

Part III

Between Analysis and
the Continent

PROOF

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10 Life-changing Metaphysics

Rational Anthropology and its Kantian Methodology

The field of philosophy ... can be brought down to the following questions:

1. *What can I know?*
2. *What ought I to do?*
3. *What may I hope?*
4. *What is the human being?*

... The last [question] is the most necessary but also the hardest.

(Kant *JL* 9: 25)¹

Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his own self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another. This immaturity is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding! is thus the motto of Enlightenment.

(Kant *WE* 8: 35)

¹ For convenience, throughout this essay I cite Kant's works in parentheses. The citations include both an abbreviation of the English title and the corresponding volume and page numbers in the standard 'Akademie' edition of Kant's works: *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Königlich Preussischen (now Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. Reimer [now de Gruyter], 1902). For references to the first *Critique*, I follow the common practice of giving page numbers from the A (1781) and B (1787) German editions only. Because the

[T]wo things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence (*Ehrfurcht*), the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: *the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me*. I do not need to search for them and merely conjecture them as though they were veiled in obscurity or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence.

(Kant *CPrR* 5: 161–2)

Here there is no place that does not see you. You must change your life.
(Rilke)²

I. INTRODUCTION

I think that authentic philosophy is what I call *rational anthropology*. Rational anthropology, in turn, is a philosophically *liberationist* – that is, an ethically, religiously, and politically *radical* re-working of Kant's Critical theoretical and practical philosophy in a contemporary context.

The Kantian methodology of rational anthropology contains six basic theses:

- (i) that there is *no deep difference* between philosophy and the history of philosophy;
- (ii) that there is a fundamental distinction between (a) *works of philosophy*, and (b) *philosophical theories*, such that the category of philosophical works is essentially wider and more inclusive than the category of philosophical theories – and more generally, that philosophical theorizing is only one way of creating and presenting authentic philosophy;

Akademie edition contains only the B edition of the first *Critique*, I have also consulted the following German composite edition: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. W. Weischedel, Immanuel Kant Werkausgabe III (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968). For references to Kant's *Reflexionen*, that is, entries in *Kants handschriftliche Nachlaß* – which I abbreviate as 'R' – I give the entry number in addition to the Akademie volume and page numbers. The translations from the *Reflexionen* are my own. I generally follow the standard English translations of Kant's works, but have occasionally modified them where appropriate.

² 'Archaic Torso of Apollo', trans. S. Mitchell, lines 13–14.

- (iii) that theories in *real metaphysics* are possible, by reverse-engineering theories of manifest reality from phenomenologically self-evident insights about the primitive fact of purposive, living, essentially embodied, conscious, intentional, caring, rational, and moral human experience;
- (iv) that real metaphysical theoretical explanation is a form of philosophical *abduction*, that is, 'inference to the best explanation', that I call *transcendental explanation*;
- (v) that the primary aim of authentic philosophy is to *change one's own life*, with a further, ultimate aim of *changing the world* through free, existentially authentic, morally principled action, hence all philosophy is liberationist, with radical ethical, religious, and political aims, or what I call, collectively, *radical enlightenment*; and finally
- (vi) that what I call *transcendental idealism for sensibility*, when fused with a Kantian aesthetics of the beautiful and sublime in external nature and a Kantian self-evident phenomenology of 'reverence' (*Ehrfurcht*) for external nature and human nature, jointly provide a transcendental explanation for radical enlightenment.

In sections 3–7, I will briefly unpack and defend the six basic theses of rational anthropology. But before I do that, I want to contrast its philosophical methodology with other contemporary alternatives.

2. RATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY VS. ANALYTIC METAPHYSICS, THE STANDARD PICTURE, AND SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM

Rational anthropology is committed to what I call *real, human-faced, or anthropocentric metaphysics*. Real metaphysics in this sense starts with the primitive, irreducible fact of purposive, living, essentially embodied, conscious, intentional, caring, rational, and moral human experience, and then reverse-engineers its basic metaphysical theses and explanations in order to conform strictly to all and only what is *phenomenologically self-evident* in human experience.

Real metaphysics therefore rejects the idea of any theoretically fully meaningful, non-paradoxical ontic commitment or cognitive access to non-apparent, non-manifest, 'really real' entities that

are constituted by intrinsic non-relational properties, that is, to 'noumena' or 'things-in-themselves' (see Hanna 2016a). Such entities are logically, conceptually, or 'weakly metaphysically' possible, but strictly unknowable by minded animals like us, both as to their nature, and as to their actual existence or non-existence. In this sense, real metaphysics is *methodologically* eliminativist about noumena. Therefore, real metaphysics rejects all *noumenal realist metaphysics*, including contemporary *Analytic metaphysics*.³

In the first half of the twentieth century, the new and revolutionary anti-(neo)Kantian, anti-(neo)Hegelian philosophical programs were Gottlob Frege's and Bertrand Russell's *logicism*, G. E. Moore's *Platonic atomism*, and the 'linguistic turn' initiated by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, which yielded The Vienna Circle's *logical empiricism*, and finally its nemesis, W. V. O. Quine's critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction (see Hanna 2001). Logical empiricism also produced a domestic reaction, *ordinary language philosophy*. Powered by the work of H. P. Grice and Peter Strawson, ordinary language philosophy became *conceptual analysis*. In turn, Strawson created a new 'connective', that is, holistic, version of conceptual analysis, that also constituted a 'descriptive metaphysics' (see Strawson 1959; 1992). Strawson's connective conceptual analysis gradually fused with John Rawls' holistic method of 'reflective equilibrium' and Noam Chomsky's psycholinguistic appeals to intuitions-as-evidence, and ultimately became the current *Standard Picture* of mainstream analytic philosophical methodology (see, e.g., Jackson 1998).

