The Rational Human Condition

Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism -A Theological-Political Treatise

VOLUME 4

World Philosophy

ROBERT HANNA

NOVA

WORLD PHILOSOPHY

THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION

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KANT, AGNOSTICISM, AND ANARCHISM: A THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE

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ROBERT HANNA



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This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS.

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All five volumes of THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION are dedicated to the people I love—you know who you are. But especially Martha and Beth. And also to all those who helped me with its ideas and arguments.

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"The Human Condition," by Thomas Whitaker/Prison Arts Coalition/

PREFACE

Robert Hanna's THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION is a five-volume book series, including:

- Volume 1. Preface and General Introduction, Supplementary Essays, and General Bibliography
- Volume 2. Deep Freedom and Real Persons: A Study in Metaphysics
- Volume 3. Kantian Ethics and Human Existence: A Study in Moral Philosophy
- Volume 4. Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism: A Theological-Political Treatise
- Volume 5. Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge

The fifth volume in the series, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, was published by Oxford University Press in 2015. So, with the present publication of the first four volumes in the series by Nova Science in 2018, all five volumes of THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION are now available in hard-copy and as e-books. All five books share a common aim, which is to work out a true general theory of human rationality in a thoroughly nonideal natural and social world. This philosophical enterprise is what Hanna calls rational anthropology. In the eleventh and most famous of his Theses on Feuerbach, Karl Marx wrote that "philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it." Hanna completely agrees with Marx that the ultimate aim of philosophy is to change the world, not merely interpret it. So, Marx and Hanna are both philosophical liberationists: that is, they both believe that philosophy should have radical political implications. But, beyond Marx, Hanna also thinks that the primary aim of philosophy (understood as rational anthropology) and its practices of synoptic reflection, writing, teaching, and public conversation is to change lives for the better—and ultimately, for the sake of the highest good. Then, and only then, can the human race act upon the world in the right way. The first four volumes of THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION will therefore appeal not only to philosophers, but also to any other philosophically-minded person interested in the intellectual and practical adventure of synoptic, reflective thinking about the nature of our rational, but still ineluctably "human, all-too-human" lives.

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A NOTE ON REFERENCES

Throughout the four-volume series THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, for convenience, I refer to Kant's works infratextually in parentheses. The references include both an abbreviation of the English title and the corresponding volume and page numbers in the standard "Akademie" edition of Kant's works: *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Königlich Preussischen (now Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. Reimer [now de Gruyter], 1902-). I generally follow the standard English translations, but have occasionally modified them where appropriate. For references to the first *Critique*, I follow the common practice of giving page numbers from the A (1781) and B (1787) German editions only. Here is a list of the relevant abbreviations and English translations:

- *BL* "The Blomberg Logic." In *Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic*. Trans. J. M. Young. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992. Pp. 5-246.
- *C Immanuel Kant: Correspondence, 1759-99.* Trans. A. Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999.
- *CF Conflict of the Faculties*. Trans. M. Gregor. Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1979.
- *CPJ Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000.
- *CPR Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997.
- CPrR Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. M. Gregor. In Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. Pp. 139-271.
- DiS "Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space."
 Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy:* 1755-1770. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992. Pp. 365-372.

- DSS "Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics." Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770*.
 Pp. 301-359.
- EAT "The End of All Things." Trans. A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni. In *Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. Pp. 221-231.
- *GMM Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. M. Gregor. In *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*. Pp. 43-108.
- ID "On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World (Inaugural Dissertation)." Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770.* Pp. 373-416.
- IUH "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim." Trans. A. Wood. In Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Eduction. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007. Pp. 107-120.
- *JL* "The Jäsche Logic." Trans. J. M. Young. In *Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic*. Pp. 519-640.
- *LE Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Ethics.* Trans. P. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997.
- *MFNS Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Trans. M. Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.
- MM Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. M. Gregor. In Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Pp. 365-603.
- *OP Immanuel Kant: Opus postumum.* Trans. E. Förster and M. Rosen. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993.
- OPA "The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God." Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770.* Pp. 107-201.
- OT "What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?" Trans. A. Wood. In Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology. Pp. 7-18.
- *Prol Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Trans. G. Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.
- PP "Toward Perpetual Peace." Trans. M. Gregor. In Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Pp. 317-351.
- *Rel Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.* Trans. A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni. In *Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology.* Pp. 57-215.
- *RTL* "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy." Trans. M. Gregor. In *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy.* Pp. 611-615.
- VL "The Vienna Logic," Trans. J. M. Young. In *Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic*. Pp. 251-377.

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WiE "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'" Trans. M. Gregor. In *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy.* Pp. 17-22.

INTRODUCTION

This book is about the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the philosophy of religion and philosophical theology, political philosophy, and real-world politics. More specifically, I use Kant's 18th century philosophical ideas in order to develop a *radically agnostic* doctrine in the philosophy of religion and philosophical theology, and also an *existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist* doctrine in political philosophy and real-world politics.

Now these controversial topics—especially *religion-and-theology* and *real-world politics*—and these strange-sounding or even scary-sounding doctrines—*radical agnosticism* and *existential Kantian cosmpolitan social anarchism*—might at first glance seem utterly distinct and disconnected. On the contrary, however, it is my double contention that

(i) radical agnosticism and existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism are seamlessly united by a single, fully intelligible, and fully defensible philosophical line of argumentation, and

(ii) radical agnosticism and existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism are also authentic expressions of the same basic set of philosophical commitments.

More simply put, they are essentially and indissolubly bound together by *the same fundamental philosophical glue*.

Here is a preliminary sketch of that philosophical glue, and how it binds these doctrines together.

In 1781, Kant published a book called the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which he argued, amongst many other things,

first, that instead of assuming, like classical Rationalist philosophers, that our finite, sensible, and specifically human minds conform to the world-in-itself, then, because we also philosophically know a priori—that is, in a way which is strictly underdetermined by any and all contingent, sensory facts—that we cannot either

scientifically know the nature of things-in-themselves or logically prove whether they exist or do not exist, it follows

second, that we should postulate that the world as it appears to us conforms to the nonempirical structure of our finite, sensible, and specifically human minds (*CPR* Bxvixviii), and

third, that we can also philosophically know a priori that any scientific knowledge of God's nature or any logical proof of God's existence or non-existence, is humanly impossible, hence it is rationally unjustified to believe that God exists, and equally rationally unjustified to believe that God does not exist.

The third thesis is what I call *radical agnosticism. Radical* agnosticism about the nature and existence or non-existence of God, is sharply distinct from an *everyday, familiar, rationally-on-the-fence* version of agnosticism about God's nature and existence or nonexistence. The everyday, familiar version is what philosophers would call a "first-order" or "object-level" position about God's nature and existence or non-existence; whereas the radical version is a Kant-inspired "second-order" or "metalevel" position about the scientific knowledge of God's nature and the logical provability of God's existence or nonexistence.

What do I mean by that? For the Kantian radical agnostic, it is *not* that we have, as a matter of fact, so far failed scientifically to know God's nature, or that we have, as a matter of fact, so far failed logically to prove whether God exists or does not exist, so we must remain rationally neutral, open-minded, and non-committal about these fundamental, ultimate questions. That would be the everyday, familiar, rationally-on-the-fence kind of agnosticism. Instead, it is that *we philosophically know a priori that we could not possibly either scientifically know God's nature or logically prove whether God exists or does not exist.*

In short, radical agnosticism is *philosophical a priori knowledge about the necessity of own scientific and logical ignorance* about God's nature and existence or non-existence. We (second-order) philosophically know a priori that we cannot (first-order) scientifically know or logically prove the answers to these fundamental, ultimate questions.

In 1784, Kant published an essay called "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?," in which he argued that, as rational creatures, we humans morally must have the courage to use our own understanding (as encapsulated in the intellectually and ethically revolutionary slogan, *Sapere aude!*, dare to know!), and more specifically, we morally must have the courage to criticize, reject, and transcend coercive religious and political authority, the Church, the State, and other State-like institutions, lest we fail fully to realize our nature as rational creatures, and fall back into a self-incurred immaturity and inauthenticity. In other words, we owe it to ourselves to screw up our moral courage, and try our wholehearted best to *grow out of* our personal immaturity and inauthenticity, and

Introduction

to *change* our lives for the better, by *criticizing*, *rejecting*, and *exiting* the Church, the State, and other State-like institutions alike, in order to create and belong to a radically better world in which there are no Churches and no States or other State-like institutions. That is what I call *radical enlightenment*.¹

Just as Kantian radical agnosticism sharply contrasts with an everyday, familiar version of agnosticism, so too radical enlightenment is a *maximalist* version of enlightenment, again inspired by Kantian ideas, that sharply contrasts with other everyday, familiar "minimalist" versions of enlightenment, whether Kantian² or non-Kantian.³

In 1788, Kant published another book called the Critique of Practical Reason, in which he argued, again amongst many other things, that we are morally required to act as if we *could believe-that God exists*, even though we know a priori that we cannot scientifically know God's nature or logically prove that God exists or does not exist. We rationally can, and indeed morally must, think about God, or more precisely, even if we are not selfconsciously religious, we morally must think about the Highest Good—aka "the sole and complete good" in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals-(GMM 4:396),⁴ which fully captures the moral content of the concept of GOD And also we must *think that* God, as the Highest Good, exists, and must *act* accordingly, while at the same time philosophically knowing a priori that we cannot scientifically know God's nature or logically prove that God exists or does not exist. Or otherwise put, we are morally required to believe-in God as the Highest Good. To borrow a justly famous formulation from the Preface to the first Critique, we must deny scientific knowing (Wissen)—by which, Kant means only that we must put critical-epistemic limits on the apparently unbounded scope of scientific knowledge and logical proof, not that we should be anti-scientific or anti-logical skeptics in order to make room for moral faith (Glauben).

All of this is what I call existential Kantian moral theology.

And finally, in 1792, Kant published a book called *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, in which he explicitly brought his doctrines of radical agnosticism, existential Kantian moral theology, and radical enlightenment together. Here he argued that we are morally required, for the purposes of our own mature, authentic enlightenment, to have the moral courage to criticize, *reject*, and then try our wholehearted best to *exit* the "juridico-civil community" (namely, the State) in order to create and belong to a universal, but also specifically cosmopolitan or worldwide, real-world, "ethical-civil community" (namely, The Real Realm of Ends, the real Church of humanity), that does the work of God on earth—in full view of the realization that it is rationally impossible scientifically to know God's nature and also rationally impossible to prove either that God exists or does not exist, and therefore rationally unjustified to believe-that God exists or does not exist. Again, we morally must *believe-in* God as the Highest Good, and we must also freely act accordingly, as rational "human, all too human" moral and political animals in pursuit of radical enlightenment; but as radical agnostics we also know a priori that we rationally

cannot *believe-that* God exists or does not exist, hence we also know a priori that we cannot scientifically know or logically prove God.

Or otherwise put, scientific knowledge and logical proof are *fully legitimate if critically restricted*, but they also have *absolute limits*, beyond which we morally must wholeheartedly pursue lives of principled authenticity in a real-world cosmopolitan ethical community, for better or worse—or else morally perish as rational human free agents.

Q: How can this moral perishing happen?

A: By unintentionally turning ourselves into mere decision-theoretic robots of the State and other State-like institutions, too relentlessly busy avoiding unhappy personal encounters with the Law and the police; too relentlessly busy making and spending money on Cool Stuff; too relentlessly busy buying guns and supporting capital punishment and the ever-growing but already massive prison system, so that we can kill or forever incarcerate all those darker-skinned Others who might take away our hard-earned money and our beloved Stuff; and too relentlessy busy obsessively checking social media on our portable electronic devices, so that we can be told by the giant media conglomerates what's Cool and what's Trending. Too busy, busy, busy, ever to feel, desire, think, or act for ourselves—so the State and other State-like institutions will do it for us. That is the contemporary acme of *inauthenticity*, and we must resist the all-too-easy slippery slide into it with every fibre of our being.

All of this is what I call existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism.

The structure of the book is simple and three-part, not including this Introduction. In part 1, I spell out and defend radical agnosticism and existential Kantian moral theology. In part 2, I spell out and defend radical enlightenment and existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism. And in part 3, I offer a concrete, multi-dimensional proposal for implementing existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism in the contemporary real world. At the end of part 3, I also show how we must also extend all these doctrines to the entire natural world and become "citizens of the cosmos." This is what I call Cosmopolitan Natural Piety.

And one last thing, by way of concluding the Introduction. It should be clear already that I not only *believe-that* radical agnosticism, existential Kantian moral theology, Kantian radical enlightenment, and existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism are all true, as philosophical doctrines: I also *believe-in* them, as life-changing personal commitments. So I want to convince you rationally, if I can, that you too should not only believe-that they are true, but even more importantly that you too should believe-in them, freely, for fundamental reasons that you already implicitly accept, and also that we not only should but also really can act on them in the real world. In other words, with Kant I am saying, *Sapere aude*!, dare to know!; and with Rainer Maria Rilke I am saying, *Du musst dein Leben ändern*, you must change your life,⁵ in order to change the world in the right way;

and with Oscar Wilde I am saying, "progress is the realization of Utopias,"⁶ so let's start realizing a Utopia right now.

PART 1. RADICAL AGNOSTICISM

The famous ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of the highest being from concepts is only so much trouble and labor lost, and a human being can no more become richer in insight from mere ideas than a merchant could in resources if he wanted to improve his finantial state by adding a few zeroes to his cash balance. (CPR A602/B630).

[T]he same grounds for considering human reason incapable of asserting the existence of [God] ... also suffice to prove the non-cogency (Untauglichkeit) of all counterassertions. For where, by pure speculation, will anyone acquire the insight that there is no highest being as the original ground of everything? (CPR A641/B669).

A postulate of pure practical reason ... [is] a theoretical proposition, though not one provable as such, insofar as it is attached inseparably to an a priori unconditionally valid practical law. (CPrR 5: 122).

There are three existence-spheres: the esthetic, the ethical, the religious.... The ethical sphere is only a transition-sphere, and therefore its highest expression is repentance as a negative action. The esthetic sphere is the sphere of immediacy, the ethical the sphere of requirement (and this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt), the religious the sphere of fulfillment, but, please note, not a fulfillment such as when one fills an alms box or a sack with gold, for repentance has specifically created a boundless space, and as a consequence the religious contradiction: simultaneously to be out on 70, 000 fathoms of water and yet be joyful.⁷

"Take that money away with you, sir," Smerdyakov said with a sigh.

"Of course, I'll take it! But why are you giving it to me if you committed a murder to get it?" Ivan asked, looking at him with intense surprise.

"I don't want it at all," Smerdyakov said in a shaking voice, with a wave of the hand. "I did have an idea of starting a new life in Moscow, but that was just a dream, sir, and mostly because 'everything is permitted.' This you did teach me, sir, for you talked to me a lot about such things: for if there's no everlasting God, there's no such thing as virtue, and there's no need of it at all. Yes, sir, you were right about that. That's the way I reasoned."⁸

If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language. In brief, the world must

thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane as a whole. The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy.⁹

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Part 1 of this book is about how four deeply important Kantian ideas can significantly illuminate some essentially intertwined issues in philosophical theology, philosophical logic, the metaphysics of agency, and above all, morality. These deeply important Kantian ideas are:

(i) Kant's argument for the impossibility of the Ontological Argument on logicosemantic grounds alone, which, when it is combined with Kant's claim that the Ontological Argument is the only possible argument for God's existence, entails not only the scientific unknowability of God's nature but also the logical uprovability of God's existence or non-existence.

(ii) Kant's third "postulate of pure practical reason," *the existence of God*, which says that even though we cannot scientifically know God's nature or logically prove God's existence or non-existence, nevertheless, because we are morally required to *think* that God exists, and also to *act* accordingly, we must also morally believe-in the rational Idea that God, as the Highest or Supreme Good, aka "the sole and complete good," exists in order to unify happiness and virtue in a thoroughly nonideal natural and social world filled to the brim with "the crooked timber of humanity" and "radical evil," and in which, it seems, nothing will ever be made straight, and "no good deed goes unpunished." That is, even though we must be *radical agnostics*, our belief-in God is necessary for our practical self-preservation and for our continuing on.¹⁰

(iii) Kant's first postulate of pure practical reason, *immortality*, which says that even though we can neither scientifically know God's nature nor logically prove God's existence or non-existence, and even though we cannot scientifically know the nature of a human pure or noumenal soul or logically prove that human pure or noumenal souls are immortal or not immortal, nevertheless, because we are morally required to *think* that God, as the Highest or Supreme Good, aka "the sole and complete good," exists, and also to *act* accordingly, we must also morally believe-in the rational Idea¹¹ that after our deaths we will have a super-long human personal existence¹² in a world that is wholly known and governed by God, and in which eventually all the morally virtuous people are made happy and all the wicked people are punished.

(iv) Kant's second postulate of pure practical reason, *freedom*, which says that even though we can neither scientifically know God's nature nor logically prove God's existence or non-existence, and even though we cannot scientifically know the nature of human freedom, lest we convert all our choices and acts into the operations of a deterministic natural mechanism, propelling itself into a randomly indeterministic and possibly bad-luck-filled future, nevertheless, because we are morally required to *think* that God exists, and also to *act* accordingly, we must also morally believe-in the

rational Idea that we are both transcendentally free and also practically free¹³ in order to rule out:

(iv.1) the impossible pseudo-science of transcendental theology, manifested in a priori arguments for the existence of God, chiefly, the Ontological Argument,

(iv.2) the self-stultifying threat to our transcendentally free intentional agency in a world in which, it seems, on the *one* hand, that the past is completely filled with deterministic and impersonal causes (the rock) and, on the *other* hand, that the future is randomly indeterministic and heart-breakingly completely filled with possibilities for bad luck (the hard place), and also

(iv.3) the self-stultifying threat to our practically free moral agency of a world in which, it seems, moral chaos reigns and "everything is permitted."

Otherwise put, part 1 is an investigation in what I call *existential Kantian moral theology*. By the term *existential*, I mean two things.

First, I intend to pick out all the profoundly value-laden, inherently anthropocentric, and metaphysically irreducible facts targetted by the 19th and 20th century philosophical and literary movement of Existentialism. Existentialism is concerned with our anxious search for a coherent, meaningful, and morally good life in an otherwise absurd, meaningless, and amoral world, existing seemingly without a God or any other functionally equivalent God-like antedently-given or innate meaning or purpose, either because God has apparently infinitely withdrawn from Her Creation (theistic Existentialism—for example, Kierkegaard) or because God apparently does not exist at all (atheistic Existentialism—for example, Sartre).¹⁴

Contemporary philosophical practice typically ignores the late Latin root, *existentia*, as shared between *existential* in the sense of Existentialism and *existential* in the sense of *existential predication* in logic. Nevertheless, there is an importantly overlapping core of meaning here.

Therefore, second, I intend the term *existential* to convey not only the Existential sense that I just sketched in the immediately preceding paragraph, but also the specifically *logico-semantic sense of existential predication*, where this is either particular quantification (as in "Some Fs are Gs") or direct reference (as in "Kant exists" or "*This* exists").

This perhaps initially surprising conjunction of existential-*moral-theological* and existential-*logical* notions is both internally consistent and also normatively cogent. One way of seeing this deep connection to recognize the rational linkage between the existential-moral-theological significance of the concept of God, and the human need *to prove logically* that God exists or does not exist. Indeed, from the beginning of the Judaeo-Christian tradition forward, the history of proofs for God's existence (theism or deism) or non-existence (atheism) and the history of logic are tightly intertwined. For example, without Judaeo-Christian theology and Scholastic logic, there would have been no modal logic as we now understand it.

In any case, the deep connection between existential-moral-theological notions and existential-logical notions was fully grasped in the first two decades of the 20th century by the early Wittgenstein:

[Wittgenstein] used to come to see me [i.e., Russell] every evening at midnight, and pace up and down my room like a wild beast for three hours in agitated silence. Once I said to him: "Are you thinking about logic or about your sins?" "Both," he replied, and continued his pacing.¹⁵

In his characteristically Cambridge-condescending way, Russell describes this encounter as a kind of farce we would now think of as Monty-Pythonesque, with Wittgenstein doing a specifically *fin-de-siécle* Viennese philosopher's *silly-walk* up and down Russell's room, night after night. But the joke was on Russell, for Wittgenstein was onto something very deep that Russell, for all his razor-keen logical and mathematical brilliance, and for all his ethical courage and sociocultural/political insight (see sections 2.6 and 2.7 below), was unable to grasp, namely,

that logic, ethics, aesthetics, and God (which Wittgenstein calls "the mystical") jointly constitute the meaningful limits of the world as it appears to us, and are thereby all manifestations of the same transcendental-existential structure of manifest reality.

Here are some particularly vivid expressions of this profound line of thinking, taken from the *Tractatus*:

6.41 All propositions are of equal value. The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: *in* it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie *within* the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world.

6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher. It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

6.44 It is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical, but *that* it exists. To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole—a limited whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.

6.52 We feel that even when *all possible* scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.

6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem. (Is not this the reason that those who have found after a long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what constituted that sense?)

6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical.¹⁶

Russell quite probably was, as his erstwhile teacher and *Principia Mathematica* collaborator, Alfred North Whitehead, remarked, the greatest *formal* logician since Aristotle. But Kant and Wittgenstein were infinitely greater *philosophical logicians*.

1.2 KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY AND THE INCOHERENCE PROBLEM

Kant's philosophical theology is notoriously difficult to understand.¹⁷ This is principally due to an apparent inconsistency between the four basic elements of his theory.

1.2.1 Element 1: The Impossibility of Proving God's Existence or Non-Existence

First, in the "Ideal of Pure Reason" in the Transcendental Dialectic in the *Critique of Pure Reason (CPR*: A567-704/B595-732), Kant works out a devastating logical, semantic, and epistemological critique of any possible proof for God's existence. This critique undermines the most famous arguments for the existence of God, including the ontological argument, the cosmological argument, and the design argument—aka "the physico-theological argument" or the telelogical argument. But even beyond that, this all-undermining critique has the immediate further implication that any possible proof for God's *non*-existence is *also* impossible, including the argument for atheism from evil, in either its classical "metaphysical" version or its more modern "evidential" version. More precisely, Kant argues that God's existence or non-existence is not only *scientifically unknowable* but also *uncognizable*. Nevertheless, at the same time God's existence remains (and indeed, as we shall see later, under Element 4, as a matter of moral necessity) *thinkable*.

The terms "scientifically unknowable," "uncognizable," and "thinkable" are all Kantian technical terms. Hence, understanding Kant's critique of arguments for God's existence or non-existence requires, as a preliminary, very briefly spelling out some fundamental Kantian concepts in epistemology and philosophical psychology.

For Kant, "scientific knowing" or Wissen is the same as a true belief that P which is sufficiently justified by reasons, in both a subjective or first-personal sense (in which case it is "conviction" or *Überzeugung*) and also an *objective* or universally intersubjective sense (in which case it is "certainty" or *Gewissheit*) (CPR A822/B850).¹⁸ For example, rational human animals can scientifically know a priori that 3+4=7. I use the term "reasons" here in a very broad sense that includes any facts, whether internal to the rational human animal (who is also at once a cognitive subject and a practical agent) or external to her, providing justification, that is, providing some rational grounding for the subject/agent's belief or action, even if these facts are not expressible in linguistic or propositional form, and even if this rational grounding falls short of being sufficient. Nevertheless, scientific knowing for Kant implies *sufficient* justification by reasons. For example, in the case of our a priori scientific knowledge of basic arithmetic, we must be able to understand rudimentary natural-number-concepts and the primitive recursive functions, at least tacitly if not self-consciously, and also be able to present these rudimentary concepts and functions phenomenologically to ourselves, via the constructive sensory imagination, in a simple schematic format, such as this stroke-diagram-

$|\,|\,|\,+\,|\,|\,|\,=\,|\,|\,|\,|\,|\,|$

Apart from from sufficient justification by reasons, scientific knowing also has two further substantive necessary conditions, namely

(i) truth or "objective reality," which is the formal correspondence of a cognition with an actual or real-world object, and

(ii) empirical meaningfulness or "objective validity," which is the necessary relatedness of any cognition to direct, non-conceptual sensory acquaintances or encounters with real individual worldly objects, that is, "empirical intuitions" (*empirischen Anschauungen*).

For example, in view of the stroke-diagram I constructed just above this paragraph, it is self-evident that "3 + 4 = 7" has real-world instances, and also that these instances can be directly sense-perceived.

By sharp contrast to scientific knowing, "cognition" or Erkenntnis is

either (i) according to the very broad construal in the 1781 or A edition of the *Critique* of *Pure Reason*, any object-directed consciousness whatsoever (*CPR* A320/B376), or else (ii) according to the quite narrow construal in the 1787 or B edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, an empirically meaningful (objectively valid) judgment that *P*, which is the same as a "judgment of experience" or *Erfahrungsurteil* (*CPR* Bxxvi, B142, B147).

On either the (i) broad or the (ii) narrow construal of *Erkenntnis*, however, it is possible for a cognition to be either not objectively valid (that is, not empirically meaningful) or not objectively real (that is, false). Thus the notion of cognition is not equivalent with the notion of scientific knowing or scientific knowledge, which on the contrary entails both objective validity (that is, empirical meaningfulness) and objective reality (that is, truth), in addition to sufficient justification by reasons. In any case, objective validity is a necessary and sufficient condition of the truth-valuedness of any belief, judgment, or statement. More specifically, the failure of objective validity for any putative belief, judgment, or statement entails that it is nothing but a *mere thought* which lacks a truth-value altogether—"thoughts without content are empty (*leer*)" (*CPR* A51/B75 —and thereby is a "truth-value gap."¹⁹

Cognition or *Erkenntnis*, according to the narrow construal that implies objective validity or empirical meaningfulness, requires the innate human capacity for "sensibility" or *Sinnlichkeit*, which in turn includes both sense perception and sensory imagination. Correspondingly, the primary cognitive outputs of sensibility are sensory "intuitions" or *Anschauungen* and sensory "images" or *Bilder*.²⁰ Thinking or *Denken*, on the other hand, is the basic operation of the innate human capacity for "understanding" or *Verstand*, which yields "concepts" or *Begriffe* as its primary cognitive outputs.²¹

So for Kant, the famous slogan "thoughts without content are empty" (which is paired by him with the other equally famous slogan, "intuitions without concepts are blind"), means that thoughts *without sensory or imaginational content* are empty. Correspondingly, "thinking" or *Denken* in the 1787 or B edition of the first *Critique*, considered on its own apart from the operations of human sensibility, as mere thinking, is *minimal consistent conceivability*, which entails the bare logical or "analytic" possibility of the object that is thereby thinkable. A Kantian example of bare logical or analytic possibility, other than the concepts of God, immortal pure souls/souls-in-themselves, or incompatibilistic, agentcausal, noumenal freedom, that is briefly considered in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Nature Science* in the context of the philosophy of Newtonian physics, and again in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, in the context of the philosophy of biology, would be the concept of a universally living matter, or *hylozoism*; and two non-Kantian examples from contemporary philosophy of mind would be the concepts of

- (i) physical and biological duplicates of us lacking all consciousness, or zombies, and
- (ii) universally minded matter, or panpsychism.

The crucial point is that the minimal consistent conceivability of a thought, which entails its bare logical or analytic possibility (aka "weak metaphysical possibility") does *not* guarantee the real or synthetic possibility (aka "strong metaphysical possibility") of the object of the object of that thought, much less its actuality or reality (*CPR* Bxxvi), much less the truth-valuedness of any thought about it. To borrow, and slightly twist a famous

Russellian example, if there is no present King of France, then neither the thought that he is bald, nor the thought that he is not bald, has a truth-value. Similarly, but even moreso, for Kant, if God is neither cognizable nor knowable, then neither the thought that God exists, nor the thought that God does not exist, has a truth-value. These thoughts are no more truth-valued than either the thought that God is bald or the thought that God is not bald—or for that matter, than either the thought that zombie Zed is bald or the thought that zombie Zed is not bald. Interestingly, however, some contemporary philosophers mistakenly persist in holding that the thoughts that zombies can exist, or cannot exist, have truth-values, and argue endlessly and unresolvably for one or the other thesis.²² Of course that sort of mistake is very good indeed for the busy-bee busy-ness and big-capitalist business of contemporary professional academic philosophy; but it is tragically bad for real philosophy.

More specifically, contemporary Analytic metaphysicians really and truly need to learn Kant's 18th century lessons about recognizing the essential cognitive-semantic difference between mere logical, analytic (weak metaphysical) possibility and real, synthetic (strong metaphysical) possibility, For, failing this recognition, they have been, are, and forever will be inevitably led into the very same "obscurity and contradictions" (*CPR* Avii) that beset classical metaphysics prior to Kant. In this sense, contemporary Analytic metaphysics is nothing but what I call *The Copernican Devolution*, a regressive, retrograde evolutionary return to a disastrous pre-Kantian, pre-Critical epistemological and metaphysical naivete, and ultimately, to philosophical skepticism and theoretical chaos.²³

1.2.2 Element 2: The Critique of Pure Souls

Second, in the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason," also in the Transcendental Dialectic (*CPR* A341-405/B399-432), Kant works out a devastating logical, semantic, and epistemological critique of what he calls "rational psychology." This critique entails not only the impossibility of knowing the nature of an immaterial, substantial soul—the "pure soul," or soul-in-itself—but also the impossibility of any proof for its existence or non-existence. This in turn has the direct implication that proving the immortality or non-immortality of the pure soul/soul-in-itself is impossible. Even more precisely, Kant argues that not only the nature of the pure soul/soul-in-itself, but also the immortality or non-immortality of the pure soul/soul-in-itself is not only scientifically unknowable but also uncognizable—although at the same time, again as we shall see below under Element 4, just like God's existence, the immortality of the human pure soul/soul-in-itself remains *thinkable* by us as a matter of moral necessity.

1.2.3 Element 3: Religion and Theology are Grounded Morally/Practically, Not Scientifically/Theoretically.

Third, in the section entitled "Opining, Knowing, and Believing" in the Canon of Pure Reason in the first Critique (CPR A820-831/B848-859), in the sections on the "postulates of pure practical reason" in the Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR 5: 122-143), in sections 90 and 91 of the Critique of the Power Of Judgment, "On the Kind of Affirmation Involved in the Moral Proof of the Existence of God," and "On the Kind of Affirmation Produced by Means of a Practical Faith" (CPJ 5: 461-484), and in the "Conclusion" to the "Doctrine of Virtue" in the Metaphysics of Morals (MM 6: 486-491), Kant argues that the rational or reasons-responsive content of "belief" or "faith" (Glauben) in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, and more generally the rational or reasons-responsive content of the or practical in character, and not scientific or theoretical in character.

1.2.4 Element 4: Morality Requires Believing-in God's Existence and in Immortality

Fourth and finally—and most puzzlingly of all, in view of the other elements of his theory—in the very same texts cited under Element 3, Kant also argues that believing in God's existence and the immortality of the human pure soul/soul-in-itself are necessary presuppositions of morality. This moral necessary presupposition, moreover, is to be understood in the strong or constitutive sense that without these rational commitments, not only would morality itself would be empty and pointless, but also my personal commitment to morality would be self-alienating and self-stultifying:

I will inexorably believe in the existence of God and a future life, and I am sure that nothing can make these beliefs unstable, since my moral principles themselves, which I cannot renounce without becoming contemptible in my own eyes, would thereby be subverted. (*CPR* A828/B856)

Now Elements 1, 2, and 3 are clearly mutually consistent. The equally clear problem is that Element 4 apparently contradicts Elements 1, 2, and 3: How can believing in God's existence and the immortality of the human pure soul/soul-in-itself be constitutive presuppositions of morality, on the assumption that morality exhausts the rational content of theology and religion, if all proofs for God's existence and the immortality of the pure soul/soul-in-itself are impossible? For convenience, let us call this *The Incoherence Problem*.

In order to make any headway at all towards solving The Incoherence Problem, we must understand three special features of Kant's theory.

The first special feature is the fact that Kant's critique of arguments for God's existence and for the immortality of the soul yield the conclusions

(i) that we *scientifically know a priori* (via the Critical philosophy) that neither God's existence nor God's non-existence is either cognizable or provable, and also
(ii) that we *scientifically know a priori* (via the Critical philosophy) that neither the immortality of the soul nor the non-immortality of the soul is either cognizable or provable, although at the same time they remain thinkable, indeed morally necessarily thinkable.

In other words, for Kant we *philosophically know a priori* that God's existence or nonexistence is unknowable, and we also *philosophically know a priori* that the immortality or non-immortality of the soul is unknowable, although again they remain thinkable, indeed morally necessarily so. Let us call this feature *radical agnosticism*, since it is not ordinary agnosticism or *epistemic neutrality* as between opposing beliefs. On the contrary, it is a special form of *epistemic certainty* with respect to the inherent scientific uncognizability, unprovability, and unknowability alike of *both* members of certain contradictory or contrary²⁴ belief-pairs, while at the same time accepting the thinkability of both propositions. Radical agnosticism is nothing more and nothing less than the permanent rational suspension of belief in a thinkable proposition (or doctrine) and its negation alike, for fundamental philosophical reassons. Or otherwise put, *radical agnosticism is having objective epistemic certainty, via (for example) the Critical philosophy, about that which is objectively epistemically uncertain.*

The second special feature is that for Kant the rational attitude of *believing-in* is *not* the same as the rational attitude of *believing-that*. Believing-in is at once an affective or emotional, moral-practical, and also cognitive-theoretical attitude, that can be directed to any sort of objects, to events or processes, to people including oneself, to human or non-human mental states or acts, to ideals and values, to human or non-human ways-of-living, or even to human or non-human life itself as a whole, whereas believing-that is only cognitive-theoretical, and only ever directed to propositions. Moreover, believing-in carries the implications of

(i) a high and even life-changing degree of personal intensity and passion, and

(ii) a fully action-guiding character, unlike, say, mere hope or trust, which are consistent with low intensity and minimal action-guidingness.

The crucial points here are that believing-in and believing-that can pull in different directions, and that believing-in is, in essence, *a profound personal commitment* that always affectively/emotionally, volitionally, and practically overrides believing-that.

For example, I can believe-*in* a certain cosmopolitan real-world moral ideal—say, a worldwide ethical community, transcending coercive States or other State-like

institutions²⁵—and thereby be profoundly personally committed to creating and belonging to this cosmopolitan real-world moral ideal, and indeed be prepared to die for the sake of it, even if I also strongly believe-that contemporary post-Cold War, military-industrialcomplex-driven, global corporate capitalist world politics are inherently corrupt and evil, and that there is no authentic ethical community anywhere on the face of the Earth, wherever coercive States or State-like institutions actually exist, controlling and virtually every our lives. So believing-in manipulating aspect of can affectively/emotionally, volitionally, and practically override believing-that. Conversely, I can believe-that 3 + 4 = 7 with a priori rational intuitive certainty, and therefore have scientific knowledge of this truth, even if, as Kant very aptly remarked, I would not be prepared to die for this belief.²⁶

Let us call the set of characteristics collectively making up this second special feature, *believing-in-as-profound-personal-commitment*.

And the third special feature of Kant's account is that for him there is a crucial distinction between these two propositional attitudes:

(i) *believing that P* when you have no sufficient epistemic justification for believing that *P*, and

(ii) *choosing or acting as if, counterfactually, you believe that P*, even though in fact you have no sufficient epistemic justification for believing that P.

Propositional attitude (i) cannot be epistemically rational in any sense. It cannot be epistemically rational to believe that P without sufficient epistemic justification for believing that P, nor can it be practically rational to believe that P without sufficient epistemic justification for believing that P. In other words, you cannot have a good practical reason to have an epistemic belief in a proposition you know you have no good epistemic reason to believe.

But by sharp contrast, propositional attitude (ii), namely, believing-in-as-profoundpersonal-commitment, *can* indeed be fully *practically* rational, while also being neither epistemically rational nor epistemically irrational, namely, while also being *outside the sphere of epistemic rationality*:

Only in a **practical relation**...can taking something that is theoretically insufficient to be true be called believing (*Glauben*). (*CPR* A823/B852, boldfacing in the original)

More precisely, what believing-in says is that you choose or act in such a way that you *would* act, *were* you to believe it, even though

either (i) you *do* not epistemically believe it, or else (b) you *cannot* epistemically believe it,

regardless of whether you self-consciously recognize your non-belief/impossibility of belief, or not. Belief-that tracks truth, that is, the way the world actually is, and also the ways that the world can be, if that belief is to be true. But believing-in tracks not truth, but instead tracks the way the world should ideally be, according to the Highest Good, from your own rational-agent-centered perspective. Hence a case of believingin can be fully practically rational if you have a sufficient practical reason for comporting yourself in the same way as you would comport yourself, were you to epistemically believe a certain proposition that P. And this is true even though you philosophically know a priori that this proposition is uncognizable and unknowable, and indeed even though you philosophically know a priori that the denial of this proposition P is also uncognizable and unknowable—although, at the same time, both the proposition and its denial remain thinkable, and even if (indeed, especially if) it is morally necessary to think that proposition or its denial. Thus it is possible to have a sufficient *practical* reason to act as though you counterfactually believe that P while also lacking (and further recognizing that you lack) a sufficient *epistemic* reason to believe that *P*—practical and epistemic rationality do not necessarily co-vary.

