

Kant, Williamson, and The Future of Analytic Philosophy

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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)



Timothy Williamson (1955-present)

[M]y writings don't engage with Kant's. I have no wish to be drawn into the endless maze of Kant hermeneutics; I happily leave others to wander there. To my knowledge, I've never been accused of transcendental idealism. (Williamson, 2023: p. 67)

Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, aka *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, aka "the first *Critique*," and also "CPR" for short, is the single most brilliant, difficult, and important book in modern philosophy; although to be sure, the CPR has always provoked as much controversy, criticism, and disagreement as it has inspired agreement, application, and creative revision-&-updating. The CPR was first published in 1781 (the A edition), followed six years later by a revised second edition (the B edition) in 1787. Whole libraries could be filled with the secondary literature—books and essays—published on the first *Critique*, since its explosive appearance on the philosophical scene in the twilight decades of the 18th century. Correspondingly, during those 240+ years, the impact of the CPR, via Kant's comprehensive *Critical Philosophy*, has steadily deepened, increased, ramified, and widened, in three directions: **first**, as a positive source for foundational work in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, aesthetics and the philosophy of art, philosophical anthropology, the philosophy of religion and philosophical theology, political philosophy, the history and philosophy of the formal and natural sciences, and the philosophy of nature, **second**, as a negative foil for *all* alternative developments in

those basic philosophical subjects, since *all* philosophers in the post-Kantian era, whether pro-Kant, anti-Kant, or officially Kant-neutral, must define themselves and their work in relation to Kant and the Critical Philosophy (Hanna, 2020), and **third**, as a broad, deep, and powerful sociopolitical force, under the much-controverted rubric of *enlightenment* (Hanna, 2016, 2017a, 2021a).

Indeed, in this very year, 2024, the 300th anniversary of Kant's birth, it's self-evident that the impact of the CPR, via the larger Critical Philosophy and post-Kantian enlightenment thinking, is now truly *cosmopolitan*, hence worldwide, and also by no means restricted to what Arthur Schopenhauer in the mid-19th century so sarcastically and presciently called "university philosophy" (Schopenhauer, 2014), i.e., *professional academic philosophy*, nowadays known simply as "professional philosophy." This is an oxymoron if ever there was one, since that's precisely how Plato defined *sophistry*, as philosophy for pay and inherently controlled by conventional social and political norms. By 2024, Kant's philosophical thinking and writing are fully and globally *in the real world*, and thereby woven as efficaciously and tightly into the warp and woof of modern life as *real philosophy* can ever be. By "real philosophy" I mean *authentic, serious* philosophy, namely, philosophy done wholeheartedly for its own sake and focused on fundamental issues and problems flowing from the rational human condition in a thoroughly nonideal natural and social world. That's as opposed to *inauthentic, superficial* philosophy, namely, philosophy done halfheartedly and essentially for the sake of one's career, and basically focused on scholastic, trivial issues—for example, contemporary professional academic philosophy (Hanna, 2022; see also Haack, 2021).

In that connection, it's ironic that Kant was the first truly great real philosopher who was *also* a professional academic philosopher, an irony presciently noted by Schopenhauer too. In his 1798 essay, "The Conflict of the Faculties," Kant rightly asserted the rational autonomy of the faculty of philosophy, not only from all the other faculties of the university, especially including the faculty of theology, but also from the government (CF 7: 27). But at the same time, Kant failed to anticipate the future heteronomy and subordination of mainstream 20th and 21st century philosophy *to the formal and natural sciences* and above all *to its own academicization and professionalization* (Hanna, 2022).