Coexisting in mainstream contemporary philosophy alongside the Standard Picture, is also the classical Lockean idea that philosophy should be an 'underlabourer' for the natural sciences, especially as this idea was developed in the second half of the twentieth century by Quine and Wilfrid Sellars, as the reductive or eliminativist, physicalist, and scientific doctrine of *scientific naturalism*, and again in the early twenty-first century in even more sophisticated versions, as 'experimental philosophy', a.k.a. 'X-Phi', and the

³ The leading figures of Analytic metaphysics include David Lewis, David Chalmers, Kit Fine, Ted Sider, and Timothy Williamson; and some of its canonical texts are (Lewis 1986), (Sider 2011), (Chalmers 2012), and (Williamson 2013).

doctrine of *second philosophy* (see, e.g., Quine 1969; Sellars 1963; Maddy 2007).

From the standpoint of rational anthropology and its real metaphysics, what is fundamentally wrong with the Standard Picture is its intellectualist, coherentist reliance on networks of potentially empty, non-substantive *concepts* (see also Unger 2014), and above all, its avoidance of the sensible, essentially non-conceptual side of human experience and human cognition, which alone connects it directly to what is manifestly real (see Hanna 2015a: esp. Chs 1–3).

Correspondingly, what is wrong with scientific naturalism/X-Phi/second philosophy is its reduction or elimination of the primitive, irreducible fact of human experience (see Hanna and Maiese 2009).

Rational anthropology and its Kantian methodology are all about *the rational human condition*, and not all about noumenal entities, coherent networks of concepts, or fundamentally physical, essentially non-mental, facts.

3. PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY: NO DEEP DIFFERENCE

In freely going back and forth between Kant's philosophy and contemporary philosophy, I am applying the following strong metaphilosophical principle that I call *The No-Deep-Difference Thesis*:

There is no fundamental difference in philosophical content between the history of philosophy and contemporary philosophy.

In other words, in doing contemporary philosophy one is thereby directly engaging with the history of philosophy, and in doing the history of philosophy one is thereby directly engaging with contemporary philosophy. And in authentic philosophy, there is no serious distinction to be drawn between the two.

What I mean by The No-Deep-Difference Thesis is that every authentic philosophical work is a logically governed attempt to say something comprehensive, illuminating, and necessarily (or at least universally) true about the rational human condition and our deepest values, including our relationships to each other and to the

larger natural and abstract worlds that surround us, and that in order to convey this basic content it does not matter at all *when* the work was created or *when* the work is interpreted.

If I am right about this thesis, then it cuts three ways: *first*, it means that everything in the history of philosophy also belongs substantively to contemporary philosophy; *second*, it means that everything in contemporary philosophy also belongs substantively to the history of philosophy; and *third*, it means that Quine was completely wrong when he (reportedly – there seems to be no published source for this) wickedly and wittily said that there are two kinds of philosophers: those who are interested in the history of philosophy, and those who are interested in philosophy. In fact, there is really only one kind of authentic philosopher, and whether s/he likes it or not, s/he should be deeply interested in the history of philosophy.

The sub-discipline called ‘History of Philosophy’ is philosophy, as philosophical as it gets, and all philosophy is also History of Philosophy, as historical as it gets. Those who on the contrary are Deep Differentists must hold that History of Philosophy is at best an enterprise in historical scholarship with a superficial philosophical inflection, but *not* philosophy as such, and that philosophy in effect always begins anew, from argumentative Ground Zero, with every new philosophical work that is created. This *metaphilosophical occasionalism* seems to me not only very implausible as a way of thinking about the relation between philosophy and its own history, but also apt to trivialize and undermine the very practice of authentic philosophy itself.

4. WORKS OF PHILOSOPHY VS. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES: PRESENTATIONAL HYLOMORPHISM AND POLYMORPHISM

In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant says that there are ‘**aesthetic idea[s]**’, by which he means:

[a] representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., **concept**, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible ..., [and] [o]ne readily sees that it is the counterpart (pendant)

of an idea of reason, which is, conversely, a concept to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate.

(Kant *CPJ* 5: 314)

In other words, an aesthetic idea is a non-empirical, metaphysical representation, like an 'idea of pure reason', but also *non*-discursive and *non*-conceptual, hence linguistically *inexpressible* by means of concepts, propositions, or Fregean 'thoughts', precisely to the extent that it is a product of human sensible imagination. Kant himself does not make this point, but I think that the doctrine of aesthetic ideas has profound meta-philosophical implications: *philosophy need not necessarily be theoretically expressed*. Correspondingly, as I mentioned above, I think that there is a fundamental distinction between (i) works of philosophy and (ii) philosophical theories, such that the category of 'philosophical works' is essentially wider and more inclusive than the category of philosophical theories – and more generally, philosophical theorizing is only one way of creating and presenting philosophy, as important as it is.