In other words, propositional attitude (ii), or believing-in-as-profound-personalcommitment, can be both fully practically rational and also fully consistent with radical agnosticism. You can have a sufficient practical reason to comport yourself as if, counterfactually, you epistemically believe a proposition that P, even though you philosophically know a priori you have no good epistemic reason to believe that P or disbelieve that P. In this way, propositional attitude (ii) is not a *doxic* propositional attitude (namely, an epistemic belief), but instead a *commissive* propositional attitude (namely, a practical belief). For example, someone can have a sufficient practical reason for comporting herself as if, counterfactually, she epistemically believes that nearly all people are generous and good-hearted, since that way of comporting herself keeps her committed to working towards her real-world cosmopolitan moral ideal, in the face of a large body of otherwise very disheartening evidence which shows that the purely decision-theoretic interests of the military-industrial-university-digital complex and multinational corporations will always trample on and trump the basic rational human interests of ordinary people, and even though she has no good epistemic reason whatsoever for believing or disbelieving that nearly all ordinary people are generous and good-hearted, indeed even though she has a great deal of utterly contrary evidence to the effect that ordinary people are generally egoistic, hedonic, and crassly utilitarian, and what is even worse, all-too-often downright malicious and evil. When a case of believing-in has a categorically sufficient, or *moral*, practical reason supporting it, then this is what Kant calls moral belief or moral certainty:

[In moral belief] it is absolutely necessary that something must happen, namely, that I fulfill the moral law in all points. The end here is inescapably fixed, and according to all

my insight there is possible only a single condition under which this end is consistent with all ends together and thereby has practical validity, namely, that there be a God and a future world; I also know with complete certainty that no one else knows of any other conditions that lead to this same unity of ends under the moral law.... The conviction is not logical but moral certainty, and, since it depends on subjective grounds (of moral disposition) I must not even say "It is morally certain that there is a God," etc., but rather "I am morally certain" etc. That is, the belief in a God and another world is so interwoven with my moral disposition that I am in as little danger of ever surrendering the former as I am worried that the latter can ever be torn away from me. (*CPR* A828-829/B856-857).

Kant's notion of "moral certainty" plays a very interesting variation on Descartes's notion of instrumental "moral certainty" in his *Principles of Philosophy*, about which Descartes says:

Moral certainty is certainty which is sufficient to regulate our behavior, or which measures up to the certainty we have on matters relating to the conduct of life which we never normally doubt, though we know it is possible, absolutely speaking, that they may be false.²⁷

In the *Discourse on Method*, Descartes also explicitly contrasts his notion of instrumental moral certainty with "metaphysical certainty,"²⁸ that is, with what Kant calls *logical* certainty. It is also importantly ironic that in that particular text in the *Discourse*, Descartes is explicitly contrasting the *metaphysical certainty* of his proof for the existence of God and the soul with the merely instrumental *moral certainty* of

everything else of which [people] may think themselves more sure—such as their having a body, there being stars and an earth, and the like.

For Kant, by sharp contrast, there can be *no such thing* as Cartesian metaphysical or Kantian logical certainty about the existence of God and the immortality of the soul; there really can be and is *natural-scientific knowledge* about the existence of one's own body, the earth, the stars, "and the like"; and there really can be, and only *ought to be*, moral certainty about the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. In this sense, Kant can consistently hold

that (i) it is cognitively impossible either to *believe-that* God exists or to *believe-that* God does not exist, and also that (ii) it is morally obligatory to *believe-in* the rational Ideas of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.

In this sense, Kant's most philosophically insightful and knowledgeable biographer, Manfred Kuehn, is strictly speaking mistaken when he says that

[i]t was clear to anyone who knew Kant personally that he had no faith in a personal God. Having postulated God and immortality, he himself did not believe in either.²⁹

Strictly speaking, what Kuehn should have written is that

[i]t was clear to anyone who knew Kant personally that he had no *belief-that a personal God exists or does not exist*. Having postulated God and immortality, he himself did not *believe-that either*. *Nevertheless, he believed-in both, by virtue of having moral certainty about their rational Ideas*.

I will come back to all of these vitally important points again, in more detail, in sections 1.3 to 1.7.

1.3 THE UNPROVABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE

Kant's critique of "transcendental theology" (*CPR* A631/B659) occurs in chapter three of the Transcendental Dialectic, "The Ideal of Pure Reason" (*CPR* A567-642/B595-670).

Now for Kant, God has at least *five different noumenal aspects, or "faces,"* all rolled up into One. More precisely, "noumenal" for Kant means: *that which exists "in-itself" and not "for us," hence that which is an ontologically independent and non-relational substance, metaphysically "lonely," non-sensory, non-spatiotemporal, and more generally transcendent.* Then the Kantian God has at least these five distinct noumenal aspects or faces:

(i) God is the noumenal ultimately real *creator* of the actual world (aka, the *ens realissimum*), who creates by determining a unique selection from among all the maximal mutually consistent sets of those possibilities, that is, from amongst all "possible worlds" (*CPR* A571-583/B579-611).

(ii) God is the noumenal ultimate necessary and sufficient *causal source* of everything in that actual world (*CPR* A452-460/B480-488).

(iii) God is the noumenal ultimate *knower of all things and all truths* by way of "intellectual intuition" (*CPR* B71-72).

(iv) God is the noumenal *holistic designer and ultimate end or purpose of the natural world as a complete systematic totality*, especially including all its non-mechanical, organismic, or otherwise teleological processes and structures (CPR A620-630/B649-658, A642-668/B670-696) (*CPJ* 5: 429-447).

(v) God is the noumenal concrete, individual epitome and paradigm of the Highest Good (CPrR 5: 132-141) (CPJ 5: 447-461), hence the noumenal ultimate ground of morality.

In short, Kant's God is a metaphysically and normatively *enhanced* version of the familiar "3-O God" of classical philosophical theology and natural religion: "the perfect being," who is at once all-powerful (so the first 'O' is for 'omnipotent'), all-knowing (the second 'O' is for 'omniscient'), and all-good (and the third 'O' is for 'omnibenevolent'). Correspondingly, I will say that *the Kantian God is* 3-O+2.

Presupposing this 3-O+2 conception of God in the Ideal, Kant then argues for the logical unprovability of God's existence in four steps, by arguing that

(i) there cannot be an ontological proof,

(ii) there cannot be a cosmological proof,

(iii) there cannot be a physico-theological proof (that is, there cannot be a sound

argument from design, or a sound teleological argument), and that

(iv) there are only three possible proofs for God's existence.

In fact, Kant's critique of the ontological proof, *on its own*, suffices to show that a 3-O+2 God's existence is logically unprovable and scientifically unknowable, since only the ontological argument even purports to be a logical—or analytic a priori—argument for God's (analytically necessary) existence, and only an analytic a priori argument for God's (analytically necessary) existence would be sufficient to show that God exists. The cosmological proof, if sound, would yield God's (synthetically necessary) existence as a synthetic a priori truth; and the physico-theological proof or design/teleological argument, if sound, would yield God's (synthetically necessary) existence truth.

All this presupposes Kant's analytic-synthetic and a priori-a posteriori distinctions. But unfortunately these distinctions are very far from being self-evident or uncontested. So I must take a short but necessary philosophical detour in order to spell them out. Moreover, while it is true that whole books have been written about these distinctions,³⁰ you will perhaps be somewhat relieved to know that I can boil the Kantian theory of analyticsynthetic and a priori-a posteriori down to three basic parts, each of which contains three sub-theses.

First—

(i) A belief, judgment, proposition, or statement is analytic if and only if its meaningfulness and truth or falsity are necessarily determined by *intrinsic conceptual connections*, including the intensional "containment" of a predicate-concept in a subject-concept (for example, "Bachelors are unmarried"), conceptual identity (for example, "Bachelors are bachelors"), and the intrinsic conceptual connections characteristic of pure general logic (for example, The Principle of Minimal Non-Contradiction, namely, "Not every propositon and its negation are both true," i.e., "~

(P) (P&~P)"), *alone*, no matter what the other semantic constituents of those beliefs, judgments, etc., might be.

(ii) The universal criterion of analyticity is that the negation of any analytic proposition entails a conceptual or logical contradiction (*CPR* A150-153/B189-193).

(iii) An analytic truth is a necessary truth that is true in every conceptually and/or logically possible world.³¹

More simply put, analytic truth and knowledge are *essentially conceptual* truth and knowledge.

Second-

(i) A belief, judgment, proposition, or statement is synthetic if and only if its meaningfulness and truth or falsity are necessarily determined by *the empirical or non-empirical sensible intuitions* that are semantic constituents of the relevant belief, judgment, proposition, or statement, not by logic alone, and not by the concepts that must also belong to it.³²

(ii) The universal criterion of the syntheticity of a belief, judgment, proposition, or statement is that its negation is conceptually and logically consistent, that is, its negation does not entail a conceptual or logical contradiction.

(iii) A synthetic truth is true in all and only the possible worlds that meet the special spatiotemporal and mathematical conditions of human sensible experience, aka the "experienceable worlds," and a truth-value gap otherwise.³³

More simply put, synthetic truth and knowledge are *essentially non-conceptual* truth and knowledge.

Third—

(i) Apriority entails both non-empiricality and necessity, and aposteriority entails both empiricality and contingency.

(ii) Whereas all analytic beliefs, judgments, etc., must be a priori, there are nevertheless not only synthetic a posteriori beliefs, judgments, etc., like "Sweetpea the cat is on the mat," but also, and most importantly—since this uniquely semantically characterizes the necessary truths of mathematics (for example, "3+4=7"), metaphysics (for example, "Every event has a cause") and philosophy (for example, "Human persons are conscious, intentional, rational, embodied free agents") more generally—there also really can be, and really are, synthetic a priori truths.³⁴

(iii) Whereas a synthetic a posteriori truth is a contingent truth—hence its negation is conceptually and logically consistent—that is true *in some experienceable worlds and false in some experienceable worlds*, and a truth-value gap otherwise, by sharp contrast, a synthetic a priori truth is a necessary truth that is true in *all and only the experienceable worlds*, and a truth-value-gap otherwise.

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More simply put, a synthetic a priori truth is a "necessary truth with a human face," that is, an anthropocentrically necessary truth, hence a necessary truth even though its negation is conceptually and logically consistent. A synthetic a priori truth does not tell us what an omniscient God or a disembodied thinking spirit could know by reason alone; instead it tells what only a rational, but also finite embodied sensible creature like us, could ever know.

Indeed, it is precisely this irreducibly anthropocentric semantic and epistemic character of synthetic apriority that has seemed, and still seems, most puzzling and even downright paradoxical to those who cut their philosophical teeth on Humean Empiricism or Logical Empiricism, including most contemporary professional academic philosophers. This is because Empiricism presupposes, without argument, that there is *one and only one kind of necessary truth*, namely, analytically necessary truths, namely, conceptual truths or logical truths. Therefore Empiricism is always explicitly or implicitly committed, without argument, to "modal monism." But on the contrary, Kant is a "modal dualist," and the Kantian doctrine of necessity is that *there are irreducibly two essentially different kinds of necessary truths*, analytic (conceptually necessary), and synthetic a priori (nonconceptually necessary). Correspondingly, the *general* idea of a necessary truth in a Kantian, "modal dualist" framework is that it is a belief, judgment, proposition, or statement *that is true in every member of well-defined, complete class of logically possible worlds, and never false in any logically possible world*, since this encompasses both analytically and synthetically necessary truths alike.

For example, "3 + 4 = 7" is a synthetic a priori truth. This is because its meaningfulness and truth are necessarily determined by our non-empirical sensory intuition of the successive, serial, recursive (namely, generated by repeated self-applications of the same operation) structure of the moments of phenomenal time, which provides a unique model of the natural numbers, not by logic alone, and not by the concepts that must also belong "3 + 7." 4 = Correspondingly, "It is not to the case that 3 + 4 = 7" is not a conceptual or logical contradiction, because there are conceptually and logically possible worlds in "3 + 4 = 7" is not true, namely, either worlds without phenomenal time per se or worlds without anything isomorphic to the structure of phenomenal time in them, hence, worlds without any natural numbers in them. Nevertheless "3 + 4 = 7" is never false in *any* possible world, since it is true in all the experienceable worlds and also a truth-value gap in all the rest of the conceptually and logically possible worlds.

It is a sad but genuine sociological fact of contemporary professional academic philosophical life that *nothing* bores distracted introductory students, stressed-out graduate students, and jaded philosophers with contingent, tenure-track, or tenured jobs too, more quickly and utterly, than discussing the analytic-synthetic and a priori–a posteriori distinctions. So before leaving this necessary detour and returning to the main road of our argument, I also need to answer this question explicitly:

Do the analytic-synthetic and a priori–a posteriori distinctions *really and truly matter*, and if so, *why*?

And the answer is: Yes!, they really and truly matter, precisely because

(i) this pair of distinctions tells us what kinds of truth and knowledge are really possible *for creatures like us*, hence having a good theory of these them tells us *how human cognitive rationality is really possible*, and

(ii) this pair of distinctions tells us what kinds of truth and knowledge are really possible *in philosophy*, hence having a good theory of them tells us *how philosophy itself is really possible*.

In short, these distinctions *really and truly matter* because without them, it would be the end of the world and ourselves *as we know them*.

Moreover, as specifically applied to philosophical theology, these distinctions make it really possible to understand, and to know philosophically a priori, how God's existence or non-existence is both strictly scientifically unknowable and logically unprovable, while still being morally necessarily thinkable. So science and logic have cognitive and metaphysical limits, beyond which we nevertheless can and must feel, choose, and act with moral certainty, because we are *not* nothing but decision-theoretic robots, as scientific naturalism tells us, and as global corporate capitalists and the governments of contemporary coercive States and other State-like institutions covertly assume, forever in search of the most cost-effective ways to control and manipulate us. On the contrary, we *are* living, caring, morally self-legislating free agents. In short, as boring as they might seem, this pair of distinctions is the unique dual key to unlocking *a philosophical truth that is as deep as it gets*.

Back now onto the main road again. As we have just seen, according to the Kantian conception of the analytic-synthetic distinction, the negative criterion of the syntheticity of any proposition, whether synthetic a priori or synthetic a posteriori, is that its negation is conceptually and logically consistent (*CPR*: A150-158/B189-197). Therefore, even if the cosmological proof or the physico-theological proof *were* sound, this would not entail that God exists *in every logically possible world*. In other words, even if either or both of these proofs *were* sound, then logically and analytically speaking, *God still might not have existed*. But that leaves open an epistemological and ontological gap into which an atheistic skeptic can always introduce a significant doubt. If God might not have existed, then even if God *seems* to exist in this actual world, since we cannot tell the difference between our world and any other world that is merely an immense mock-up or simulation of our world, with nothing whatsoever behind the evidential façade, then we are not rationally entitled to believe that God exists. This is known as "new evil demon skepticism," in order to distinguish it from the classical or old Cartesian evil demon skepticism, which is the

equally significant doubt that, possibly, this actual world itself is nothing but an immense mock-up or simulation created by an evil demon, a super-powerful being other than God, lacking God's 3-O perfections. Just like old evil demon skepticism, new evil demon skepticism is still powerful enough to screw us up completely where the real possibility of any sort of knowledge is concerned. And not only that, but if new and old evil demon skepticism *are taken together, and deployed by the atheist*, then they collectively undermine any conceptual, logical, or analytic proof of God's existence, whether the classical Anselmian or Cartesian ontological argument per se, *or any other purported analytic proof of God's existence*, nowadays generically called "ontological arguments."³⁵

So showing that ontological arguments are impossible suffices to show that God's existence is logically unprovable in the sense required for *epistemic necessity*, which according to Kant is a belief which involves not merely "conviction" (*Überlegung*), thereby having a subjectively sufficient justification, but also involves "certainty" (*Gewissheit*), thereby having an objectively sufficient justification (*CPR* A820-822/B848-850). In other words, showing that the ontological proof of God's existence is impossible, also shows that *strict scientific a priori knowledge* of God's existence is impossible.

The technical term "dialectic" is used by Kant to refer to the logic of error, illusion, and fallacy, whether formal fallacies or informal fallacies. The chapter on the Ideal of Pure Reason follows the Paralogisms of Pure Reason and the Antinomies of Pure Reason, and completes Kant's transcendental (or specifically philosophical) logic of error, illusion, and fallacy, the Transcendental Dialectic (*CPR* A293-704/B349-732).³⁶ In turn, the Dialectic is triadically organized according to three basic types of Idea of Pure Reason:

(i) the Idea of an absolute subject of cognition, or the Cartesian immaterial soul (the Paralogisms),

(ii) the Idea of an absolute object of cognition, or nature as a cosmological totality (the Antinomies), and

(iii) the Idea of an absolute ground of both the subject and the object of cognition, or God (the Ideal).

Kant's basic argumentative strategy in the Paralogisms, the Antinomies, and the Ideal is to show that some important logical error, illusion, or fallacy has been committed has been made by anyone who attempts to argue for the existence or nonexistence of some or another noumenal entity. So his critique is *second-order*, in that he shows that arguers have ignored the impossibility of arguments for or against the existence of the relevant objects, and thereby have also ignored our epistemological duty to radical agnosticism regarding the existence or non-existence of the relevant objects.

Now the key dialectical error in the Paralogisms is the invalid inference from the fact of transcendental apperception or the "I think," to the existence of a noumenal soul; and in the Antinomies the key dialectical error is failing to draw the fundamental ontological distinction between appearances or phenomenal entities on the one hand, and things-inthemselves or noumenal entities on the other. In the Ideal, however, the key error is the invalid inference from the fact that every part of the actual or real world is completely determined, to the existence of a single absolutely real being (God) which is the ground of (namely, is necessary and sufficient for) the complete determination of the actual or real world.

What does that mean?

As Kant very succinctly notes in his final gloss at the very end of the Dialectic, human cognition has an inherent rational goal-directedeness or teleology: "all human cognition begins with intuitions, goes from there to concepts, and ends with Ideas" (*CPR* A702/B730). In other words, we cannot rationally help being absolutizing, noumenalizing thinkers, trying desperately *to think like God*, and also, in effect, as Sartre later rightly noted, passionately but uselessly desiring *to be God*. In this sense, an Idea is a human cognitive Jacob's ladder leading up to rational heaven.

Less metaphorically put, Ideas of Reason are third-order "absolutizing" or "noumenalizing" concepts, aka what Kant calls "notions," that apply to the logically fundamental universal second-order concepts, or pure concepts of the understanding, which in turn apply to empirical concepts. So, for example, beginning with an empirical intuition or sense-perception of a certain cute cuddly cat, say, "Sweetpea," one goes from there to the empirical concept CAT, under which the adorable object Sweetpea falls, and from there to the pure concept SUBSTANCE, under which the empirical concept CAT falls, and ends with the rational Idea ABSOLUTE OR NOUMENAL SUBSTANCE, under which the pure concept SUBSTANCE falls By contrast with the Ideas, Ideals, according to Kant, are the Ideas *incarnate* or *reified*: they are concrete, individual beings which contain in themselves the completed totality of conditions that is represented by the content of some Idea. Otherwise and again metaphorically put, Ideals are Ideas that have grown legs to walk around on.

The concept GOD, in turn, depends on the very concept of a "concept." Logicosemantically speaking, as I briefly noted earlier, a concept is a unified self-consistent inherently general semantic content that functions as a predicate of beliefs, judgments, propositions, or statements. For every such concept (for example, the concept of a cat, or the concept of the cat's being on the mat), given the unity and self-consistency of its semantic content, there is a corresponding logically possible object or logically possible state-of-affairs (for example, a cat, or a cat's being on the mat). For every such concept, there is also a corresponding contradictory concept (for example, the concept of a non-cat, or the concept of its not being the case that the cat is on the mat). Now consider the total set of all such concepts together with their contradictories: this constitutes our total human conceptual repertoire, or what Kant calls "**the sum total of all possiblity**" (*CPR* A573/601, boldfacing in the original). From this repertoire, a *logically possible world* can be cognitively constructed as a total set of mutually consistent concepts such that the addition of one more concept to the set would lead to a contradiction. In the jargon of contemporary logic, this is called "maximality." So a logically possible world for Kant is nothing but a maximal consistent set of concepts. Now consider the set containing every maximal consistent set of concepts. This is the set of all logically possible worlds.

A *determination* for Kant is an empirical concept insofar as it is actually applied or at least applicable to an empirical object: in contemporary terms, a determination is a *property* of an object. Furthermore, according to Kant, everything that is actual or real must be *completely determined*. This means that for every actual or real thing, and for every concept of things, either the concept or its contradictory applies to the thing, but not both. Obviously this ontological principle corresponds directly to the classical logical Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC):

For all predicates *P* and all objects *x*, necessarily ~ (Px & ~Px).

But the ontological significance of complete determination is that the actuality or reality of a thing expresses a logically complete systematic selection of properties from the totality of possible properties. The actual or real thing is then what uniquely instantiates, or falls under, that select set of properties. Otherwise put, every actual or real thing is identical with the thing that instantiates the total set of mutually consistent concepts that apply to it. This corresponds to Leibniz's idea that every monad or metaphysically real individual has a *complete individual concept* that completely determines its essence. And this in turn corresponds to Leibniz's Laws: *The Identity of Indiscernibles*, which says that necessarily, any two things sharing all properties in common are identical, and *The Indiscernibility of Identicals*, which says that necessarily, identical things share all their properties in common.

According to Kant, then, the concept GOD is the concept of a single noumenal being that is the ground of (namely, is necessary and sufficient for) the complete determination of the actual or real world. Again, the concept GOD is the concept of a single thing-initself that contains within its essence all of actuality or reality: hence Kant calls the concept GOD the concept of the *ens realissimum* (*CPR* A577/B605).

Given this Kantian framework, the fallacy of the Ideal of Pure Reason can be construed in two different ways:

(i) to infer invalidly from the objectively valid thesis of the complete determination of every actual or real thing, to the noumenal concept or Idea of a single "really real" being that completely determines all of actuality or reality (false reification), or

(ii) to infer invalidly from the concept of the *ens realissimum*, or the concept of the ground of the sum total of all possibilities, to the existence of what is described by that concept, namely, the Ideal corresponding to that Idea (false existence proof).

As I have mentioned already, ontological arguments (OAs) are any analytic a priori argument from the concept GOD to God's existence. The most famous ontological arguments are to be found Anselm's *Proslogion* and Descartes's fifth *Meditation*, and correspondingly, here are quick glosses of those two arguments:

Anselm's Ontological Argument

(1) The concept of God is the concept of that-than-which-nothing-more-real-can-bethought.

(2) That-than-which-nothing-more-real-can-be-thought could not exist merely inside the mind (as a concept or idea), for then it would be possible to think of something more real than it: namely, its existing outside the mind.

(3) Therefore that-than-which-nothing-more-real-can-be-thought must not exist merely inside the mind (as a concept or idea). That is, it must also exist outside the mind.

(4) Therefore it is necessarily (that is, logically, analytically a priori) true that God exists.

Descartes's Ontological Argument

(1) The concept of God is the concept of a perfect being.

(2) The concept of a perfect being is the concept of a being whose essence contains all perfections.

(3) Existence is a perfection.

(4) Therefore the concept of God is the concept of a being whose essence entails its existence.

(5) Therefore it is necessarily (that is, logically, analytically a priori) true that God exists.

And here is the core of Kant's critical response to any ontological argument:

I answer: You have already committed a contradiction when you have brought the concept of its existence, under whatever disguised name, into the concept of a thing which you think merely in terms of its possibility. If one allows you to do that, then you have won the illusion of a victory, but in fact you have said nothing; for you have committed a mere tautology. I ask you: is the proposition **This or that thing** (which I have conceded to you as possible, whatever it may be) **exists**—is this proposition, I say, an analytic or synthetic proposition? If it is the former then with existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing; but then either the thought that is in you must be the thing itself, or else you haver inferred that existence on this pretext from its inner possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The word 'reality,' which sounds different from 'existence' in the concept of the predicate, does not settle it. For if you call all positing (leaving indeterminate what you posit) 'reality,' then you have already posited the thing with all its predicates in

the concept of the subject and assumed it to be actual, and you only repeat that in the predicate. If you concede, on the contrary, as in all fairness you must, that every existential proposition is synthetic, then how would you assert that the predicate of existence may not be cancelled without contradiction?—since this privilege pertains only in the analytic propositions, as resting on its very character. I would have hoped to annihilate this oversubtle argumentation without any digressions through a precise determination of the concept of existence, if I had not found that the illusion consisting in the conusion of a logical predicate with a real one (i.e., the determination of a thing) nearly precludes all instruction. Anything one likes can serve as a logical predicate, even the subject can be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from every content. But the **determination** is a predicate, which goes beyond the concept of a subject and enlarges it. Thus it must not be included in it already. **Being** is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves. In the logical use it is merely the copula of a judgment.... [T]he little word 'is' is not a predicate, but only that which posits the predicate in relation to the subject. Now if I take the subject (God) together with all its predicates ... and say God is, or there is a God, then I add no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit the **object** in relation to my concept. Both must contain exactly the same, and hence when I think this object as given absolutely (though the expression, 'it is') nothing is thereby added to the concept, which expresses merely its possibility. Thus the actual contains nothing more than the merely possible. A hundred actual dollars do not contain the least bit more than a hundred possible ones. For since the latter signifies the concept and the former its object and its positing in itself, then, in case the former contained more than the latter, my concept would not express the entire object and thus would not be the suitable concept of it. But in my financial condition there is more with a hundred actual dollars than with the mere concept of them (i.e., their possibility). For with actuality the object is not merely included in my concept analytically, but adds synthetically to my concept (which is a determination of my state); yet the hundred dollars themselves that I am thinking of are not in the least increased through this being outside my concept. Thus when I think a thing, through whichever and however many predicates I like (even in its thoroughgoing determination), not the least bit gets added to the thing when I posit in addition that this thing is. For otherwise what would exist would not be the same as what I had thought in my concept, but more than that, and I could not say that the very object of my concept exists.... Now if I think of a being as the highest reality (without defect), the question still remains whether it exists or not.... Thus whatever and however much our concept of an object may contain, we must go out beyond it to provide it with existence. With objects of sense this happens through connection with some perception of mine in accordance with empirical laws; but for objects of of pure thinking thete is no means whatever for cognizing their existence, because it would have to be cognized entirely a priori, but our consciousness of all existence (whether immediately through perception, or through inference connecting something with perception belongs entirely and wihout exception to the unity of experience, and though an existence outside the field cannot be declared absolutely impossible, it is a presupposition

that we cannot justify through anything. (CPR A597-601/B625-629, boldfacing in the original)

Reduced to its essentials, Kant's critique of ontological arguments consists of three distinct theses.

(Thesis i): "Exists" is a logical and not a "real" or "determining" predicate: more precisely, "exists" is a second-order concept C_2 which says of some first-order concept C_1 that C_1 has at least one instance.

(Thesis ii): The category of existence, when schematized, yields the schematized category of reality or actuality (*Realität*, *Wirklichkeit*).

(Thesis iii): Objectively valid and true existence-judgments (for example, "Socrates exists") are synthetic (hence their meaning and truth is based on intuition), not analytic (hence their meaning and truth is not based solely on concepts).

Each of these theses needs to be unpacked more. I will do that one-by-one and then recombine them into a single complex critical thesis about ontological arguments.

Re (Thesis i): According to Kant, *logical predicates* or *logical concepts* are those concepts whose application to another concept does not change or augment the semantic content of the second concept, although they may nevertheless change or augment the second concept's psychological or logical form. For example, applying the logical operation of analytical decomposition to the concept BACHELOR yields the several ordered constituents of its conceptual microstructure, namely,

<UNMARRIED + ADULT + MALE>

but does not in any way change or augment the semantic content of that concept. Nevertheless the decomposition operation itself *does* generate new semantic information, that is, direct reflective insight into the microstructure of that concept. (This, by the way, would be the key to a Kantian solution of the "paradox of analysis."³⁷) Again, applying the logical operation of negation to the concept CAT³⁸ yields NON-CAT but does not in any way change or augment CAT's semantic content. CAT's semantic content is its *intension*, and this intension uniquely determines CAT's cross-possible-worlds *extension* or semantic value, namely, the set of all actual and possible cats. Nevertheless the negation operation as applied to CAT itself *does* generate a new semantic value, namely the set of all non-cats.

By contrast, *real predicates, determining predicates*, or *determining concepts* are precisely those concepts whose application to another concept does indeed change and augment the semantic content of the second concept. For example, RED is a real or determining concept whose application to the concept ROSE modifies the latter's content by further specifying it and also correspondingly narrowing its extension. In other words, while a logical predicate or concept, when applied or added to the set of predicates or

concepts, that are truly predicated of or applicable to, respectively, some existing or nonexisting object, does not change, enlarge, or diminish the set of actual or possible objects to which that predicate or concept is truly predicated of or applicable to, a real predicate, determining predicate, or determining concept, when so-applied or –added, does indeed change, enlarge, or diminish the set of actual or possible objects to which that predicate or concept is truly predicated of or applicable to.

Now EXISTS is merely a logical concept in that applying it to the concept of, say, ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS, does not in any way change or augment the latter's semantic content. Notice that Kant does *not* say that applying EXISTS to another concept is either meaningless or vacuous. Having an existent one hundred dollars in my pocket is quite different from a merely logically possible one hundred dollars! Similarly, Kant does *not* say that EXISTS is *not* an authentic predicate: on the contrary EXISTS *is* an authentic predicate. It is just that it is a logical predicate and not a real or determining predicate.

At this point in the exegesis of Kant's doctrine, we can now ask the following \$64,000.00 philosophical question,

Q: What precisely does the logical concept EXISTS *mean* when it is applied to another concept?

And here is the corresponding \$64,000.00 Kantian philosophical answer,

A: The concept EXISTS is a second-order concept which means *that the first-order concept to which it is applied has instances in some non-empty domain of objects.* So EXISTS is a second-order predicate that functions in essentially the same way as the existential quantifier of first-order predicate logic.

Re (thesis ii): For Kant, the concept EXISTS is empirically meaningful or objectively valid only when it is "schematized," that is, partially interpreted by means of the sensible imagination (CPR A137-147/B176-187), by the representations of time and space. Correspondingly, as schematized, EXISTS says that the concept to which it is applied has empirically intuitable or sense-perceivable instances at some time or another and/or some place or another in the empirical world. Otherwise put, the schematized concept EXISTS means the same as the concepts ACTUAL and REAL. The Anticipations of Perception further tell us that for something to be real is for it to be an empirically intuitable object of sense-perception having some positive degree of intensive magnitude (force) (*CPR* A165-176/B207-218). And the Postulates of Empirical Thought even further tell us that for something to be given in empirical intuition at some time and/or place, or another (*CPR* A217-226/B264-274).

Re (thesis iii): If EXISTS is a logical predicate but not a real or determining predicate, and if the concept EXISTS is a second-order concept which means that the concept to which it is applied has instances in some non-empty domain of objects, and if the schematized concept EXISTS means the same as ACTUAL and REAL, then to apply EXISTS to another concept in an objectively valid judgment (for example, "Socrates exists") is to say of the second concept that it has empirically intuitable actual or real instances in the empirical natural world. Hence "X exists" is true if and only if something falling under the concept X has empirically intuitable actual or real instances in the empirical natural world. Now any judgment whose whose meaning and truth depend on empirical intuition is synthetic. Therefore every objectively valid and true existential judgment is synthetic.

At this point, some non-Kantian or even anti-Kantian reader might well say:

"Well that's all fine and good if you accept Kant's philosophical system, but I don't."

Fair enough. But really, one can strip away all the special Kantian metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic backdrop and superstructure here, and still get to the independently important claims being made, which are

(i) that EXISTS is a second-order, logical predicate and not a first-order, real or determining predicate,

(ii) that EXISTS, to the extent that it can be partially interpreted and meaningfully applied to things in the manifest perceivable world, has the same semantic content as ACTUAL and REAL, and

(iii) that no existential proposition is an analytic truth.

Any one or all of those claims can be defended independently of the central doctrines of Kant's Critical philosophy. Indeed, a great many philosophers who would almost literally *die of shame* if publicly accused of being seriously sympathetic to Kantian ideas, can and do hold theses equivalent to them. For example, *Frege* held a version of (i); all *actualists* in modal metaphysics hold some version of (ii); and *Quine* held a version of (iii).

Let us suppose for the purposes of further argument, then, that the three notspecifically-Kantian claims that were (as it so happens) made by Kant, listed in paragraph just above, are true. And now we can also reintroduce Kant's *specifically* Kantian claims. How then does all this apply to ontological arguments? In two ways.

First, ontological arguments fallaciously and fatally err by treating the concept EXISTS as if it were a real or determining predicate. But EXISTS is neither a real or determining predicate nor is it ever contained analytically in any other real or determining predicate. Therefore, all arguments purporting to show that the concept EXISTS is analytically contained in the concept GOD are fallacious and unsound.

The very same point also goes for NECESSARILY EXISTS. This is simply because NECESSARILY EXISTS, just like EXISTS, is also a logical predicate but not a real or determining predicate. The logical representation of necessary existence is simply a further

modal operation on the logical representation of existence, and therefore the modal logical concept, NECESSARILY EXISTS, has the same basic logico-semantic character as EXISTS—and the same goes for the other modal logical concepts POSSIBLY EXISTS, CONTINGENTLY EXISTS, etc.

Hence the objection which is sometimes made against Kant's critique of ontological arguments and in favor of some or another post-classical ontological argument,³⁹ to the effect that even if EXISTS is not a real predicate, nevertheless NECESSARILY EXISTS can be a real predicate of God, is doubly mistaken.

First, it is mistaken because it wrongly assumes that Kant's technical term "real predicate" means the same as "authentic predicate," whereas, as we have seen, in fact it means the same as *real or determining* predicate, which is a completely different notion.

And second, it is mistaken because if EXISTS is a second-order logical predicate which does not operate like a first-order real or determining predicate, then obviously the modal logical concept NECESSARILY EXISTS is also *another* second-order logical predicate which also does not operate like a first-order real or determining predicate. Cranking up the modal implications of a second-order logical predicate does not turn it into a first-order real or determining predicate.

Second, consider the belief, judgment, proposition, or statement, "God exists." It is true just in case

(i) the concept GOD is objectively valid, and

(ii) the concept GOD has empirically intuitable instances.

But the concept GOD is not objectively valid, hence "God exists" is a truth-value gap. Moreover even if, *per impossibile*, "God exists" *were* true, that judgment could only ever be synthetic, not analytic. This is because, like all synthetic beliefs, judgments, propositions, or statements, the meaning and truth of "God exists" are necessarily determined by intuitions, not by concepts, and its negation is conceptually and logically consistent.

There are also three extremely important logical, semantic, and epistemological consequences of this Kantian critique of ontological arguments.

First, as I noted above, the impossibility of ontological arguments generalizes to the impossibility of any strict scientific a priori knowledge of God's nature or strict logical proof of God's existence.

Second, the Kantian critique of ontological arguments also entails a general solution to a longstanding problem in philosophical logic: the problem of the correct analysis of negative existential propositions. This is a problem which goes back at least as far as Plato's *Sophist*, but also seriously worried Frege, Russell, and many other major philosophical logicians, not to mention recent and contemporary philosophers of language and/or logic. The problem is this: If a word has to have a reference in order for it to be meaningful, then

how can existence ever be truly denied of anything? In other words, it seems paradoxical to assert "X does not exist" wherever what replaces 'X' is a meaningful word: for example, "Superman does not exist." You are apparently talking about that existing superhero, Superman, out of one side of your mouth, and yet also denying that he, Superman, exists, out of the other side.

The Kantian critique of ontological arguments, however, shows us that wherever existential predications are made, the subject-term of the proposition *stands for an objectively valid concept, not an object.* And some objectively valid concepts have a null actual-world or real-world extension, for example, the empirical concept SUPERMAN. So it is not generally true that a word has to have a reference in order for it to be meaningful: words can stand for concepts, and concepts need not be instantiated in the actual or real world. Then when a word—for example, 'Superman'—stands for a concept that has no actual or real instances, then it can be truly and non-paradoxically said that *X* does not exist. Thus an existential proposition is true just in case

(i) the subject concept of the proposition is objectively valid and has some actual or real instances,

and a negative existential proposition is true just in case

(ii) the subject concept of the proposition is objectively valid and has no actual or real instances.