In any case, given the conception of real philosophy I spelled out two paragraphs above, my metaphilosophical view about the CPR in particular and the Critical Philosophy in general is this:

Like all philosophers Kant sometimes errs, or anyhow nods. But we respect him most by critically noting and then setting aside his slips, and by promoting his deepest and most

powerful doctrines.... Kant's Critical Philosophy is fully worth studying, critically analyzing, charitably explicating, defending, and then independently developing in a contemporary context. This is because, in my opinion, more than any other single-authored body of work in modern philosophy the Critical Philosophy most doggedly pursues and most profoundly captures some non-trivial fragment of the honest-to-goodness truth about rational human animals and the larger natural world that surrounds them. (Hanna, 2006a: p. 7)

Lying behind and scaffolding those claims, my take on the relationship between contemporary philosophy and the history of philosophy is based on what I call *The No-Deep-Difference Thesis*:

There is no fundamental difference in philosophical content between the history of philosophy and contemporary philosophy. (Hanna, 2017b: section 3)

In other words, in doing contemporary philosophy one is thereby directly engaging with the history of philosophy, and in doing the history of philosophy one is thereby directly engaging with contemporary philosophy. There's no fundamental difference in philosophical content between philosophy that was thought, spoken, written, or published 2000 or 200 or 20 years ago, or 20 months ago, and philosophy that was thought, spoken, written, or published 20 weeks or 20 days or 20 minutes or 20 seconds ago.

Relatedly, it's a truth *not* generally acknowledged, that *all* Anglo-American-&-European philosophy since Kant—i.e., since the end of the 18th century—is *post-Kantian*. This is of course trivially true, in that all Anglo-American-&-European philosophy since the end of the 18th century literally temporally succeeds the publication and dissemination of Kant's philosophical writings. But it's also profoundly true, in that all Anglo-American-&-European philosophy since the end of the 18th century falls within a single comprehensive *Ur*-framework, according to which Kant's philosophy is either (1) wholly accepted without revision-or-updating (*ortho-Kantianism*), (2) at least partially accepted but also significantly revised-&-updated (*quasi-Kantianism*, *crypto-Kantianism*, and classical 19th and early 20th century *neo-Kantianism*, whose original rallying cry was: *back to Kant!*), or (3) outright rejected (*anti-Kantianism*) (Hanna, 2008, 2020).

The paradigmatic example of ortho-Kantianism is mainstream late 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st century Kant-scholarship, allowing of course for many and various domestic or in-house scholarly disagreements about how best or correctly to interpret Kant's writings. Paradigmatic examples of quasi-Kantian philosophy include: classical German idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc.); British neo-Hegelianism (Bradley, McTaggart, etc.);

realistic phenomenology, transcendental phenomenology, and existential phenomenology (Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, etc.); other varieties of post-phenomenological “Continental” philosophy (existentialism, hermeneutics, post-structuralism, deconstructionism, postmodernism, etc.); New England transcendentalism (especially Emerson); classical American pragmatism (especially Peirce); process philosophy (especially Bergson and Whitehead); and Pittsburgh neo-Hegelianism (especially Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom). The paradigmatic example of crypto-Kantianism is Wittgenstein’s philosophy, both early and late (Hanna, 2017c). And obviously, classical 19th and early 20th century German and French neo-Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of neo-Kantianism. As to anti-Kantian philosophy, paradigmatic examples are classical Analytic philosophy and post-classical Analytic philosophy (Hanna, 2001, 2006a, 2021b).

But whether Kant’s philosophy is wholly accepted, partially accepted, or outright rejected, *it’s inescapable*. This is simply because Kant’s philosophy determines the total logical space of relevant philosophical options for all post-Kantian Anglo-American-&-European philosophy. In this sense, all post-Kantian Anglo-American-&-European philosophy, including of course all contemporary philosophy up to 6am this morning, *has come out from under Kant’s wig*, whether positively (pro-) or negatively (anti-).

