minds." *Theory, Culture, & Society* 1-27. Available online at URL = https://www.academia.edu/7314050/Critical_Neuroscience_and_Socially_Extended_Minds>.

(Smith, 1988). Smith, J.W. *The Progress and Rationality of Philosophy as a Cognitive Enterprise: An Essay on Metaphilosophy*. Aldershot UK: Avebury.

(Smith, 2023-2024). Smith, J.W. "The Limits of Reason: Cognitive Psychology, The Epistemological Crisis, and Epistemic Humility." *Against Professional Philosophy*. In six installments, 31 December 2023 – 4 February 2024. Available online at URL = <https://againstprofphil.org/2024/02/04/the-limits-of-reason-cognitive-psychology-the-epistemological-crisis-and-epistemic-humility-6/>>.

(Smith, 2024a). Smith, J.W. "The The Limits of Philosophy: Its Disenchantment and A Case for Epistemic Humility." *Against Professional Philosophy*. In five installments, 11 February – 10 March. Available online at URL = <https://againstprofphil.org/2024/03/10/the-limits-of-philosophy-its-disenchantment-and-a-case-for-epistemic-humility-5/>.

(Smith, 2024b). Smith, J.W. "The Limits of Logic: Paradoxes and The Failure of Formal Logic." *Against Professional Philosophy*. In four installments, 17 March – 7 April. Available online at URL = <https://againstprofphil.org/2024/03/17/the-limits-of-logic-paradoxes-and-the-failure-of-formal-logic-1/>.

(Smith, 2024c). Smith, J.W. "The Limits of Statistical Methodology: Why a 'Statistically Significant' Number of Published Scientific Research Findings are False." *Against Professional Philosophy*. Forthcoming.

(Smith & Positano, 2010). Smith, J. W. & Positano, S. *The Self-Destructive Affluence of the First World: The Coming Crisis of Global Poverty and Ecological Collapse*. Lewiston NY: Edwin Mellen Press.

(Torday, Miller Jr, and Hanna, 2020). Torday, J.S., Miller, W.B. Jr, and Hanna, R. "Singularity, Life, and Mind: New Wave Organicism." In J.S. Torday and W.B. Miller Jr, *The Singularity of Nature: A Convergence of Biology, Chemistry and Physics*. Cambridge: Royal Society of Chemistry, 2020. Ch. 20, pp. 206-246.