Third, the concept SUPERMAN and the concept GOD are radically different concepts. The concept SUPERMAN is an objectively valid *empirical* concept with (as it so happens) a null real or actual world extension. But the concept GOD is *not* an objectively valid concept, and therefore *not* an empirical concept. On the contrary, GOD is an absolutized or noumenal concept, namely, a "notion," aka an Idea of Pure Reason. Hence the concept GOD is not cognizable, but instead only thinkable. This means that *neither* the proposition "God does not exist" has a classical truth-value: indeed, both "God exists" and also "God does not exist" are *truth-value gaps*. This in turn means that *atheism* is every bit as closed to strict scientific knowledge or logical proof as *theism* or *deism* are:

[T]he same grounds for considering human reason incapable of asserting the existence of [God] ... also suffice to prove the non-cogency (*Untauglichkeit*) of all counter-assertions. For where, by pure speculation, will anyone acquire the insight that there is no highest being as the original ground of everything? (*CPR* A641/B669)

For example, and perhaps most importantly, both the metaphysical and evidential arguments for atheism *from the existence of evil* are impossible,⁴⁰ just as ontological

arguments are impossible. *Philosophical theology contains unprovable propositions*. As we will see in the next section, this is a logico-semantically profound result which is comparable in its *moral* and *practical* significance to the *cognitive* and *theoretical* significance of Kurt Gödel's logico-semantic demonstration in the 1930s that the system of elementary or Peano arithmetic (that is, elementary logic plus the five Peano axioms) contains unprovable sentences.⁴¹

It is relevantly interesting and philosophically ironic in this connection that Gödel *also* developed an ontological argument.⁴² It seems clear, however, that Gödel intended his ontological argument to be strictly a pump for *rational intuition*. Rational intuition, according to the later Gödel, can exceed logical provability in the narrower senses of either decidability or formal provability in elementary logic or elementary arithmetic⁴³—hence Gödel did not hold that the existence of God is logically provable in either of those narrower senses. Nevertheless, this at least indirectly shows that Kant's strictures on *analytic* logical provability significantly anticipate and mirror Gödel's strictures on logical provability in the *narrower* senses.

Now let us move from Gödel to Nietzsche, via GOD. As every clever 16 year-old knows, even if only as a bit of pop-edgy urban lore, Nietzsche shockingly wrote that "God is dead and we have killed Him." This vividly expresses an especially extreme and "eliminativist" version of atheism. Eliminativism says that for some concept C, not only does C have no actual or real world instances (hence Cs do not exist), but for good reasons we should all simply stop using C. But even more shockingly than Nietzsche, Kant proved by means of his critique of ontological arguments that it is philosophically a priori known (hence of, course, also knowable) that God's nature is strictly scientifically unknowable and that God's existence *or* non-existence is logically unprovable. Hence not only are all theists and deists mistaken, but all atheists are mistaken too, including all extreme eliminativist atheists like Nietzsche who attempt to dispense with the concept GOD.

Relatedly, in the late 60s and early 1970s, at some time or another, in virtually every public washroom in virtually every college or university in North America, alongside the usual trash-talk, one could find the following four-line graffito:

God is dead. —Fred Fred is dead. —God

As a matter of empirical fact, Fred *is* dead, since 25 August 1900. Therefore, given the Kantian analysis of negative existentials, and some time-indexing, it is unproblematically true that Nietzsche, aka Fred, does not exist. Fred did exist for some years prior to 25

August 1900, but now Fred does not exist. Nevertheless, we cannot get rid of the concept GOD so very easily; indeed, we cannot get rid of the concept GOD at all.

1.4 EXISTENTIAL KANTIAN MORAL THEOLOGY: THE FIRST AND THIRD POSTULATES

We know from the Paralogisms and from the Ideal of Pure Reason that both the idea of the human pure soul and the idea of God are *scientifically unknowable Ideas of pure reason*. Correspondingly, both the immortality of the soul and the existence of God are *strictly scientifically unknowable and logically unprovable propositions*. Neither their truth nor their falsity can be cognized, and neither their truth nor their falsity can be cognized, and neither their truth nor their falsity can be demonstrated. Hence the correct philosophical attitude to take towards them is *radical agnosticism*, that is, second-order a priori philosophical certainty about the first-order impossibility of knowing either *P* or not-*P*. But notice, again, that radical agnosticism makes the provability of God's *non-existence* as impossible as the provability of God's existence. In other words, atheism is as rationally impossible as theism or deism. This, in turn, puts us into an existential state of tension, and indeed into a state of acute personal crisis: *what am I to do* when I have a priori philosophical certainty about my ignorance about God?

Kant's answer to the question raised by radical agnosticism is that the Ideas of immortality, of freedom, and of God's existence still can, and indeed must, have regulative, practical significance as *postulates of pure practical reason*. But as always, the abstract, technical, dry, Scholastic-inflected Kantian terminology superficially disguises the profundity of what he is really saying. So thinking beyond the dryness of the terminology, the significant parallels of Kant's thought here with Pascal's so-called "wager," and with Kierkegaard's so-called "leap of faith," should be obvious enough. What Kant is really saying is that what we should do, given radical agnosticism, is not *really* a wager at all (because that makes it seem like instrumental reasoning, whereas in fact it is deeply noninstrumental) and it is not *really* a leap at all (because that makes it seem irrational, whereas it is deeply rational). At the same time, however, it is psychologically *similar to* a liferisking wager and *similar to* a life-risking leap, by way of its being a conscious and intentional state whose specific character is intensely tense ignorance and acute personal crisis. In the *Religion*, Kant calls it a "revolution of the heart" or a "revolution of the will," namely, a fundamentally, life-changing Gestalt-shift in a person's "attitude" or "disposition" (Gesinnung) towards herself and the world. So Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Kant are, in effect, all playing on the same existential-philosophical A-team.

Moreover, as A-team team-mates, even if Kant's rhetoric and style can sometimes seem stilted and stodgy by comparison with that of the other two existential-philosophical theologians, who famously write with directness and verve, Kant is characteristically the clearest and most distinct of all three in expressing precisely what he means. He clearly and distinctly says that what we are to do, given radical agnosticism, is *not* an instrumental wager, and it is *not* an irrational leap: it is an *autonomous, life-changing, wholehearted, personal commitment to the Highest Good.* So for short, I will call this *Kantian commitment.*⁴⁴

Here is what Kant himself writes about Kantian commitment:

The production of the highest good in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law. But in such a will the *complete conformity* of dispositions (Gesinnungen) with the moral law is the supreme condition of the highest good. This conformity must be just as possible as its object is, since it is contained in the sane command to promote the object. Complete conformity of the will with the moral law is, however, *holiness*, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since it is nevertheless required as practically necessary, it can only be found in an *endless progress* toward the complete conformity, and in accordance with principles of pure practical reson it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will. This endless progress is, however, possible only on the presupposition of the existence and personality of the same rational being continuing endlessly (which is called the immortality of the soul). Hence the highest good is practically possible only on the presupposition of the immortality of the soul, so that this, as inseparably connected with the moral law, is a **postulate** of pure practical reason.... For a rational but finite being only endless progress from lower to higher stages of moral perfection is possible. The eternal being, to whom the temporal condition is nothing, sees in what is to us an endless series, the whole of conformity with the moral law, and the holiness that his command inflexibly requires in order to be commensurable with his justice in the share he determines for each in the highest good is to be found whole in a single intellectual intuition of the existence of rational beings. All that a creature can have with respect to hope for this share is consciousness of his tried disposition, so that, from the progress he has already made from the worse to the morally better and from the immutable resolution he has thereby come to know, he may hope for a further uninterrupted continuance of this progress, however long his existence may last, even beyond this life, and thus he cannot hope, either here or anu any foreseeable future moment of his existence, to be fully adequate to God's will (without indulgence or dispensation, which do not harmonize with justice); he can only hope to be so only in the endlessness of is duration (which God alone can survey). (CPrR 5: 122-124, italics and boldfacing in the original)

Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose existence *everything goes according to his wish and will*, and rests, therefore, on the harmony of nature with his whole end as well as with the essential determining ground of his will. Now, the moral law as a law of freedom commands through determining grounds that are to be quite independent of nature and of its harmony with our faculty of desire (as incentives); the acting rational being in the world is, however, not also the cause of the world and of

nature itself. Consequently, there is not the least ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between the morality and the proportionate happiness of a being belonging to the world as part of it and hence dependent upon it, who for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature and, as far as his happiness is concerned, cannot by his own powers make it harmonize thoroughly with his practical principles. Nevertheless, in the practical task of pure reason, that is, in the necessary pursuit of the highest good, such a connection is postulated as necessary: we ought to strive to promote the highest good (which must therefore be possible). Accordingly the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature, which contains the ground of this connection, namely of the exact correspondence of happiness with morality, is also *postulated*. However, this supreme cause is to contain the ground of the correspondence of nature not merely with a law of the will of rational beings but with the representation of this *law*, so far as they make it the *supreme* determining ground of the will, and consequently not merely with morals in their form but also with their morality as their determining ground, that is, with their moral disposition. Therefore the highest good in the world is possible only insofar as a supreme cause of nature having a causality in keeping with the moral disposition is assumed. Now a being capable of actions in accordance with the representation of laws is an intelligence (a rational being), and the causality of such a being in accordance with his representation of laws is his will. Therefore the supreme cause of nature, insofar as it must be presupposed for the highest good, is a being that is the cause of nature by *understanding* and *will* (hence its author), that is, God. Consequently, the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest original good, namely of the existence of God. (CPrR 5: 124-125, italics and boldfacing in the original)

[The postulates of pure practical reason] proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a postulate but a law by which reason determines the will immediately; and this will, just because it is so determined as a pure will, requires these necessary conditions for the observance of its precept. These postulates are not theroretical dogmas but *presuppositions* having a necessarily practical reference and thus, although they do not indeed extend speculative cognition, they give objective treality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their reference to what is practical) and justify its holding concepts even the possibility of which it could not otherwise presume to affirm. These postulates are those of *immortality*, of *freedom* considered positively (as the causality of a being insofar as it belongs to the intelligible world), and of the existence of God. The first, flows from the practically necessary condition of a duration befitting the complete fulfillment of the moral law; the *second* from the necessary presupposition of independence from the sensible world and of the capacity to determine one's will by the law of an intelligible world, that is, the law of freedom; the *third* from the necessity of the condition for such an intelligible world to be the highest good, through the presupposition of the highest independent good, that is, of the existence of God. (CPrR 5: 132, italics in the original)

As I previewed it in section 1.1, Kant's third postulate of pure practical reason, *the existence of God*, says that even though we cannot scientifically know God's nature or logically prove God's existence or non-existence, nevertheless, because we are morally

required to *think* that God exists, and also to *act* accordingly, we must also morally believein the rational Idea that God exists in order to unify happiness and virtue in a thoroughly nonideal natural and social world filled to the brim with "the crooked timber of humanity" and "radical evil," and in which, it seems, nothing will ever be made straight, and "no good deed goes unpunished." And Kant's first postulate of pure practical reason, *immortality*, says that even though we can neither scientifically know God's nature nor logically prove God's existence or non-existence, and even though we cannot scientifically know the nature of a human pure or noumenal soul or logically prove that human pure or noumenal souls are either immortal or not immortal, nevertheless, because we are morally required to *think* that God, as the Highest Good, exists, and also to *act* accordingly, we must also morally believe-in the rational Idea that after our deaths we will have a super-long human personal existence⁴⁵ in a world that is wholly known and governed by God, and in which eventually all the morally virtuous people are made happy and all the wicked people are punished.⁴⁶

I will come back explicitly to the second postulate, *freedom*, in section 1.5. So, bracketting the freedom postulate for the time being, what does Kant mean by all this? He certainly does not hold that we have *scientific or logical justification* for believing either that God exists or that personal immortality is really possible. Moreover, neither God's existence nor personal immortality can be "proved through experience" (*CPR*: A802-803/B831), via the "Fact of Reason," as practical freedom can:

<u>The consciousness of this fundamental law</u> [of pure practical reason, which says: so act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle of universal law giving] <u>may be called a fact of reason</u>, since one cannot ferret it out from antecedent data of reason, <u>such as the consciousness of freedom</u> (for this is not antecedently given), and since it forces itself upon us as a synthetic proposition a priori based on no pure or empirical intuition... In order to regard this law without any misinterpretation as given, one must note that it is not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of pure reason, which by it proclaims itself as originating law. (*CPrR* 5: 31, underlining added—see also *CPrR* 5: 42, 47, and 55-56, underlining added)

Hence neither God's existence nor personal immortality has *practical reality* in the sense that freedom has practical reality.

So, correspondingly, here is what I think the God postulate and the immortality postulate really mean. I think that Kantian philosophical theology is radically different from any form of transcendent (aka *noumenal*) theology. More precisely, I think that in order to solve the Incoherence Problem, then Kant's philosophical theology should be understood as what I call *existential Kantian moral theology*. Furthermore, I also believe that existential Kantian moral theology is independently philosophically defensible, quite apart from Kant's own texts. Here, then, is a preliminary sketch of existential Kantian moral theology, in eight steps.

First, existential Kantian moral theology contains Elements 1-4 of Kant's philosophical theology as I described them in section 1.2.

Second, existential Kantian moral theology contains the three special features I also described in section 1.2:

(i) radical agnosticism,

(ii) believing-in-as-profound-personal-commitment, and

(iii) moral certainty.

Third, Kantian radical agnosticism means our taking the philosophical a priori knowledge that God's *non*-existence is scientifically unknowable and uncognizable, every bit as seriously as we take the philosophical a priori knowledge that God's *existence* is scientifically unknowable and uncognizable.

Here is where classical arguments for atheism from the existence of natural evil and moral evil become directly relevant to existential Kantian moral theology.⁴⁷ The classical *Metaphysical Argument for Atheism from the Existence of Evil* runs as follows:

(1) Assume that God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Or in other and fewer words, assume that *a 3-O God* exists. (Premise.)

(2) Assume that evil exists in the world—both natural evil (e.g., disasters and disease) and also moral evil (wicked choices and acts, or just bad things that happen to people). (Premise.)

(3) Then EITHER a 3-O God is responsible for the existence of evil, in which case a 3-O God is Her/Himself evil and not all-good, which is a contradiction with God's assumed 3-O-ness. (From 1 and 2.)

(4) OR a 3-O God is not responsible for the existence of evil and yet knew that it was going to happen and could not prevent it—so a 3-O God is not all-powerful, which is also a contradiction with assumed God's 3-O-ness. (From 1 and 2.)

(5) OR a 3-O God would have prevented evil but did not know it was going to happen, and is not all-knowing, which is another contradiction with God's assumed 3-O-ness. (From 1 and 2.)

(6) Therefore, given the existence of evil, necessarily a 3-O God does not exist. (From 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.)

If the metaphysical argument for atheism from evil were sound, then it would show that it is analytically necessary that a 3-O God does not exist.

In the classical theistic critical response to the metaphysical argument for atheism from evil, it is claimed that it is at least logically possible that God has a sufficient reason for permitting evil that we are either capable of knowing, or else simply incapable of knowing, given our finite epistemic powers. Perhaps this sufficient reason is the Leibnizian "this world is necessarily the best of all possible worlds" doctrine (brilliantly mocked in Voltaire's *Candide*), perhaps it is free will, perhaps it is moral progress, perhaps it is all of these taken together, or perhaps it is something else completely unfathomable by us. Let us call this classical response *Theodicy*. In response to Theodicy, the neo-classical evidential argument for atheism from evil says that even if it is logically possible that God has a sufficient reason for permitting evil, nevertheless it is significantly more rationally justified to believe that God does not exist, than to believe that God exists.

But as I have already pointed in section 1.3, for strictly logico-semantic reasons, neither God's nature, nor God's existence, nor God's non-existence is strictly scientifically knowable or logically provable. Hence not only the metaphysical argument for atheism from evil, but also Theodicy, as well as the evidential argument for atheism from the existence of evil, are *equally* rationally ungrounded.

This radically agnostic fact, in turn, puts the classical problem of evil in a completely new light. If natural evil and moral evil both exist, and there is massively lots of evil of both kinds at all times and all over the place, but God's nature is strictly scientifically unknowable and God's existence or non-existence is logically unprovable, then natural evil and moral evil *are entirely up to us to deal with*. We and we alone must deal with natural evil and moral evil, as best we can, by cleaning up or fixing up the natural world when it breaks down, by responding morally to even the most horrific and monstrous moral evils, and by trying wholeheartedly to be morally good in a thoroughly nonideal natural and social world.

Again: either God does not exist, and evil is simply a massive natural and moral challenge for us; or else God does exist, it is all part of God's plan, and we must do God's work. But since both options are *equally* scientifically unknowable and logically unprovable, and yet at the same time *equally* intelligible and relevant to us, and morally necessary for us, then we must comport ourselves *accordingly*. I will come back briefly to this fundamental point again at the end of section 1.5.

Fourth, it is *not* Kant's view that we have a sufficient *practical* reason to believe what we do not have a sufficient *epistemic* reason to believe, namely that God exists and that there is immortality of the soul. Instead it is Kant's view that we have sufficient practical reason for *choosing and acting as if, counterfactually, we believe* that God exists and that there is immortality of the soul,⁴⁸ even while also *philosophically knowing a priori with certainty* that these propositions are not only scientifically unknowable and uncognizable, and logically unprovable, but also morally necessarily thinkable. This is the same as *believing-in* the Idea of God's existence, namely, the same as having moral *certainty* or *Glaube* in God's existence.

Fifth, according to Kant, given radical agnosticism, the notion of believing-in-asprofound-personal-commitment, and the notion of moral certainty, then for me to believein God's existence and for me to believe-in the immortality of the soul⁴⁹ are *non-cognitively equivalent* to my believing that life itself has absolute moral meaning and also to my believing that my own life has an absolute moral meaning. And these, in turn, are *noncognitively equivalent* to my being morally certain that life itself has absolute moral

meaning and also to my being morally certain that my own life has an absolute moral meaning. This truly profound Kantian idea was anticipated by Pascal, and then later adopted by the post-Kantian developers of 19th century literary and philosophical Existentialism, particularly by Kierkegaard, and also by the early Wittgenstein:

To believe in God means to understand the problem about the meaning of life. To believe in God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning.⁵⁰

Sixth, therefore according to Kant, our *soundly but non-scientifically and non-logically proving* that God exists and that there is immortality of the soul is non-cognitively equivalent to our *soundly but non-scientifically and non-logically proving* that life itself has absolute moral meaning and that our own lives have an absolute moral meaning, which in turn are non-cognitively equivalent to my *becoming morally certain* that life itself has absolute moral meaning and that my own life has an absolute moral meaning.

Seventh, therefore according to Kant, *the only acceptable way* of soundly but nonscientifically and non-logically proving that life itself has absolute moral meaning and that our own lives have an absolute moral meaning, which in turn are non-cognitively equivalent to our becoming morally certain that life itself has absolute moral meaning and that our lives have an absolute moral meaning, is this. We do it *by actually going forth and having a morally meaningful life* by means of our autonomous power of choice, and by means of the wholehearted pursuit of good willing and the worthiness to be happy, under the constitutive presuppositions that we choose and act *as if, counterfactually, we believe* that God exists and that there is immortality of the soul.⁵¹

Eighth, therefore according to Kant, the only acceptable way of soundly nonscientifically and non-logically proving that God exists and that there is immortality of the soul, is this. We do it *by soundly non-scientifically and non-logically proving ourselves as moral agents*—namely, by actually going forth and having a morally meaningful life. In so doing, we thereby *actually become the kind of persons we would be* if a 3-O+2 God *were* to exist and if there *were* immortality of the soul.⁵² At the same time, we still *philosophically know a priori* that these propositions are not only scientifically unknowable and uncognizable, but also logically unprovable, while also being *morally necessarily thinkable*. This affective-emotional, volitional, and practical project of *morally proving ourselves* begins as a fundamental "loss of faith" or anxiety (*Angst*), particularly in the face of the problem of evil. But it ends up, in a certain special way, as a Pascalian so-called "wager," and as a Kierkegaardian so-called "leap of faith," as in Kierkegaard's sublime version of the story of Abraham and Isaac,⁵³ but only when these existential tropes are interpreted "kantianly" and specifically in terms of radical agnosticism, the notion of believing-in-as-profound-personal-commitment, and the notion of moral certainty.

Morally proving ourselves is clearly and distinctly not a scientific or logical proof of God's existence and the immortality of the soul,⁵⁴ in the *classical logical*, or analytic, sense of a valid or sound argument in first-order bivalent polyadic quantified logic with identity. Rather it is much, much closer to being a non-scientific, non-classical-logical proof in the sense of Intuitionistic constructivist mathematics or logic,55 which provides for an inherently ruled-governed step-by-step generation of an actual token of the ideal type whose existence you are demonstrating.⁵⁶ And just as in Intuitionistic logic, so too in existential Kantian moral theology, the classical logical Principle of Excluded Middle does not apply to God's existence, for as we have seen, it is strictly scientifically unknowable and logically unprovable either that God exists or that God does not exist. Because it is strictly scientifically unknowable and logically unprovable whether God exists or not, then precisely the right affective-emotional, volitional, and practical attitude to take towards the question of God's existence or non-existence is radical agnosticism and believing-in-asprofound-personal-commitment. But for someone to believe-in God's existence or believein the immortality of the soul,⁵⁷ and then to *non-scientifically and non-logically prove it*, is just as if she were to prove non-scientifically and non-classically-logically, in an Intuitionistic constructivist way, that her own life really does have a meaning. And this would be by virtue of its categorically normative moral content, and it would happen via her steady, step-by-step, pursuit of a life of wholehearted commitment to her own fundamental projects, along with other rational human agents, or real human persons, as fully embedded in the larger natural world, under absolute moral principles, thereby producing an actual token in her own life of the ideal types whose existence she is nonscientifically and non-logically demonstrating.

If these eight steps are cogent, then Kantian moral theology is not a *transcendental* theology in any ontological or metaphysical sense, that is, in the sense of a transcendent or noumenal theology. Sharply on the contrary, it is an *existential* theology of an altogether unique kind, and unique specifically because of its significant and illuminating analogy with Intuitionistic constructivist mathematics and logic. For not only does post-Kantian Existentialism obviously flow historically from existential Kantian moral theology, and capture many of its deepest insights. It also seems self-evident that the robust analogy between existential Kantian moral theology and Intuitionistic constructivist logic-and-mathematics turns philosophical theology onto a sharply new path. As a philosophical theologian, you should not be trying *to prove that God exists*. You should be trying *to show us how to prove ourselves morally, step-by-step, in a thoroughly nonideal natural and social world*. Then add to this, the deeply important basic doctrines of Kantian ethics. The result is a radically new, Kantian way of seeing and doing philosophical theology.

Looked at this way, then, what ultimately matters for philosophical theology is the notion of believing-in-as-profound-personal-commitment, and correspondingly the notion of having moral certainty about, the real possibility that your life has a meaning and categorically normative moral content, via radical agnosticism about about God's existence

and the immortality of the soul.⁵⁸ If a person believes-in and is thereby profoundly personally committed to the real possibility that her life has a meaning and categorically normative moral content, then just by virtue of that profound personal commitment itself, and just by means of *a life-changing, lifelong Intuitionistic constructivist non-scientific non-logical proof of this*, then her life necessarily *does* have a meaning and categorically normative moral content. This is a truly remarkable *existential bootstrapping* feature of the Kantian moral metaphysics of rational human agency. Unlike moral virtue, which, as everyone knows, and as Kantians always emphasize, can often be extremely lonely, self-repressing and therefore depressing, unpleasant, and very unrewarding in an everyday, prudential sense, even despite its absolute intrinsic value, still, rational human agency genuinely *can be* and *is* its own reward, beyond all possible economics. So *ought* implies *can*; and what is even more, given a life-changing, lifelong project of morally proving oneself via believing-in-as-profound-personal-commitment, *can* also implies *is*.

1.5 THE FREEDOM POSTULATE AND THE TWO FALLACIES OF FREEDOM-INAUTHENTICITY

I turn now to the second postulate of pure practical reason, *freedom*, which, as I somewhat long-windedly glossed it in section 1.1, says that even though we can neither strictly scientifically know God's nature nor logically prove God's existence or non-existence, and even though we cannot scientifically know the nature of human freedom, lest we convert all our choices and acts into the operations of a deterministic natural mechanism, propelling itself into a randomly indeterministic and possibly bad-luck-filled future, nevertheless, because we are morally required to *think* that God exists, and also to *act* accordingly, we must also morally believe-in the rational Idea that we are both transcendentally free and also practically free in order to rule out

(i) the impossible pseudo-science of transcendental theology, manifested in a priori arguments for the existence of God, chiefly, the Ontological Argument,

(ii) the self-stultifying threat to our transcendentally free intentional agency in a world in which, it seems, on the *one* hand, that the past is completely filled with deterministic and impersonal causes (the rock) and, on the *other* hand, that the future is randomly indeterministic and heart-breakingly completely filled with possibilities for bad luck (the hard place), and also

(iii) the self-stultifying threat to our practically free moral agency of a world in which, it seems, moral chaos reigns and "everything is permitted."

In order to unpack this profound three-part doctrine properly, I will briefly develop some basic points about Kant's metaphysics of free will in particular and about the metaphysics of free will more generally.

Kant's theory of transcendental freedom is his metaphysics of free will. Transcendental freedom is how a person can, "**from itself**" (*von selbst*) (*CPR* A533/B561, boldfacing in the original), be the spontaneous mental cause of certain natural events or processes. If I am that person, then insofar as I am transcendentally free, it follows that certain events or processes in physical nature are *up to me*—or to use Kant's own phrase, *in meiner Gewalt* (literally: "in my control" or "in my power"; *CPrR* 5: 94-95). So otherwise put, transcendental freedom is deep freedom of the will, or up-to-me-ness (as it were, although this does not quite scan grammatically in proper German, *In-Meiner-Gewalt-Sein*).

Transcendental freedom is the same as absolutely spontaneous mental causation:

By freedom in the cosmological sense ... I understand the faculty of beginning a state **from itself** (*von selbst*), the causality of which does not in turn stand under another cause determining it in time in accordance with the law of nature. Freedom in this signification is a pure transcendental idea, which, first, contains nothing borrowed from experience, and second, the object of which cannot be given determinately in any experience.... But since in such a way no absolute totality of [natural] conditions in causal relations is forthcoming, reason creates the idea of a spontaneity, which could start to act from itself, without needing to be preceded by any other cause that in turn determines it to action according to the law of causal connection. (*CPR* A533/B561, underlining added, boldfacing in the original)

Although transcendental freedom is a particularly robust kind of *mental* causation, in the second *Critique* Kant sharply distinguishes distinguishes transcendental freedom from mere *psychological* freedom:

These determining representations [i.e., instincts or motives] themselves have the ground of their existence in time and indeed in the *antecedent state*, and in a preceding state, and so forth, these determinations may be internal and they may have psychological instead of mechanical causality, this is, produce actions by means of representations and not by bodily movements; they are always *determining grounds* of the causality of a being insofar as its existence is determinable in time and therefore under conditions of past time, which are thus, when the subject is to act, *no longer within his control* and which may therefore bring with them psychological freedom (if one wants to use this term for a merely internal chain of representations in the soul) but nevertheless natural necessity, leaving no room for *transcendental freedom* which must be thought of as independence from everything empirical and so from nature generally, whether regarded as an object of inner sense in time only or also as an object of outer sense in both space and time; without this freedom (in the latter and proper sense), which alone is practical a priori, no moral law is possible and no imputation in accordance with it. (*CPrR* 5: 96-97, underlining added)

Otherwise put, psychological freedom is the subject's subjective experience or consciousness of choosing or acting without being prevented, and without inner or outer compulsion. As Kant explicitly points out, and as Hume and Leibniz also noted in anticipation of contemporary Compatibilism, it is both logically and metaphysically possible to be psychologically free without being transcendentally free. This is what Kant very aptly and famously calls "the freedom of a turnspit" (*CPrR* 5: 97). So psychological freedom is not a sufficient condition of transcendental freedom.

Nevertheless, according to Kant psychological freedom remains a *necessary* condition of transcendental freedom. And this seems independently highly plausible. No one could be transcendentally free and also at the same time undergo the subjective experience or consciousness of being prevented from choosing or acting, or of being inwardly or outwardly compelled to choose or act. Indeed, as the second Analogy of Experience explicitly shows, psychological freedom is necessarily built into the mental representation of *any* objective causal sequence, via what Kant calls the "the **subjective sequence** of apprehension," whose ordering is always subjectively experienced as "entirely arbitrary" (*ganz beliebig*) and not necessitated (*CPR* A193/B238, boldfacing in the original).⁵⁹

When we ascribe transcendental freedom specifically to the will of a real human person, then in addition to the positive factor of absolute spontaneity, which confers what I call *deep freedom* (aka "up-to-me-ness" or "ultimate sourcehood")—see *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, especially chapters 1-5—on the real human person's choices and acts, and psychological freedom, which guarantees the subjective experience or consciousness of being unprevented and uncompelled in one's choices and acts, there is also a negative dimension of freedom which guarantees the person's choices and acts occur independently of all "alien causes," that is, independently of all pathological inner and unowned outer sources of nomologically sufficient compulsion:

The will is a kind of causality that living beings have so far as they are rational. *Freedom* would then be that property whereby this causality can be active, independently of alien causes *determining* it; just as *natural necessity* is a property characterizing the causality of all non-rational beings—the property of being determined to activity by the influence of alien causes. The above definition of freedom is *negative*. (*GMM* 4: 446, underlining added)

This is where practical freedom comes on the scene. Practical freedom presupposes but also exceeds transcendental freedom, in that practical freedom is the absolute spontaneity of the will independently of all alien causes and also independently of *all sensible impulses* (empirical desires):

Freedom in the practical sense is the independence of the power of choice (*Willkür*) from necessitation by impulses of sensibility. For a power of choice is sensible insofar as it is pathologically affected (through moving-causes of sensibility); it is called an animal

power of choice (*arbitrium brutum*) if it can be pathologically necessitated. The human power of choice is indeed an *arbitrium sensitivum*, yet not *brutum*, but *liberum*, because sensibility does not render its action necessary, but in the human being there is a faculty of determining oneself from oneself, independently of necessitation by sensible impulses. (*CPR* A534/B562, underlining added, boldfacing in the original)

But this is a merely negative characterization of practical freedom. As positively characterized, practical freedom also involves the capacity for *self-legislation* in conformity with the Categorical Imperative or moral law. Or in other words, practical freedom is necessarily equivalent with *autonomy* (*GMM* 4: 440-441, 446-463).

It may seem, on the face of it, that there would be no direct connection whatsoever between the person's absolutely spontaneous, psychologically free, autonomous will and her existence in physical nature. But in fact Kant himself explicitly asserts otherwise:

<u>Practical freedom can be proved through experience</u>. For it is not merely that which stimulates the senses, i.e., immediate affects them, that determines human choice, but we always have a capacity to overcome impressions on our sensory faculty of desire by representations of that which is useful or injurious even in a more remote way; but these considerations about that which in regard to our whole condition is desirable, i.e., good and useful, depend on reason. Hence this also yields laws that are imperatives, i.e., objective **laws of freedom**, and that say **what ought to happen**, even though it never does happen.... We thus cognize practical freedom through experience, as one of the natural causes, namely a causality of reason in the determination of the will. (*CPR* A802-803/B830-831, underlining added, boldfacing in the original)

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: *the starry heavens above me* [i.e., nature] *and the moral law within me* [i.e., freedom]. I do not need to search for them and merely conjecture them as though they were veiled in obscurity or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. (*CPrR* 5: 161-162, underlining added)

Now although there is an incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible ...: yet the latter **should** have an influence on the former, namely the concept of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible world; and nature must consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the possibility of the ends that are to be realized in it in accordance with the laws of freedom. (*CPJ* 5: 176, underlining added, boldfacing in the original)

In other words, Kant is explicitly saying that transcendental freedom is both *really possible* and also *actually realized* in physical nature.

Now *Universal Natural Determinism* is the doctrine that the complete series of settled past events, together with the general causal laws of nature, causally necessitate the existence and specific character of all present and future events, including all the choices and acts of persons. This can be formulated even more carefully. Let us adopting the following symbolic conventions, where 'p' stands for an arbitrarily chosen proposition about the natural world:

C-NEC: It is causally necessary that Pa: All settled past events are taken together as a complete series Ln: All the general causal laws of nature are conjoined FEp: Every fact that p about every present and future event is fixed

Then Universal Natural Determinism can be explicitly stated as:

(C-NEC) [(Pa & Ln) \rightarrow FEp]

If Universal Natural Determinism is true, then it specifically follows that whatever we are choosing or doing now is necessitated by the Big Bang, or by whatever it was that actually constituted and determined the causal and nomological origins of the physical world. Furthermore, Universal Natural Determinism entails that

Causally necessarily, if any two events E_1 and E_2 have *exactly the same past*, then E_1 and E_2 will also have *exactly the same presents and futures*.

Let us call this *The Closed Future Rule*. The basic idea of The Closed Future Rule is that the present and the future of the larger natural world and all the persons in it is antecedently fixed with causal necessity, and that natural history and the lives of persons do not contain any inherently random factors. It also follows directly from Universal Natural Determinism that if someone were able to know all the relevant natural facts about the past and also the general causal laws of nature, then she would be able to predict all present and future events a priori with scientific certainty.

For clarity's sake, it is crucial to distinguish Universal Natural Determinism from a much stronger doctrine which says that the complete series of settled past events, together with the general causal laws of nature, *logically necessitate* the existence and specific character of all future events, including all the choices and acts of persons. This is *Fatalism*. Let us also adopt this convention:

L-NEC: It is logically necessary that

Then Fatalism can be explicitly stated as:

(L-NEC) [(Pa & Ln) \rightarrow FEp]

In other words, according to Fatalism there *is no logical contingency whatsoever in the causal processes of natural history or the lives of persons*. Otherwise put, according to Fatalism all the *causal links* in nature or in us are also *logically necessary links*. It follows directly from Fatalism that if someone were able to know all the relevant natural facts about the past and also the general causal laws of nature, then she would be able to predict all present and future events a priori with *logical* certainty.

While Fatalism is consistent with Universal Natural Determinism, nevertheless Universal Natural Determinism does not entail Fatalism. You can consistently affirm Universal Natural Determinism and deny Fatalism. Even if every present and future moment's existence and specific character is in itself *logically contingent*, in the sense that it logically could have been otherwise, given all the actual facts about the past and the laws of nature, Universal Natural Determinism can still be true. Universal Natural Determinism says only that any present or later event in time is *causally* necessitated to exist and have a certain specific character, *given* that the past exists in the specific way that it does exist, and *given* the specific character of the general causal laws of nature *logically have to be* just that way, nor did the general causal laws of nature *logically have to be* just that way. To be sure, the logical necessity of the past and the logical necessity of the general causal laws of nature *logically have to be* just that way. To be sure, the logical necessity of the past and the logical necessity of the general causal laws of nature *logically have to be* just that way. To be sure, the logical necessity of the past and the logical necessity of the general causal laws of nature *logically have to be* just that way. To be sure, the logical necessity of the past and the logical necessity of the general causal laws of nature *logically have to be* just that way. To be sure, the logical necessity of the past and the logical necessity of the general causal laws of nature *logically have to be* just that way. To be sure, the logical necessity of the past and the logical necessity of the general causal laws of nature are not automatically entailed by Fatalism. Yet they are still *consistent with* Fatalism.

Moreover Fatalism does not entail Universal Natural Determinism, on at least one interpretation of Fatalism. If it turned out that both the past and the general laws of nature were *logically* necessary—if, in effect, the essence of the physical world directly mirrored a system of classical logic, as, for example, in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*—then this ultra-Fatalism could hold true even if Universal Natural Determinism were false. Indeed, in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein claims that all necessity is logical necessity and that causal necessity is not only impossible but even unintelligible:

5.133 All inference takes place a priori.

5.135 In no way can an inference be made from the existence of one state of affairs to the existence of another entirely different from it.

5.136 There is no causal nexus which justifies such an inference.

5.1361 The events of the future *cannot* be inferred from those of the present. Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus.

6.37 A necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened does not exist. There is only *logical* necessity.⁶⁰

Wittgenstein's extremely interesting philosophical response to his own ultra-Fatalism is what I will call *Mystical Transcendental Compatibilism*:

6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one.)

6.423 Of the will as the subject of ethics we cannot speak. And the will as a phenomenon is only of interest to psychology.

6.43 If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language. In brief, the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane as a whole. The world of the happy is quite another than the world of the unhappy.

6.44 The intuition (*Anschauung*) of the world sub specie aeterni is its intuition as a limited whole. The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling.⁶¹

Wittgenstein's ultra-Fatalism clearly brings out the crucial point that Universal Natural Determinism is about the *causal* necessity of the future, not about the *logical* necessity of the future. Similarly, Universal Natural Determinism cannot logically guarantee that any particular moment of time will actually exist. For all that Universal Natural Determinism says, it is logically possible that the world *might never have existed*. Of course, the world does actually exist now. So either the world always existed, or perhaps the world started to exist and then continued to exist until now, or else the world pops in and out of existence discontinuously. But in any case, it is always logically possible that it might also *fail* to exist at any later time.

I now want to focus on a particular aspect of Wittgenstein's Mystical Transcendental Compatibilism, as a segue to a fundamental doctrine of existential Kantian moral theology. When, heavily influenced by Schopenhauer's metaphysical neo-Kantianism and proto-Existentialism, Wittgenstein says that "ethics cannot be expressed," "ethics is transcendental," "ethics and aesthetics are one," and that "of the will as the subject of ethics we cannot speak," he is asserting essentially the same thing that Kant is asserting at the end of the *Critique of Practical Reason*:

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: <u>the starry heavens above me [i.e., nature] and the moral law within me [i.e., freedom]</u>. I do not need to search for them and merely conjecture them as though they were veiled in obscurity or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; <u>I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence</u>. (*CPrR* 5: 161-162, underlining added)

In other words, what Kant and Wittgenstein are both asserting, in a shared proto-Existentialist spirit, is that is someone's sense of himself as an intentional and moral agent is *an indispensably necessary and affectively salient phenomenal character* of "the consciousness of [his] own existence." What Wittgenstein calls "the world of the happy," and so very sharply contrasts with "the world of the unhappy," is then, for all intents and purposes, a volitionally-oriented and freedom-oriented version of the moral-psychological phenomenon that the Existentialists called *authenticity*. Correspondingly but negatively, what Wittgenstein calls "the world of the unhappy," and so very sharply contrasts with "the world of the happy," is then, for all intents and purposes, a volitionally-oriented and freedom-oriented version of the moral-psychological phenomenon that the Existentialists called *inauthenticity*. The moral-psychological phenomenon of inauthenticity also appears in Kant's writings, in at least three slightly different guises.