Now, it must be admitted that it’s at least possible that some old or new *non-Anglo-American-&-European* philosophical framework will unexpectedly stride into the center of the global intellectual and sociocultural scene like an all-conquering Colossus, and henceforth dominate philosophy worldwide. Let’s call this *the extra-Kantian-philosophy possibility*. But the extra-Kantian-philosophy possibility seems to me *extremely unlikely*, in view of the bumpy (to put it very mildly) yet relentless *Americanization* of world culture, driven by the USA’s militaristic adventures and misadventures, music, movies, television, and digital technology, and the correspondingly equally bumpy yet equally relentless *neoliberalization* of world politics, driven by technocratic capitalism, whether corporate capitalism or State-capitalism, and whether democratic or not-so-democratic, since the end of World War II.

So, leaving aside the extra-Kantian-philosophy possibility, then all foreseeably future philosophy worldwide *will be a series of positive or negative footnotes to Kant*. Moreover, as regards negative footnotes, the 140-year-long anti-Kantian tradition of Analytic philosophy is in fact now coming to an end, as post-classical Analytic philosophy crashes, burns, and goes down forever into the ash-heap of history. And as regards positive footnotes, obviously ortho-Kantianism is historically and philosophically backward-looking, not forward-looking. Therefore, (i) the times they are a-changing, and (ii) the near-future emergence of some or another creatively revised-&-

updated version of Kant's philosophy, as the central and dominant world philosophy, is historically inevitable. For all these reasons, *forward to Kant!* must be humankind's philosophical futurist rallying cry.

Now, in a nutshell, what does Kant's Critical Philosophy say? Focusing for the purposes of this essay on Kant's *theoretical* philosophy, especially including logic, metaphysics, the theory of cognition, and epistemology (see, e.g., Hanna, 2021c, 2021d, 2021e, 2021f, 2021g, 2021h)—as opposed to his practical philosophy, including his moral theory, his political theory, and his theory of enlightenment—what I call Kant's *real metaphysics* (Hanna, 2017d), aka his "transcendental idealism," is an a priori conceptual science describing the essential nature of the manifestly real world, insofar as that world necessarily conforms to the a priori formal constraints and normative structures of our two basic innately-specified cognitive faculties or powers: (1) "sensibility" (*Sinnlichkeit*), the capacity for pure or empirical sensory intuition (*Anschauung*), sense-perception, and imagination, and (2) "understanding" (*Verstand*), the capacity for conceptualizing and logical thinking (*CPR* A713/B741, A723/751, A841-842/B869-870).

Kant's real metaphysics of transcendental idealism is also a *cognitive semantics*, that is, a general theory of rational human representational content (*C* 10: 129-130; see also Hanna, 2001, 2006a). According to Kant, a representational content is *richly* meaningful, *empirically* meaningful, or "objectively valid," if and only if it is either directly grounded on human sensible intuition or is an a priori necessary condition of a representational content that is directly grounded on human sensible intuition, hence *indirectly* grounded on human sensible intuition (*CPR* A38-40/B55-57, A239-240/B298-299). A judgment or proposition can have a truth-value, and be true or false, according to Kant, if and only if all of its representational components are objectively valid (*CPR* A58/B83). If any representational component of a judgment or proposition is *not* objectively valid, *not* empirically meaningful, or "empty" (*leer*), then the whole judgment or proposition is *not* objectively valid, not richly or empirically meaningful, and empty—"thoughts without content are empty" (*CPR* A 51/B 75)—and it has no truth-value, hence it is neither true nor false. By sharp contrast, if a judgment or proposition *is* objectively valid, hence richly or empirically meaningful, and thereby has a truth-value, then (i) it is synthetic if and only if (ia) its denial is logically and conceptually consistent and (ib) its meaning and truth are grounded on either pure or empirical human sensible intuition (*CPR* B73, A721/B749, *C* 11: 38, *OD* 8: 245), and (ii) it is analytic if and only if (iia) its denial entails either a formal logical contradiction, a formal contradiction in "intension" or *Inhalt*, or a mutual exclusion of "comprehension" or *Umfang* (*CPR* A150-153/B189-19, *Prol* 4: 267), (iib) it is necessarily true and a priori (*CPR* B4, A6/B10), and (iic) its meaning and necessary truth are grounded on essential connections between objectively valid, richly or empirically meaningful concepts.