The aim of philosophical theories, according to rational anthropology, is to provide philosophical explanations that lead to essential, synoptic insights about the rational human condition, guided by the norms of propositional truth and logical consistency, by means of conceptual construction and conceptual reasoning. A similarly open-minded conception of philosophical theorizing, in the tradition of connective conceptual analysis, was developed by Robert Nozick in his influential book, *Philosophical Explanations* (1981). But I think that Nozick's conception is still too much in the grip of the deeply wrongheaded, scientistic idea that all philosophy *must* be modeled on natural science, mathematics, or logic.

According to rational anthropology, the aim of philosophical works, *as such*, is to present insights about the rational human condition and the larger world around us, with synoptic scope, and a *priori*/necessary character, tracking categorical normativity and our highest values, with the ultimate goal of radical enlightenment. But this can be achieved even without concepts, propositions, arguments, or theories, in an essentially non-conceptual way, by presenting imagery, pictures, structures, and so on, that have strictly universal and strongly modal implications, and categorically normative force. These essentially non-conceptual insights could *also* be called 'truths', if we

use the term 'truth' sufficiently broadly – as in 'the truth shall set you free'. My basic point is that philosophy should be as much aimed at being *inspiring and visionary*, as it is at being *argumentative and explanatory*.

Pivoting on that basic point, here is a proposal for five disjunctively necessary, individually minimally sufficient, and collectively fully sufficient criteria for something *W* – where *W* is a 'work', any intentional human product, whether an object (material or intentional), or performance – to count as a 'work of philosophy' –

- (i) *W* provides a philosophical theory or a visionary worldview (or both);
- (ii) *W* negatively or positively engages with earlier or contemporary philosophical ideas;
- (iii) *W* expresses and follows a philosophical method;
- (iv) *W* contains an explicit or implicit 'philosophy of philosophy', a metaphilosophy;
- (v) *W* deals with some topic or topics germane to the rational human condition, within a maximally broad range of issues, encompassing epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, history, culture, society, politics, aesthetics, art, formal and natural science, religion, and so-on.⁴

Given how I defined the term 'work', by my use of the term 'works' in the phrase 'works of philosophy', I mean something as broad as its use in 'works of art'. So there is no assumption or presupposition whatsoever here that works of philosophy must be *written or spoken texts*, although obviously many or most works of philosophy have been and are written or spoken texts. Correspondingly, I want to put forward two extremely important metaphilosophical theses of rational anthropology:

- (i) the thesis of *presentational hylomorphism* in works of philosophy (PHWP), and
- (ii) the thesis of *presentational polymorphism* in works of philosophy (PPWP).

⁴ I'm extremely grateful to Otto Paans for proposing this basic list of criteria in e-mail discussion.

PHWP says:

There is an essential connection, and in particular, an essential *complementarity*, between the presentational form (*morphê*) of philosophical works and their philosophical content (*hyle*).

'Content' here is *cognitive-semantic content*, but this content can be either (i) conceptual, or (ii) essentially non-conceptual (see Unger 2014), and also it can be either (iii) theoretical content, or (iv) non-theoretical content, including, aesthetic/artistic, affective/emotive, pragmatic, moral, political, or religious content. Also, (i) and (ii) cross-cut with (iii) and (iv). Hence there can be conceptual content that is either theoretical or non-theoretical, and there can be essentially non-conceptual content that is either theoretical or non-theoretical.

The *first* thing that PHWP implies, is the intimate connection between truly creative, ground-breaking works of philosophy, and truly creative, original forms of literary and spoken philosophical expression. Thus Socrates created philosophical works entirely by conversation; Plato did it by writing dialogues; Aristotle did it by presenting (it seems) nothing but lectures; Descartes wrote meditations; Locke and Hume wrote treatises; Kant wrote the Critiques; Kierkegaard wrote strange pseudonymous books; Nietzsche wrote poetry and aphorisms; Wittgenstein wrote the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, both of them completely original, completely different, and equally uncategorizable, and so on.

The *second* thing that PHWP implies is that since all works of written and spoken philosophy are essentially connected to their literary style and expressive vehicles, then it is a mistake to impose a needlessly restrictive stylistic and expressive straight-jacket on works of philosophy, for example, the standard professional 'journal essay', '200+ page book', and 'philosophy talk'.

And a *third* thing that PHWP implies is that since the standard view of philosophical content in the Analytic tradition – whether as logical analysis, linguistic analysis, conceptual analysis, Analytic metaphysics, or scientific naturalism – is that the content of philosophy is exclusively conceptual and theoretical, then recognizing the essential non-conceptuality and non-theoreticality of philosophical content, completely opens up the way we should be thinking about works of philosophy, in three ways.

First, all written and spoken philosophy is in fact shot through with imagery, poetry, rhetorical devices, and speech-acts of various kinds. *Second*, philosophy need not necessarily be presented (exclusively) in written or spoken form. There could be works of philosophy that are cinematic, diagrammed or drawn, painted, photographed, musical (instrumental or voiced), sculpted, performed like dances or plays, and so on, and so on, and perhaps above all, mixed works combining written or spoken forms of presentation and one or more non-linguistic forms or vehicles. *Third*, if philosophical content is as apt to be essentially non-conceptual or non-theoretical as it is to be conceptual or theoretical, then there are vast realms of philosophical meaning that very few philosophers, even the most brilliant and great ones, have ever even attempted to explore.