The first is the almost shockingly stark picture of the person who dogmatically and slavishly accepts the precepts of some existing philosophical system such as the Wolffian philosophy:

He has formed himself according to an alien reason, but the faculty of imitation is not that of generation, i.e., the cognition did not arise from reason in him, and although objectively it was certainly a rational cognition, subjectively it is still merely historical. He has grasped and preserved well, i.e., he has learned, and is a plaster cast of a living human being. Rational cognitions that are objectively so (i.e., could have arisen originally only out of the reason of human beings themselves) may also bear this name subjectively only if they have been drawn out of the universal sources of reason, from which critique, indeed even the rejection of what has been learned, can also arise, i.e., from principles. (*CPR* A836-837/B864-865, underlining added)

The second is the equally stark picture of the essentially immature and cowardly person who refuses to acknowledge the fundamental ethical idea behind "enlightenment" or *Aufklärung*, which is to think for yourself with moral resolution and courage:

Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-inflicted immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-inflicted if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: *Sapere aude!* Have the courage to use your own understanding! [O]nce the germ on which nature has lavished most care—the human being's inclination and vocation to think freely—has developed within its hard shell, it gradually reacts upon the mentality of the people, who thus gradually become increasingly able to *act freely*. Eventually, it even influences the principles of governments, which find that they can themselves profit by treating the human being, who is *more than a machine*, in a manner appropriate to his dignity. (*WiE* 8: 35 and 41-42, underlining added)

And the third is the perhaps even more stark picture of the person who hides from himself the self-defining fact of his own "radical evil" (*radicale Böse*) by pretending that evil is nothing but *bad historical consequences of human activity*, and not the direct result of our transcendental freedom of the will:

This dishonesty (*Unredlichkeit*), by which we throw dust in our own eyes and which hinders the establishment in us of an authentic moral disposition (*ächter moralischer Gesinnung*), then extends itself also externally, to falsity or deception of others. And if this dishonesty is not to be called malice, it nonetheless deserves at least the name of unworthiness. It rests on the radical evil of human nature which (inasmuch as it puts out of tune the moral ability to judge what to think of a human being, and renders any imputability uncertain, whether internal or external) constitutes the foul stain of our species—and so long as we do not remove it, hinders the germ of good from developing as it otherwise would. A member of the English Parliament exclaimed in the heat of debate: "Every man has his price, for which he sells himself." If this is true (and everyone can decide for himself), if nowhere is a virtue which no level of temptation can overthrow, if whether the good or evil spirit wins us over only depends on which bids the most and affords the promptest pay-off, then, what the Apostle says might indeed hold true of human beings universally, "There is no distinction here, they are all under sin—there is none righteous (in the spirit of the law), no, not one." (*Rel* 6:38-39, underlining added)

Human practical reason is our living, spontaneous capacity to exercise the power of choice for the sake of instrumental or non-instrumental principles. So in these three ways, inauthenticity in the Kantian sense is just to comport yourself *as if you were nothing but a robot*, wholly determined by natural causal laws, and neither alive nor practically free. Or in other words, inauthenticity in the Kantian sense is the *self-automating* denial of your own capacity for practical freedom:

[I]f the freedom of our will were nothing else than [an *automaton spirituale* when it is <u>impelled by representations</u>], i.e., psychological and comparative and not at the same time transcendental or absolute, it would in essence be no better than the freedom of a turnspit, which when once wound up also carries its motions from itself. (*CPrR* 5: 97, underlining added)

In relation to our capacities for transcendental and practical freedom, there are two different and yet also intimately related ways in which someone can fall into selfautomating inauthenticity.

The first way is what I call The Fallacy of the Rock and the Hard Place. This is the fallacy of philosophically looking backward towards the past and also forward towards the future in ways that self-stultifyingly deny the actual existence of one's own inherent teleology as a rational human intentional agent whose innermost life is aimed at the highest or supreme good.⁶² Leaving out the inherently teleological character of one's own rational

human innermost life, it can seem on the one hand, that the past is completely filled with deterministic and impersonal causes (the rock) and, on the other hand, that the future is randomly indeterministic and heart-breakingly completely filled with possibilities for bad luck (the hard place). In so doing, one loses heart, and then in effect tragically dies as an authentic intentional and moral agent, even if neurobiological and psychological life continues on.

The right and authentic existential Kantian moral-theological response to The Fallacy of the Rock and the Hard Place is what I have called Kant's "believing-in-as-profound-personal-commitment," "moral faith," or *Glaube*, as specifically applied to the chain of past events and future events. It is, more specifically, a *teleological believing-in-as-profound-personal-commitment, or moral faith in the physico-theological sense*. You morally must resolutely choose and act as if, counterfactually, you believe that the world is designed for us by an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good God, even though you know a priori, via radical agnosticism, that the existence or non-existence of such a God is both scientifically unknowable and logically unprovable. In short, you morally must resolutely choose and act in such a way that you thereby convert the world in which you choose and act into *the world of the happy*.

The second way to fall into freedom-inauthenticity runs as follows. It is a standard strategy for critics of Universal Natural Determinism, whether intentionally or not, to confuse Universal Natural Determinism with Fatalism, whether "ordinary" Fatalism or ultra-Fatalism. For example, if someone sincerely says

"If everything is naturally determined, then whatever *has* happened, was *strictly fated* to happen, and whatever *will* happen, *strictly must* happen, no matter what I choose or do,"

then he is confusing Universal Natural Determinism with Fatalism.

It is equally crucial to distinguish Universal Natural Determinism from another stronger doctrine which says that nature is initially created and also sustained at every later moment by the irresistible causal powers of an all-knowing and all-good deity. This stronger doctrine is *Universal Divine Determinism*, aka "Theological Determinism." While Universal Divine Determinism is both consistent with Universal Natural Determinism and indeed *entails* Universal Natural Determinism as a trivial consequence, nevertheless Universal Natural Determinism does *not* entail Universal Divine Determinism. Even if an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, world-creating, and world-sustaining deity does *not* exist, Universal Natural Determinism can still be true.

In this connection, and corresponding to the fallacy of confusing Universal Natural Determinism with Fatalism, there is an important two-part fallacy that consists in confusing Universal Natural Determinism with Theological Determinism, and then unsoundly

inferring universal moral nihilism from the denial of Theological Determinism, which I dub *Smerdyakov's Fallacy*:

"If God is dead, then everything is permitted."

Smerdyakov's Fallacy is of course so-dubbed because of the famous passage in Fyodor Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamozov* that I included as the fourth epigraph of part 1:

"Take that money away with you, sir," Smerdyakov said with a sigh.

"Of course, I'll take it! But why are you giving it to me if you committed a murder to get it?" Ivan asked, looking at him with intense surprise.

"I don't want it at all," Smerdyakov said in a shaking voice, with a wave of the hand. "I did have an idea of starting a new life in Moscow, but that was just a dream, sir, and mostly because 'everything is permitted.' This you did teach me, sir, for you talked to me a lot about such things: for if there's no everlasting God, there's no such thing as virtue, and there's no need of it at all. Yes, sir, you were right about that. That's the way I reasoned."

Here is the crucial point. From the standpoint of existential Kantian moral theology, the *moral significance* of someone's sincerely asserting

"If everything is naturally determined, then whatever *has* happened, was *strictly fated* to happen, and whatever *will* happen, *strictly must* happen, no matter I choose or do,"

and Smerdyakov's Fallacy are exactly the same. He has thereby given himself a license to choose and do whatever he feels like choosing and doing, without any regard for non-self-interested, non-selfish, non-hedonic, and non-consequentialist moral principles, and constrained only by natural causal laws. He thereby comports himself as if he were nothing but a fleshy deterministic or indeterministic Turing-machine, running a decision-theoretic program for satisfying self-interested, selfish, hedonic, or consequentialist desires. This sort of highly self-deceived and highly self-serving reasoning—ironically and tragically enough, only a really and truly free agent could ever engage in this sort of duplicitous reasoning—is the quintessence of *freedom-inauthenticity* in the Kantian sense.

1.6 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RADICAL AGNOSTICISM

Phenomenology, in the classical sense spelled out by Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl, is the a priori descriptive philosophical psychology of first-person, conscious, intentional, rational human experience, grounded in self-evident rational intuitions of the essential structures of that kind of experience. While classical and contemporary Rationalist philosophers have pursued the idea that a priori knowledge is really possible via rational intuition, and while classical and contemporary theologians have sometimes pursued the idea that a special sort of agnosticism or "knowing ignorance" is the representational and experiential essence of religious belief or faith,⁶³ nevertheless these two ideas have never been explicitly combined. In sharp contrast, the upshot of the following five-step argument is the explicit combination of those two apparently very distinct ideas into a single line of Kantian phenomenological-theological thinking, by means of the notions of *non-conceptual cognition*⁶⁴ and *essentially non-conceptual content*.⁶⁵

First, I start with Kant's four-part argument for *radical agnosticism*, which, as we have already seen, says this--

(1) The concept of God is the concept of a 3-O+2 being, namely the absolute metaphysical ground of all real possibility, and the one and only being that is capable of creating and sustaining an ideal world in which all and only the morally virtuous people are happy because they morally deserve to be happy, and more generally the concept of *the Highest Good*, or, in effect, the concept of that which gives conscious life in particular and the larger natural and social world itself, as actually thoroughly nonideal, *meaning and purpose*.

(2) If God, as the 3-O+2 being, and the Highest Good, *were* to exist, then God would be a humanly-unknowable *noumenal or transcendent object* or a *thing-in-itself*.

(3) God's nature is strictly scientifically unknowable, and all possible logical proofs for the existence or non-existence of God depend for their soundness on knowing noumenal/transcendent things or noumenal/transcendent facts that cannot be strictly scientifically known.

(4) Therefore it is philosophically known a priori by us, with certainty, that neither God's non-existence nor God's existence is logically provable.

From this argument, it follows directly as a logical consequence that for all rational but still "human, all too human" creatures like us, atheism is as philosophically mistaken as theism or deism. In turn, given our fundamental commitment to God as the Highest Good, what follows as a direct affective-emotional, volitional, and practical consequence from the radically agnostic rejection of atheism and theism alike, is that in our rational human life-project of either rejecting or seeking belief about God we are, as Pascal said, forever *anxiously poised between the divinely infinite and the materially finite*, and must "wager" our lives; or as Kierkegaard more metaphorically, but also even more vividly said, *we are forever suspended over a chasm of 40,000 fathoms* and must "leap."

Second, as we have also already seen, there is also a fundamental cognitive-semantic distinction to be drawn between two essentially different types of belief or *Glaube*, namely

(i) belief-that, or propositional/conceptual belief, and

(ii) belief-in, or non-propositional/non-conceptual belief.

In particular, subject S's belief-in X is a direct relation of more or less wholehearted personal commitment to X by S, that does not depend on logical proof or inferential epistemic justification. Given the relation of belief-in, then S is

either (i) profoundly personally committed to *X*, or else (ii) she isn't personally committed at all (in which case belief-in fails, and she is in some other kind of state that is inherently different from belief-in).

But if S is indeed profoundly personally committed to X, then S is

either (i) *wholeheartedly* personally committed to *X*, or else she is only *half-heartedly* personally committed to *X*.

This is what I call *double-disjunctivism about belief-in-as-personal-commitment*, with explicit reference to a formally parallel and increasingly important theory in contemporary philosophy of mind-and-knowledge, namely, *disjunctivism about sense perception*.⁶⁶

For my purposes here, however, what is most important about the double-disjunctivist approach to belief-in-as-personal-commitment, is that even if it is a priori known philosophically with certainty that neither God's non-existence nor existence can be logically (hence propositionally or conceptually) proved, nevertheless it is still possible to *believe-in God*. For this is equivalent to *being either wholeheartedly or else only halfheartedly personally committed to the Highest Good*, that is, equivalent to being either wholeheartedly or else only half-heartedly personally committed to what gives meaning and purpose to conscious life in particular and to the larger, thoroughly nonideal natural and social world itself.

Furthermore, it is arguable that whether they are self-consciously aware of it or not, *all* minimally rational human animals or human persons, no matter how seemingly uncaring or wicked they are, provided that they are capable of caring about differences between good things and bad things, and capable of wanting better things instead of worse things, for themselves or for others, hence capable of being held responsible for their choices and actions, and also capable of taking responsibility for their choices and actions, are either wholeheartedly or else only half-heartedly personally committed to the Highest Good. Therefore they are either wholeheartedly or else only half-heartedly personally committed to God, quite apart from any question of knowing or proving whether God does not exist or exists, and quite apart from either atheism or theism.

In this sense, what Kant calls "rational theology" is virtually cognitively and practically *irrelevant* to what we care about most deeply as religious rational human animals. On the

contrary, the project of believing-in God is just the project of encountering fundamental meaning and purpose in conscious life and in the larger thoroughly nonideal natural and social world, that is, in a world that is so dangerously, heart-rendingly, and ubiquitously filled with moral and natural evil. Then, by borrowing and slightly twisting a famous Pascalian phrase, "the heart has its own reasons that reason knows nothing about," I want to claim that the rational human heart has its own *non-propositional/non-conceptual* reasons that the rational human intellectual capacity for *propositional/conceptual* reason knows nothing about.

Third, I hold that there are what I call basic authoritative rational intuitions in religious understanding, just as there are basic authoritative rational intuitions in logic, mathematics, morality, and philosophy, and that essentially non-conceptual mental representational *content* is the core cognitive-semantic element in all of them.⁶⁷ In turn, a representational content is essentially non-conceptual if and only if it it refers to something in such a way that conceptual, propositional, or otherwise logic-based representations (for example, linguistic representations)⁶⁸ are neither necessary nor sufficient for that reference. Let's take two everyday examples: (i) an infant's immediate, pre-reflective, non-linguistic recognition of its mother's face, and (ii) an ordinary adult human's immediate, prereflective, non-linguistic awareness of her own right and left hands as distinct from one another and as bodily-positioned in an egocentrically-centered orientable space. The first case exemplifies essentially non-conceptual visual perception; and the second case exemplifies essentially non-conceptual proprioception.⁶⁹ So, springboarding from those examples, and playing another riff on the famous Pascalian phrase, then I am saying that essentially non-conceptual sense perception has its own reasons that conceptual reason knows nothing about. Perhaps even more importantly, essentially non-conceptual contents can *also* be used for the immediate, pre-reflective, non-linguistic representation of special non-propositional, non-logical abstract objects or structures of various kinds.⁷⁰

Fourth, what is specifically different in the case of religious cognition, however, is that an authoritative rational intuition in religion is an essentially non-conceptual insight, via belief-in and its relation of direct more or less wholehearted commitment, into *fundamental non-instrumental value in the actual world*—namely, the *Highest Good*, namely, *God* in Pascal's, Kant's, or Kierkegaard's senses. In short, religious cognition provides a direct grasp of what, in principle, logic-driven (hence also proposition-driven, concept-driven) *formal or natural science* cannot ever know.

Fifth and finally, in religious cognition—that is, by means of an essentially nonconceptual insight, via belief-in-as-personal commitment and its relation of direct wholehearted or else only half-hearted personal commitment, into fundamental noninstrumental value, the Highest Good—a conscious, rational "human, all too human" animal stands in direct cognitive and emotional contact with a special intentional target, that is, with what Rudolf Otto calls *the numinous*.⁷¹ In turn, this manifest fact about intentional act or state of religious cognition stands in sharp contrast to the traditional philosophical construal of understanding as the self-conscious subsumption of an object under a concept.

This fundamentally first-person-experiential, or phenomenological, aspect of religious cognition has been brilliantly worked out by Pascal, Kierkegaard, Otto, and William James.⁷² But if I am correct, then since religious cognition is essentially non-conceptual, the non-conceptualist approach to it significantly deepens and elaborates this classical phenomenological account by explaining how such experiences of religious understanding are *really possible*. Believing-in God is, at bottom, structurally analogous *to directly encountering the world in acts of essentially embodied veridical human sense perception that are inherently guided by essentially non-conceptual content*, and *not* importantly structurally analogous to conceptual or logical thinking—that is, to either bringing a noumenal or transcendent object under a concept, or inferentially reaching the conclusion of an argument about such an essentially mysterious object. Indeed, other recent "perceptualist" or epistemological approaches to religious understanding have been mistaken *precisely* insofar as they presuppose a conceptualist model of cognition and a noumenal realist metaphysics.⁷³

Otherwise put, according to the non-conceptualist approach, believing-in God is directly encountering the world as an egocentrically-centered, finite but unbounded, thoroughly nonideal natural and social *field* for human life, perception, and action that is *also* fundamentally pervaded by larger meaning and purpose. Hence it is *not* magically perceptually judging some impossible-to-know noumenal or transcendent object outside of space, time, and the natural causal order, by analytically and inferentially bringing it under the concept of a 3-O+2 God.

1.7 IF GOD'S EXISTENCE IS UNPROVABLE, THEN IS EVERYTHING PERMITTED?

I am now in a position to raise explicitly the following quasi-Dostoevskian question, as summing up in a nutshell the fundamental issue I have been grappling with in part 1 of this book:

If God's existence is unprovable, then is everything permitted?, that is, is human morality really impossible—is universal moral nihilism true?

The existential Kantian moral theology-based answer I have been presenting is, emphatically, *No!* In fact, the truth of the matter is precisely the other way around. Only if God's existence or non-existence is scientifically unknowable and logically unprovable, is rational human morality really possible. Only if God's existence or non-existence is scientifically unknowable and logically unprovable, will we

be able to face up to the problem of natural and moral evil adequately. And only if God's existence or non-existence is strictly scientifically unknowable and logically unprovable, can life have a moral meaning either generally or first-personally.

Radical agnosticism tells us that a morally meaningful rational human life in pursuit of God, the Highest Good, begins at the inherent limits of natural science and classical logic, and that it also presupposes those limits. You cannot rationally be either a theist/deist or an atheist. The logic of our moral-religious lives is deeply non-classical, Intuitionistic, and constructivist. This profound doctrine of existential Kantian moral theology is therefore neither theism/deism nor atheism.

On the contrary, existential Kantian moral theology is the doctrine that there ought to be and therefore morally must be, for each and every one of us who is capable of anxiously feeling the force of, and seriously considering, these matters, a rational, freely chosen, and entirely wholehearted step-by-step constructivist, existential, life-changing revolutionary transition from the strict scientific unknowability and logical unprovability of God's existence or non-existence, to moral authenticity. But as I shall argue in part 2, this constructivist, existential, existential, life-changing revolutionary transition is also, necessarily, a *social and political* revolutionary transition, that I call *radical enlightenment*.

PART 2. RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT

Our age is the genuine age of **criticism**, to which everything must submit. **Religion** through its holiness, and **legislation** through its **majesty** commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination. (*CPR* Axi n., boldfacing in the original)

Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his own self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another. This immaturity is *self-incurred* when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding! is thus the motto of Enlightenment. (WE 8: 35, italics in the original)

That kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings is not to be expected, but is also not to be wished for, since possession of power unavoidably corrupts the free judgment of reason. (*PP* 8: 369)

"Is there a special group of people with the right to use threats of violence to force everyone else to obey their commands, even when their commands are wrong?" The modern state claims a kind of authority that obliges all other agents to obey the state's commands and entitles the state to deploy violence and threats of violence to enforce those commands, independently of whether the commands are just, reasonable, or beneficial. [T]hat sort of authority, "political authority," is an illusion. No state is legitimate, and no individual has political obligations. This leads to the conclusion that at a minimum, the vast majority of government activities are unjust. Government agents should refuse to enforce unjust laws, and individuals should feel free to break such laws whenever they can safely do so.⁷⁴

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Part 2 of this book is about how robust versions of *philosophical social anarchism* and *political social anarchism* both flow directly from the existential Kantian moral theology I spelled out and defended in part 1. And part 3 shows how political social anarchism in

this specifically Kantian moral and theological sense can actually be implemented and realized in the real world, *right now*. Thus I am pursuing a contemporary Kantian line of philosophical reasoning that is at once (i) deeply and radically *religious*, (ii) deeply and radically *social and political*, and (iii) deeply and radically *activist*. Therefore the three parts of this book, to borrow an apt label from Spinoza, constitute a single contemporary Kantian *theological-political treatise*,⁷⁵ or equivalently, a study in Kantian *political treatise*,

For purposes of presentational clarity and distinctness in what follows, I will begin with some working definitions, and a correspondingly precise formulation of the problem I will be grappling with. By *political authority* I mean:

the existence of a special group of people (aka *government*), with the power to coerce, and the right to command other people and to force them to obey those commands as a duty, no matter what the content of these commands might be, and in particular, even if these commands and/or the forcing are morally impermissible.

And by coercion I mean:

either (i) using violence (for example, injuring, torturing, or killing) or the threat of violence, in order to manipulate people according to certain purposes of the coercer (*primary coercion*),

or (ii) inflicting appreciable, salient harm (for example, imprisonment, termination of employment, large monetary penalties) or deploying the threat of appreciable, salient harm, even if these are not in themselves violent, in order to manipulate people according to certain purposes of the coercer (*secondary coercion*).

So all coercion is manipulation. But whether the manipulation at the heart of coercion is primary or secondary, coercion should also be carefully distinguished from what I will call *minimal sufficiently effective, last resort, defensive, protective, and preventive moral force*:

As a last resort, only either using the smallest sufficiently effective level of violence or threat of violence, or deploying the smallest sufficiently effective threat of appreciable, salient harm, in order to defend against, protect against, or prevent, oneself or someone else being primarily or secondarily coerced, or having their rational human dignity directly violated.

Therefore, as I am understanding it, the general problem of political authority is this:

Is there an adequate rational justification for the existence of any special group of people (aka *government*) with the power to coerce, and the right to command other people and to force them to obey those commands as a duty, no matter what the content

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of these commands might be, and in particular, even if these commands and/or the forcing are morally impermissible?

Now by the State or any other State-like social institution I mean:

any social organization that not only claims political authority, but also actually possesses the power to coerce, in order to secure and sustain this authority.

Of course, this is only the *essence* of a State or any other State-like social institution. It does certainly does not *exhaust* the very idea of a State in an anthropological, historical, or sociolopolitical sense. For example, States normally also control geographical areas, or *territory*, over which they monopolize the application of coercive force to the people (and other animals) who inhabit that territory. Moreover, as James C. Scott points out:

[T]he standard [Kantian and] Weberian criterion of a territorial unit that monopolizes the application of coercive force⁷⁶ [is not] entirely adequate, for it takes so many other features of states for granted. [I] think of states as institutions that have strata of officials specialized in the assessment and collections of taxes—whether in grain, labor, or specie and who are responsible to a ruler or rulers. [I] think of states as exercising executive power in a fairly complex, stratified, hierarchical society with an appreciable division of labor.... Some would apply more stringent criteria: a state should have an army, defensive walls, a monumental ritual center or palace, and perhaps a king or queen.⁷⁷

Therefore, also granting Scott's more fully specified and somewhat open-ended conception of a State as backdrop to the essential characterization I am using, by *the specific problem of political authority* I mean:

Is there an adequate rational justification for the existence of the State or any other State-like social institution?

And now let's face up to that specific problem directly. What, *if anything*, adequately rationally justifies political authority, the State, or any other State-like institution? Is it the divine right of pharoahs or kings? Is it the actual social contract, as per Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and the enlightened despots of Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries? Is it the hypothetical social contract, as per Rawls? Is it actual democracy, or the democratic process? Is it rule consequentialism?

In sharp contrast to the justificatory strategies of divine right, the actual or hypothetical social contract, actual or process-based democracy, or consequentialism, the thesis of *philosophical social anarchism* that I am defending says that there is *no* adequate rational justification for political authority, the State, or any other State-like social institution; and, correspondingly, the thesis of *political social anarchism* that I am defending says that we

should *reject* and *exit* the State and other State-like institutions, in order to create, belong to, and sustain a real-world, *universal ethical community*, in a world in which there are no States or other State-like institutions. Moreover, precisely because this ethical community is *universal*, the political social anarchism I am defending is also *cosmopolitan* social anarchism.

Ironically, although perhaps altogether understandably, in view of the very real risks of political and religious dissent and unorthodoxy in 18th century Europe, Kant's own political theory, as formulated in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, part 1, the *Rechtslehre*, in my opinion, is sharply out of step with the central ideas of his own moral philosophy, as formulated in *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the *Lectures on Ethics*, his own philosophy of religion, as formulated in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* and "What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?," and his most famous political-anthropological essays, "Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim," "Toward Perpetual Peace," and "What is Enlightenment?" The *Rechtslehre*, in my opinion, presents a fairly run-of-the-mill and explicitly anti-revolutionary, hence politically mainstream and safe, version of classical individualist liberalism, plus constitutional monarchy and/or parliamentarianism, plus—when we add to it "Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim" and "Toward Perpetual Peace—a peace-securing internationalism, in the social-contract tradition of Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, and Rousseau.

But emphatically on the contrary, I think that a highly original, politically radical, and if not revolutionary, then at least robustly State-resistant, State-subversive, and even outright civilly-disobedient cosmopolitan, existentialist version of philosophical and political social anarchism that I call existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism very naturally flows from Kant's moral philosophy,⁷⁸ his philosophy of religion, and his political anthropology, or, in a word, from existential Kantian moral theology. Roughly, the idea is that if we take Kant's famous injunction to have the moral courage to use your own understanding, and apply this morally courageous act not merely to "the public use of reason" (that is, to intellectual activity, writing, and speech or self-expression in the broad sense of "free speech"), but also to our individual choices, our individual agency, our shared social life, and especially to what Kant quite misleadingly calls "the private use of reason" (that is, to our social lives as functional role-players, or functionaries, within the State or any other State-like institution, including, for example, citizenship or public office), then the result is existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism. Then and only then, in my opinion, can we understand the last sentence of "What is Enlightenment?" as it truly ought to be understood, namely as formulating a vision of *radical* enlightenment:⁷⁹

When nature has unwrapped, from under this hard shell [of the "crooked timber of humanity" (*IUH* 8: 23)], the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to *think* freely, the latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the people

(which thereby gradually becomes capable of *freedom* in acting) and eventually even upon the principles of *government*, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, *who is now more than a machine*, in keeping with his dignity. (*WE* 8: 41-42, italics in the original)

To be sure, neither the term "existentialism" nor the term "anarchism" (as standing for a specific radical philosophical thesis and correspondingly radical political doctrine) existed until the 19th and 20th centuries. The term "anarchism," in particular, was first used in that sense by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in 1840.⁸⁰ This is in sharp contrast to the term "anarchy," standing for violent social-political chaos and moral nihilism, which had been in use since at least the middle of the 18th century.⁸¹ But insofar as Existentialism was substantially anticipated by certain lines of thought in Pascal's 17th century writings,⁸² and insofar as the very idea of cosmopolitanism was already a well-established notion in political social anarchism, as a pair of radical philosophical and political theses and doctrines, were substantially anticipated by certain lines of thought in William Godwin's, Thomas Paine's, and Rousseau's 18th century writings,⁸⁴ it is clear that Kant belongs to an emergent existential cosmopolitan social anarchist tradition in 17th and 18th century philosophy.

In any case, insofar as it at once existentialist, Kantian, cosmopolitan, and both philosophically and politically social anarchist, parts 2 and 3 of this treatise therefore constitute a project in radical *Kantian* enlightenment.⁸⁵

2.2 EXISTENTIAL KANTIAN COSMOPOLITAN SOCIAL ANARCHISM DEFINED

I fully realize that even when it has been helpfully reduced to a philosophical label, "existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism" is still rather a mouthful. So what, more precisely, do I mean by it?

(1) By *existential*,⁸⁶ I mean the primitive motivational, or "internalist," normative ground of the philosophical and political doctrine I want to defend, which is the fundamental, innate need we have for a wholehearted, freely-willed life *not essentially based* on egoistic, hedonistic, or consequentialist (for example, utilitarian) interests, aka *the desire for self-transcendence*, while at the same time fully assuming the natural presence—aka the *facticity*—of all such instrumental interests in our "human, all too human" lives. In a word, the existential ideal of a rational human wholehearted autonomous life is the ideal of *authenticity*.

(2) By *Kantian*, I mean the primitive objective, or "externalist," normative ground of the philosophical and political doctrine I want to defend, which is the recognition that the fundamental, innate need we have for a wholehearted, freely-willed, non-egoistic, non-hedonistic, non-consequentialist life, which we call *the desire for self-transcendence*, can be sufficiently rationally justified only in so far as it is also a life of *principled authenticity*, by which I mean *principled wholehearted autonomy*, or having *a good will* in Kant's sense, guided by respect for the dignity of all real persons,⁸⁷ under the Categorical Imperative.

(3) Now, what is *cosmopolitanism*? Notoriously, there is no comprehensive, analytic definition of the term as it is used in either ordinary or specialized (say, legal, political, or scholarly) language, covering all actual and possible cases. It is variously taken to refer to globe- trotting sophistication; to nihilistic, rootless, world-wandering libertinism; to the general idea of "world citizenship"; to a single world-state with coercive power; to a tight federation of all nation-states, again with coercive power; or to a loose, semi- coercive international federation of nation-states and related global institutions concerned with peace-keeping, criminal justice, human rights, social justice, international money flow and investment, or world-trade, like the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the (plan for a) World Court of Human Rights, the World Bank, or the World Trade Organization.⁸⁸

Nevertheless, the term "cosmopolitanism" has an original, core meaning. As Kwame Anthony Appiah correctly and insightfully points out:

Cosmopolitanism dates at least to the Cynics of the fourth century BC [and especially to Diogenes of Synope], who first coined the expression cosmopolitan, "citzen of the cosmos." The formulation was meant to be paradoxical, and reflected the general Cynic skepticism toward custom and tradition. A citizen—a *politēs*—belonged to a particular polis, a city to which he or she owed loyalty. The cosmos referred to the world, not in the sense of the earth, in the sense of the universe. Talk of cosmopolitanism originally signalled, then, a rejection of the coventional view that every civilized person belonged to a community among communities.⁸⁹

In short, the original, core meaning of *cosmopolitanism* expresses a serious critique of existing political communities and states; a thoroughgoing rejection of fervid, divisive, exclusionary, loyalist commitments to convention, custom, identity, or tradition; and a robustly universalist outlook in morality and politics, encompassing not only the Earth but also other inhabited worlds if any, and also traveling between worlds, and, finally, the entire natural universe.

By *cosmopolitan*, then, I mean the original, core meaning of that term. And, borrowing from Kant, I call the cosmopolitan universal ethical community, *The Real Realm of Ends*.

(4) Finally, by *social anarchism*,⁹⁰ I mean philosophical and social anarchism, as defined above:

The thesis of *philosophical social anarchism* says that there is *no* adequate rational justification for political authority, the State, or any other State-like social institution; and, correspondingly, the thesis of *political social anarchism* says that we should *reject* and *exit* the State and other State-like institutions, in order to create, belong to, and sustain a real-world, *universal ethical community*, in a world in which there are no States or other State-like institutions.

I emphasize and re-emphasize that existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism rules out the possibility that the cosmopolitan universal ethical community, aka The Real Realm of Ends, could ever permissibly take the form of either a coercive *federation* of States or a coercive *world*-State. At the same time, however, my idea is *neither* the *non-revolutionary Marxist idea* that States and other State-like institutions will somehow *wither away* in the face of the gradual actualization or realization of The Real Realm of Ends, *nor* is it *the revolutionary Marxist idea* that States and States and State-like institutions must be destroyed in a single all-encompassing campaign of violent social change. On the contrary, my idea is instead the very different thought that existing or real-world States and other State-like institutions will be gradually *detoxified* and *devolved* by us into something less and less State-like. Or in other words, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism is *devolutionary* anarchism, not *revolutionary* anarchism. As regards the use or threat of physical force, what is at most permissible for the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist *is minimal sufficiently effective, last resort, defensive, protective, and preventive moral force*, hence *never* coercion, and *never* terrorism.

And, in connection with Marxism, or at least with Marxist humanism (that focuses especially on the early Marx of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of the $1840s^{91}$), here is another extremely important implication of existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism that also needs emphasis and re-emphasis. I think that it is generally overlooked, or at the very least insufficiently appreciated, by Marxist humanists and neo-Marxists alike,⁹² that advanced, late, or "big" (that is, global, corporate, technocratic) capitalism requires Statism and State-like institutions as a constitutive a priori presupposition. Property, money, trade, markets, market-expansion, and technocracy in big capitalism all essentially require a coercive State, or a coercive federation of States, not to mention armies, in order to assert, police, protect, and perpetuate their interests. Even gung-ho libertarian capitalists, when they talk about a "minimal state," mean a minimal coercive state. In short, big capitalism essentially needs the State's or State-like institutions' big guns. Otherwise, all the people everywhere who are alienated, "commodified," exploited, and oppressed by big capitalists- which is massively most people, worldwide—would simply rise up and take all, or anyhow most, of the big capitalists' property, money, trade, markets, and technology away from them, and redistribute or otherwise use whatever is left over in order to satisfy their real human needs.

Therefore, for us to detoxify, devolve, and exit the State and other State-like institutions is *thereby to detoxify, devolve, and exit big capitalism*. And in that way, The Real Realm of Ends will also be a *post-big-capitalist* cosmopolitan moral community. This is the *elective affinity* of existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism and Marxist humanism/neo-Marxism.

Moreover from our contemporary historical vantage point, 135 years after the death of Marx, it is very difficult indeed to see how a post-big-capitalist world could *ever* come about in any *other* way. So, to put my point as a friendly recommendation: all Marxist humanists and neo-Marxists should immediately sign up for existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism.

In effectively detoxifying, devolving, and exiting States and other State-like institutions, and in thereby creating a post-big-capitalist world, we will gradually deconstruct, purge, and neutralize all their immoral political and social toxins, including: protected State-borders and State-boundaries; State-centralized or more locally institutionalized identity-politics and xenophobia; State-centralized or more locally institutionalized patriotism; wars of aggression or pre-emption; the military development and/or use of doomsday weaponry; police-Statism and totalitarianism, including State-centralized or more locally institutionalized or more locally institutionalized mechanisms of thought-control, censorship, and witch-hunting; State-driven terrorism; State-driven espionage; Constitutional idolatry, permitting such moral abominations as the individual or collective right to possess guns and other lethal weapons, capital punishment, the denial of universal healthcare, and the destruction or degradation of the environment; and above all, State-centralized or more locally institutionalized racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, or age-based forms of discrimination, persecution, or—the nadir of all State-driven evil—genocide.

What would remain after such a gradual detoxification, devolution, and exiting of all existing or real-world States and other State-like institutions, and the consequent creation of a post-big-capitalist world, is a living, organismic, fundamentally healthy, garden-like, world-encompassing, complex dynamic structure of *post-States and post-State-like social institutions*. These would include multiple overlapping non-coercive, non-compulsive⁹³ social organizations, structures, and systems for *bottom-up* mutual aid, care, empowerment, and support (for example, intimate partnerships and families), and also multiple overlapping non-coercive, non-compulsive, constructive, enabling social organizations, structures, and systems for *universal* communal aid, care, empowerment, and support (for example, intimate partnerships and families), and also multiple overlapping non-coercive, non-compulsive, constructive, enabling social organizations, structures, and systems for *universal* communal aid, care, empowerment, and support (for example, truly generous universal basic income, universal basic jobs, aka *eco-jobs*, universal free healthcare, universal free public education, and so-on—see part 3 below). Just to give it a name, I will call this world-encompassing, complex dynamic vital network of post-big-capitalist post-States and post-State-like institutions, *the Kosmopolis*, with a capital 'K' to remind us of the ancient Greek term *Kosmos* and "Kantian" alike. The Real Realm of Ends we are striving for is identical to the Kosmopolis.

2.3 AND FURTHER EXPLICATED

Let me now spell out the basic ideas of existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism again somewhat more fully.

According to existential Kantian ethics,⁹⁴ the Supreme Good is a *good will* in Kant's sense (*GMM* 4:393) (*CPrR* 5: 110). And a good will in Kant's sense is the self-consciously experienced realization, at least partially and to some degree, of our innate capacity for autonomy, that is, our innate capacity for free moral self-legislation, insofar as it is also inherently combined with an innate capacity for wholeheartedness, in this thoroughly nonideal natural and social world. Otherwise put, self-consciously-experienced-autonomy-with-wholeheartedness-in-this-thoroughly-nonideal-natural-and-social-world is nothing more and nothing less than a rational human minded animal or real human person who is choosing and acting freely, on principle, and with a passionate and yet Stoic commitment, for the sake of the Categorical Imperative, aka *the moral law*.