If the intension of the predicate-term of an objectively valid categorical judgment or proposition is “contained in” the intension of its subject-term (or, alternatively, if the comprehension of the subject-term is “contained under” the comprehension of its predicate-term), then that judgment or proposition is analytic (CPR A6/B10). But intensional containment-in (or comprehensional containment-under) is only a *sufficient condition* of analyticity, *not a necessary condition* of analyticity. This is because all the truths of classical sentential logic—which is an essential fragment of what Kant calls “pure general analytic logic”—are indeed *analytic*, insofar as they capture the “form of truth” by “expound[ing] the general and necessary rules of the understanding” (CPR A59/B83-84), yet clearly, such truths do *not* fall under the containment-criterion, since they are not equivalently expressible in categorical or subject-predicate form. In contemporary logical terms, Kant’s pure general analytic logic is an intensional version of classical monadic predicate logic, with first-order quantification over predicate-comprehensions consisting of actual and possible objects of experience, and second-order quantification over predicate-intensions, a special designated sub-class of which also stand in containment-in and/or containment-under relations, and another designated sub-class of which stand in mutual exclusion relations. Leaving aside the specifically intensional component in pure general analytic logic, monadic logic is a consistent, complete, sound, and decidable fragment of classical quantified polyadic predicate logic, which, in turn, is itself consistent, complete, and sound, but *not* decidable. Otherwise put, except for the monadic logic fragment, the rest of classical quantified polyadic predicate logic is *synthetic* in Kantian terms, not analytic. Pure general analytic logic holds even over empty domains. But synthetic logic requires the existence of at least one object in the domain of quantification, for the quasi-dyadic relation of identity, for normal dyadic relations, the existence of at least two objects in the domain, and so-on, *mutatis mutandis*, for n-adic relations.

In Kantian terms, the analytic fragment of classical quantified polyadic predicate logic is purely *conceptual*, whereas the synthetic part of classical quantified polyadic predicate logic also requires *intuition* in order to guarantee the existence of at least one object in the domain. Hence, again leaving aside the specifically intensional component, Kant’s pure general analytic logic is a consistent, complete, sound, and decidable fragment of classical quantified polyadic logic *that also has an extremely good theoretical claim to be the analytic “core” of classical logic*, combining the classical Aristotelian logic of one-place predicates and the syllogism with the classical Stoic logic of propositions and truth-functions. All this entails that for Kant, (i) the semantics and deep formal structures of analyticity and conceptual truth are adequately systematically represented by pure general analytic logic and (ii) objectively valid analytic, conceptual truths *are really possible only in the context of real metaphysics*. It thereby, and even more importantly, entails that for Kant, objectively valid analytic truths are nothing more and nothing less *than richly or*

empirically meaningful necessary, normatively robust a priori conceptual truths that limn the discursive structure of the manifestly real world. In other words, by means of his theoretical philosophy, Kant worked out a richly detailed, robust, and (I strongly believe) defensible theory of the analytic-synthetic distinction and philosophical analysis (Hanna, 2001, 2006a: chs. 5-7, 2015: chs. 4-8; see also Lewin, 2023a, 2023b).

What about Analytic philosophy? In the late 19th century and early 20th century, a group of Young Turk *avant-garde* philosophers carrying the banner of the new tradition of classical Analytic philosophy came onto the scene, following on from the work of Gottlob Frege (as it were, the intellectual Father of the founding Trinity of classical Analytic philosophy), but led by G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell (the other members of the founding Trinity—as it were, the Son and the Holy Ghost—who were, appropriately enough, students and Apostles,¹ research fellows, and then lecturers at Trinity College, Cambridge University), by the young Ludwig Wittgenstein, another Trinity College genius and Apostle, by the even younger Frank Ramsey,² by The Vienna Circle Logical Empiricists/Positivists (especially Rudolf Carnap, but also including Kurt Gödel and Alfred Tarski), and by W.V.O. Quine. Moreover, in a sociocultural sense, classical Analytic philosophy also stood in an important elective affinity with the rise of what James C. Scott has aptly called “a high modernist ideology,” or *high modernism* for short, which

is best conceived as a strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws (Scott, 1998: p. 4),