Therefore, in full view of PHWP, we also have PPWP:

Philosophy can be expressed in any presentational format whatsoever, provided it satisfies PHWP.

From the standpoint of rational anthropology, and looking towards the philosophy of the future, this is a truly exciting thesis.

5. RATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND REAL METAPHYSICS

Kant discovered the metaphysics of *transcendental idealism* between the publication of his seminal proto-Critical essay of 1768, 'Concerning the Ground of the Ultimate Differentiation of Directions in Space', and 1772. Indeed, the philosophical implications of the 'Directions in Space' essay almost certainly triggered the major proto-Critical philosophical [break](#) that Kant famously reports when he says in one of the *Reflexionen* that 'the year '69 gave me great light' (R 5037, 18: 69). More precisely, what Kant had discovered between 1768 and 1772 is what I have called *transcendental idealism for sensibility* (see also Hanna 2016b). In 1772, Kant told Marcus Herz that if the human mind conformed to the world, whether phenomenal or noumenal, then *a priori* knowledge would be impossible (PC 10: 130–1); but by 1770 Kant already also held that *a priori* knowledge of the phenomenal world is actual and therefore really possible in mathematics, hence the phenomenal world must conform to the non-empirical sensible

structure of the human mind, and more specifically must conform to our *a priori* representations of space and time, since that is what makes mathematics really possible (*ID* 2: 398–406).

So transcendental idealism for sensibility says that the apparent or phenomenal world fundamentally conforms to the essentially non-conceptual *a priori* forms of human sensibility, our representations of space and time. Kant worked out explicit proofs for transcendental idealism for sensibility in the Inaugural Dissertation and again in the Transcendental Aesthetic in the first *Critique*. The simplest version of the proof, provided in the Transcendental Aesthetic, goes like this:

- (1) Space and time are either (i) things in themselves, (ii) properties of/relations between things in themselves, or (iii) transcendently ideal.
- (2) If space and time were either things in themselves or properties of/relations between things in themselves, then *a priori* mathematical knowledge would be impossible.
- (3) But mathematical knowledge is actual, via our pure intuitions of space and time, and therefore really possible.
- (4) Therefore, space and time are transcendently ideal.

(Kant CPR A 23/B37–8, A38–41/B55–8)

In a nutshell, then, Kant's thesis of transcendental idealism says that the basic structure of the apparent or phenomenal world necessarily conforms to the pure or non-empirical (hence *a priori*) structure of human cognition, and not the converse (*CPR* B xvi–xviii). Or in other words, Kant is saying that the phenomenal world fundamentally conforms to the *a priori* structure of the human mind, and it is also *not* the case that the human mind fundamentally conforms to the phenomenal world, or indeed to any non-apparent or *noumenal* world. So if Kant is correct, then he is saying that the world in which we live, move, and have our being (by which I mean the phenomenal natural and social world of our ordinary human existence) is fundamentally dependent on *our* minded nature, and not the converse. If transcendental idealism is true, then we cannot be inherently alienated from the world we are trying to know, as global epistemic sceptics claim, and human knowledge – not only *a priori* knowledge, but also *a posteriori* knowledge – is therefore really possible (Hanna 2015a: esp. Chs 3 and 6–8).

According to rational anthropology and Kant alike, *real*, or transcendental idealist, metaphysics must be evidentially grounded on human experience. Or otherwise put, real metaphysics reverse-engineers its basic metaphysical theses and explanations in order to conform strictly to all and only what is *phenomenologically self-evident* in human experience. By 'phenomenologically self-evident' I mean this:

A claim C is phenomenologically self-evident for a rational human subject S if and only if (i) S's belief in C relies on directly given conscious or self-conscious manifest evidence about human experience, and (ii) C's denial is either logically or conceptually self-contradictory (i.e., a Kantian analytic self-contradiction), really metaphysically impossible (i.e., it is a Kantian synthetic a priori impossibility), or pragmatically self-stultifying for S (i.e., it is what Kant calls 'a contradiction in willing' in the *Groundwork*).

This leads directly to what I call *the criterion of phenomenological adequacy for metaphysical theories*:

A metaphysical theory is phenomenologically adequate if and only if it is evidentially grounded on all and only phenomenologically self-evident theses.

By this criterion, contemporary Analytic metaphysics is clearly phenomenologically *inadequate*, so is classical noumenal metaphysics more generally, and so is scientific naturalism, whereas by sharp contrast, Kant's metaphysics of transcendental idealism is, arguably, fully phenomenologically adequate.

In the B Preface to first *Critique*, Kant notes that radically unlike seventeenth- and eighteenth-century *metaphysics*, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century *physics* entered the 'highway of science' (*Heeresweg der Wissenschaft*) by virtue of a 'sudden revolution in the way of thought' (Kant *CPR* Bxii). This thought-revolution consisted in shifting from the empiricist idea that our rational human *a priori* knowledge of necessary or essential properties of objects is somehow derived by Baconian induction from individual or collective samples, to the idea that *a priori* knowledge is generated by *self-knowledge* of the spontaneous cognitive activity of human theoretical reason in non-empirically introducing formal features into its mental representations of objects. With that basic thought

in place, Kant's philosophy of physics smoothly transitions into his real metaphysics. Here is his basic line of argument.