In turn, the self-conscious experience of our own at-least-partially-realized capacity for autonomy carries with it a *deep* happiness, or "self-fulfillment" (*Selbstzufriedenheit*) (*CPrR* 5: 117), aptly characterized by Kant—who clearly has the Stoic notion of *ataraxia* in mind—as a *negative satisfaction in one's own existence*, which also strongly anticipates what the Existentialists later called *authenticity*. This consists, in the ideal case, of the self-conscious experience of the perfect coherence and self-sufficiency of all one's own desires, beliefs, cognitions, inferences, intentions, motivating reasons, and choices in the act of autonomous willing. To choose and act in this way to any extent is, to that extent, to have thereby achieved *principled authenticity* (that is, principled wholehearted autonomy, or a "good will" in Kant's sense), at least partially and to some degree. Or otherwise put, to choose and act in this way is to have reached or exceeded the highest possible bar, standard, or ideal of rational normativity for rational human minded animals, and indeed for any other actual or possible creatures essentially like us, whether or not they are human.

This fundamental axiological thesis about the good will can be directly compared and contrasted with that of *ethical egoism*, which says that the highest good is individual self-interest (whether this self-interest is specifically narcissistic/self-loving, selfish/self-inflating, or hedonistic/pleasure-seeking, or not), and also with that of *act consequentialism*, which says that the highest good is choosing and acting with good results. Now ethical egoism (including but not restricted to hedonism) and act consequentialism can both be consistently combined with classical *eudaimonism*, which says that the highest good is human happiness— fundamentally self-interested and therefore *individual shallow happiness* for the ethical egoist, or, for the act consequentialist, good results that increase *overall shallow happiness for as many people or other shallow-happiness-capable creatures as possible*. Deep happiness, however, is not only *irrelevant* to ethical egoism (including hedonism) and act consequentialism, but even *inimical* to them, since the achievement of deep happiness generally runs contrary to

the pursuit of shallow happiness. So existential Kantian ethics is sharply distinct from ethical egoism, hedonism, act consequentialism, and classical eudaimonism alike.

Now *real human persons* exist in our thoroughly nonideal natural and social world, alongside non-living material things, forces, and processes, other living organisms, and non-rational human or non-human minded animals. To extend Descartes's Cogito to real human persons, necessarily,

I am, I exist, I am a real human person is true whenever I think it or say it.

But it is also what Gilbert Ryle aptly called a *category mistake* to infer from the existence of real human persons and the structured, intersubjective, mutual and communal social relationships between them, to the thesis that the State-in-itself, namely, *the supposed Really Real ground of human social existence and political authority*, either exists or does not exist, or has a knowable essence or nature of some sort.

More precisely, the State-in-itself, the supposed Really Real ground and source of human social existence and political authority, with the power and the right to command and to force people to obey its commands as a duty, even if these commands and/or the forcing are impermissible according to basic existential Kantian moral principles—just like God, the supposed Really Real ground of worldly, creaturely existence and morality, namely a super-human entity with the power and the right to command and to force people to obey its commands as a duty, even if these commands and/or the forcing are impermissible according to basic existential Kantian moral principles—just like God, the supposed Really Real ground of worldly, creaturely existence and morality, namely a super-human entity with the power and the right to command and to force people to obey its commands as a duty, even if these commands and/or the forcing are impermissible according to basic existential Kantian moral principles—is nothing but a *noumenal or transcendental abstraction* in the Kantian sense, a mere "thought-entity" or *Verstandeswesen*. If Kant's radical agnosticism about things-in-themselves or noumena is correct, then it follows that the nature of the State-in-itself, and its existence or non-existence, *just like God*, is a priori knowably unknowable and logically unprovable.

Now the *non*-existence of the mythical State-in-itself is fundamentally connected to the mythical Hobbesian *state-of-nature*. It is just as philosophically fallacious to think that if God were to fail to exist (the dark night of atheism), then everything would be permitted in a *moral* sense (the chaos of universal moral nihilism, "anarchy" in the lurid, popular sense), as it is to think that if the State-in-itself were to fail to exist (the dark night of the Hobbesian state-of-nature), then everything would be permitted in a *political* sense (the chaos of "the war of all against all"). Correspondingly, it is just as philosophically fallacious to use the mythical bogeyman of "the war of all against all" as a sufficient reason for believing in the necessity of a State-in-itself, as it is to use the mythical bogeyman of universal moral nihilism as a sufficient reason for believing in the necessity of God's existence. Theism is to Statism, as atheism is to the belief in a Hobbesian state-of-nature lurking behind the paper-thin façade of civil society. All are *equally* rationally unsupported and illusory.

Therefore, since there is no knowable Really Real ground or *source* of human social existence and political authority, or of States or other State-like institutions, then there is no such thing as a *sufficient rational justification* of either political authority or States or other State-like institutions. Or as Michael Huemer crisply puts it, "that sort of authority, 'political authority,' is an illusion." —Not merely a psychological illusion, however, but more fundamentally a *philosophical* illusion, and more specifically, a *noumenal or transcendental* illusion.

That is one Kantian argument for philosophical social anarchism. In section 2.4, I will present another Kantian argument for philosophical social anarchism, this time specifically from Kantian ethics, that I call *the core Kantian argument for philosophical social anarchism*.

In the meantime, I want to say something about the ultimate goal or target for Kantian political social anarchism. According to existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism, The Realm of Ends is the total ideal moral community of rational minded animals or real persons, each of whom respects one another and themselves as creatures with dignity (absolute objective intrinsic non-denumerable moral value), and also considers all the others and themselves equally in relation to the Categorical Imperative/moral law; and, finally, each possesses a good will. The Highest Good, that is, the ideally best life for any real human person, is a life of deep individual happiness and also deep communal or social happiness that is intrinsically controlled and structured by a good will in the Kantian sense, such that moral virtue and deep happiness are adequately proportioned. As we saw in part 1, the concept of the Highest Good is the same as the Idea of God. The Realm of Ends and the Highest Good/Idea of God are only regulative ideals, never real-world facts. What I call, by sharp contrast, The Real Realm of Ends is what is *really* possible for *us* in this thoroughly nonideal natural and social world. Otherwise put, The Real Realm of Ends is the "human, all too human" actualization or realization of The Ideal Realm of Ends, to whatever degree or extent this is really possible, by means of our wholehearted autonomous constructive activity.

So every time an agent truly chooses or acts for the sake of the Categorical Imperative/moral law, she thereby actualizes or realizes moral worth, and she thereby experiences autonomous self-fulfillment, at least partially or to some degree. But if she also thereby achieves some individual and also communal or social happiness, then she also realizes a proper part of the complete good, and partially actualizes or realizes The Real Realm of Ends in this "human, all too human" world, at least partially or to some degree. Given "the crooked timber of humanity" in this thoroughly nonideal natural and social world, which is a timber that "can never be made straight" (*IUH* 8: 23) and which is a world in which, it seems, as they say, no good deed ever goes unpunished, however, then the Highest Good is not humanly possible to *any* degree or *any* extent unless

(i) we satisfy the epistemological, metaphysical, and moral constraints and principles of existential Kantian moral theology, as spelled out in part 1, and unless

(ii) we recognize that proofs of the State-in-itself's existence or non-existence (the Hobbesian state-of-nature), and knowledge of The State-in-itself's nature as a supposed Really Real ground of human social existence and source of political authority, and therefore any rational justification of its political authority, are all *a priori philosophically knowably unknowable and logically unprovable* (radical agnosticism), and unless

(iii) we morally prove ourselves to be worthy of happiness, by collectively constructing realizing The Real Realm of Ends on this Earth and in this thoroughly nonideal natural and social world, in the form of a world-wide complex of post-big-capitalist post-States and post-State-like institutions, the Kosmopolis, as if we were *already* liberated from the morally impermissible and rationally unjustifiable commands, limitations, prejudices, and restrictions of real-world States and other State-like institutions (existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism), hence

(iv) it is at the very least always *permissible*, and, other things being equal, sometimes also *obligatory*, that we refuse to accept, and are also prepared to resist, subvert, or even overtly civilly disobey—using, however, at most minimal sufficiently effective, last resort, defensive, preventive, and protective moral force—any actual State or State-like institution, precisely insofar as it is not morally consistent and coherent with collectively creating and belonging to The Real Realm of Ends on this Earth and in this thoroughly nonideal natural and social world, as the Kosmopolis ("the arts of resistance"⁹⁵).

Now as I see it, the four classical problems about philosophical and political anarchism are these:

(i) its supposed lack of well-worked-out ethical foundations,

(ii) its supposed tendency to collapse into destructive, violent mayhem,⁹⁶ revolutionism, and terrorism,

(iii) how it handles the all-important issue of the use of physical force and threats of physical force *within* an anarchist social framework, and

(iv) its supposed lack of a workable theory of how, once anarchism has been widely accepted, "to make the trains run on time": that is, the lack of any workable theory of how to sustain all the morally good things in our actual-world political and social existence, while also expunging all the morally reprehensible things in actual-world States and other State-like institutions.

But, at least prospectively, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism clearly responds adequately and effectively to problems (i) to (iv).

First, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism is committed to the basic principles of Kantian ethics and to moral realism about those principles. More precisely,

according to existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism, such principles really do objectively exist, and they are humanly a priori knowable by means of rational intuition.⁹⁷

Second, according to existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism, destructive ludic or non-ludic, vicious mayhem, revolutionism, and terrorism are all strictly inconsistent with respecting the dignity of real persons, and with choosing and acting for the sake of the Categorical Imperative, and therefore, *they are all are strictly morally impermissible*.

Third, according to existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism, the use of physical force or the threat of physical force is permissible, *but only as a last resort*, and *only for the purposes of*

(i) minimal sufficiently effective defense against, or prevention of, primary or secondary coercion directed against oneself, especially life-threatening primary coercion,

(ii) minimal sufficiently effective protection of others, especially innocent and weak others, against primary or secondary coercion, especially life-threatening primary coercion, and

(iii) minimal sufficiently effective defense against, or prevention of, direct violations of rational human dignity.

Therefore, only the use of minimal sufficiently effective, last-resort, defensive, protective, and preventive moral force, or the threat of such force, is permissible, *never* coercion, *never* violence, and *never* terrorism.⁹⁸

And fourth, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism's "detoxification" and "devolution" model of the deconstruction of actual-world States and other State-like institutions—whereby all and only the morally good-making, environmentally-sound, non-coercive, non-compulsive bottom-up and universal social institutions or structures are all left in place, and all and only the morally, physically, and psychologically toxic features of actual States and State-like institutions are purged and/or phased-out—also clearly and effectively responds to problem (iv).

Within the scope of "morally good-making, environmentally-sound, non-coercive, non-compulsive bottom-up and universal social institutions or structures" I mean to include, for example, flourishing families and intimate adult partnerships of all kinds;⁹⁹ truly generous universal basic income; universal basic jobs, aka *eco-jobs*; universal free healthcare; universal free public education; a worldwide or cosmopolitan network of voluntarily-associated humanistic and scientific communities of free rational inquiry and teaching, aka *higher education without commodification*; fine arts and everyday arts, and crafts; private and public entertainment; sports and games; eco-sensitive agriculture, public forestry, and public park-cultivation; small-scale, non-exploitative capitalism; highly progeressive taxation; and trains that run on time. As such, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism is neither anarcho-*capitalist in the classical liberal or*

contemporary neoliberal sense, insofar as big capitalism is rationally unjustified and immoral, nor is it anarcho-socialist in the classical Marxist sense, insofar as authoritarian and/or totalitarian "top-down" coercive socialism is also rationally unjustified immoral. At the same, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism is perfectly compatible with any and all morally permissible forms of *small* (aka petit bourgeois) non-exploitative capitalism, provided that it is *also* combined with a truly generous universal basic income, universal basic jobs (aka eco-jobs), universal free healthcare, universal free public education, universal free higher education without commodification, and the means necessary to fund them all, namely highly progressive taxation.

In any case, it should therefore be obvious by now that the philosophical and political view I am proposing is—

(i) social anarchism and not egoistic or individualist anarchism,

(ii) devolutionary and constructive (moral-community-growing) anarchism, and not revolutionary, terrorist, or destructive (bomb-throwing, dynamite-club) anarchism,
(iii) *authentic* and *serious* anarchism, and not *shallow* or *lifestyle* (*radical chic*) anarchism, and

(iv) realistic, although still driven by ethical ideals, and therefore

(v) neither cynical, *Realpolitik* anarchism on the one hand, nor excessively idealistic, *millenarian utopian* (cloud cuckoo-land) anarchism on the other.

At the same time, however, as we shall seen in part 3, the version of philosophical and political anarchism I am proposing is also *neo-utopian*, insofar as it is aimed at *implementing and realizing a moral, social, and political utopia, right now*.

Indeed, philosophical and political anarchism as I am understanding it is the permanent constitutively necessary social condition of achieving the moral ideal of principled authenticity, to some salient degree and extent, and thereby creating, belonging to, and sustaining the real-world moral community of The Real Realm of Ends on Earth, via our detoxifying and devolutionary construction of the Kosmopolis. So, in effect, we *prune back* and *weed out* real-world States and other State-like institutions, until finally they are nothing but *mulch* for the world-wide growth of morally good-making, environmentally-sound, non-coercive, non-compulsive bottom-up and top-down social institutions or structures. And in this way, we endlessly cultivate the post-big-capitalist, post-State, post-State-like, fundamentally healthy, world-wide *garden* of our deepest individual and collective rational human aspirations. Nevertheless, this is *not* the pre-lapsarian, mythical, paradisal, Adam-and-Eve-privately-owned garden of *Eden*: instead, it is nothing more and nothing less than the post-lapsarian, real-world, mixed-use, communal sociopolitical garden of *home-planet Earth as ineluctably embedded in the total natural universe*.

Bounded in a nutshell, then, here are the five simplified imperatives of this devolutionary, constructive, authentic, serious, realistic, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism:

(1) Think for yourself.

(2) Criticize all political and social-institutional coercive authority.

(3) Clearly recognize and firmly reject and resist all political and social-institutional coercive authoritarian bullshit.¹⁰⁰

(4) Treat everyone with respect that sufficiently heeds their human dignity, and never allow yourself to be tyrannized by anyone, whether the majority or any minority.

(5) Be profoundly personally committed to creating, belonging to, and sustaining The Real Realm of Ends on Earth.

2.4 THE CORE KANTIAN ARGUMENT FOR *Philosophical* Social Anarchism

As I mentioned in section 2.1, by *political authority* I mean:

the existence of a special group of people (aka *government*), with the power to coerce, and the right to command other people and to force them to obey those commands as a duty, no matter what the content of these commands might be, and in particular, even if these commands and/or the forcing are morally impermissible.

And again, by *coercion* I mean:

either (i) using violence (for examplr, injuring, torturing, or killing) or the threat of violence, in order to manipulate people according to certain purposes of the coercer (*primary coercion*),

or (ii) inflicting appreciable, salient harm (for example, imprisonment, termination of employment, large monetary penalties) or deploying the threat of appreciable, salient harm, even if these are not in themselves violent, in order to manipulate people according to certain purposes of the coercer (*secondary coercion*).

Therefore, again, as I am understanding it, *the general problem of political authority* is this:

Is there an adequate rational justification for the existence of any special group of people (aka *government*) with the power to coerce, and the right to command other people and to force them to obey those commands as a duty, no matter what the content of these commands might be, and in particular, even if these commands and/or the forcing are morally impermissible?

And again, by *the State or any other State-like institution*, as an essential characterization, I mean:

any social organization that not only claims political authority, but also actually possesses the power to coerce, in order to secure and sustain this authority.

Therefore, as before, by the specific problem of political authority I mean:

Is there an adequate rational justification for the existence of the State or any other State-like institution?

This problem applies directly to *all* kinds of political authority, States, and State-like institutions, from Mesopotamian potentates, Egyptian pharaohs, pre-Socratic tyrants, Athenian military dictatorships, caesars, kings, popes, and emperors, to constitutional monarchies, communist states, fascist states, religious fundamentalist states, big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democracies, provincial or city governments, military organizations, business corporations, and universities—basically, any institution with its own army, navy, air-force, police-force, or armed security guards.

But of course the problem is not just philosophical, it is all too horribly real. Since the time of the pharoahs and pre-Socratic tyrants, humanly-created States and other State-like institutions have explicitly claimed to possess political authority, and then have proceeded to use the power to coerce, especially the power of primary coercion, frequently of the most awful, cruel, and monstrous kinds, thereby repressing, detaining, imprisoning, enslaving, torturing, starving, maiming, or killing literally billions of people, in order to secure their acceptance of these authoritarian claims. Even allowing for all the other moral and natural evils that afflict humankind, it seems very likely that there has never been a single greater cause of evil, misery, suffering, and death in the history of the world than the coercive authoritarianism of States and other State-like institutions.

As I also noted in section 2.1, the thesis of *philosophical social anarchism* says that there is no adequate rational justification for political authority, States, or any other State-like institutions; and the thesis of *political social anarchism* says that we should *reject* and *exit* all such States and State-like institutions, in order to create, belong to, and sustain a real-world, absolutely universal, cosmopolitan ethical community, *The Real Realm of Ends*, in a world in which there are no States or other State-like institutions, but instead only a world-wide network of constructive, principled-authenticity-enabling, radically enlightened, post-big capitalist, post-State, post-State-like institutions, *the Kosmopolis*.

On the one hand, it is rationally coherent and permissible to defend philosophical social anarchism without also defending political social anarchism. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how one could rationally justify political social anarchism except by way of philosophical social anarchism. So philosophical social anarchism is the rational key to social anarchism more generally, although *political social anarchism is ultimately where all the real-world action is*.

But what is of paramount importance right now, in this section, is formulating what I take to be a self-evidently sound five-step argument for *philosophical* social anarchism, which I will call *the core Kantian argument for philosophical social anarchism*. Here it is.

(1) Let us adopt, as basic moral principles, by means of which we can judge the permissibility or impermissibility of any human choice, action, practical policy, or other practical principle, the set of basic *existential Kantian* moral principles, as clearly and explicitly formulated, for example, in what I have called *The Hierarchy of Kantian Moral Principles*—see *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence*, chapter 2.

(2) Precisely insofar as it is morally impermissible for *individual real persons or groups of real persons* to command other people and coerce them to obey those commands as a duty, then by the same token, it must also be morally impermissible for *special groups of people inside States or any other State-like institutions*, aka *governments*, to command other people and coerce them to obey those commands as a duty.

(3) Therefore, precisely insofar as it is morally impermissible for individual real persons or groups of real persons to command other people and coerce them to obey those commands as a duty, even if governments have *the power* to command other people and coerce them to obey those commands, nevertheless governments do not have *the right* to command other people and coerce them to obey those commands as a duty.

(4) But all governments claim political authority in precisely this sense.

(5) Therefore, there is no adequate rational justification for political authority, States, or other State-like institutions, and philosophical social anarchism is true. QED

Or in other and even fewer words, and one long sentence:

Because there is no adequate rational justification, according to the set of basic existential Kantian moral principles, for any individual real person, or any group of real persons, immorally to command other people and coerce them to obey those immoral commands as a duty, yet the very idea of political authority entails that special groups of people within States or State-like institutions, namely governments, have not only the power to coerce, but also the right to command other people and to coerce them to obey those commands as a duty, even when the commands and/or coercion are immoral, then it follows that there is no adequate rational justification for political authority, States, or any other State-like institutions—therefore, philosophical social anarchism is true. QED

Or in still other and even fewer words, and one medium-sized sentence:

Human *governments* have no moral right to do to other people what *real human persons* have no moral right to do to other people, according to the set of basic Kantian

moral principles, yet *all* human governments falsely claim this supposed moral right, hence philosophical anarchism is true. QED

A very striking feature of the core Kantian argument for philosophical social anarchism is that it has exactly the same form as what I will call *the core Kantian argument against divine command ethics*, with appropriate substitutions underlined:

Because there is no adequate rational justification, according to the set of basic existential Kantian moral principles, for any individual real person, or any group of real persons, immorally to command other people and coerce them to obey those commands as a duty, yet the very idea of <u>divine command ethics</u> entails that <u>an all-powerful</u>, <u>all-knowing</u>, <u>all-good being</u>, <u>namely God</u>, <u>has not only the supreme power</u> to cause people to do things, but also the right to command other people and to <u>cause</u> them to obey those commands as a duty, even when the commands and/or <u>causing</u> are immoral <u>by rational human standards</u>, then it follows that there is no adequate rational justification for <u>divine command ethics</u>—therefore, divine command ethics is false, and anti-divine-command ethics is true. QED

Or in still other and even fewer words, and one medium-sized sentence again:

<u>Divine beings</u> have no moral right to do to people what *real human persons* have no moral right to do to other people, according to the set of basic Kantian moral principles, yet *all* versions of <u>divine command ethics</u> falsely claim this supposed moral right, hence <u>anti-divine-command-ethics</u> is true. QED

By the immediately preceding argument, the falsity of divine command ethics is rationally self-evident. Reduced to its essentials, divine command ethics fallaciously says that God's commands are good and right, just because God says that that are good and right, and also has the power to impose these commands on people, no matter what the moral content of these commands might be. Now Statism fallaciously says that a government's commands are good and right, just because governments say that they are good and right, and also have the power to impose these commands on people, no matter what the moral content of these commands might be. Hence *God* plays exactly the same functional and logical role in divine command ethics as *governments* do in Statism. Therefore the truth of philosophical social anarchism is just as rationally self-evident as the falsity of divine command ethics.

If only it were so simple! Another fundamental task of the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist is to explain how, paradoxically, there is almost universal "commonsense" belief in the political authority of governments, States, and other Statelike institutions, even in the face of, for example, the rationally self-evident soudness of the core Kantian argument for philosophical social anarchism. One possible explanation for the almost universal failure to recognize the truth of philosophical social anarchism is that most people, including most political philosophers, are subject to a complex and powerful *cognitive* illusion—the cognitive illusion of political authority—that interferes with and undermines the proper employment of their rational capacities, and thus makes it extremely difficult for them to recognize what is otherwise rationally self-evident. And I do think that this is indeed the case.

One everyday example of this complex and powerful cognitive illusion is the more or less spine-chilling spectatorial horror we feel when we watch post-apocalyptic movies— say, *Mad Max: Fury Road*¹⁰¹—that convey the mythic Hobbesian "war of all against all" (often reminiscent of Hollywood depictions of the Wild West, only even more chaotic and gory) that is depicted as following from the breakdown of State-order; yet we seem to feel no disgust or horror *whatsoever* about the horrendous State-system that must have led to the fictional apocalypse.

But I also think that there is a deeper *Kantian* explanation, namely, that most people, especially including most political philosophers, are subject to a complex and powerful *philosophical* illusion—the noumenal or transcendental illusion of *The State-in-itself* and its equally illusory dialectical contrary, *the Hobbesian state-of-nature*—that makes it extremely difficult or even practically impossible for them to see the self-evident truth of philosophical social anarchism.

Here, then, is where Kant's radical agnosticism can be smoothly extended and added to the five-step core Kantian argument for philosophical social anarchism, as follows:

(6) Nevertheless, there is almost universal "commonsense" belief in the political authority of governments, States, and other State-like institutions.

(7) Part of the explanation for the almost universal failure to recognize that there is no adequate rational justification for political authority is that most people, including most political philosophers, are subject to a complex and powerful cognitive illusion— the cognitive illusion of political authority—that makes it extremely difficult or even practically impossible for them to recognize the self-evident truth of philosophical social anarchism.

(8) The cognitive illusion of political authority can, to a significant extent, be dismantled by a careful critical diagnosis of its basic elements,¹⁰² together with a bracing regimen of what J. C. Scott very aptly calls "anarchist calisthenics,"¹⁰³ that is, frequent rehearsals, under non-dangerous physical and social conditions, of the art of avoiding and undermining mindless, pointless obedience to the commands of States or other State-like institutions.

(9) But the deeper Kantian explanation is that most people, including most political philosophers, are subject to the philosophical, and more specifically noumenal and transcendental illusion *that it is possible to know the nature of The State-in-Itself and prove its existence or non-existence,* thereby yielding the supposed ultimate ground or source of the right to command people and to coerce them to accept its commands as

a duty, even if these commands and/or the coercion are impermissible according to basic existential Kantian moral principles.

(10) Kantian radical agnosticism undermines this philosophical illusion, and makes it possible to see the rationally self-evident truth of philosophical social anarchism.

This argument-strategy, in turn, has a special advantage over other existing arguments for philosophical anarchism that proceed by

(i) enumerating, criticizing, and rejecting a finite number of candidates (say, divine right of kings, social contract theory, democracy, and rule consequentialism) for providing sufficient rational justification for political authority, then
(ii) critically attacking the cognitive illusion of political authority, and then
(iii) concluding that philosophical anarchism is true.¹⁰⁴

All such arguments have the following serious flaw: they cannot, in principle, rule out the possibility that there is some *other* candidate, *as yet unexamined*, that will provide sufficient rational justification for political authority. So, apparently, there is always room for a reasonable doubt that political authority can be sufficiently rationally justified, and the argument for philosophical anarchism falls short of decisive proof. Let us call this *the objection from arguments-by-cases*. But if, as Kant's radical agnosticism shows, *we have a priori philosophical knowledge that we cannot know either the nature of The State-initself or logically prove its existence or non-existence,* then unless the philosophical defender of political authority can actually *specify* another minimally plausible candidate for providing a rational justification for it, there is no reason *whatsoever* to believe in the possibility of there being such a thing. Therefore the objection from arguments-by-cases fails, and there is *decisive* proof for philosophical social anarchism.

2.5 THE CORE KANTIAN ARGUMENT FOR *Political* Social Anarchism

In this section, I will present the core Kantian argument for *political* social anarchism, in a way that also specially emphasizes its essential connections with theology and religion/spirituality. Here goes.

(1) Political social anarchism says that there is no adequate rational justification for political authority, the State, or any other State-like institution, and that we should reject and exit the State and other State-like institutions, in order to create, belong to, and sustain a real-world, absolutely universal, cosmopolitan ethical community, *The Real Realm of Ends*, in a world without any States or State-like institutions, but instead

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only a world-wide network of constructive, principled-authenticity-enabling, radically enlightened, post-big capitalist, post-State, post-State-like institutions, *the Kosmopolis*. (2) All human persons, aka *people*, are

(2.i) absolutely non-denumerably infinitely, intrinsically, objectively valuable, beyond all possible economics, which means they have *dignity*,

(2.ii) autonomous rational animals, which means they can act freely for good reasons, and above all they are

(2.iii) morally obligated to respect each other and to be actively concerned for each other's well-being and happiness, aka *kindness*, as well as their own well-being and happiness.

(3) Therefore it is rationally unjustified and immoral to undermine or violate people's dignity, under any circumstances.

(4) By *political authority* I mean the existence of a special group of people, aka *government*, with the power to coerce, and the right to command other people and to coerce them to obey those commands as a duty, no matter what the moral content of these commands might be.

(5) By coercion I mean

either (5.i) using violence (for example, injuring, torturing, or killing) or the threat of violence, in order to manipulate people according to certain purposes of the coercer (*primary coercion*),

or (5.ii) inflicting appreciable, salient harm (for example, imprisonment, termination of employment, large monetary penalties) or deploying the threat of appreciable, salient harm, even if these are not in themselves violent, in order to manipulate people according to certain purposes of the coercer (*secondary coercion*).

(6) By *the State or any other State-like institution* I mean any social organization that not only claims political authority, but also actually possesses the power to coerce, in order to secure and sustain this authority.

(7) And by *the specific problem of political authority* I mean: "Is there an adequate rational justification for the existence of the State or any other State-like institution?" (8) This problem applies directly to *all* kinds of political authority, States, and State-like institutions, from Mesopotamian potentates, Egyptian pharaohs, pre-Socratic tyrants, Athenian military dictatorships, caesars, kings, popes, and emperors, to constitutional monarchies, communist states, fascist states, religious fundamentalist states, capitalist liberal democracies, provincial or city governments, military organizations, business corporations, and universities—basically, any institution with its own army, navy, air-force, police-force, or armed security guards.

(9) If it is rationally unjustified and immoral for *ordinary people* to undermine or violate the dignity of other people by commanding them and coercing them to obey those commands as a duty, then it must also be rationally unjustified and immoral for *governments* to undermine or violate the dignity of people by commanding them and coercing them to obey those commands as a duty, no matter how those governments got into power.

(10) But all governments claim political authority in precisely this sense.

(11) Therefore, there is no adequate rational justification for political authority, States, or other State-like institutions, and philosophical social anarchism is true, on Kantian grounds alone.

(12) It is well known since Plato's Socratic dialogue, the *Euthyphro*, that what is called *Divine Command Ethics* is rationally unacceptable.

(13) Divine Command Ethics says that God's commands are good and right, just because God says that they are good and right, and God has the divine power to impose these commands on people, no matter what the moral content of these commands might be.

(14) But this means that God can command *anything*, including commands that undermine or violate of the dignity of people, which is rationally unjustified and immoral.

(15) So Divine Command Ethics is rationally unacceptable.

(16) Correspondingly, *Statist Command Ethics* says that governments' commands are good and right, just because governments say that they are good and right, and they have the coercive power to impose these commands on people, no matter what the moral content of these commands might be.

(17) In other words, *governments* play exactly the same functional and logical role in Statist Command Ethics as *God* does in Divine Command Ethics.

(18) So, just as in Divine Command Ethics, God can command *anything*, including commands that undermine or violate of the dignity of people, so too in Statist Command Ethics, governments can command *anything*, including commands that undermine or violate the dignity of people.

(19) Therefore, Statist Command Ethics is just as rationally unacceptable as Divine Command Ethics, and again, philosophical social anarchism is true on existential Kantian grounds alone.

(20) Since the time of the Mesopotamian potentates, Egyptian pharaohs, and pre-Socratic tyrants, humanly-created States and other State-like institutions have explicitly claimed to possess political authority, and then have proceeded to use the power to coerce, especially the power of primary coercion, frequently of the most awful, cruel, and monstrous kinds, thereby repressing, detaining, imprisoning, enslaving, torturing, starving, maiming, or killing literally billions of people, in order to secure their acceptance of these authoritarian claims. Even allowing for all the other moral and natural evils that afflict humankind, it seems very likely that there has never been a single greater cause of evil, misery, suffering, and death in the history of the world than the coercive force of States and other State-like institutions.

(21) Now imagine a world *without* States or other State-like institutions, in which all the members of humanity freely form various dignity-respecting sub-communities built on kindness, mutual aid, personal enlightenment, and the pursuit of principled authenticity, and then freely link them all together in a worldwide network of partially overlapping sub-communities, *the Kosmopolis*. Isn't that an infinitely better world than the world of States and any other State-like institutions? To make this moral intuition fully vivid, simply listen (again) to John Lennon's "Imagine."

(22) Jesus preached the ethical gospel of universal human love. Yet he also reportedly said:

Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's. 105

By a crucially important contrast, political social anarchism says:

If Caesar and God can command things that undermine or violate human dignity, then why should we render *anything* unto them? *Render unto humanity the things that respect human dignity*.

But is it not obvious that *this* is the ethical gospel of universal human love? So, leaving aside Jesus's mistakes about rendering unto Caesar and God, Jesus was implicitly an existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist.

(23) Therefore we should reject and exit the State and all other State-like institutions, in order to create, belong to, and sustain a real-world, absolutely universal, cosmopolitan ethical community, *The Real Realm of Ends*, in a world without any States or State-like institutions, but instead only a world-wide network of constructive, principled-authenticity-enabling, radically enlightened, post-big capitalist, post-State, post-State-like institutions, *the Kosmopolis*.

2.6. THE PLIGHT OF THE EXISTENTIAL KANTIAN COSMOPOLITAN SOCIAL ANARCHIST IN A WORLD OF STATES AND OTHER STATE-LIKE INSTITUTIONS

So far, so good. We know philosophically and politically exactly who we are—namely, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchists—and who our closest intellectual and spiritual allies are—namely, radically enlightened Kant, radically agnostic Kierkegaard,

non-violent Kropotkin, "Imagine"-period John Lennon, and Jesus, without rendering anything either unto Caesar or God—and what we all should be doing now and for the rest of our lives. But unfortunately this existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist imperative about "what we all should be doing now and for the rest of our lives" leads to yet another serious problem that must be addressed.

In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant distinguishes between

(i) an "ethical-civil community," under non-coercive laws of virtue, guaranteeing the possibility of autonomy (that is, moral laws), and

(ii) a juridico-civil community, under coercive political laws, guaranteeing at most the possibility of external freedom, that is, a kind of freedom that is consistent with our also being nothing but psychological turnspits or wind-up toys. (*Rel* 6: 94-95)

The ethical-civil community is of course the same as The Realm of Ends, in real time and space, hence it is the same as The Real Realm of Ends, and the juridico-civil community is of course the same as the State or any other State-like institution.

According to Kant, the ethical-civil community has a "form and constitution essentially distinct from those of the [juridico-civil community]" (*Rel* 6: 94). Nevertheless, supposedly, "without the foundation of a political community, [the ethical-civil community] could never be brought into existence by human beings" (*Rel* 6: 94). Moreover, even though the members of an ethical-civil community must

freely commit themselves to enter into this state, [and] not allow the political power to command over them how to order (or not order) such a constitution internally.... [nevertheless] nothing [can] be included which contradicts the duty of its members as *citizens of the state*—even though, if the ethical bond is of the genuine sort, this condition need not cause anxiety (*Rel* 6: 96).

Need not cause anxiety! What Kant is saying here, on the face of it, is utterly incoherent. If the ethical-civil community has an essentially different form and constitution from that of the juridico-civil community, then no coercive laws or commands of the political state can be allowed to control personal and social life in the ethical-civil community. Hence the existence of a juridico-civil community, precisely to the extent that its coercive laws and commands are in force, is in *direct opposition* to the existence of an ethical-civil community, and cannot possibly be required as a necessary condition of the founding of an ethical-civil community.

Indeed, given the continued existence of a juridico-civil or political community (namely, the State), the existence of an ethical-civil community (namely, The Real Realm of Ends) becomes *morally and politically impossible*. This is because the political community requires its citizens to obey its coercive laws and commands, even when these are rationally unjustified and immoral. Hence to the extent that this obedience occurs, the

citizens of the political state must think and act like robots, and impose upon themselves a self-stultifying rational immaturity and inauthenticity, contrary to their own project of enlightenment and autonomous freedom. In the Hobbesian state of nature, the individual thinks and acts for himself, even if egoistically and wickedly. So at least he is still alive, thinking, and transcendentally free. But in the political community, he turns off his ability to think or act for himself, and becomes a drone or puppet of the State, thereby making his radical enlightenment and the achievement of moral autonomy impossible.

Therefore, according to Kant, a necessary condition of the real possibility of the creation of an ethical community is that its members must *reject* the juridico-civil community, and *exit* such a community: just as, also according to Kant, in order to enter the juridico-civil community, the person must *reject* the Hobbesian state of nature, and *exit* the Hobbesian state of nature. Kant himself even describes the existence of the juridio-civil community as an *ethical state of nature*, which must be rejected and exited in order to enter the ethical-civil community, because

the ethical state of nature [is] a *public* feuding between the principles of virtue and a state of inner immorality which the natural human being ought to endeavor to leave behind as soon as possible (*Rel* 6: 97).

Or as he puts it most explicitly, in capital letters, in the title of part III, division one, section II of the *Religion*:

THE HUMAN BEING OUGHT TO LEAVE THE ETHICAL STATE OF NATURE IN ORDER TO BECOME A MEMBER OF AN ETHICAL COMMUNITY. (*Rel* 6: 96)

In other words, what Kant's view implicitly entails is *political social anarchism*, namely, *existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism*, although at the same time he officially endorses *Statism*.

Now *either* Kant is simply being philosophically insincere or even philosophically mendacious—or both, in which case he is writing *duplicitous philosophical bullshit—or else* he really is deeply psychologically conflicted and simply confused on this fundamental point.

The charitable interpretation is the latter; and I am prepared to hold that it is really possible that Kant's commitment to the Hobbesian myth of the state of nature as the war of all against all, and correspondingly his commitment to the belief that this war of all against all is the *necessary* result of any human community that fails to enter into a juridicocivil condition, and become a State, is so psychologically powerful that he simply cannot accept the valid consequence of his own argument—namely, political social anarchism, aka existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism. So then he simply flips back into Statism in order to avoid facing up to the cognitive and emotional dissonance between his

fear-driven explicit commitment to Statism on the one hand, and his rational implicit commitment to political social anarchism on the other. In any case, the *true* upshot of Kant's theory of the ethical-civil community (namely, of The Real Realm of Ends) in relation to the juridico-civil (namely, the State and any other State-like institution), when taken together with his theories of enlightenment and autonomous freedom, is indeed political social anarchism, aka existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism— whether or not he was psychologically capable of facing up to this, and whether or not he was personally brave enough to face up to it explicitly in print.