¹ That is, they were all members of the Cambridge Apostles, then as now, a highly-selective and highly exclusive Cambridge secret society and discussion group, whose members also include Henry Sidgwick, Whitehead, John Maynard Keynes, Frank Ramsey, and (somewhat fitfully) Wittgenstein. See, e.g., (Levy, 1980).

² There’s been a recent burst of interest in Ramsey and his work. See, e.g., (Methven, 2015; Potter, 2019; Misak, 2020). For a long time, Ramsey had been mainly known as a co-translator of the *Tractatus* and as a minor figure in classical Analytic philosophy, although, to be sure, during his all-too-brief lifetime, he had already been exceptionally highly regarded by the Cambridge people and The Vienna Circle people alike (see, e.g., Edmonds, 2020: pp. 44, 46, 48, 51-52, 84-85, and 92). But what explains the current Ramsey boom? In my view, it’s simply that (i) since the 1980s, Moore’s reputation has been significantly downgraded, hence a replacement-genius is needed to fill out the classical “founding Trinity = Frege, Russell, and X” narrative of early Analytic philosophy, (ii) unlike Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein, Ramsey wasn’t importantly influenced by the neo-Kantians, and (iii) the combination of logicism, pragmatism, and scientific naturalism in Ramsey’s work also very conveniently fits the tick-the-boxes profile of post-Quinean, late 20th-century/early 21st-century, post-classical Analytic philosophy.

especially in the applied and fine arts, the formal and natural sciences, and engineering (Janik and Toulmin, 1973; Galison, 1990; The Vienna Circle, 1996; Reisch, 2005; Isaac, 2013). At the same time, the classical Analytic philosophers were also engaged in a serious intellectual competition with *phenomenology*, especially Husserlian transcendental phenomenology (Hanna, 2013) and Heideggerian existential phenomenology (Friedman, 2000; Hanna, 2008: pp. 149-150). In any case, and again in a nutshell, classical Analytic philosophy is founded and grounded on two basic theses: (i) that all necessary truth is *logical truth*, which is the same as *analytic a priori truth*, and that there are no non-logical or non-analytic necessary truths, which I'll call *the thesis of modal monism*, and (ii) that all a priori knowledge is *knowledge of analytic truths* and that this knowledge follows directly from the process of analysis, which I'll call *the thesis of a-priori-knowledge-as-analysis* (Urmson, 1956; Pap, 1972; Hacking, 1975; French, 1981; Tugendhat, 1982: esp. part I; Bell and Cooper, 1990; Dummett, 1993; Hanna, 2001; Soames, 2014; Beaney, 2013; Isaac, 2019).

In *The Fate of Analysis* (Hanna, 2021b), I argued—among other things—(i) that the philosophical program of *classical* Analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine was defunct by the early 1950s, (ii) that since the early 1950s, classical Analytic philosophy has been gradually succeeded by *post-classical* Analytic philosophy, which has dominated professional academic philosophy in a social-institutional sense for the last 70 years, right up to 6am this morning (see also Soames, 2018), (iii) that in its post-classical period, the difference between Analytic philosophy and non-Analytic philosophy is purely sociological and not theoretically substantive (see also Rorty, 1982: esp. p. 217), and (iv) that contemporary post-classical Analytic philosophers don't actually either practice philosophical analysis or believe in the very idea of an analytic-synthetic distinction. In short, ironically, **first**, Analytic philosophy as originally conceived, *has been dead since the early 1950s, and actually has no future whatsoever*, and **second**, Kant's theoretical philosophy *is actually significantly closer in content and methodology to classical Analytic philosophy, than post-classical Analytic philosophy is* (Hanna, 2001, 2006a: chs. 5-7, 2015: chs. 4-8, 2021; see also Lewin, 2023a, 2023b). Therefore, the title of this essay—"Kant, Williamson, and The Future of Analytic Philosophy"—is doubly ironic. For not only does Analytic philosophy itself actually have no future whatsoever, but also whatever was worth saving from the wreckage of Analytic philosophy—i.e., the analytic-synthetic distinction (now supplemented by an intelligible and defensible theory of synthetic a priori necessary truth and knowledge), and the thesis that analytic a priori necessary truth and knowledge are genuine kinds of a priori necessary truth and knowledge (even if not the *only* kinds of genuine a priori necessary truth and knowledge)—is *already* preserved in contemporary and futuristic Kantian philosophy (Hanna, 2015, 2023).