Manifest material or physical nature is rationally comprehensible via natural scientific investigation, and thereby knowable *a posteriori*, only to the extent that it is governed according to principles or laws that have the epistemic, modal, non-sensory, purposive, and normative properties of necessary *a priori* truths, but are nevertheless also *empirical*, in that these principles and laws bind together apparent, phenomenal, or manifest material or physical objects and states-of-affairs that are themselves actual-world bound, and contingent. Indeed, it is precisely the principle-governedness or causal-law-governedness of manifest actual-world bound, contingent material or physical nature that makes it *objective*, and therefore a proper subject for the authentic *objectual a priori* science of physics. So, odd as it might at first seem, even an *empirical* science like physics is an authentic science only and precisely to the extent that it has a *non-empirical* foundation that of course includes both logic and mathematics, but also extends *beyond* the purely logico-mathematical part of its foundation into the necessary and objectual *a priori* law-governed *causal* connections between actual-world bound, contingent manifest material things and states-of-affairs.

Now the causal natures of these manifest material things and states-of-affairs are knowable *a posteriori* in all their specificity by means of experimental investigations that involve not only Baconian (i.e., simple colligative, descriptive, and generalizing) induction, but also another method only partially anticipated by Bacon, namely what I will call *Kantian abduction*, or Kantian *inference-to-the-best-explanation*. The theory of Kantian abduction is developed by Kant during both his Critical period and also his post-Critical period, in his scattered and all-too-brief remarks on 'the method of those who study nature' (*CPR* Bxviii–Bxix n.), 'the empirical affinity of the manifold' (*CPR* A113–14), 'empirical laws' or 'particular laws' (*CPR* A127–8 and B163–5; *Pröl* 4: 318–22), and also under the rubrics of what he calls the 'regulative use of the ideas of pure reason', the 'hypothetical use of reason' and 'reflective judgment' (*CPR* A642–68/B670–96; *CPI* 20: 211–17, 5: 179–81).

In any case Kantian abduction, as exemplified in the B Preface by Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl, is not itself *merely* an empirical or a

posteriori method, but in fact systematically closes the epistemic and semantic gap between empirical/*a posteriori* generalizations and non-empirical/*a priori* principles and causal natural laws. It does *not* do so, however, by what classical Logical Empiricist philosophy of science calls *the hypothetico-deductive method*, according to which general propositions about the material or physical world, originally derived by induction, are laid down, more or less arbitrarily, like extra axioms added to first-order classical logic, and then particular propositions about empirical consequences deduced from these axioms, which in turn are tested by observations. For such a procedure would be unable to distinguish between, on the one hand, inductive hypotheses that are *noumenal*, and therefore humanly unknowable and anthropocentrically meaningless, and, on the other hand, humanly knowable *empirically meaningful* hypotheses that are specifically grounded on the objectively valid and objectively real metaphysics of rational human experience, transcendental idealism.

By sharp contrast to the hypothetico-deductive method, then, Kantian abduction does *not* operate by induction + analytic stipulation + deduction + observation, but instead operates by *synthetic a priori* ‘*counterfactual*’, or *subjunctive conditional*, reasoning. Thus, according to the Kantian real modal semantics of counterfactual conditionals that I am using, a conditional proposition of the form,

$$P^{\circ} \rightarrow Q$$

which in English says ‘If if P *were* the case, then Q *would be* the case’, and is therefore a counterfactual or subjunctive conditional proposition, is true if and only if:

Given the smallest restricted class of logically possible worlds, each member of which has the same basic transcendental structure as the apparent or manifest actual natural world, that is, *the class of humanly experienceable worlds*, and is also consistent with the truth of P, then, in every member of this class, the truth of P synthetically necessitates the truth of Q.

Granting this truth-definition, then according to Kantian abduction, natural science advances inferentially from:

- (i) the complete set of schematized synthetic *a priori* Principles of the Pure Understanding, which, in turn, collectively specify the basic transcendental structure of the apparent or manifest actual natural world, and thereby determine the smallest restricted class of logically possible worlds, that is, *the class of humanly experienceable worlds*, each member of which has the same basic transcendental structure as the manifest actual natural world, and is also consistent with the truth of some general empirical natural causal law proposition P,

together with

- (ii) P, which is partially derived by induction, but which also specifically reflects the creative and imaginative insight (a.k.a. the 'genius') of the individual natural scientist who formulates P, in whom '[genius] gives the rule to **nature**' (*CPJ* 5: 308), and which is postulated as the hypothetical antecedent of a subjunctive conditional of the form,

If, given the schematized Principles of Pure Understanding, P
were true in the experienceable worlds $W_1, W_2, W_3 \dots W_n$,

to

- (iii) a synthetically *a priori* entailed proposition Q in all those experienceable worlds, as the consequent of that same subjunctive conditional of the form,

... then Q *would be* true in the experienceable worlds $W_1, W_2, W_3 \dots W_n$,

then

- (iv) compares and contrasts that synthetic *a priori* counterfactual or subjunctive conditional implication Q with what is supplied by direct observational evidence in the actual world,

and then

- (v) also compares and contrasts the physical explanation provided by the counterfactual or subjunctive conditional $P^{\circ} \rightarrow Q$ with all the other relevant possible sufficiently good physical explanations of the same actual apparent, phenomenal, or manifest natural facts, thus ruling out the worry that the explanation provided by $P^{\circ} \rightarrow Q$ is only 'the best of a bad lot', and not the best *overall* explanation,

and then

- (vi) asserts the general proposition P as the true synthetic *a priori* representation of a natural causal law governing dynamic interactions and processes in the apparent or manifest actual natural world, by Kantian inference-to-the-best-explanation (see also Douven 2011; Lipton 1991).