Moreover, it is quite true that had Kant actually published this political social anarchist result, or had refused to knuckle under to censorship, he would have been publicly excoriated, summarily dismissed from his professorship, and jailed, or worse. After all, as it was, in 1794 he had already been required not to teach or publish anything else pertaining to *religion*, under pain of scandal, dismissal, jail, or worse.¹⁰⁶ So perhaps the seemingly uncharitable interpretation, according to which Kant is writing duplicitous philosophical bullshit because he lacked personal bravery, is not so *very* uncharitable to him after all.¹⁰⁷ How many philosophers are courageous enough to say explicitly what we really think about States and other State-like institutions, and face scandal, dismissal from our jobs, jail, or worse, far less *acting upon* what we really think? Socrates was prepared to be jailed and drink hemlock for the sake of his philosophical and political views; and during World War I, Bertrand Russell lost his Trinity College Cambridge fellowship, was publicly shamed, and then imprisoned, for his pacifism. But many other philosophers have ever been that courageous?¹⁰⁸ Moreover, it is absolutely true that Kant in fact comes this close to defending political social anarchism explicitly in the Religion; and it is equally absolutely true that in fact political social anarchism certainly is *there*, right under the surface of the published texts, for anyone who is willing to follow Kant's argument right through to the end and to liberate herself intellectually and emotionally from its Statist surface rhetoric.

In any case, quite apart from the clearly and distinctly self-conflicted state of Kant's own writings on this fundamental point, however, the deeper problem is this:

If the Hobbesian conception of the state of nature is a myth, and indeed a cognitive illusion, then there is no necessity either to enter into, or to remain within, the juridicocivil community. Indeed, since life in the juridico-civil community is inherently *inimical* to the existence of the ethical-civil community, then it is morally necessary for us both to reject the juridico-civil community and also to exit it in order to pursue the radical enlightenment project and to live for the sake of autonomy and respect for the dignity of persons and the moral law. *But how can the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist ever actually survive*

either (i) inside the State and other State-like institutions, while still actively criticizing and rejecting them,

or (ii) outside the State and other State-like Institutions, having actively criticized them, rejected them, and exited them?

I call this problem the plight of the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist in a world of States and other State-like institutions.

I do not pretend to have a fully adequate solution to this problem, but rather only a few follow-up thoughts about possible partial solutions.

One possible route under (i) is that the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist simply publicly stands up for what s/he believes, and then accepts the consequences: scandal, dismissal from her or his job, jail, or worse. But this practically guarantees that s/he will not survive. The most s/he could hope for is posthumous vindication.

Another possible route under (i) is to engage in covert resistance, combined with superficial compliance, utilizing the "weapons of the weak." But this means living a double life, and constantly experiencing the fear of being "outed."

What about (ii)? In one sense, since every part of the earth is controlled by some State or another, and some State-like institution or another, moving to a place beyond States and other State-like institutions is practically impossible. One cannot go anywhere, or remain anywhere, without a passport, proof of citizenship, or a visa, and an identity card, social security number, a job, etc., etc. To be sure, one can leave the State in which one is currently living, move to another one, or to a series of other States, and live there in exile, having opted out of various coercive laws of that first State and its State-like institutions. But of course, even if the particular State to which one has moved, and its State-like institutions, are better and less coercively authoritarian in certain respects or even overall, than the first one, nevertheless one is still inside a State and other State-like institutions, and therefore under their coercive authoritarian control. And what about family and loved ones, who may well still live inside the first State and its State-like institutions?

In effect, I have reached the conclusion that the plight of the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist in a world of States and other State-like institutions is *hopeless*. But perhaps there is still *some* rational ground for hope.

2.7 WHAT MAY WE HOPE FOR?

The field of philosophy ... can be brought down to the following questions:

- (1) What can I know?
- (2) What ought I to do?
- (3) What may I hope for?
- (4) What is the human being?

Metaphysics answers the first question, morals the second, religion the third. (JL 9: 25, boldfacing added).

Here is a line of thought that I *hope* will provide a sufficient ground for rational hope about the plight of the existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchist. In the Kantian sense, *rational hope* is believing-in something whose existence or non-existence it is humanly impossible to prove logically, in a way that is also existentially boot-strapping, non-scientifically and non-logically demonstrative, and morality-affirming, as I have spelled out these notions in sections 1.4 to 1.7.¹⁰⁹ So here is where *radically agnostic moral theology* and *radically enlightened social anarchist politics* ultimately merge into a single rationally hopeful life-project.

In his "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim," Kant develops an explicitly *teleological* reading of the history of humanity, namely, rational humanity, that postulates the modern State as a necessary developmental stage on the way to individual and social enlightenment for rational humankind as a not-merely-biologically-defined species. Although the very idea of teleology is of course controversial, I do think that Kant is *deeply right* about the the possibility of a teleological history of rational humanity, but also *deeply wrong* about the teleological necessity of the State. At the same time, however, thinking about Kant's essay prompted me to think about the role of Federalism in such a teleological moral history of rational humanity, which in turn led me to what I will call *an idea for a universal history with an existental Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist aim*. It goes like this.

Idea for a Universal History With an Existential Kantian Cosmopolitan Social Anarchist Aim

(1) The "original sin of political authority" is that the natural rational human need for mutual aid, and also for the protection of the innocent and weak, in a pre-State condition, plus fear, whether justified fear or irrational fear, pushes us into the very idea of the State and its supposed political authority.

(2) But although we do indeed all need mutual aid, and also we do indeed all need to protect the innocent and weak, because of our fear we go too far, and this is a fundamental, tragic error that we have been paying for ever since.

(3) In effect, we traded our basic moral principles, our autonomous freedom, and our respect for rational human dignity, for the social-contractual promise that governments, States, and State-like institutions will (3.i) provide effective protection against mortal threats, and (3.ii) guarantee our mutual freedom of action, aka *external* freedom (as opposed to freedom of the will and autonomy in the Kantian sense, aka *internal* freedom), especially our freedom of economic action to pursue self-interested ends in a big-capitalist system.

(4) In other words, in a tragic way, because of our fear, we have traded our own rational humanity for the Mephistophelian (and so often, as a matter of actual political-

historical fact, false) promise of living like well-serviced machinery, smiley-faced ⁽²⁾ "moist robots."

(5) Nevertheless, insofar as there actually have been various active attempts to challenge, constrain, deconstruct, and detoxify the political authority of the State, or other State-like institutions, by appealing to moral principles with a broadly Kantian justification—for example, universal human rights, based on the notion of rational human dignity—then there has been, on the whole, and looked at through a wide-angle historical lens, a morally healthy devolutionary trend towards existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism.

(6) Now, as well-described by Andreas Føllesdal, here is the basic idea behind Federalism:

Federalism is the theory or advocacy of [basic existential Kantian moral] principles for dividing powers between member units and common institutions. Unlike in a unitary state, sovereignty in federal political orders is non-centralized, often constitutionally, between at least two levels so that units at each level have final authority and can be self governing in some issue area. Citizens thus have political obligations to, or have their rights secured by, two authorities. The division of power between the member unit and center may vary, typically the center has powers regarding defense and foreign policy, but member units may also have international roles. The decision-making bodies of member units may also participate in central decision-making bodies. Much recent philosophical attention is spurred by renewed political interest in federalism, coupled with empirical findings concerning the requisite and legitimate basis for stability and trust among citizens in federal political orders. Philosophical contributions have addressed the dilemmas and opportunities facing Canada, Australia, Europe, Russia, Iraq, Nepal and Nigeria, to mention just a few areas where federal arrangements are seen as interesting solutions to accommodate differences among populations divided by ethnic or cultural cleavages yet seeking a common, often democratic, political order.¹¹⁰

(7) In this quotation, taken from the Introduction to Føllesdal's excellent Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on "Federalism," I have made only one editorial change, which is to insert the term "basic existentential Kantian moral" for the term "federal" in the original text. Of course, this controversial emendation might not be what Føllesdal actually had in mind.¹¹¹ But it does set up the final step in my existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist teleological history of rational humanity.

(8) Looked at teleologically, the real-world fact of Federalism seems to me to be, precisely insofar as it is "the theory or advocacy of [basic existential Kantian moral] principles for dividing powers between member units and common institutions," a practically necessary and morally healthy devolutionary step in actual human political history between, on the one hand, our fundamental tragic error of believing the myth of political authority and our corresponding creation of States and other State-like institutions, by means of which we voluntarily turn ourselves into more or less well-serviced and smiley-faced ⁽²⁾ "moist robots," and on the other hand, the guiding moral

ideal of an existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist post-big capitalist, post-State, post-State-like institutions world—the Kosmopolis.

(9) In this way, then, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchists could *also* be quasi-Federalists. The existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist could work in a covert, measured, constructive, non-violent revolutionary way towards the Kosmopolis by using Quasi-Federalist means, step-by-step, to devolve and dismantle all States and other State-like institutions, and to replace them with ethically acceptable, non-coercive social structures, institutions, and social relations.

(10) Therefore the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist could still survive in a world of States and other State-like institutions, until the Kosmopolis finally emerged.

Or at least that is the rational hope. And in any case, given the plight of the existential Kantian cosmopolitan political social anarchist in a world of States and other State-like institutions, what else have we got to hold on to?

2.8 HOW TO CONSTRUCT "THE WORLD AS IT COULD BE MADE"

With rational hope in our hearts and minds, we can now begin to move forward again. Correspondingly, the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist *social dynamics* that I develop and defend in this and the next two sections has six sources of philosophical inspiration:

(i) Plato's Socratic dialogues,

(ii) Kant's ethics and theory of radical enlightenment,

(iii) Bertrand Russell's little-known 1918 book, Proposed Roads to Freedom,¹¹²

(iv) the Brazilian neo-Marxist philosopher of education Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*,¹¹³

(v) Rebecca Solnit's brilliant 2009 book on disaster communities and social anarchism, *A Paradise Built in Hell*,¹¹⁴ and

(vi) a series of classic books on facilitation, principled negotiation, and participatory decision-making, including Roger Fisher's and William Ury's *Getting to YES* (1981),¹¹⁵ Samuel Kaner's "What Can Organizational Design Professionals Learn from Grassroots Political Activists?" (1987),¹¹⁶ Elinor Ostrom's *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (1990),¹¹⁷ Allan Kaplan's *Development Practitioners and Social Process: Artists of the Invisible* (2002),¹¹⁸ Kaner's *Facilitator's Guide to Participatory Decision-Making* (2007),¹¹⁹ and Peter Block's *Community: The Structure of Belonging* (2008).¹²⁰

As to the last source of inspiration—the classic books on facilitation, principled negotiation, and participatory decision-making—it makes perfect sense, in a world of big

capitalism, States, and Statelike institutions, that the most important works in social theory and political philosophy over the last 35 years, since the decline of neo-Marxism as a culturally and intellectually powerful force, would have actually been written by people working almost entirely *outside* the officially-sanctioned hegemonic framework of *classical liberal or neoliberal democratic political theory* inside the Anglo-American professional academic system, which Jeff Schmidt so accurately calls "the militaryindustrial-university complex,"¹²¹ but nowadays extended to the military-industrialuniversity-*digital* complex, that I call *The Deep(er) State*.

In part 2 of *Proposed Roads to Freedom*, Russell discusses many concrete social and political issues, and proposes a number of concrete solutions, in line with his favored doctrine, "Guild Socialism," which is a federalist development of Kropotkin-style social anarchism. And in the last chapter, "The World As It Could Be Made," he quite lyrically describes a normative vision of a categorically politically better world: as it were, John Lennon's "Imagine" for 1918. In fact, it turns out that Lennon's political views were actually strongly influenced by Russell's views, via Paul McCartney.¹²²

One thing that is very striking about Russell's arguments in this 1918 political book is his consistent avoidance of a priori reasoning, abstraction, and even minimal formalization. It is as if, in this book, he found great intellectual relief from the relentless abstractions and formal-logical reasoning patterns of *Principles of Mathematics* (1903), *Principia Mathematica* (1910), *Problems of Philosophy* (1912), the aborted *Theory of Knowledge* project (1913), *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914), and even *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1918), written in Brixton Prison, about which he later wrote in his *Autobiography*:

I found prison in many ways quite agreeable. I had no engagements, no difficult decisions to make, no fear of callers, no interruptions to my work. I read enormously; I wrote a book, "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy"... and began the work for "Analysis of Mind."¹²³

As a consequence, however, Russell's political solutions in *Proposed Roads to Freedom* are in fact *too* concrete–too much embedded in a certain historical-social context: Europe and England, circa 1918, at the end of The Great War. This fact makes Russell's excellent ideas less generalizable, less directly applicable, and less relevant to the USA and the rest of the world, one hundred years later, circa 2018, not to mention the future world, than they should be. But here I can help Russell out with *a basic procedural principle of existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism*, as follows.

First, by an institutional structure, I mean

an ordered set of moral principles shared in common by a group of people, with a collective aim, guiding their mutual interactions.

Or, in other words, an institutional structure is a social network of moral principles designed to further some collective aim. Second, by oppression, I mean this:

A person or a group of people are oppressed if and only if their actual condition falls below what would be minimally sufficient to meet the ethical demands of respect for their human dignity.

Third, by oppression with respect to X, I mean this:

A person or group of people are oppressed with respect to X if and only if their actual condition falls below what would be minimally sufficient to meet the ethical demands of respect for their human dignity with respect to X.

So, for example, as the Black Lives Matter movement clearly demonstrates, young black men in the US have been *oppressed with respect to treatment by the police*: the police historically have been and still are treating young black men violently in ways that fall substantially below what would be minimally sufficient to meet the ethical demands for their human dignity with respect to police treatment. Fourth, *Federalism* says:

States should introduce a series of mediating institutional structures between government and the individual, each of which and all of which have specifically ethical aims and rational justifications.

Fifth, Quasi-Federalism says:

Humanity should introduce a series of mediating institutional structures between government and the individual, each of which and all of which have specifically existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist aims and adequate rational justification.

Sixth, Quasi-Federalism operates according to a recursive¹²⁴ basic procedural principle that I call the principle of *Devolutionary and Dynamic Anti-Oppression*, aka DDAO:

Suppose that a State or Statelike institutional structure S exists. Then S should be replaced by a series of new institutional structures, each one of which simultaneously represents a definite step in the direction of the devolutionary deconstruction of S and also a definite step in the direction of the dynamic construction of a non-oppressive condition, in a post-big-capitalist, post-State, post-State-like institutional world, for all the people affected by S.

According to DDAO, in a normative sense, each new institutional structure simultaneously represents a definite "left to right" *decrease* in big-capitalist alienation, commodification, and *economic oppression* more generally, and in Statist and State-like institutional coercion and *authoritarian oppression* more generally, and also a definite "right to left" *increase* in individual and collective non-alienation, non-commodification, non-coercion, and overall non-oppression. So each new structure is dual and *enantiomorphic* (mirror-reflected) in a categorically normative sense. More generally, we should always be looking to design and create new institutional structures that have this normatively dual, enantiomorphic character, namely, they satisfy DDAO.

Here is a brief example of how DDAO can be applied, also partially inspired by Alex Vitale's breakthrough book, *The End of Policing*.¹²⁵

For each armed police force in the USA, we create a new devolutionary/dynamic *Police Force Regime 1* in which *no* police officers normally carry guns or *ever* use other violent solutions to policing problems (left to right devolution of the State) and *all* police officers *consistently* practice non-violent solutions to policing problems, although they still carry nightsticks and have some training in the martial arts (right to left construction of a non-oppressive condition for young black men, and others, in a post-big-capitalist, post-State, post-State-like institutional world).

Then, as soon as it can be implemented, for each armed police force in the USA, starting with *Police Force Regime 1*, we create should be a new devolutionary/dynamic *Police Force Regime 2* in which *no* police officers normally carry nightsticks or *ever* use other violent solutions to policing problems (left to right devolution of the State) and *consistently* practice non-violent solutions to policing problems, although they still have some training in the martial arts (right to left construction of a non-oppressive condition for young black men, and others, in a post-big-capitalist, post-State, post-State-like institutional world).

And so-on, set-by-step, until *Police Regime Null* is reached, in which there is, in effect, *the end of policing in the USA*, because whatever social institutional structure remains in place, fully meets or exceeds the minimal demands of respect for human dignity, in a post-big-capitalist, post-State, post-State-like institutional world.

Here are two crucial further points about real-world applications of DDAO.

First, in applying DDAO, we are always drawing directly on *fully embedded social know-how* about the actual operations of the relevant institutional structures,¹²⁶ and thereby also always using phenomenologically self-evident moral and religious intuition (see section 1.6 above) to guide us in knowing how each new institutional structure simultaneously represents a definite *decrease* in Statist and State-like institutional coercion and also a definite *increase* in individual and collective non-oppression.

Second, obviously, no change in institutional structures occurs independently of simultaneous changes in *other* institutional structures, since there are multiple dependency relations not only *within* institutional structures but also *between* and *among* institutional

structures. So, for exemple, in the police oppression example, obviously, in order to make each recursive change in the institutional structures constituting police forces, until, in effect, we reach the end of policing in the USA, we would also simultaneously have to make corresponding, relevant changes in other institutional structures, for example, in the local government administration regimes that control police forces.

2.9. SOCIAL DYNAMICS 1: DDAO, CONCORDAR, AND CARNIVAL

When I wrote the first draft of this section in August 2016, it had become self-evident to any reasonable person that, given the Presidential election campaign in the USA, and given the scandalous situation in Brazilian politics at that time, *majoritarian representative democracy in general*, and *big-capitalist neoliberal majoritarian representative democracy in particular*, were deeply questionable. Since then, nothing has materially changed for the better: on the contrary, with Donald Trump's election as US President, and the worldwide double-whammy trend towards *neoliberal populism*, it has gotten significantly worse. So it is more than merely reasonable to look for radical alternatives to big-capitalist neoliberal majoritarian representative democracy: it is morally and politically *imperative* to do so.

In section 2.8, I defined "institutions" in terms of shared ordered sets of ethical principles and *collective aims*. What is a collective aim? By that, I mean *an essentially embodied, action-oriented, desire-based emotive*¹²⁷ shared set of basic ideals and values, or what the Brazilians call *concordar*: a shared heart. It is also what Samuel Alexander calls "sociality" and what Jan Slaby calls "relational affect."¹²⁸ The basic idea is that once we realize that, from the standpoint of the philosophy of mind, emotions are *neither* merely "in the head" *nor* inherently passive, but on the contrary are essentially embodied, first-person experiences of *desiderative caring*, directly expressed as dispositions spontaneously and creatively to move one's body intentionally in various ways, then we can also clearly see that all emotions are immediately manifest in the world and fully shareable with others.

Concordar is vividly obvious in the deeply important yet still everyday human phenomena of sexuality and love, religious rituals, revivalist meetings, team sports, rock music concerts, and all kinds of dancing, for example, hip-hop dancing. In all of these group activities, *concordar* exists not only among and between *active participants or performers*, but also among and between *audiences or viewers*, and also among and between *active participants or performers* and *audiences or viewers*. These phenomena clearly show that *concordar* can be the source of tremendous personal and social liberation, intense bodily and spiritual enjoyment, and morally authentic happiness—as well, of course, as considerable amounts of shallow or morally trivial happiness, "just having fun."

Concordar is equally vividly obvious, however, in the bonding rituals of business corporations, cults, and terrorist oganizations, in angry political demonstrations and

protests, in jingoistic political spectacles, in military rituals and spectacles, in mob hysteria, and in mob violence. The latter phenomena all clearly show that *concordar* can also be the source of tremendous psychological and social oppression, and evil.

What I want to concentrate on is *concordar* with respect to *the Highest Good* in the Kantian ethical sense. As I argued in part 1, this is essentially bound up with radically agnostic religious experience or spirituality. As such, we could also call it *solidarity*.

The dual conception of social dynamics according to DDOA and *concordar* or solidarity with respect to the Highest Good, enables me to display a sharp and indeed radical contrast between existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism on the one hand, and both democracy in general and also big-capitalist neoliberal majoritarian representative democracy in particular. This in turn is deeply important because what social anarchists call *direct democracy*—that is, collective, face-to-face, participatory decision-making in a non-majoritarian, non-representative framework—is radically distinct from majoritarian representative democracy.¹²⁹

Majoritarian representative democracy is a form of Statism which says that there should be "majority rule" and "representation." This means that the governmental control of coercive power should be vested in a majority of "the people," that is, of those legally qualified to vote, who then hand over legislative and executive control of coercive power to an elected or appointed minority who actually govern. But government according to the possession of coercive power is always rationally unjustified and immoral on Kantian anarchist grounds, no matter how few or how many people have it. *Even 100% of "the people" can be morally wrong*. And if they are wrong, *then they are wrong*, and their possession of coercive power cannot ever make it right. Therefore, any version of majoritarian representative democracy is rationally unjustified and immoral on existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist grounds.

The truth is, that in its rationally defensible essence, politics is *not* about *who should possess coercive power*, especially including the "power vested in the people" and their governments, even despite the 5200+ year old history of States and other State-like institutions, going back to the emergence of the earliest States in Mesopotamia.¹³⁰ That politics is about *who should possess coercive power* is what *Statism* says. But as we have seen, Statism is rationally unjustified and immoral on existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist grounds.

On the contrary, in its authentic moral essence, politics is about respect for human dignity, ending/reducing human oppression, mutual aid/kindness, and radical enlightenment, universally and worldwide. So coercive power "vested in the people" and their governments is no better than any other kind of Statist coercive power. Moreover, and more specifically, (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democracy essentially requires *conformity, consensus, voting, elections,* and *popular mandates.* Then the elected or appointed mandated minority who actually govern determine the specific character of the use of coercive power. But *the tyranny of the minority* is no better than *the tyranny of the*

majority: both are tyranny, hence both are rationally unjustified and immoral. So any version of democracy that is based on majoritarian representative democracy, at the end of the day, even with total consensus, is merely another form of Statism.

In existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism, by sharp contrast, based as it is on DDAO and *concordar* or solidarity, we share collective basic ideals and values, and yet we also fully allow for a radical multiplicity of human differences in bodily coloration, configuration, and natural operation, language, and ethnicity, and for a radical multiplicity of spontaneous variations of opinion and lifestyle under those basic ideals and values, that I will call *creative self-expression*.

Hence existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism is directly opposed to the conformity, consensus, voting, elections, and popular mandates that are essentially characteristic of big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democracy. All of these treat people like mere factory products or machines; by means of these, they rule and apply coercive power by treating people as sheer aggregates of human bodies more or less accidentally collected inside bordered sub-regions of the Earth—where the borders are very often, actually or operationally, walls with barbed wire on top, and passage across which is highly restricted, and enforced by well-armed, trigger-happy guards—and by monitoring and surveillance systems based on the omnipresence of CCTVs and sheer numbering (for example, social security numbers in the USA, or CPF numbers and Federal Police identity cards in Brazil), alone; and they suppress or even kill creative self-expression.

By means of post-big-capitalist, post-State, post-Statelike institutional, and therefore *post-majoritarian-representative-democratic* existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist social dynamics, the big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic mechanisms of conformity, consensus, voting, elections, and popular mandates will all be *gradually devolved out of existence* and simultaneously dynamically replaced by an indefinitely large number of partially overlapping, shared human *sentimental journeys*, that is, by an indefinitely large number of partially overlapping, shared human non-oppressive, freely-chosen, yet collective DDAO-guided processes of forming and acting on the basis of *concordar* or solidarity.

So, given DDAO and *concordar* or solidarity, since we share collective basic ideals and values in our collective creation of a better world, and since we also fully allow for a radical multiplicity of human differences in bodily coloration, configuration, and natural operation, language, and ethnicity, as well as a multiplicity of spontaneous variations of opinion and life style under those aims, aka creative self-expression, then this sentimenal journey will be like free-style collective dancing combined with wholehearted respect for all humanity: that is, it will be like Brazilian *carnival* at its very best.

2.10 SOCIAL DYNAMICS 2: PARTICIPATORY DECISION-MAKING AND DIALOGUE-TOWARDS-DECIDING

Now for some specific details. Let us consider the classical big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic two-valued voting system:

Yes (or Yea) No (or Nay)

and also the classical Robert's Rules of Order-style¹³¹ three-valued voting system:

Yes Abstain No

In most versions of the classical big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic two-valued voting system, full participation of all eligible voters is not required. So deciding not to vote, for any reason whatsoever, is functionally equivalent to abstention in that system. But in *Robert's Rules-of-Order*-style three-valued systems— with numerical ranking of candidates or candidate-options, and iterated rounds of re-shuffled rankings in which the least favored candidate or candidate-option is dropped in each round, until a victor is determined—the "abstain" vote is used for any one of three reasons:

(i) genuine neutrality or unconcern about a proposal, either way (relatively rare),
(ii) as a polite way of saying "a plague on both their houses," or
(iii) as a way of *quasi-nay-voting*, without incurring any social consequences or repercussions (or social stigmata, in voting without secret ballot) that might be attached to actual disagreement.

But by sharp contrast to all of the above, consider now the following six-part existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist scheme:

(i) that group decision-making should not be *a discrete, individual act* (like a vote) that is carried out at a particular moment by a group of people, but instead should be *a temporally extended social-dynamic process containing a medley or symphony of mutually-coordinated individual acts*, that is engaged in and performed by a group of people,

(ii) that every such process of group decision-making should be a dialogue with people collectively discussing various proposals for institutional (hence, principled) group action acording to DDAO,

(iii) that every process of group decision-making should feature a five-valued array of options for taking a position on any given proposal, including two degrees of agreement, one neutral or as-yet-uncommitted value, and two degrees of disagreement, namely—

Strongly Agree Mildly Agree Abstain Mildly Disagree Block or Walk

—any of which is registered by each member of a group at any point in a given dialogue about a given proposal being considered by that group,

(iv) that every registration of a position carries with it the option to change or update your position at any time in the dialogue,

(v) that every registration of a position is aimed at a principled, negotiated decision collectively made by that group as whole, and

(vi) that therefore every process of group decision-making ideally involves full participation by all members of the relevant group.

Following the facilitation and principled negotiation traditions in non-mainstream social and political theory since the 1980s, let us call this system *participatory decision-making*. It could also be called *direct democracy*, although this label is somewhat problematic in view of the fact that the term "democracy" is systematically ambiguous and widely misused, especially in self-congratulatorily self-labeled "democratic" States like the USA (see section 3.12 below for details). So to avoid confusion, I will stick to the term "participatory decision-making." But I must also add eight crucial further points by way of unpacking the specifically existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist *interpretation* of participatory decision-making.

First, there is a *basic principle* governing the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist system of participatory decision-making:

No one is ever coerced in any particular sub-cycle or overall process of participatory decision-making, either with respect to their own position or with respect to their other contributions to the dialogue-towards-deciding, and more specifically, no one is ever forced to walk, or punished for blocking or walking.

Second, *blocking* means not merely a strong disagreement with a given proposal, but also that *one block is enough to defeat a given proposal in any given sub-cycle of a particular process of participatory decision-making*.

Third, every blocker must also offer, or support, or at least refrain from blocking, *an alternative proposal* in the next sub-cycle of the same decision-making process.

Fourth, every participant is permitted *only a limited number of blocks* (say, three or four, or whatever) in a particular decision-making process, but if s/he uses up *all* his or her blocks, s/he must then also *walk away from* that decision-making process and thereby *exit it*.

Fifth, walking away from/exiting a particular decision-making process can be done at any point in the process, not only after the permitted maximum number of blocks; and it will always carry some natural consequences, whether good or bad; but these consequences are always freely chosen by the walker/exiter, not coerced, since

(i) according to the basic principle, no one is ever coerced for walking/exiting, hence no one is ever forced to do so or punished for doing so, and

(ii) everyone involved in a particular decision-making process always has the option of staying in that process under one or another of the five positions—except after using up all his or her permitted blocks, which entails walking away from/exiting the process, *but this is part of the rules*, hence agreed-to from the start, and not coerced.

Sixth, *mild disagreement* always entails going forward with the current proposal if there is sufficiently strong support for it.

Seventh, *sufficiently strong support* means that there is close to or more than 50% strong or mild agreement with the proposal, and no blocks.

Eighth and finally, *not participating* in the process—yet, or perhaps ever—for any reason whatsoever, is functionally and normatively equivalent to abstention or walking/exiting, hence it is never coerced, and more specifically, no one is ever forced to participate, punished for not participating, or prevented from participating.

The dynamic registration of positions in participatory decision-making according to the scheme I just laid out essentially tells us how a person is *rationally feeling* about any proposal put forward for group decision-making. Therefore the dynamic registration of positions in participatory decision-making in this sense is *not* majoritarian representative democratic voting: on the contrary, it is dynamically tracking the levels of people's rationally-guided but also fundamentally affective and emotional *concordar* or solidarity about any given proposal for DDAO-guided institutional group action, for the sake of which those people are having a dialogue-towards-deciding. Otherwise put, the dynamic registration of positions in participatory decision-making is tracking the level of people's *onboardness* about any given proposal for DDAO-guided institutional group action, in a way that is relevantly similar to *monitoring the dynamics of team-spirit* in team-sports or to *monitoring the dynamics of mutual cohesion and harmonization* in dancing or musical performances.

Let us call the classical (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic two-valued voting system (yes/no, with or without full participation, and with or without a secret ballot), together with *Robert's Rules of Order-style* three-valued systems (yes/abstain/no,

with full participation, with or without a secret ballot, and numerical rankings of candidates or candidate-options), *voting*. By contrast, let us call participatory decision-making *deciding*. The fundamental difference between *voting* and *deciding* is essentially analogous and parallel to the fundamental difference between *debate* and *dialogue*. Here are some important conceptual contrasts between dialogue and debate.

- Dialogue requires temporarily suspending one's own beliefs, encourages critical reflection on them, listens in order to understand and find meaning, and opens the possibility of reaching a better solution than any of the original solutions. *Dialogue discovers new common aims and thoughts*. Debate dogmatically asserts one's own beliefs, negatively criticizes by denying the validity of others' beliefs, listens only in order to be able to refute, and presupposes that one's own position is the only acceptable or possible solution to any problem. *Debate digs in its heels and suppresses or even kills shared creative thinking*.
- Dialogue allows the expression of real feelings (in ourselves and others) for understanding and catharsis. Debate expresses feelings to manipulate others and denies others' emotions and feelings as legitimate.
- Dialogue respects the human dignity of all participants and seeks neither to alienate nor oppress. Debate rebuts contrary positions and typically belittles and depreciates all participants who disagree.
- Dialogue is collaborative and all about exploring common ground towards a new understanding and a new synoptic vision of the conceptual and ideological landscape. Debate is combative and all about conversational conquest, closure, and closed minds.

Or to summarize all of this in a single statement:

Dialogue aims to elucidate ideas and enlighten—in the Kantian, heavy-duty sense of radical enlightenment—all of its participants, but a debater aims only to defeat and silence his conversational opponents.

Classically, in the Platonic tradition, debaters were labelled *Sophists*; but in the context of modern big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic states, they are *demagogues*. Classically, in the Platonic tradition, people engaging in dialogue were labelled *Socratic philosophers*; but in the theory of social dynamics that I am developing and defending here, people engaging in participatory decision-making in the sense I just spelled out are *existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchists*.

Now debate is inherently aimed at voting. In standard debating competitions, people in the audience vote at the end to determine who "won." And this perfectly parallels political campaigns in modern big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic states, of which the 2016 US Presidential campaign is a paradigmatic example. On the one hand, there are the debaters (namely, Sophists or demagogues), *the politicians*, and on the other hand there is the passive audience, *We the People*, that pretends it is authentically participating by voting at the end of all the debates, in order to determine *who wins* and *who loses*.

Voting, by its very nature and central role in the social and political mechanisms of modern big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States or other Statelike institutions, institutionally polarizes and segragates people into with-me or against-me camps, and also into winners and losers camps; and ultimately it also coercively demands toe-the-line conformity and inauthentic consensus at the conclusion of the voting process, since the majority rules. Moreover, this inherently adversarial and contradictory situation is true whether people vote Yes or No, even if they antecedently possessed much more nuanced, subtle, non-bivalent views before they entered into the voting system. So it is Yea or Nay, no matter what We the People say; and when they come out of voting, the system has institutionally polarized and segregated them, and yet also coercively demands their lock-step conformity and their phony consensus. Three-valued Robert's Rules of Order-style voting systems may seem to be an improvement on modern big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic voting polarization; but actually they are not. Numerical rankings of candidates or candidate-options only promotes systematic strategic partisan, polarized voting, and the systematic strategic partisan, polarized destruction of unwanted candidates or candidate-options. And "abstain" in a Robert's Rules of Order-style system merely means, in effect:

"for whatever reason, I am not saying which polarized group I belong to, and I also accept the coercive demand for obedient conformity and artificial consensus that voting imposes in modern big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States and other Statelike institutions."

By sharp contrast, participatory decision-making according to the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist interpretation does *not* institutionally polarize people, thereby segregating them into partisan factions, *nor* does it coercively demand conformity and consensus. This is because participatory decision-making in the sense I spelled out is essentially dialogical; because it is guided by DDAO; because it dynamically registers people's levels of *concordar*—solidarity, onboardness, or team-spirit—about proposals for institutional action; because the process of creating *concordar* is a mutual coordination and harmonization of affects, emotions, and values; and because people take individual and mutual responsibility for the institutional actions they perform at the end of the process.

In modern big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic voting with the secret-ballot, it is true that people are, by virtue of secrecy, protected from the social consequences, repercussions, or stigmata attached to publicly being in this polarized,

segregated partisan camp or that one. But this in turn means that people take no mutual responsibility for their votes. Moreover, in modern big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic political debating, no one but the debaters actually gets to contribute to the formation of proposals or the discussion itself. How people vote at a debate is wholly determined by how *the debaters*, that is, the politicians, whether Sophists or demagogues, verbally convince each atomic, isolated individual to belong to one polarized, segregated partisan camp or the other, always appealing to their rational self-interest only, hence inherently guided by ethical egoism. And it coercively demands, and imposes, consensus and conformity at the end of the voting-mechanism's functioning, by majority rule.

Thus, to summarize, the modern big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic voting-debating system

(i) is inherently polarizing, and it segregates people into partisan factions,

(ii) in secret ballot versions, it is without mutual responsibility,

- (iii) it is atomistic/solipsistic and driven by rational self-interest only, and
- (iv) it is inherently coercive.

But by sharp contrast, participatory decision-making according to the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist interpretation is inherently an open, face-to-face group activity, everyone is responsible to everyone else, everyone is also individually responsible for their own contributions, and no one is ever coerced into anything: whether by *the tyranny of the majority* or by *the tyranny of the minority*. On the contrary, when a group decides on institutional action by means of a process of participatory decision-making according to the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist interpretation, via dialogue, *it is because they have mutually coordinated and harmonized their rational affects, and created* concordar *or solidarity, according to shared non-egoistic principles, and have freely taken both individual and shared responsibility for their collective decision*.

But there is at least one important left-over problem. *Full* participatory decisionmaking is a categorically normative, high-bar, rational ideal; yet in real-world, nonideal circumstances, *partial* participatory decision-making is the norm. Given the fact that full participatory decision-making is the high-bar normative standard, and also given the further fact that levels of non-participation higher than, say, 10%, cannot normally be expained away by sheer accidents and goading contingencies, it follows that the issue of non-participation, relative to any given dialogue-towards-deciding, is a significant problem. So, from the standpoints of existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism and dialogue-towards-deciding, how should we think about non-participants and how should we engage with them? Leaving aside sheer accidents and contingencies like illness and emergencies, which normally will account for a "structural" non-participant rate as high as 10%, merely as a brute statistical fact in a thoroughly nonideal real world, here are seven possible reasons for non-participation that apply to any kind of social context—

(i) Non-participants might be distracted by other, seemingly more pressing things.

(ii) Non-participants might be angry, bored, or simply not care.

(iii) Non-participants might be worried about saying something that other interlocutors would abuse or ridicule; or even worse, they could be in an oppressed condition and rightly terrified about coercive Statist or Statelike institutional consequences, repercussions, and social stigmata, all the way from shaming and blacklisting, to being imprisoned, tortured, or murdered.

(iv) Non-participants might be inclined to participate, yet feel overwhelmed and need more time to think things through, before taking a position.

(v) Non-participants might be genuinely puzzled by the issues and in a conceptual knot.

(vi) Non-participants might be genuinely conflicted about ethical principles or values, and in a moral dilemma.

(vii) Non-participants might see, or believe they see, that the whole conversation is based on a false unexamined presupposition, or a set of such presuppositions, and think it is nothing but absurd and pointless discourse, devolving towards debate.

Perhaps suprisingly, as Solnit's *A Paradise Built in Hell* clearly shows, *disasters* are strikingly effective in re-engaging social and political non-participants, creating *concordar* or solidarity, and empirically proving that the Hobbesian myth of inherent human egoism, antagonism, and necessary regression to the "war of all against all" aka "the state of nature," when people are thrust into a temporary or localized post-State condition, *is* indeed nothing but a pernicious myth and a deep-seated cognitive illusion. But obviously, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchists cannot either ghoulishly await or morally permissibly create disasters. Correspondingly then, here are seven non-ghoulish and morally permissible possible ways of addressing the problem of non-participation—

(i*) In view of the fact that dialogue-towards-deciding is being lost in the noise of what A. N. Whitehead so aptly called "the goading urgencies of contingent happenings," try to find a way of focusing or re-focusing the distracted non-participant's attention. (ii*) In view of the fact that dialogue-towards-deciding is looking like nothing but "blah blah blah," or worse, to the angry, bored, or uncaring non-participants, try to find ways of inspiring and engaging or re-engaging them.