It was therefore not only gratifying but also quite surprising to discover that during 2023 (arguably) *the* leading contemporary post-classical Analytic philosopher,

Timothy Williamson, Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford (see, e.g., Williamson, 2000, 2007, 2013), explicitly confirmed my theses (iii) and (iv):

[T]he current sense of the phrase ‘analytic philosophy’ is quite serviceable. It refers to a broad tradition, with various sub-traditions. Like other traditions, it has evolved over time, and is unified not by shared intrinsic features (for example, of doctrine or method) but by historical connections of influence (for example, the teacher-pupil relation). Although the distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘non-analytic’ or ‘continental’ philosophy is rough, with many borderline cases, it marks an observable sociological divide in the profession, which for almost a century has played a major role in philosophers’ understanding of what they are doing and its likeness or unlikeness to what their contemporaries do; it is reflected in how they use the pronouns ‘us’ and ‘them’. A future historian of philosophy in this period who ignores that distinction will miss something in many philosophers’ self-understanding, and to that extent will be doing a poor job as a historian. (Williamson, 2023: p. 52)

I obviously belong to the tradition labelled ‘analytic philosophy’. For example, Michael Dummett supervised me for the final year of my doctoral studies at Oxford, and a glance at the bibliography and index in any of my books will show which philosophers I most engage with. Yet my philosophical theorising cannot be classified as ‘analysis’ in any useful or distinctive sense. I rarely seek necessary and sufficient conditions. I find attempts to divide truths into the ‘analytic’ or ‘conceptual’ and the ‘synthetic’ or ‘empirical’ deeply misleading. (Williamson, 2023: p. 53)

Perhaps Williamson thought that by burying his frank, revealing metaphilosophical remarks in an obscure venue called *Kantian Journal*, no one but a few woolly-minded contemporary Kantians would ever read them. After all, as we’ve seen already at the top of this essay,

my writings don’t engage with Kant’s. I have no wish to be drawn into the endless maze of Kant hermeneutics; I happily leave others to wander there. To my knowledge, I’ve never been accused of transcendental idealism. (Williamson, 2023: p. 67)

Quite so; perish the thought.

But, what if leading contemporary professional academic *physicists* publicly admitted that the difference between physics and non-physics is purely sociological and not theoretically substantive, and that they themselves don’t actually either practice physics or believe in the very idea of physical laws? That would be an intellectual scandal of the first order, fully equivalent to the notorious *Sokal Hoax* (Sokal, 1996; Wikipedia, 2024).

In a precisely analogous way, if leading (not to mention rank-&-file) members of the dominant “Us” *versus* “Them” group in professional academic philosophy are continuing to call themselves “Analytic philosophers,” even though there’s no theoretically substantive difference between Analytic philosophy and non-Analytic philosophy, and even though they don’t actually either practice philosophical analysis or believe in the very idea of an analytic-synthetic distinction, then it’s another intellectual scandal of the first order. Far more accurate and honest labels for their actual philosophical practice and theory would be “Pseudo-Analytic philosophy” or “Quasi-Analytic philosophy.” Otherwise, their continuing to conduct business under the unqualified brand name “Analytic philosophy” is nothing but false advertising, and professional academic bullshit (Frankfurt, 1988).