Correspondingly, much later in the first *Critique*, we learn that philosophical reasoning, and more specifically metaphysical reasoning, is (i) inherently conceptual and *a priori*, like logic, but at the same time, (ii) synthetic *a priori*, *objectual*, and objectively valid, like mathematics and physics, yet also (iii) non-constructive, unlike mathematics, and also (iv) not the direct result of *empirical* reasoning constrained by abduction or inference-to-the-best-explanation, unlike natural science or physics, nevertheless also at the same time (v) *non-empirically* abductive, and also necessarily *indirectly* related to abductive empirical reasoning in natural science, via what Kant calls *transcendental deduction* (CPR Axvi–xvii, A84–92/B116–24) and *transcendental proof* (CPR A782–94/B810–22).

In this way, Kant thinks that there is a deep analogy between the kind of *experimental* reasoning that natural scientists like Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl engage in, and his own *abductive counterfactual* approach to philosophical reasoning via transcendental idealism.

But Kant's analogical appeal to the experimental reasoning of Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl isolates only the *first* phase of a Kantian abduction, which adds a hypothetical antecedent general empirical natural causal law proposition P – which is derived by

induction, together with the creative and imaginative insight of some individual natural scientist, in whom '[genius] gives the rule to **nature**' (*CPJ* 5: 308) – to the complete set of schematized synthetic *a priori* Principles of the Pure Understanding. These Principles, in turn, collectively specify the basic transcendental structure of the apparent, phenomenal, or manifest actual natural world, and thereby determine the smallest restricted class of logically possible worlds, that is, the class of experienceable worlds, each member of which has the same basic transcendental structure as the manifest actual natural world, and is also consistent with the truth of P. Then Kantian abduction completes its first stage by advancing, via the subjunctive synthetic *a priori* conditional $P^{\circ} \rightarrow Q_{\Delta}$ to the truth of Q. By contrast to this first phase of reasoning, however, the *experimental* phase in Kantian abduction isolates the *second* phase of reasoning, in which the truth of Q is tested against the manifest facts of the natural world. In the *third* phase of a Kantian abduction, it is inferred that, amongst all the good possible *natural scientific or physical* explanations of Q, P yields the best physical explanation of Q. And then in the fourth and final phase of a Kantian abduction, it is inferred that, amongst all the good possible *metaphysical* explanations of Q, the complete set of schematized synthetic *a priori* Principles of the Pure Understanding, together with P, together with transcendental idealism, yields the best possible metaphysical explanation of Q, namely *the transcendental explanation*, or 'transcendental proof', of Q. Furthermore, transcendental idealism, by being a real metaphysics of *human experience*, satisfies the phenomenological criterion of adequacy for metaphysical theories. So every Kantian *natural scientific abduction*, via *counterfactuals* is also, at least potentially, the basis of a Kantian *real metaphysical abduction*, via *transcendental proof* (*CPR* Bxii n.).

6. RATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT

In the eleventh of his *Theses on Feuerbach*, Marx wrote that 'philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in different ways; the point is to *change* it'. I completely agree with him that the ultimate aim of philosophy is to change the world, not merely interpret it. So Marx and I are both *philosophical liberationists*: that is, we both

believe that philosophy should have radical political implications. But I also sharply disagree with him, insofar as I think that the primary aim of philosophy, now understood as rational anthropology, and its practices of synoptic reflection, writing, teaching, and public conversation, is *to change our lives*. Then, and only then, can we act upon the world in the *right way*.

Ironically, although perhaps altogether understandably, in view of the very real risks of political and religious dissent and unorthodoxy in eighteenth-century Europe, Kant's own political theory, as formulated in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, part 1, the *Rechtslehre* is sharply out of step with the central ideas of his own moral philosophy (see Hanna 2016c). The *Rechtslehre*, in fact, presents a fairly run-of-the-mill and explicitly anti-revolutionary, hence politically mainstream and safe, version of classical individualist liberalism, in the social-contract tradition of Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, and Rousseau, plus constitutional monarchy and/or parliamentarianism, plus a peace-securing internationalism.