In relation to (i^{*}) and (ii^{*}), this point is essential: dialogue is not just discursive or conceptual activity, it is also a fundamentally *non-discursive* or *non-conceptual* activity. Now Plato appealed to *irony* and *myth* when Socratic dialogue had reached the limits of

conceptual or discursive understanding. In the same spirit, Kantian radical enlightenment is every bit as much about our sensibility and our essentially non-conceptual capacities for perception, imagination, and feeling as it is about our intellect and our essentially conceptual capacities for judgment, scientific knowledge, and logical reasoning. These points, in turn, strongly suggest that appeals to examples of, or appeals to techniques characteristic of, any or all of the following might be effective for focusing or refocusing, inspiring, and engaging or re-engaging non-participants:

- aesthetics and artwork, especially music, poetry, film, dance, and other performance-arts
- religious and spiritual rituals
- humor and laughter
- motivational speech and "pep talks," and here the motivational strategies of firstrate coaches in team sports could provide a working model

(iii*) Find ways to assure and reassure non-participants that participatory decisionmaking is *not* Statist or State-like, and in fact that it is the diametrical opposite of Statist or State-like political mechanisms: hence their human dignity will be fully respected and their contributions to dialogue-towards-deciding will be fully welcomed.

(iv*) Provide non-participants with sufficient time to catch up, and also provide them with clear, simple summaries of the main points and goals of the dialogue so far.

 (v^*) Provide non-participants with the opportunity to articulate and unpack their conceptual puzzlement, examine its presuppositions, and reflect on them critically.

(vi*) Provide non-participants with the opportunity to articulate their moral dilemma, examine its basic principles, and reflect on them critically.

(vii*) Together with the non-participants, collectively investigate the truth/falsity and implications of the relevant unexamined presuppositions.

And if none of *those* works, then we simply need to be more creative and find some *other* new, radically enlightened, and inherently non-oppressive strategy for addressing the problem of non-participation.

Someone once said to me:

"Existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism sounds pretty interesting. But how are you ever going to force people to participate and to be good?"

After a jaw-dropping double take, I replied:

"According to this view, *nobody ever forces people to do or be anything, including being good.*' It's absolutely anti-coercive, voluntary, mutually respectful of

everyone's dignity and autonomy, and dialogical. That's *the whole point* of participatory decision-making according to the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist interpretation."

2.11. SEGUE TO PART 3

For all the reasons I have provided in part 2, we must reject and exit all States and State-like social institutions in general, and big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democracy in particular, and create "the world as it could be made" for ourselves, by means of DDOA and radically agnostic, radically enlightened *concordar* or solidarity and *carnival*, participatory decision-making according to the existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchist interpretation, and dialogue-towards-deciding. Furthermore it is a matter of rational hope for us, as existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchists, even in full view of the fact that all real-world applications of DDAO are context-dependent, require hands-on social know-how and phenomenological insight, and must simultaneously apply to multiple institutional structures, and even in view of the brute fact that in a thoroughly nonideal real world, only partial and not full participatory decisionmaking is the norm, that such changes are still really possible. Then, wholeheartedly motivated by this hope, in an attitude of passionate Kantian stoicism, together with our radically agnostic and radically enlightened *concordar* and *carnival*, by means of participatory decision-making and dialogue-towards-deciding we repeatedly apply DDAO and quasi-Federalism to all other Statist or Statelike institutional structures, especially in big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democracies like the USA, until we have finally constructed "the world as it could be made." Or in other words,

When [after a long devolutionary/dynamic, Quasi-Federalist process] nature has unwrapped, from under this hard shell [of the "crooked timber of humanity" (*IUH* 8: 23)], the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to *think* freely, the latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of *freedom* in acting) and eventually even upon the principles of *government*, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, *who is now more than a machine*, in keeping with his dignity. (*WE* 8: 41-42)

But how can we do this *right now*? That is what part 3 is all about.

PART 3. UTOPIA NOW

A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias.¹³²

I once heard an astronaut describe his trip to space. At first he saw individual countries, then continents, bound by oceans. When he went high enough, he could see only one world. Do we all need to go to the moon to understand that we live together in one interconnected world where peace can be found?¹³³

3.1 INTRODUCTION

There are two fundamentally different conceptions of "utopia." One conception, which I will call *millenarian utopia*, and is intended to capture the *classical* conception of utopia, begins with an uncompromising vision of an ideal human community in a far-off future, and is all-too-often often used by authoritarian political regimes in order to justify coercive social engineering in the present, molding people to fit the uncompromising vision, ending in actual *dystopia*. But by a sharp contrast, the other conception of utopia, which I will call *utopia now*, is epitomized by Oscar Wilde's famous essay, "The Soul of Man Under Socialism," and instead provides a guiding idea of a morally and politically better world, as a ground of rational hope for progressive social activism and change in the present moment. So Utopia Now is *neo-utopianism*, not classical utopianism.

Part 3 of this book pursues Wilde's neo-utopian project and applies it directly to the contemporary real world, as a way of jointly implementing the existential Kantian moral theology I presented and defended in part 1, and the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism I presented and defended in part 2.

More specifically, in part 3, I present a concrete, multi-part proposal that fully exemplifies the methodological principle I formulated in section 2.8, the principle of *Devolutionary and Dynamic Anti-Oppression*, aka DDAO:

Suppose that a State or Statelike institutional structure *S* exists. Then *S* should be replaced by a series of new institutional structures, each one of which simultaneously represents a definite step in the direction of the devolutionary deconstruction of *S* and also a definite step in the direction of the dynamic construction of a non-oppressive condition, in a post-big-capitalist, post-State, post-State-like institutional world, for all the people affected by *S*.

It cannot be overemphasized, then, the several parts of my neo-utopian program are irreducibly *process-driven*, *relational*, and *structuralist* in character. This means not only that the several elements of the program are intended to be implemented and realized together, simultaneously, in and over real time and real space, but also that each distinct element derives its social and political meaning and efficacy from the ongoing real-world spatiotemporal systematic totality consisting of all of them. Precisely to the extent that the several parts of this neo-utopian program are mistakenly taken in isolation from one another, then they are, in direct proportion, *drained of their social and political meaning*, *efficacy, and objective reality*. Hence we must *never* engage in static, non-relational, or non-structural social-political thinking, if we are to realize "the world as it could be made."

Part 3 also has three further motivations: two smooth-flowing ones, and an angry one.

First, it flows smoothly from my intellectual and emotional engagement with three excellent recent books on altruism and utopianism: Rutger Bregman's *Utopia for Realists*,¹³⁴ Larissa MacFarquhar's *Strangers Drowning*,¹³⁵ and Rebecca Solnit's *A Paradise Built in Hell*.¹³⁶

Second, it also flows smoothly, although somewhat more negatively, from my critical engagement with Peter Singer's significant, but in certain important ways, philosophically misguided book, *One World Now*.¹³⁷ So in part 3, I want to provide a clearly-and-distinctly presented, well-worked-out anti-Utilitarian, principled non-consequentialist, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist alternative to *One World Now*. Moreover, although I remain broadly sympathetic with Singer's *globalist* ethical and political orientation, this is *only* when it is understood specifically as *cosmopolitan* in the sense I spelled out in section 2.1:

[T]he original, core meaning of *cosmopolitanism* expresses a serious critique of existing political communities and states; a thoroughgoing rejection of fervid, divisive, exclusionary, loyalist commitments to convention, custom, identity, or tradition; and a robustly universalist outlook in morality and politics, encompassing not only the Earth but also other inhabited worlds if any, and also traveling between worlds, and, finally, the entire natural universe.

Third and finally, the angry motivation. To be quite frank, part 3 has also been directly inspired by an intense personal, moral, political, and spiritual *rage* about the media-driven Punch-and-Judy show that masqueraded as the 2016 United States of America Presidential campaign; and, as a direct consequence of that, the election of the greedy, ruthless, nativist, bigoted, demagogue billionaire Donald Trump as President of the US, starting in January 2017. Trump received 46.1% of the popular vote (as compared to Hillary Clinton's 48.2%), and 306 Electoral College votes (as opposed to Clinton's 232 votes). As I will demonstrate, however, for a great many if not most people, the entire process of voting for and electing the US President in 2016 was an exemplary case of what the Brazilian radical philosopher of education Paulo Freire, in his highly influential 1968 book, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, with incisive, prescient moral and political insight and aptness, calls *internalizing the oppressor:* kissing the foot of the tyrant who is stepping on your head. —In this case, however, the head-crushing tyrant was the entire big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic American State.

Therefore, in addition to the four motivations I have already mentioned, part 3 is also intended to be a radical, life-changing, world-changing philosophical contribution towards our collective self-liberation from this contemporary situation of local, national, international, and global ethical and political oppression, *by daring to think and act for ourselves*, that is, by collectively developing what Freire also so very aptly called *a critical consciousness*.

Now back to MacFarquhar, Solnit, and Bregman. MacFarquhar's book brilliantly explores the ethics and existential psychology of real-world altruistic "sinner-saints." Solnit's book very compellingly describes how ordinary people frequently become active altruists and temporarily create real-world utopias in the aftermath of disasters. And here are Bregman's ideas in a nutshell:

- Universal Basic Income (UBI) means that every adult person gets a decent living income (say, \$25,000.00 USD per year) with no further requirements and no strings attached.
- Wherever UBI has been tried in the past, it has had good all-around benefits for everyone involved.
- UBI could be easily funded by rich countries, for example, by progressive taxes on capital accumulation, large incomes, money transactions, and moneymanaging, and by sharp reductions in military spending (especially in the USA).
- UBI would end world poverty, if implemented worldwide.
- The UBI idea primes us to think seriously about the nature and purpose of work, and more specifically about why *anyone* should be doing what the political anthropologist David Graeber aptly calls "bullshit jobs"—namely, jobs that are inherently absurd and meaningless, and also unproductive and useless for anyone other than the job-holder, even if lucrative.

• The primary barriers to UBI are

(i) cognitive "walls" or illusions about poverty (in particular, the classical invidious, ideologically-driven distinction between "deserving" and "undeserving" poor), and(ii) neoliberal ideology.

Bregman also has some very interesting and important–although less well-worked-out– ideas and arguments about universal open borders (aka UOB) and a 15-hour workweek (aka FHW).

In what follows, then, building and elaborating on part 1 and part 2, Bregman, MacFarquhar, and Solnit, but also sharply over against Singer's act-utilitarian, consequentialist ethical commitments, I present, defend, and directly apply a six-part, process-driven, relational, and structuralist but also collective altruist, anti-Utilitarian, principled non-consequentialist, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist program for Utopia Now.

What is the overall shape of this proposal? It starts with what I call "The U-Zone."

By *The U-Zone*, I mean *an empirical test* of the six-part collective altruist, anti-Utilitarian, principled non-consequentialist, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist program I just mentioned, by means of a large-scale, real-world pilot project, or prototype, consisting of a *North American Utopian Zone* comprising Canada, the USA, and Mexico. The U-Zone pilot project would start with a process of radical political change in the USA, and then bring Canada and Mexico onboard.

Obviously, not only would The U-Zone pilot project require intensive and extensive advance-planning, but also every year, year after year, the existing conditions, effects, and implications of the U-Zone pilot project would have to be carefully studied by large teams of well-trained experts in Canada, the US, and Mexico, working together; and many important fine-tunings, refinements, reforms, or repairs would have to be made along the way.

Assuming that all went well, however, then the success of The U-Zone *would show the rest of the world what can actually be done,* and as a natural consequence of this radical transformation of North America, other u-zones would begin to proliferate around the world, until finally the *global* implementation of the six-part, process-driven, relational, and structuralist, but also collective altruist, anti-Utilitarian, principled non-consequentialist, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist program is complete. In other words, the creation of Utopia Now will be bottom-up, dynamic, and (d)evolutionary, not top-down, externally-imposed, and violently revolutionary.

To give it a handy eponymous label, I will also call this entire six-part program, including The U-Zone pilot project and its eventual extension to global implementation, *Utopia Now*.

Starting with the USA, then, here is what I am specifically proposing-

1. Truly Generous Universal Basic Income (TGUBI):

Anyone 21 years of age or over and living permanently in the US, who has a personal yearly income of \$50,000 USD or less, and who is mentally and physically capable of requesting their UBI, would receive \$25,000 USD per year, with no strings attached.

2. A 15-Hour Workweek for Universal Basic Jobs (FHW-for-UBJs):

Anyone 18 years of age or older who is living permanently in the US, who has completed a high school education, and is mentally and physically capable of doing a job, would be offered an *eco-job*, paying a yearly wage of \$25,000 USD, for *no more than* fifteen hours of work per week.

Thus anyone 21 years of age or older with a high-school degree and who is also mentally and physically capable of working, would have a guaranteed yearly income of at least \$50,000 USD if they chose to do an eco-job. Those people who are mentally and/or physically incapable of requesting their UBI or working, would be covered by special provisions under the universal free healthcare, aka UFH, proposal to be described shortly as proposal 4.

The rationale behind the three-year gap between

(i) being offered an eco-job at 18 and

(ii) beginning to receive their TGUBI at 21,

is that every young adult who has finished high school will have the option of pursuing three years of part-time or full-time free *higher education without credentialing*, that is, for its own sake, after high school, before making longer-term decisions about what, in section 3.4, I call *jobwork* and *lifework*.

3. Universal Free Higher Education Without Commodification (HEWC):

Everyone would be offered, beyond their high-school education, a free, three-year minimum, optional (but also open-ended beyond those three years, as a further option), part-time or full-time universal public education program in the so-called "liberal arts," and also in some of the so-called "STEM" fields, including the humanities, the fine arts, the social sciences, mathematics, and the natural sciences.

For many or even most people, their HEWC would fall between

(i) the end of their high school education at age 18 and the corresponding availability of eco-jobs, and

(ii) the beginning of their TGUBI at age 21.

But HEWC would be open to anyone with a high school degree, no matter how old they are, provided they are mentally and physically capable of doing the program.

4. Universal Free Healthcare (UFH):

Every human person living permanently in the USA would receive free lifelong healthcare.

5. 2-Phase Universal Open Borders (2P-UOB):

Phase 1: Starting in 2021, there will be universal open borders with Canada and Mexico, and everyone who moves across those borders and then claims residence in the US, will receive *temporary or permanent residence in the US* and also *full membership in the system of TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH in the US*, with the precise number of new temporary or permanent residents to depend on the current availability of

(i) adequate funding for TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH, and (ii) adequate living accommodation,

in the US, provided that all new residents also fully respect the human dignity of everyone else in the US and elsewhere in the world.

Phase 2: Also starting in 2021, the US, Canada, and Mexico will collectively form a Global Refugee Consortium (GRC), with three-way open borders to any political refugee, economic refugee, or asylum seeker from anywhere in the world (aka "global refugees"), who will receive temporary or permanent residence in the US, Canada, or Mexico, and also full membership in the system of TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH in the three GRC countries, with the precise number of new temporary or permanent residents, and the precise distribution of new residents among the three members of the GRC, to depend on the current availability of

(i) funding for TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH, and(ii) adequate living accommodation,

in the three GRC countries, provided that all new residents also fully respect the human dignity of everyone else in the GRC and elsewhere in the world.

6. Universal No-Guns (UNG):

No one in the US, including police, internal security forces of all kinds, armies, and intelligence forces of all kinds, has the moral right to possess and use guns of any kind,

for any purpose whatsoever, because the primary function of guns is coercion, and coercion is immoral.

UNG would be implemented by repealing the Second Amendment to the US Constitution in 2021 and then universally banning the possession or use of guns thereafter in a step-bystep, zone-by-zone way, by COMBINING the process of civilian gun abolition with a stepby-step, zone-by-zone *police, internal security, military, and intelligence force disarmament, and "the end of policing."*

I am assuming that *Universal Public Education* (UPE)—universal free access for all human persons of any age to good public education up to the end of high school—already exists in most countries, and needs no further justification. Where UPE does not already exist, it would automatically become a necessary part of the six-part *Utopia Now* package, thereby making it a seven-part package.

Correspondingly, then, my twofold contention in part 3 is

(i) that implementing TGUBI + FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs + HEWC + UFH + 2P-UOB + UNG first in the US, second in The U-Zone, and then third and finally across the entire world—namely, *Utopia Now*—not only *morally and politically should be done* but also *realistically can begin to happen immediately*, and

(ii) that our primary motivation for *Utopia Now* should be *religious* or *spiritual* in nature, flowing from existential Kantian moral theology.

What do I mean by that second contention? Part 1 was all about philosphical theology and religiosity or spirituality *in general*. So before getting fully underway, then, I should say something more about the *specific* kind of *real-world* religiosity or spirituality I have in mind here in part 3.

3.2 COLLECTIVE ALTRUISM, AND DDAO AGAIN

By *altruism*, I mean not only non-egoistic, unselfish, or self-sacrificing feelings, choices, or actions undertaken specifically for the sake of other people, especially otherdirected feelings of empathy and sympathy, and other-directed choices and acts of aid, benevolence, or kindness, but also *idealistic, non-hedonistic, non-instrumental, nonconsequentialist* feeling, choice, or action of any kind. So a profound personal commitment to, say, some form of artistic activity, spiritual activity, or philosophy as a full-time, lifetime calling would also count as altruism.

MacFarquhar's *Strangers Drowning* and Solnit's *A Paradise Built in Hell* clearly and distinctly demonstrate that Hobbesians and neo-Hobbesians are not *merely* mistaken, but actually *dangerously and spectacularly* mistaken

both (i) that all human beings are inherently egoistic and mutually antagonistic by nature or neurobiology,

and (ii) that all human beings are even all-but-inevitably egoistic and mutually antagonistic by virtue of culture.

These claims are simply false, given the actual empirical facts on the ground. As a matter of actual fact, *many* people really do feel, choose, and act altruistically, *some* of them characteristically, and *some* of them under specific ranges of contextual conditions, such as disasters, neo-utopian social experiments, progressive political movements, religions or spirituality, and so-on. Therefore, *it cannot possibly be true* that all human beings are either inherently or all-but-inevitably egoistic and mutually antagonistic. At most, what *could* be true is that *many* people *often* feel, choose, and act in egoistic and mutually antagonistic ways, and also that *some* people *characteristically* feel, choose, and act in egoistic and mutually antagonistic ways. But those are perfectly consistent with the anti-Hobbesian truth about rational human altruism. So even despite their widespread currency, the Hobbesian or neo-Hobbesian theses—not to mention popular cynicism about human nature—are simply *philosophical and scientific dead letters*.

On the contrary, then, given the empirical evidence, according to existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism—and this will undoubtedly seem, to many, to be two claims that are either deeply shocking or ludicrously "utopian" in the classical millenarian, pejorative sense—

not only (i) are all real human persons innately *capable* of altruism, but also (ii) the capacity for altruism *can be regularly activated and cultivated under specific ranges of contextual conditions*.

If (i) and (ii) are correct, as I strongly believe and contend that they are, then the Hobbesian or neo-Hobbesian theses and popular cynicism about human nature are nothing but cognitive illusions and cultural myths that are self-servingly used to justify *certain people's or certain groups'* egoism/self-interest or authoritarian oppression and tyranny, whether by Mesopotamian potentates, Egyptian pharaohs, kings, popes, emperors, Czars, military dictators, fascist governments, communist governments, proponents of big capitalism and "right libertarianism," or the governments of big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democracies.

Another member of the same family of cognitive illusions and cultural myths is the equally clearly and distinctly false classical *ethical egoist* thesis to the effect that

if everyone always and systematically pursued ethical-egoist ends, then everyone would be better off than if not everyone did or no one did.

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How could that possibly be true? The ethical egoist always has sufficient reason to cheat, hobble, maim, or murder his competitors for limited resources and rewards *if no one else is either watching or at least in a position to stop them.* Therefore, all those people who are cheated, hobbled, maimed, or murdered by clever, powerful ethical egoists who take advantage of situations in which their coercive feelings, choices, and deeds go undetected or at least unchecked *will necessarily be worse off* than in a world *without* ethical-egoist feeling, choice, and action. Therefore, *not* everyone will be better off in a universally ethical-egoist world—in fact, *many* or even *most* people will be *much* worse off if everyone always and systematically pursues ethical-egoist ends, since many or even most people pursuing ethical-egoist ends will inevitably fall prey to the cleverest and most powerful ethical egoists, and suffer a miserable fate.

Moreover, the other classical *psychological egoist* claim that every apparently altruistic choice or action really satisfies some deeper egoistic imperative or urge, is patently question-begging and sophistical. This is because this claim refuses to tell us *what could ever count as acceptable evidence in favor of altruism*, by presupposing that every item of apparent evidence for altruism can be systematically reinterpreted so as to confirm egoism. So it wholly begs the question.

Correspondingly, even over and above the question-begging incoherence and sophistry of psychological egoism, how many times have you heard someone say this?—

"Anyone who feels, chooses, or acts in a *seemingly* altruistic way *really* enjoys doing so: therefore, we are all *really* egoists!"

In the first place, it is simply false that people who feel, choose, or act in altruistic ways always or even usually *enjoy* it: on the contrary, it is very often difficult, painful, or otherwise unpleasant to be altruistic. How much fun is it to repress or suppress a strong temptation to be egoistic? And in the second place, even when people *do* enjoy being altruistic, that does *not* entail that they are feeling, choosing, or acting as they do *for the sake of the enjoyment alone*. This would be true only if, in a counterfactual scenario, *were* those very same people to experience difficulty, pain, or other unpleasantness instead of enjoyment *with respect to the very same or at least relevantly similar situations*, then they would not be altruistic. It is self-evidently obvious that in *some* counterfactual scenarios, *some* people who seem to be altruistic, will turn out not to have been really so; but, given the actual empirical facts about altruism, *not in every counterfactual scenario*, and *not everyone*. Therefore, enjoying being altruistic, as such, does *not* entail psychological egoism.

Now, by *collective intelligence*¹³⁸ I mean an emergent property of human or otherwise animal mindedness, that is constituted by the cognitive capacities and cognitive activities of a group of (for example) people *as* a group, especially including group-reasoning, group brain-storming and innovation, the social production of written texts and other kinds of

social media, group deliberation, and participatory decision-making. Recent work in cognitive psychology, social psychology, and organizational studies shows that *collective wisdom*, or a relatively high level of group coordination, creativity, problem-solving, and productivity (aka "constructive *Gemeinschaft*"), is determined by high levels of socially-open, non-hierarchical, free-thinking, and non-conformist, but at the same time also mutually comfortable, mutually communicative, mutually respectful/principled, relaxed, mutually sensitive, mutually supportive, and highly dialogical collaborative activities within groups,¹³⁹ and is not a function of high average IQ levels among the group's individual members.¹⁴⁰

Generalizing from this, by *collective altruism* I mean an emergent property of human or otherwise animal mindedness, that is constituted by the practical capacities and practical activities of a group of (for example) people *as* a group, especially including group deliberation and participatory decision-making. More specifically, collective altruism is a relatively high level of altruistic group activity that is *not* a function of high average levels of altruism across individual group members, but instead is produced by effective collaborative interaction within the group. Or in other words, and to put it very simply, *you don't have to be an all-star altruist yourself* in order to engage in *highly successful team altruism*, aka collective altruism.

Utopia Now is therefore a six-part, process-driven, relational, and structuralist, altruist, anti-Utilitarian, principled non-consequentialist, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist program in neo-utopian global ethics and politics, that is not only grounded on *a rationally decisive and thoroughgoing rejection* of the Hobbesian, neo-Hobbesian, and popular cynical cognitive illusions and myths about human nature, and the self-serving, sophistical individual egoism, big capitalism, and many-faced State and State-like institutional coercive authoritarianism lying behind it, but also *effectively and thoroughly motivated* by profound personal moral-spiritual commitment and collective altruism.

One other essential thing to note about *Utopia Now*, moreover, is that to the extent that all its specific real-world proposals are inherently guided by the principle of *Devolutionary and Dynamic Anti-Oppression*, aka DDAO, then they introduce only *intermediate institutional structures* that are the vehicles of a step-by-step transition between

(i) inherently oppressive contemporary big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States and any other State-like institutions, as they now exist, and

(ii) the inherently non-oppressive post-big-capitalist, post-State, post-Statelike world of the Kosmopolis.

So these intermediate institutional structures are not *themselves parts of the Kosmopolis as such*, but instead only *exemplifications of its beginning and emergence*. Therefore, the neoutopianism that I am defending in part 3 is a concrete plan for bringing about, right now, *the beginning and emergence* of "the world as it could be made," not an impossible project for suddenly shooting us out of a revolutionary cannon into an already fully-formed magical, cloud-cuckoo-land post-big-capitalist, post-State, post-State-like institutional world.

3.3 POVERTY, ECONOMIC OPPRESSION, AND UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME

According to the US Census Bureau Report on Income and Poverty in the US for 2015,¹⁴¹ in 2015, the median household income in the USA was \$56,516 USD. This means that 50% of all households had an income *below* \$56,516 USD. In 2015, the official poverty rate in was 13.5 percent, and there were 43.1 million people in poverty.

Now consider the present, 2018. Do you really seriously think that, over the next 2 or 6 years, President Donald Trump and all the other rich people in the Trump power elite are going to make economic life better for you, for those people with household incomes under \$56,000 USD, and for the (at least) 43 million people living in poverty? *Hell no*. Of course not. It is *not* going to get significantly better and will *probably* get significantly worse, especially if you are black, Hispanic, a single mother of any race, or a white person who lives in a non-urban area. This morally scandalous situation is epitomized by what the economist Angus Deaton aptly calls the USA's "deep poverty problem."¹⁴²

Now let us call all those people who either have household incomes significantly under \$56,000 USD or are outright living in poverty, according to whatever definition of "poverty" well-informed economists use, *economically oppressed people*. How would *you* like to be an economically oppressed person? Or perhaps *you already are one*. How does it feel? Like a *sickness-unto-death*, right?

Therefore, it is self-evidently obvious that every human person in the US should be living in a household that has an income of *at least* \$50,000 USD, with further incomeadjustments upwards for increases in the cost of living. Moreover, this goal can be brought about by means of what I call a *Truly Generous Universal Basic Income*, when this is *taken together with* the FHW-for-UBJs + eco-jobs proposal that I will make in the next section.

According to the *Truly Generous Universal Basic Income* (TGUBI) proposal, anyone 21 years of age or over who is living permanently in the US, who has a personal yearly income of \$50,000.00 USD or less, and who is capable of requesting their UBI, would receive \$25,000.00 USD per year, with no strings attached. In order to receive your TGUBI, you would have to request it. No one would receive a TGUBI who had not requested it. Anyone could voluntarily forego their UBI for any given year, just by not requesting it. And those who were incapable of requesting a TGUBI would still be fully covered for all their basic needs by *Universal Free Healthcare*, aka UFH—see section 3.6

below. Furthermore, the TGUBI would be indexed to the cost of living (COL), so that if the COL went up, then every TGUBI recipient would also receive a yearly Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) in addition to their existing TGUBI.

Various experimental, prototype versions of UBI have been tried in the past, with significant benefits for all concerned;¹⁴³ and currently, several different experimental, prototype versions of UBI are being tried in the USA, Canada, and Europe. But one essential thing to note is that most if not all of the UBI proposals that have been put forward, including most if not all of the experimental, prototype versions, are *not* truly generous, and, correspondingly, most if not all of them are covertly or overtly intended simply

(i) to dismantle all or most current social welfare programs, including Social Security, and combine them into a much cheaper annual "one-stop-shopping" social welfare pay-out, without the classical big-bureaucratic strings attached, and

(ii) by means of this no-strings-attached social welfare pay-out, to turn currently difficult, problematic, "economically unproductive" people into docile, unproblematic "economically productive," good little do-bee citizens of the big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic State and its State-like institutions.

But these standard motivations for UBI, and their corresponding specific UBI proposals or experimental protoypes, are completely at odds with TGUBI, for two reasons.

First, the essential point of TGUBI is to end economic oppression, and especially to end poverty, and, in so doing, to be one way of treating all people in all and only those ways that express sufficient respect for their human dignity. But the standard UBI motivations (i) and (ii), whatever their Utilitarian cash-value or social value for contemporary big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States and State-like institutions, have nothing whatsoever to do with treating all people in all and only those ways that express sufficient respect for their human dignity, except purely accidentally.

Second, and in a closely-related way, the standard UBI motivations (i) and (ii) exemplify a basic problem, indeed, a paradox, about distributive social justice in *any* social institution or State, but especially including contemporary big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States—as enshrined philosophically, for example, in John Rawls's highly influential and indeed, as regards Anglo-American political theory since the 1970s, hegemonic, *Theory of Justice*.¹⁴⁴ The very existence of the basic problem sharply contradicts the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist aims, by way of DDAO, that lie behind TGUBI.

In their *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* article on "Distributive Justice," Julian Lamont and Christi Favor very correctly although somewhat tautologously note that

[p]rinciples of distributive justice are ... best thought of as providing moral guidance for the political processes and structures that affect the distribution of benefits and burdens in societies, and any principles which do offer this kind of moral guidance on distribution, regardless of the terminology they employ, should be considered principles of distributive justice.¹⁴⁵

Correspondingly, the basic problem I will now present and briefly elaborate is what I call *The Paradox of Distributive Social Justice*.

Simply put, *The Paradox* is that insofar as principles of distributive social justice are applied to an oppressive social system, then even despite its ideological overlay of "justice-as-fairness," this actually turns out to be the most effective way to perpetuate the oppressive system itself. More explicitly, with the ideological overlay in shudder-quotes:

Suppose that an oppressive social system *OSS* exists in any State, such that there is an *oppressor class* who collectively and individually greatly benefit from *OSS*, and also an *oppressed class*, who collectively and individually greatly suffer under *OSS*. And further suppose that the leading members of the oppressor class in *OSS* recognize, at a given time, that *OSS* is in serious danger of collapsing if things go on in the same way. So the leading members of the oppressor class calculatingly and prudently create a "fair and therefore just" system of compensating a certain non-trivial but still strategically small number of more-or-less¹⁴⁶ randomly-selected members of the oppressor class, and at the same time also using mass incarceration to control and suppress the more rebellious members of the oppressed class.¹⁴⁷ Then this "fair and therefore just" distribution of compensation for oppression not only does nothing to fundamentally change or end *OSS*, it actually turns out to be the most effective way of perpetuating *OSS*.

An important corollary of *The Paradox* is that if the leading oppressors *fail* to act in this calculating and prudent "fair and therefore just" way, then their oppressive social system eventually collapses. For example, let *OSS* be the enslavement of black people in the US in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Then *The Paradox* guarantees that if, in the early 19th century, the leading Southern American slave-masters had, contrary to actual fact, seen the writing on the wall, then calculatingly and prudently created a "fair and therefore just" system of admitting a certain non-trivial but still strategically small number of more-or-less randomly selected slaves either into the oppressor class of slave-masters, or into a complicit class of fairly well-paid, fairly high social-status bureaucrats, professionals, managers, or skilled laborers who served the class of slave-masters, and then, instead of lynching them, simply mass-incarcerating trouble-making slaves, the US would never have experienced the Civil War of 1860-65, and would still be a slave State, at least throughout most of the South. Of course, in actual fact, the slave-masters did *not* do this, so the oppressive system of slavery in the USA collapsed—although, to be sure, a new system of

racist oppression, *also* heavily driven by mass incarceration, soon arose to take its place, during the Jim Crow period and after.

Now let OSS be big capitalism in Europe and North America. Then we can ask: Why didn't big capitalism in Europe and North America collapse due to its internal dialectical social and economic contradictions by the late 19th century or early 20th century, as Marx had fervently hoped and confidently predicted? The answer, clearly and distinctly, is provided by *The Paradox*. The leading late 19th and early 20th century big-capitalist bosses, rightly worried about communism, calculatingly and prudently created a "fair and therefore just" system of admitting a certain non-trivial but still strategically small number of moreor-less randomly-selected members of the working class or below, aka the *proletariat* or *lumpen proletariat*, either into the oppressor class of big-capitalist bosses, or into the complicit class of fairly well-paid, fairly high social status bureaucrats, professionals, managers, or skilled laborers, who serve the class of capitalist bosses, and then at the same time mass-incarcerating anarchists, communists, tramps, hobos, vagrants, illegal immigrants, gangsters and other felons, and overtly rebellious or otherwise "problematic" or "undesirable" brown or black people. This is confirmed, at least for the USA, by empirical data about about the size and specific constitution of the American working class during the 20th and 21st centuries, and by recent studies of policing and mass incarceration.¹⁴⁸ They called it "upward social mobility" and then more recently, "equal opportunity." As a consequence, distributive social justice not only did nothing to fundamentally change or end big-capitalist oppression, it actually turned out to be the most effective way of perpetuating it.

Therefore, precisely to the extent that the standard UBI motivations (i) and (ii) fall directly under *The Paradox*, then they sharply contradict the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist motivations, by way of DDAO, for TGUBI. What TGUBI proposes is *not* a distributive social justice mechanism for most effectively perpetuating the system of big capitalist economic oppression, under the ideological overlay of "justice-as-fairness," but instead a radical solution that saliently advances the devolution and dismantling of big capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic Statism itself. The essential point here is that a *truly generous* UBI, together with the FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs proposal that I will spell out and defend in the next section, would begin to make it really possible for people of *any* economic or social class, race, ethnicity, genderidentity, sexual-preference-identity, age-cohort, etc., etc., to *exit* the big capitalist part of the system, by simply *refusing* to become "economically productive" good little do-bee workers within it, in order to pursue what I call *lifework* instead. The closely-related issues of mass incarceration and crime-&-punishment will be treated in section 3.10.

Leaving aside for a moment its radically progressive political motivations, one obvious objection to TGUBI is that it would be too expensive, hence that it could not be afforded by the USA. But I want to reply, vigorously, that this claim is clearly and distinctly not only *false*, but also *serious bullshit*. Here is why.

According to my proposal, we set the initial TGUBI for individuals who are 21 or older at \$25,000 USD per year. In 2016, there were 226 million eligible voters in the US; and since 2012, 16 million people have reached the age of 18.¹⁴⁹ Let us conservatively estimate, then, that roughly 10 million of those are between 18 and 20. So, in 2018, there are roughly 216 million possible UBI recipients in the US. Of those roughly 216 million people, 111.5 million have yearly personal incomes of 50K USD or less.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, the total cost of the initial TGUBI for the US in 2018, if everyone who is 21 years or older, who has a personal income of \$50,000 USD or less, and who is capable of requesting a TGUBI, actually did request-and-receive their TGUBI, would be at most 2.8 trillion USD per year. To put that in perspective, the 2015 US military defense budget *alone* was 585 billion USD,¹⁵¹ that is, more than half a trillion. Since TGUBI would replace social security and many other basic assistance programs, all the money currently raised in social security taxes or spent on other basic assistance programs per year could be used for TGUBI, in addition to highly progressive taxes on capital accumulation, high incomes, money transfer, and money management, and also sharp reductions in military spending. Hence TGUBI is easily affordable, and those who claim it isn't, are trying to sell you down the

Another perhaps even more obvious objection to TGUBI is that it would turn people into "economically unproductive" people, aka *lazy bums*, aka *slackers*, unwilling to work for a living. That is clearly and distinctly false and serious bullshit too. As I will argue in the next section on FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, by nature, people want to do creative, meaningful, productive, useful things with their lives. Moreover, by nature, they do not want to be coerced or nudged, or otherwise told what to do. Therefore, if I am correct, then massively most TGUBI recipients will take their TGUBI together with their FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, *refuse* to engage in the big capitalist system, and instead do the things they think are most important for the satisfaction of their true human needs and for the sake of their whole lives more generally. My estimate is *that far less than 10% of the people who request their TGUBIs will misuse it or squander it*. But in any case, the precise normal rate of misuse or squandering can also be tested in advance, in small-scale TGUBI + FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs pilot programs.

river.

Moreover, think for a moment of all the very or extremely well-off people who are currently misusing or squandering their incomes. President Donald Trump, his family, and his very or extremely wealthy epigones are perfect examples. Let us estimate, then, that at least 10% of billionaires misuse or squander their incomes. Then it is self-evidently obvious that the rate of misuse or squandering among TGUBI-recipients would be *far lower than that*. For the moral values of autonomy and freedom-from-oppression under the existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism-inspired TGUBI + FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs plan *are nondenumerably infinitely great*. Therefore, with their TGUBI and FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs in hand, people will be *greatly more* creative, meaning-making, productive, and useful than they were without it.

To summarize so far, here are four individually excellent and collectively decisive reasons for adopting and implementing the TGUBI proposal, in conjunction with the FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs proposal that I will spell out in the next section.

First, if the TGUBI proposal, in conjunction with the FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs proposal, were adopted and implemented, *then it would specifically end poverty in the USA, forever.*

Second, if the TGUBI proposal, in conjunction with the FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs proposal, were adopted and implemented, *then it would more generally end economic oppression in the USA, forever.*

Third, if the TGUBI proposal, in conjunction with the FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs proposal, were adopted and implemented, *then everyone living permanently in the USA would be liberated from the fear of the sickness-unto-death that is poverty and economic oppression, forever.*

Fourth and finally, if the TGUBI proposal, in conjunction with the FHW-for-UBJs/ecojobs proposal, were adopted and implemented, then it would saliently advance the overarching existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist goal of exiting the big capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic State and its State-like institutions, and creating and sustaining a post-big-capitalist, post-State, post-State-like world, the Kosmopolis.