By sharp contrast, at least some woolly-minded contemporary Kantians *do* actually practice transcendental philosophy—up to and including an updated and appropriately weakened version of transcendental idealism—and, unlike contemporary so-called “Analytic” philosophers, *do* actually believe in the very idea of an analytic-synthetic distinction: indeed, shockingly, in addition to believing in the very idea of genuine analytic *a priori* necessary truth and knowledge, they *also* believe in the very idea of genuine *synthetic a priori* necessary truth and knowledge. And they also think that these ideas can all be developed and defended on independent philosophical grounds, *without* being “drawn into the endless maze of Kant hermeneutics” (Hanna, 2001, 2006a, 2015).

By way of a parting shot, Williamson writes this:

The two distinctions (analytic-synthetic and *a priori-a posteriori*) were robust enough to facilitate progress in Kant’s day and for some time thereafter. But that does not mean that they must be foundational forever.

A concluding reflection: Three disciplines close to the issues we have been discussing are logic, linguistics, and psychology. Each of them has been transformed in progressive ways out of all recognition since Kant’s day. Would it not be both strange and sad if philosophy alone had made no such progress? (Williamson, 2023: p. 70)

But begging to differ, I think that in fact contemporary logic, linguistics, and psychology can *all* be consistently and productively combined with contemporary Kantian philosophy (Hanna, 2006b, 2006c, 2015). Moreover, I *also* think that that it truly would be “both strange and sad” if philosophy failed to pull itself out of the tailspin of the decline-&-fall of post-classical Analytic philosophy as it crashes, burns, and goes down forever into the ash-heap of history (Hanna, 2021b, 2022). As a relevant alternative to that catastrophe or tragedy, non-Analytic, non-Kantian philosophers and demobilized former

Analytic philosophers, alike, could instead pursue the collective project I call *Kantian futurism* (Hanna, 2023).

What is that collective project? It contains three futuristic philosophical ideas. **First**, in order to be able to explain the existence and real possibility of contemporary physics, the essential structure of the manifestly real natural universe must conform to the innate structure of our conscious, intelligent and more generally rational human animal minds. **Second**, the manifestly real natural universe, especially including rational human minded animals, is fundamentally organic—processual, purposive, and self-organizing—*not* mechanical; and all natural mechanical processes are metaphysically and ontologically derivative from organic processes. **Third**, morality and sociopolitics are grounded on human dignity, *not* on group identity. These ideas jointly constitute the foundational tripod of a Kantian philosophy of the near future: *rational anthropology*, the general philosophical theory of *the rational human condition*, i.e., humankind's existential predicament—including its epistemic, metaphysical, logical, mathematical natural-scientific, moral, sociopolitical, and religious or spiritual modes—in this thoroughly nonideal natural and social world (Hanna, 2015, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2024).

If, in concert and collaboration with futuristic Kantian philosophers, those non-Analytic, non-Kantian philosophers and demobilized former Analytic philosophers I mentioned two paragraphs above *did* commit themselves to pursuing those three futuristic philosophical ideas, then they'd not only finally come to terms with contemporary philosophy's Kantian foundations and origins, but also enable genuine progress in philosophy.

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- C *Immanuel Kant: Correspondence, 1759-99*. Trans. A. Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999.
- CF *The Conflict of the Faculties*. Trans. M. Gregor. Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1979.
- CPR *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997. (1781 or A edition: Ak 4: 1-251; 1787 or B edition: Ak 3)
- OD "On a Discovery Whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by An Older One." Trans. H. Allison. In H. Allison, *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy*. Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973. Pp. 107-160. (1790, 8: 185-252)
- Prol *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Trans. G. Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004. (1783, Ak 4: 253-383)

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