But emphatically on the contrary, I think that a highly original, politically radical, and if not revolutionary, then at least robustly State-resistant, State-subversive, and even outright civilly disobedient *cosmopolitan, existentialist* version of *anarchism* that I call *existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism* (see Hanna and Chapman 2016) very naturally flows from Kantian ethics (see Hanna 2015b), Kantian philosophy of religion, and Kantian political anthropology. Roughly, the idea is that if we take Kant's famous injunction *to have the moral courage to use your own understanding*, and apply this morally courageous act not merely to 'the public use of reason' (that is, to intellectual activity, writing, and speech or self-expression in the broad sense of 'free speech'), but also to our individual choices, our individual agency, our shared social life, and especially to what Kant quite misleadingly calls 'the private use of reason' (that is, to our social lives as functional role-players, or functionaries, within the State, including, e.g., citizenship or public office), then the result is existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism. Then and only then, in my opinion, can we understand the last sentence of 'What is Enlightenment?' as it truly ought to be understood, namely as formulating a vision of Kantian 'maximalist' or *radical* enlightenment (Fleischacker 2013: 7):

When nature has unwrapped, from under this hard shell [of the ‘crooked timber of humanity’ (*IUH* 8: 23)], the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to *think* freely, the latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of *freedom* in acting) and eventually even upon the principles of *government*, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, *who is now more than a machine*, in keeping with his dignity.

(*WE* 8: 41–2)

To be sure, neither the term ‘existentialism’ nor the term ‘anarchism’⁵ existed until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But insofar as existentialism was substantially anticipated by certain lines of thought in Pascal’s seventeenth century writings (see Clarke 2012: esp. §6), and insofar as the very idea of cosmopolitanism was already a well-established notion in political philosophy by the time Kant came to write about it (see Kleingeld and Brown 2013: esp. §1), and insofar as philosophical and political anarchism, as a radical political thesis and doctrine, was substantially anticipated by certain lines of thought in Rousseau’s and William Godwin’s eighteenth century writings (see Bertram 2012: esp. §3.1; and Philp 2013: esp. §3), it is clear that Kant belongs to an emergent existential cosmopolitan anarchist tradition in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. In any case, insofar as it is at once existentialist, Kantian, cosmopolitan, and philosophically and politically anarchist, rational anthropology in its life-changing aspect constitutes a fundamental project in Kantian radical enlightenment.

I fully realize that even when it has been helpfully reduced to a philosophical label, ‘existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism’ is still rather a mouthful. So what, more precisely, do I mean by it?

1. By *existential* (see also, e.g., Crowell 2012),⁶ I mean the primitive motivational, or ‘internalist’, normative ground of the philosophical and political doctrine I want to defend, which is the fundamental, innate need we have for a wholehearted, freely-willed

⁵ As opposed to ‘anarchy’, popularly meaning ‘pandemonium, social-political chaos, and/or universal moral nihilism’, which has been around since at least the mid-eighteenth century – including Kant’s own use of ‘anarchy’ at *CPR* A13, Percy Shelley’s radical poem, *The Masque of Anarchy*, and so on.

⁶ For an extended response to the classical ‘formalism’, ‘rigorism’, and ‘universalism’ worries about Kantian ethics, see (Hanna 2015b: esp. Chs 1–2).

life *not essentially based* on egoistic, hedonistic, or consequentialist (e.g., utilitarian) interests, a.k.a. *the desire for self-transcendence*, while at the same time fully assuming the natural presence – a.k.a. the *facticity* – of all such instrumental interests in our ‘human, all too human’ lives. In a word, the existential ideal of a rational human wholehearted autonomous life is the ideal of *authenticity*.

2. By *Kantian*, I mean the primitive objective, or ‘externalist’, normative ground of the philosophical and political doctrine I want to defend, which is the recognition that the fundamental, innate need we have for a wholehearted, freely willed, non-egoistic, non-hedonistic, non-consequentialist life, which I call *the desire for self-transcendence*, can be sufficiently rationally justified only in so far as it is also a life of *principled authenticity*, by which I mean *principled wholehearted autonomy*, or having a *good will* in Kant’s sense, guided by respect for the dignity of all real persons,⁷ under the Categorical Imperative.

3. By *cosmopolitan* (see also Kleingeld and Brown 2013: esp. §2), I mean that this philosophical and political doctrine recognizes States (e.g., nation-States) as actual brute past and contemporary facts, but also requires our choosing and acting in such a way that we reject in thought, and perhaps also reject and resist in words and/or actions, any immoral commands, limitations, restrictions, and prejudices present in any contemporary States, especially including the one (or ones, in my case, Canada and the USA) we happen to be citizens or members of, and regard ourselves instead as citizens or members of a single moral world-community of real persons, The Real Realm of Ends.

4. Finally, by *anarchism* (see also Kropotkin 1910; Bookchin 1995), I mean that this philosophical thesis and political doctrine fully recognizes that there is no adequate rational justification for political authority, and correspondingly also no adequate rational justification for the existence of States or any other State-like institutions. Here is a very short version of the Kantian argument for philosophical anarchism:

⁷ By ‘real person’, I mean *an essentially embodied person*, or a rational minded animal, as opposed to either disembodied persons (e.g., souls) or collective persons (e.g., business corporations). On essential embodiment, see, for example, (Hanna and Maiese 2009). And for a general theory of real personhood, see Hanna 2015c: Chs 6–7).

Because there is no adequate rational justification, according to the set of basic Kantian moral principles, for an individual real person's, or any group of real persons', immorally commanding other people and coercing them to obey those commands as a duty, yet the very idea of political authority entails that special groups of people within States or State-like institutions, namely governments, have not only the power to coerce, but also the right to command other people and to coerce them to obey those commands as a duty, even when the commands and/or coercion are immoral, then it follows that there is no adequate rational justification for political authority, States, or any other State-like institutions – therefore, philosophical anarchism is true.

Or in other and even fewer words:

Human *governments* have no moral right to do to other people what *real human persons* have no moral right to do to other people, according to the set of basic Kantian moral principles; yet *all* human governments falsely claim this supposed moral right; hence philosophical anarchism is true.

According to existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism, the sole adequate rational justification for the continued existence of any aspects or proper parts of *actual contemporary* States or other State-like institutions, is that they fully satisfy the moral requirements under 1., 2., and 3. Otherwise, resistance, subversion, or even outright civil disobedience – strictly constrained, however, by using at most minimal sufficiently effective, last resort, defensive, preventive, and protective moral force – is at the very least permissible, and possibly also required. In any case, we are morally obligated to *reject* and *exit* the State and other State-like institutions, in order to create and belong to a real-world cosmopolitan universal ethical community, in a post-State world. That is existential Kantian cosmopolitan *political* anarchism.

7. FROM (TRANSCENDENTAL) AESTHETICS TO RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT

According to rational anthropology, Kantian transcendental idealism for sensibility, when taken together with some central claims of

Kantian aesthetics and some self-evident Kantian phenomenology, jointly provide a transcendental explanation for radical enlightenment. The argument for this claim fuses the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first *Critique* with a Kantian aesthetics of the beautiful and the sublime in external nature in the third *Critique* and a Kantian self-evident phenomenology of our experience of 'reverence' (*Ehrfurcht*) for external nature and human nature in the second *Critique*. In turn, the argument has four basic steps.

Step 1. Given the truth of transcendental idealism for sensibility, then we can take fully seriously the sensibility-grounded, essentially non-conceptual evidence provided by the aesthetic experience of the beautiful in nature outside us, as veridically tracking natural purposive form, without a purpose, in a way that is inherently *disinterested* and therefore *divorced from all possible self-interest* (*CPJ* 5: 204–11). In short, the experience of the beautiful shows us that beautiful nature outside us *cannot be and ought not to be regarded or treated purely instrumentally*, that is, merely as a means, or exploited.

Step 2. Given the truth of transcendental idealism for sensibility, and the experience of the beautiful in nature, then we can *also* take fully seriously the Romantic/natural-religious/natural-theological reverential experience of what Kant calls 'the mathematically sublime in nature', for example, 'the starry heavens above me'. Now since, according to Kant, via the human experience of the mathematically sublime in nature, external nature is thereby experienced as having a specific character and normative value that is expressible only as a *transcendently infinite, transfinite, or non-denumerably infinite, quantity*, it follows that external nature inherently cannot be reduced to any denumerable quantity, no matter how great (*CPJ* 5: 244–60). Hence external nature, experienced as mathematically sublime, *cannot have a 'market price' and is experienced as beyond price, or priceless*, since all 'market prices', or exchangeable economic values (say, monetary values) 'related to general human interests and needs' (*GMM* 4: 434), are expressible only as denumerable (natural number, rational number) quantities, even infinite ones. Otherwise put, the specific character and normative value of external nature,

experienced as mathematically sublime, inherently transcends any economic calculus.

Step 3. Steps 1 and 2 jointly entail *the proto-dignity of external nature*. External nature is not itself a real person, and therefore does not have dignity *per se*. Nevertheless, external nature, as beautiful and sublime, *inherently cannot* (without eco-disaster) and *inherently ought not* (without moral scandal) be merely exploited, merely bought or sold, or otherwise treated as a mere capitalist resource or commodity (a.k.a. 'commodified').

Step 4. *But human nature belongs to external nature*. Therefore transcendental idealism for sensibility, plus the self-evident phenomenology of our reverential experience of beauty/sublimity in external nature ('the starry heavens above me'), plus our equally reverential experience of respect for the autonomous dignity of human nature ('the moral law within me'), *transcendentally prove* that external nature is the metaphysical ground of all real human persons and their autonomous dignity.

8. CONCLUSION

In shorthand format, the Kantian philosophical methodology of rational anthropology consists of:

- (i) The No-Deep-Difference Thesis,
- (ii) The Theses of Presentational Hylomorphism and Polymorphism for Works of Philosophy,
- (iii) The Criterion of Phenomenological Adequacy for Metaphysical Theories,
- (iv) transcendental idealism for sensibility and Kantian abduction,
- (v) Kantian radical enlightenment, and finally
- (vi) the Kantian (transcendental) aesthetics of external nature and the self-evident phenomenology of our reverence for external nature and human nature.

The real metaphysics of transcendental idealism, plus the self-evident phenomenology of aesthetic and natural-reverential human

experience, yields a life-changing radical politics. So rational anthropology is life-changing metaphysics.

Socrates said 'know thyself'. Rational anthropology says: 'know the world by knowing yourself; then change your life; and then change the world too'.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>CPJ</i>	<i>Critique of the Power of Judgment.</i>
<i>CPR</i>	<i>Critique of Pure Reason.</i>
<i>CPrR</i>	<i>Critique of Practical Reason.</i>
<i>GMM</i>	<i>Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.</i>
<i>ID</i>	'On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World (Inaugural Dissertation)'.
<i>IUH</i>	'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim'.
<i>JL</i>	'The Jäsche Logic'.
<i>PC</i>	<i>Immanuel Kant: Correspondence.</i>
<i>ProI</i>	<i>Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.</i>
<i>WE</i>	'An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?"'

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