In short, if the TGUBI proposal, in conjunction with the FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs proposal, were adopted and implemented, then the result would be *neo-utopian*.

3.4 THE JOB DILEMMA, A 15-HOUR WORKWEEK, AND UNIVERSAL BASIC JOBS

The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation. What is called resignation is confirmed desperation.... A stereotyped but unconscious despair is concealed even under what are called the games and amusements of mankind. There is no play in them, for this comes after work.¹⁵²

By a shit job, I mean

either (i) a job in the contemporary big-capitalist economy that pays well, but is meaningless and pointless, and also unproductive and useless for anyone other than the job-holder (aka *a bullshit job*¹⁵³),

or (ii) a job in the contemporary big-capitalist economy that is bad for any other reason, for example, it is boring, dangerous, demeaning, otherwise exploitative, otherwise low-status, grossly underpaid, and so-on.

Simply put, a shit job is a job you would quit right now, if you could afford it. So the criterion of whether you now have a shit job or not is this: Would you quit your job right now, if you could afford it? If so, then you have a shit job. Is having a shit job, a job that you hate, which means that you lead a life of quiet or not-so-quiet desperation, your fault? No, it isn't your fault. And here is why.

In The Age of Trump—that is, over the next 2 to 6 years—most people living in the US are going to face the following dilemma, *The Job Dilemma*:

either (i) you have no job at all, because you are unemployed—for whatever reason, or else (ii) you hate your job, because it is a shit job.

The reasons for this are simple.

First, in November 2016, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics,¹⁵⁴ the unemployment rate was 4.6 percent, with 7.4 million unemployed people actively looking for jobs, plus 2 million long-term unemployed people. That is almost 10 million unemployed people. Correspondingly, let us assume that the roughly-10-million-unemployed-people number is a benchmark for the next 2-6 years.

Second, over the next 2-6 years, *advances in technology are going to make a great many current jobs obsolete*—for example, driverless cars and trucks, pilotless aircraft, drones, pilotless spacecraft, pilotless ships, engineer-less trains, etc., etc., and robotic machinery of all sorts.

Third, even if the unemployment rate were reduced effectively to zero, since it seems self-evidently true that many or even most people would quit their current job instantly if they could afford to, because they hate it, it follows that many or even most jobs are shit jobs.

According to the *Truly Generous Universal Basic Income* (TGUBI) proposal I spelled out and defended in section 3.3:

Anyone 21 years of age or over who has a personal yearly income of \$50,000.00 USD or less, and is mentally and physically capable of requesting their TGUBI, would receive \$25,000.00 USD per year, with no strings attached.

And don't forget the further Cost-of-Living, aka COLA, provision. Now, over and above TGUBI and its COLA provision, but also in necessary conjunction with TGUBI, as I have already mentioned, I am also proposing a *15-Hour Workweek for Universal Basic Jobs* (FHW-for-UBJs), which says:

Anyone 18 years of age or older who is living permanently in the USA, who has completed a high school education, and is mentally and physically capable of doing a job, would be offered an *eco-job*, paying a yearly wage of \$25,000 USD, for *no more than* fifteen hours of work per week.

More precisely, then, high school graduates of 18 years of age or older would be offered an eco-job paying \$25,000 USD per year, and, in addition, when they reached the age of 21, provided they were earning in total \$50,000 USD per year or less, they would also receive another \$25,000 as their initial TGUBI—subject, however, to systematic scalingback for non-eco-job income, as described below.

One side-bar point: the rationale behind the three-year gap between

(i) being offered an eco-job at 18 and

(ii) beginning to receive their TGUBI at 21,

is that every young adult who has finished high school will have the option of pursuing three years of part-time or full-time higher education for its own sake after high school, before making longer-term decisions about what, a few paragraphs below, I will call *jobwork* and *lifework*. In any case, it would mean that anyone 21 years of age or older with a high-school degree and who is also mentally and physically capable of working, would have a guaranteed yearly income of at least \$50,000 USD if they chose to do an eco-job.

Here are a few more details about TGUBI and eco-jobs. The TGUBI would be paid by a monthly stipend check. Eco-job income would not be not taxed. Indeed, for all individual yearly incomes of \$50,000 USD or under, no tax whatsoever would be levied; hence for someone receiving their TGUBI and also doing an eco-job, no income tax would be be levied. For all individual non-eco-job incomes, for every \$1.00 USD earned above the standard UBI of \$25,000 USD, the monthly TGUBI stipend is reduced by 50 cents, until the recipient's UBI is reduced to zero. Hence for those individuals with yearly non-eco-job incomes equal to or under \$50,000 USD, the maximum UBI + non-eco-job income sum is always \$50,000.00 USD.

What about taxation more generally? For all individual yearly incomes over \$50,000 USD, for every \$10,000.00 USD earned, that surplus income would be taxed at the rate of 1%, rising incrementally to a maximum of 50% at yearly incomes of \$550,000.00 USD or higher, with two further special tax rates of

(i) 75%, applying to all yearly incomes in the top .9%, and

(ii) 90%, applying to all yearly incomes in the top .1%,

and *no* tax deductions or tax reductions whatsoever. In other words, the system of taxation would be *highly* progressive.

What is so good about eco-jobs? Here is a short, but I think decisive, non-Utilitarian, non-consequentialist argument for eco-jobs, from the standpoint of a radical environmental philosophy I call *Cosmopolitan Natural Piety*, which flows naturally flows from the idea,

inspired by the ancient Greek Cynics, that existential Kantian *cosmopolitan* anarchism entails being *our all being, like Diogenes, citizens of the cosmos*. I will spell out this argument in detail in section 3.14 below, but for the moment, here goes.

As rational human animals, and real human persons, by means of *natural piety* we have reverence (*Ehrfurcht*) for nature and its *proto-dignity*. But, as rational human animals and real human persons, we must also exit the State and Statelike institutions in order to create and belong to a cosmopolitan ethical community in which all people are treated in all and only those ways that express sufficient respect for their human dignity, including alleviating or ending human oppression, mutual aid, and mutual kindness. Therefore, we must simultaneously protect the natural world and systematically dismantle the big capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic, or non-democratic, States and State-like institutions that are damaging or destroying the natural environment, *insofar as they oppress people*.

According to the FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs proposal, there would be at least five different types of eco-jobs:

(i) *eco-education (eco-ed) jobs*: that is, jobs whose specific role is to provide help in currently under-staffed areas within the system of *Universal Public Education* (UPE),
(ii) *eco-healthcare (eco-health) jobs*: that is, jobs whose specific role is to provide help in currently under-staffed areas within the system of *Universal Free Healthcare* (UFH),

(iii) *eco-protection (eco-pro) jobs*: that is, jobs whose specific role is to provide help in currently under-staffed areas in (iii.1) urban-environmental clean-up and tending (including garbage collection, litter removal, recycling, public gardening, snow removal, etc.) and (iii.2) natural-environmental clean-up and tending (including forestry and re-forestation, water pollution-clean up, industrial pollution clean-up, etc.),

(iv) *eco-transportation (eco-trans) jobs*: that is, jobs whose specific role is to provide help in currently under-staffed areas in the all-electric car industry, and

(v) *eco-administration (eco-admin) jobs*: that is, jobs whose specific role is to provide help in organizing, implementing, and running the system of eco-jobs.

Moreover, there would be six individually necessary and jointly sufficient requirements for an eco-job:

(i) You have completed a high school education.

(ii) You are 18 years of age or older.

(iii) You are mentally and physically capable of doing your eco-job.

(iv) If you want to own a vehicle other than a bicycle or other self-propelled machine, you either (iv.1) sell or trade in any gasoline-only vehicles you already own, in return or a free all-electric car, or (iv.2) if you do not already own a gasoline-only vehicle, then you receive a free all-electric car.

(v) If, by virtue of requirement (iv), you do own an all-electric car, then you agree to drive it according to a regular plan for modest electricity consumption.

(vi) You agree to purchase and eat meat-products according to a regular plan for modest meat-consumption.

How would the system of eco-jobs be implemented? According to the FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs proposal, in the first six months of 2021, all (roughly ten million) unemployed people would be asked the following two-part question: do you meet the requirements for an eco-job, and if so and you were offered an eco-job, would you take it? Let us call the number of unemployed people who would answer "yes" to both parts of that question, *the New Jobs Number*, aka the NJN. Then, in the second six months of 2021 a total number of eco-jobs equal to the NJN would be created and offered to those unemployed people. Also during 2021, the number of jobs made obsolete due to new technology would be calculated. Let us call that number *the Obsolete Jobs Number*, aka the OJN. And *also* during the first six months of 2021, everyone who has a job at that time will be asked the following question: if you were offered an eco-job starting in January 2022, would you quit your current job and take the eco-job? Let us call the number of those who say yes to that question *the Shit Jobs Number*, aka the SJN. Then, starting in 2022, the total number of eco-jobs that would be created and offered every year would be equal to the OJN + the SJN for the preceding year.

One thing that should already be self-evidently obvious, is that lying behind the TCUBI and FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs proposals is a radical re-conception of the very idea of *work*. And in order to make this re-conception more clear and distinct, I need to start with Marx's theory of labor and alienation. Here it is, in a Wiki-nutshell:

In a capitalist society, the worker's alienation from their humanity occurs because the worker can only express labour—a fundamental social aspect of personal individuality— through a private system of industrial production in which each worker is an instrument, a thing, and not a person; in the "Comment on James Mill" (1844) Marx explained alienation thus:

Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have, in two ways, affirmed himself, and the other person. (i) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and, therefore, enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also, when looking at the object, I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses, and, hence, a power beyond all doubt. (ii) In your enjoyment, or use, of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man's essential nature ... Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature.

In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (1927), ... Marx identified four types of alienation that occur to the worker labouring under a capitaist system of industrial production.

In the capitalist mode of production, the generation of products (goods and services) is accomplished with an endless sequence of discrete, repetitive, motions that offer the worker little psychological satisfaction for "a job well done." By means of commodification, the labour power of the worker is reduced to wages (an exchange value); the psychological estrangement (*Entfremdung*) of the worker results from the unmediated relation between his productive labour and the wages paid him for the labour. That division of labour, within the capitalist mode of production, further exploits the worker by limiting their Gattungswesen (species-essence)—the human being's power to determine the purpose to which the product (goods and services) shall be applied.... [C]apitalism remove[s] from the worker the right to exercise control upon the value and the effects of their own labour, which, in turn, robs the worker of the ability to either buy (consume) the goods and services, or to receive the full value from the sale of the product. The alienation of the worker from the act of producing renders the worker unable to specialize in a type of productive labour, which is a psychologically satisfying condition; within an industrial system of production, social alienation reduces the worker to an instrument, to an object, and thus cannot productively apply every aspect of one's human nature.¹⁵⁵

I am in substantial agreement with Marx's analysis of labor and alienation under capitalism, *if and only if*, as per existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism,

(i) we interpret capitalism as big capitalism (see directly below for a definition), and

(ii) we interpret Marx's notion of *human species-essence* as *human dignity*.

But I also think that Marx made two serious mistakes.

First, he mistakenly concentrated almost exclusively on *the exploitation and oppression of workers*. On the contrary, he should have concentrated on *the oppression of humanity*, that is, *the oppression of all real human persons*, which is not only more fundamentally morally wrong, but also massively more widespread, than worker-exploitation *alone*, awful as it is.

Second, Marx was mistaken that human labor under capitalism per se¹⁵⁶ is *necessarily* alienating, expoitative, and oppressive. What is necessarily alienating, exploitative, and oppressive is *big capitalism*. By *big capitalism* I mean basically what Marx meant by "capitalism," now expanded to what the neo-Marxists called *advanced capitalism*, that is, *global corporate capitalism plus technocracy*.

But *small capitalism*—by which I mean: modest individual ownership of private property, sufficient to one's true human needs and individual tastes; non-exploitative small-scale business enterprises for the production of goods and the provision of services that satisfy and sustain people's true human needs and individual tastes; modest individual profit-making accumulation of wealth sufficient for the satisfaction of one's own true

human needs and individual tastes, and those of the members of one's household or family; and modest, non-exploitative collective profit-making and collective profit-sharing enterprises (aka cooperatives), sufficient for the satisfaction of every worker's true human needs and individual tastes—is perfectly consistent with a social system in which human labor is not only *not alienating, not exploitative, and non-oppressive,* but in fact *human-dignity-respecting and liberating*, when human *labor* is re-conceived as human *work* from the standpoint of *Utopia Now*.

From the standpoint of Utopia Now, human work is

any form of creative, productive, or otherwise energy-expending rational human agency or performance (roughly, intentionally changing or moving oneself or other things, in the natural or social worlds), under the presupposition that every human worker is a real human person, inherently possessing human dignity, and not a *mere* instrument or a mere thing, whether the work itself is undertaken freely or under some sort of coercive compulsion, and whether it is undertaken for purely instrumental or for non-instrumental purposes.

In turn, are two basic kinds of human work, namely *jobwork* and *lifework*.

Jobwork in general is whenever a human worker receives money in return for creation, production, the provision of services, or any other rational human agential/performative energy expenditure, especially including working for a salary or wages. Of course, this covers all jobs under capitalism, whether big capitalism or small capitalism, and whether self-employed or employed by someone else. But jobwork, when it is specifically construed according to the FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs proposal, is the part-time (15 hours per week or less) means by which the person *earns an adequate living-wage* doing something productive and useful for humanity.

Lifework, by contrast, is some creative, meaningful activity (aka a *project*), or a series of such activities (aka *projects*), pursued as a full-time, or almost full-time, lifetime calling. Simply put, lifework is *whatever you would do for the rest of your life if you were freed from financial worries*. And the basic function of jobwork is *to enable and support lifework*, although, to be sure, one's jobwork could *also* be chosen as one's lifework.

Relatedly, it is absolutely crucial to note that lifework is an exceptionally broad category, including anything from raising children or otherwise caring for other people, to carpentry and all other sorts of craftsmanship, to nurturing or tending non-human natural processes or creatures—for example, bee-keeping, animal-husbandry, forestry or walking through or camping in forests, woodworking or looking at woodworking, or gardening or looking at gardens—to playing or observing games or sports, to making, performing, or listening to music, to dancing or watching dancing, to painting or sculpting or looking at paintings or sculptures, to reading or writing literature of any kind, to making or watching movies, to studying or writing history, to doing or studying philosophy. Or *thinking* about any of the above in an engaged way. Or doing an eco-job, for that matter. What is essential

to lifework is that it involves creative, meaningful activity. Therefore, lifework substantially overlaps with the category of human *play*, which is often falsely opposed to human work, and called *idleness* or *leisure*. On the contrary, insofar as play is creative and meaningful, it can *also* be lifework.

Here are six individually excellent and conjointly decisive reasons for universally implementing TGUBI together with FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs.

First, under the system of TGUBI together with FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, *no one who is capable of working and who wants jobwork, will ever be unemployed again, forever.*

Second, under the system of TGUBI together with FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, *no one* who is capable of working and who wants jobwork, will ever have to take a shit job again, forever.

Third, as a direct consequence of the first two reasons, under the system of TGUBI together with FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, *The Job Dilemma would be fixed, forever*.

Fourth, under the system of TGUBI together with FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, since there would be an initial set of eco-jobs created and offered in the second six months of 2021 equal to *the New Jobs Number*, then a further set of new eco-jobs equal to *the Obsolete Jobs Number* + *the Shit Jobs Number* for 2021 would be created and offered in January 2022, and then a further set of new eco-jobs equal to the OJN + SJN for 2022 would be created and offered in January 2023, and so-on for subsequent years, then, year by year, there would be a *significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in the USA*, and, correspondingly *significant progress would be made by the USA towards preventing future disasters of global climate change*.

Fifth, therefore, under the system of TGUBI together with FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, every eco-job will by its very nature be a useful, productive, and environmentally respectful job.

Sixth and finally, under the system of TGUBI together with FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, since the function of *jobwork* is to enable and support *lifework*, the combination of TGUBI, which begins at age 21, plus the universal availability of eco-jobs, which begins at age 18, will be in itself liberating for humanity, *since it makes it really possible for anyone 18 years of age or over to refuse and exit the alienation and economic oppression of big capitalism, <i>forever*. So, again, all Marxist humanists and neo-Marxists¹⁵⁷ should immediately sign up for existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism.

3.5 HIGHER EDUCATION WITHOUT COMMODIFICATION

Marxist humanists and neo-Marxists are also the natural segues into my discussion of the next proposal in the *Utopia Now* program. *Commodification*, according to the Marxist-humanist and Neo-Marxist traditions,¹⁵⁸ is the process whereby capitalism turns everything that has human moral and spiritual value into *mere things*—commodities—that can be

produced, re-produced, bought, and sold. Commodification also applies directly to human agents, or real persons, who, by being unintentionally absorbed into the capitalist system, to that extent, turn themselves into *mere decision-theoretic Hobbesian machines*—self-interested, mutally antagonistic biochemical puppets—who endlessly produce and consume, controlled by their bosses and political masters, via ideology and coercive authoriarian means, until the biochemical puppets finally break down, fall apart, and die. In the 21st century, commodification is a direct implication of big capitalism, neoconservatism, and especially neoliberalism, with its fusion of classical Hobbesian liberalism, Millian democratic or republican liberalism, hence Statism, and above all the valorization of big capitalism and technocracy.

It is by no means an antiquarian or irrelevant historical fact, however, that the origins of the 19th, 20th, and 21st century concept of commodification lie in the Hegelian and Young Hegelian idea that organized religion, in Hegelian lingo, is "the alienation and externalization of absolute Spirit," and also in Kant's moral critique of organized religion in *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*: you merely subsitute *big capitalism* for *organized religion*, and then you have got Marx's theory of alienation. In Marxist humanist lingo, commodification systematically degrades, distorts, and finally exterminates our species-essence or *Gattungswesen*; and in Kantian lingo, commodification systematically degrades and in Kantian lingo of *Bigenocide* and all human moral *faith* or *Glaube*. Therefore, commodification is the *genocide* of all rational human moral and spiritual values.

In this section, I want to focus specifically

on (i) commodification as it applies to *higher education*, and also

on (ii) what I call borderless philosophy,¹⁵⁹ as a model for higher education without commodification.

Then I also want to tie these directly to the overall *Utopia Now* program in general, and in particular to the *Universal Public Education* (UPE) component I have mentioned several times in passing, and also to the FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs component I discussed in section 3.4, especially its concept of *lifework*, as opposed to *jobwork*.

Serious critics of commodification in higher education in general, or in professional academic philosophy in particular, include Schopenhauer,¹⁶⁰ Nietzsche,¹⁶¹ William James,¹⁶² Robert Paul Wolff,¹⁶³ Jeff Schmidt,¹⁶⁴ Jane Jacobs,¹⁶⁵ William Deresiewicz,¹⁶⁶ and the pseudonymous anarcho-philosophers at *Against Professional Philosophy*.¹⁶⁷

Now as I mentioned in section 3.2, *collective intelligence* is an emergent property of human or otherwise animal mindedness, that is constituted by the cognitive capacities and cognitive activities of a group of (for example) people *as* a group, especially including group-reasoning, group brain-storming and innovation, the social production of written texts and other kinds of social media, group deliberation, and participatory decision-

making. And as I also mentioned in section 3.2, recent work in cognitive psychology, social psychology, and organizational studies shows that collective wisdom, or a relatively high level of group coordination, creativity, problem-solving, and productivity (aka constructive *Gemeinschaft*), is determined by high levels of socially-open, non-hierarchical, free-thinking, and non-conformist, but at the same time also mutually comfortable, mutually communicative, mutually respectful/principled, relaxed, mutually sensitive, mutually supportive, and highly dialogical collaborative activities within groups, and is *not* a function of high average IQ levels among the group's individual members.

Sharply on the other hand, however, by *collective stupidity* I mean a relatively low level of social group coordination, creativity, problem-solving, and productivity, and correspondingly a relatively high level of group dysfunctionality (aka destructive *Gemeinschaft*). The same recent work in cognitive psychology, social psychology, and organizational studies that I cited earlier that demonstrates the existence, character, and etiology of collective wisdom, also, by simple inversion, demonstrates the existence, character, and etiology collective stupidity. Collective stupidity is determined by high levels of socially-closed, top-down organized, conformist, but at the same time mutually antagonistic and competitive, coercive, arrogant, non-collaborative, zero-sum, winner-takes-all, gaming-the-system-style activities within social groups, independently of high average IQ levels amongst the group's individual members. In other words, groups made up *entirely of people with very high IQs* can manifest very high levels of collective stupidity.

A more aggravated manifestation of collective stupidity is what I call *collective sociopathy*. Collective sociopathy is when collectively stupid social institutions stop asking altogether whether what they are doing is morally right or wrong, and concentrate entirely on efficient ways of implementing group policies and on coercively imposing the policies and directives of the group's administrative and/or governing elite on people belonging to, participating in, or under the jurisdiction of those institutions, who cannot effectively push back or resist. These groups involve especially high degrees of coercion and vanishingly few opportunities for authentic collaboration. Perspective-taking and empathy become very, and sometimes even impossibly, difficult. At the same time, however, the "power elite," consisting of those individuals who administer, control, and/or directly govern sociopathic institutions, as individuals, may seem to be otherwise quite normal, sane, and socially well-adjusted: they are "good, law-abiding citizens," and they love, look after, and more generally care for their partners, their children, their extended family and friends, their dogs, and so-on, and so forth. But, in an operative sense, they are social-institutional *monsters*.

The real-life, catastrophic paradigm of this, of course, was the Nazi bureaucracy's increasingly effective, increasingly satanic "solutions" to the "Jewish question." Eichmann, at least as portrayed by Arendt in *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, was the perfect

"company man" or "organization man" in the modern world's most evil, murderous example of institutional sociopathy.

But in a far less satanic and more mundane, although equally important and currently urgent sense, along the lines of Czeslaw Milosz's classic critical essay on institutional sociopathy in post-War communist eastern Europe, *The Captive Mind*,¹⁶⁸ virtually all contemporary college and university administrations and academic departments operate on the assumption that effectively implementing various higher-administration-mandated, state-mandated, or Federally-mandated policies and directives, without any critical reflection whatsoever on the rational justifiability or moral permissibility of those policies and directives, as applied to the members of their academic communities, is their be-all and end-all. So in that sense, these contemporary professional academic communities, the intellectual arm of *the miltary-industrial-university-digital complex* that drives contemporary big capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States and their State-like institutions, also manifest institutional sociopathy.

In turn, it is obvious enough that professional academics, taken one-by-one, and in general, are highly intelligent people, "the smartest kids in class," all the way from kindergarten to graduate school. And, judging at least by average GRE scores across all academic disciplines,¹⁶⁹ physicists and philosophers are the most intelligent professional academics: physicists top out the quantitative scores across all disciplines and also have relatively high analytical/verbal scores; whereas philosophers top out the analytical/verbal scores across all disciplines and also have relatively high quantitative scores. But as Jeff Schmidt's Disciplined Minds¹⁷⁰ clearly shows, to the extent that a group is more and more "professionalized," and therefore has increasingly levels of what Schmidt calls *ideological* discipline, the more they are, collectively, stupid, and even institutionally sociopathic, endlessly contributing to a downwards spiral of destructive *Gemeinschaft*, while, at the same time, all-too-busily promoting their own professional careers, slithering up "the greasy pole" of professorial and/or administrative promotion, reward, and status. Since, as Z at Against Professional Philosophy has persuasively argued, professional academic philosophers are now, by virtue of their special training, methodological narrowness, and intellectual arrogance, in fact "hyper-disciplined minds,"¹⁷¹ it follows that they are, as regards their collective intelligence, hyper-stupid, and hyper-institutionally-sociopathic.

Existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchists, as philosophers, are truly independent philosophers, *anarcho-philosophers*. And as anarcho-philosophers, they seriously pursue, among other fundamental philosophical topics, *radical metaphilosophy*, that is, a socially and politically radical version of the philosophy of philosophy. From the standpoint of radical metaphilosophy, then, the most urgent questions before us, therefore, are:

(i) how can this catastrophic trend towards professional academic philosophical collective stupidity and collective sociopathy be reversed?, and

(ii) how can contemporary philosophers move towards the kinds of collective wisdom variously imagined, for example, in the ancient Greek Cynics' radical free-thinking and what Z has called Diogenes of Sinope's "promethean philosophical failure"; ¹⁷² in Plato's Socratic dialogues; in Kant's conception of enlightenment, fully realized as the "ethical community" of his later religious writings; in Friedrich Schiller's aesthetic and artistic extension of Kant's conception of enlightenment,¹⁷³ yielding a fusion of an ideal of aesthetically and artistically creative, fully embodied, freely self-realizing, productive human activity with the ideal of an ethical community; in Marx's early humanistic writings, with their emphasis on emancipation from the mechanistic, self-interested, alienating system of capitalism and on the ideal of free social production; in Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid*; or in the early Russell's vision of "the world as it could be made"?

Or otherwise put:

(iii) how can contemporary philosophers move from where they are now, in a downward-spiralling condition of destructive *Gemeinschaft*, to a radically different condition in which they begin to achieve high levels of socially-open, non-hierarchical, free-thinking, and non-conformist, but at the same time also mutually comfortable, mutually communicative, mutually respectful/principled, relaxed, mutually sensitive, mutually supportive, highly dialogical and collaborative, aesthetically and artistically creative, fully embodied, freely self-realizing, productive human philosophical activities within groups?

In answer to this question, here are four proposals. The conjunction of these four proposals is what I call *borderless philosophy*.

First, we should get rid of graduate schools, MA and PhD degrees, and philosophy departments *altogether*, and replace them with a network of interlinked *borderless philosophy communities*, each one created and sustained by voluntary association, teamspirit, and a shared sense of real, serious philosophy as a full-time, lifetime calling and mission, that combine dialogue, research, writing, publishing, the creation and sharing of original works of philosophy in any presentational format whatsoever, teaching, and grassroots social activism, whose members are widely distributed spatiotemporally, in many different countries, continents, and time-zones, and who are therefore also fully *cosmopolitan* thinkers, doing real, serious philosophy without borders.

Second, we should get rid of professional academic philosophy journals, presses, and the rest of the professional academic publishing racket *altogether*, and replace them with a cosmopolitan, border-less, worldwide network of interlinked *borderless philosophy online sites and platforms* for dialogue, research, writing, publishing, the creation and sharing of original works of philosophy in any presentational format whatsoever, teaching, and grassroots social activism, that are severally and collectively organized and run by the worldwide network of borderless philosophy communities.

Third, as a consequence of the first two proposals, philosophy should become fully *cosmopolitan* in the original, core meaning of that term.

Fourth and finally, philosophers should adopt the following ten-part general conception of *a work of philosophy* (see also the Preface and General Introduction of THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 1, part 1)—

1. By "philosophy" (aka "real philosophy"), I mean synoptic, systematic, rational reflection on the individual and collective human condition, and on the thoroughly nonideal natural and social world in which human and other conscious animals live, move, and have their being.

1.1. But the primary aim of real philosophy is to change one's own life, with a further, ultimate aim of changing the world through free, existentially authentic, morally-principled action, hence all philosophy is liberationist and rationally rebellious, with radical ethical, religious, and political aims, or what I call, collectively, *radical enlightenment*.

1.2. Real philosophy in this sense fully includes the knowledge yielded by the natural and formal sciences; but real philosophy also goes significantly beneath and beyond the exact sciences, and non-reductively incorporates aesthetic, artistic, affective/emotional, ethical/moral, and, more generally, personal and practical insights that cannot be adequately captured or explained by the sciences.

1.3. By "a work," I mean any freely chosen product of human activity, whether an object (material or intentional), or a performance.

1.4. So works of philosophy are freely chosen products of the human activity of real philosophy, whether an object (material or intentional), or a performance.

2. In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant says that there are "aesthetic idea[s]," by which he means,

[a] representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible..., [and] [o]ne readily sees that it is the counterpart (pendant) of an idea of reason, which is, conversely, a concept to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate. (*CPJ* 5: 314)

2.1. In other words, an aesthetic idea is a non-empirical, metaphysical representation, like an "idea of pure reason," but also non-discursive and non-conceptual, hence linguistically inexpressible by means of concepts, propositions, or Fregean "thoughts," precisely to the extent that it is a product of human sensible imagination.

3. Kant himself does not make this point, but I think that the doctrine of aesthetic ideas has profound meta-philosophical implications: philosophy need not necessarily be theoretically expressed.

3.1. Correspondingly, I think that there is a fundamental distinction between

(i) works of philosophy (aka "philosophical works") and

(ii) philosophical theories,

such that the category of "philosophical works" is essentially wider and more inclusive than the category of philosophical theories—and more generally, philosophical theorizing is only one way of creating and presenting philosophy, as important as it is.

4. The aim of philosophical theories is to provide philosophical explanations that lead to essential, synoptic insights about the rational human condition, guided by the norms of propositional truth and logical consistency, by means of conceptual construction and conceptual reasoning.

4.1. A similarly open-minded conception of philosophical theorizing, in the tradition of connective conceptual analysis, was developed by Robert Nozick in his influential book, *Philosophical Explanations*.¹⁷⁴

4.2. But I think that Nozick's conception is still too much in the grip of the deeply wrongheaded, scientistic idea that all philosophy must be modeled on natural science, mathematics, or logic.

5. In my view, the aim of philosophical works, as such, is to present insights about the rational human condition and the thoroughly nonideal natural and social world around us, with synoptic scope, and a priori/necessary character, tracking categorical normativity and our highest values, as I said above, with the primary aim of changing one's own life, and the ultimate aim of changing the world, hence expressing radical enlightenment.

5.1. But this can be achieved even without concepts, propositions, arguments, or theories, in an essentially non-conceptual way, by presenting imagery, pictures, structures, etc., that have strictly universal and strongly modal implications, and categorically normative force. 5.2. These essentially non-conceptual insights could also be called "truths," if we use the term "truth" sufficiently broadly—as in "the truth shall set you free."

5.3 My basic point is that philosophy should be as much aimed at being inspiring and visionary, as it is at being argumentative and explanatory.

6. Pivoting on that basic point, here is a sub-proposal for five disjunctively necessary, individually minimally sufficient, and collectively fully sufficient criteria for something W—where W is a work, that is, as per 1.1, any freely chosen product of human activity, whether an object (material or intentional), or a performance—to count as "a work of philosophy":

(i) W provides a philosophical theory or a visionary worldview (or both),

(ii) W negatively or positively engages with earlier or contemporary philosophical ideas,

(iii) W expresses and follows a philosophical method,

(iv) W contains an explicit or implicit "philosophy of philosophy," a metaphilosophy,

(v) W deals with some topic or topics germane to the rational human condition, within a maximally broad range of issues, encompassing epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, history, culture, society, politics, aesthetics, art, formal and natural science, religion, and so-on.¹⁷⁵

7. Given how I defined the term "a work," by my use of the term "works" in the phrase "works of philosophy," I mean something as broad as its use in "works of art."

7.1. So there is no assumption or presupposition whatsoever here that works of philosophy must be written or spoken texts, although obviously many or most works of philosophy have been and are written or spoken texts.

8. Correspondingly, I want to put forward two extremely important metaphilosophical theses that conform to this conception of works of philosophy,

(i) the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy, and(ii) the thesis of presentational polymorphism in works of philosophy.

8.1. Presentational Hylomophism in Works of Philosophy says:

There is an essential connection, and in particular, an essential complementarity, between the presentational form $(morph\hat{e})$ of philosophical works and their philosophical content (hyle).

8.2. "Content" here is cognitive-semantic content, but this content can be

either (i) conceptual, or (ii) essentially non-conceptual,

and also it can be

either (iii) theoretical content or (iv) non-theoretical content, including, aesthetic/artistic, affective/emotive, pragmatic, moral, political, or religious content.

8.3. Also, (i) and (ii) cross-cut with (iii) and (iv).

8.4. Hence there can be conceptual content that is either theoretical or non-theoretical, and there can be essentially non-conceptual content that is either theoretical or non-theoretical.9. The first thing that Presentational Hylomoprhism in Works of Philosophy implies, is the intimate connection between truly creative, ground-breaking works of philosophy, and truly creative, original forms of literary and spoken philosophical expression.

9.1. Thus Diogenes and Socrates created philosophical works entirely by epigrammatic pronouncements and dialogical conversation; Plato did it by writing dialogues; Aristotle

did it by presenting (it seems) nothing but lectures; Descartes wrote meditations; Locke and Hume wrote treatises; Kant wrote the Critiques; Kierkegaard wrote strange pseudonymous books; Nietzsche wrote poetry and aphorisms; Wittgenstein wrote the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, both of them completely original, completely different, and equally uncategorizable; and so on.

9.2. The second thing that Presentational Hylomophism in Works of Philosophy implies is that since all works of written and spoken philosophy are essentially connected to their literary style and expressive vehicles, then it is a mistake to impose a needlessly restrictive stylistic and expressive straight-jacket on works of philosophy, for example, the standard professional "journal essay," "200+ page book," and "philosophy talk."

9.3. And a third thing that Presentational Hylomophism in Works of Philosophy implies is that since the standard view of philosophical content in the analytic tradition—whether as logical analysis, linguistic analysis, conceptual analysis, analytic metaphysics, or scientific naturalism—is that the content of philosophy is exclusively conceptual and theoretical, then recognizing the essential non-conceptuality and non-theoreticality of philosophy, in three ways.

9.4. First, all written and spoken philosophy is in fact shot through with imagery, poetry, rhetorical devices, and speech-acts of various kinds.

9.5. Second, philosophy need not necessarily be presented (exclusively) in written or spoken form. There could be works of philosophy that are cinematic, diagrammed or drawn, painted, photographed, musical (instrumental or voiced), sculpted, performed like dances or plays, etc., etc., and perhaps above all, mixed works combining written or spoken forms of presentation and one or more non-linguistic forms or vehicles.

9.6. Third, if philosophical content is as apt to be essentially non-conceptual or non-theoretical as it is to be conceptual or theoretical, then there are vast realms of philosophical meaning that very few philosophers, even the most brilliant and great ones, have ever even attempted to explore.

10. Therefore, in full view of Presentational Hylomophism in Works of Philosophy, we also have *Presentational Polymorphism in Works of Philosophy*:

Philosophy can be expressed in any presentational format whatsoever, provided it satisfies Presentational Hylomophism in Works of Philosophy.

In other words, then, borderless philosophy is "borderless" in at least three different ways:

(i) it is *fully "cosmopolitan" in the original, core meaning of that term*, crossing State and continental borders, connecting philosophers from all over the world, and extending its scope to the entire natural universe,

(ii) it is maximally unrestricted as to presentational format, and

(iii) it is maximally unrestricted as to philosophical content.

Granting that, and based on the four proposals I made immediately above, my thesis is that if and only if borderless philosophy *can be* implemented by contemporary philosophers, and precisely to the extent that open philosophy *actually is* implemented by contemporary philosophers, will they exit their current condition of professional academic philosophical collective stupidity and destructive *Gemeinschaft*, including institutional sociopathy, and finally begin to achieve a condition of philosophical *collective wisdom* and constructive *Gemeinschaft*, in the spirit of Diogenes, Socrates, Kant, Schiller, Kropotkin, and early Russell.

In sections 3.3 to 3.4, I have argued that we should demand, wholeheartedly work towards, and ultimately implement, as the first two parts of a six-part realistic, collective altruist project in contemporary utopian global ethics and politics, from an existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist point of view, these two radical proposals—

1. Truly Generous Universal Basic Income (TGUBI):

Anyone 21 years of age or over and living permanently in the US, who has a personal yearly income of \$50,000 USD or less, and who is mentally and physicall capable of requesting their UBI, would receive \$25,000 USD per year, with no strings attached.

2. A 15-Hour Workweek for Universal Basic Jobs (FHW-for-UBJs):

Anyone 18 years of age or older who is living permanently in the US, who has completed a high school education, and is mentally and physically capable of doing a job, would be offered an *eco-job*, paying a yearly wage of \$25,000 USD, for *no more than* fifteen hours of work per week.

In section 3.1, I also noted that I am assuming that *Universal Public Education* (UPE) universal free access for all human persons of any age to good public education up to the end of high school—already exists in most countries, and needs no further justification. And where UPE does not already exist, it would automatically become a necessary part of the *Utopia Now* package, thereby making it a seven-part package.

Now, built on top of UPE, I want to make a further proposal about the radical reform of education at colleges and universities, which I call *Higher Education Without Commodification* (HEWC). What do I mean by HEWC?

HEWC is the generalization of borderless philosophy, as a model or paradigm, to *all parts* of what has been traditionally called "liberal arts education," but which Deresiewicz so aptly calls *the neoliberal arts*, that is, commodified higher education at contemporary colleges and universities, whether undergraduate or graduate. More specifically, HEWC would make available to everyone, beyond their high school education, a free, three-year minimum, optional (but also open-ended beyond those three years, as a further option), part-time or full-time UPE program in the so-called "liberal arts," and also in some of the so-called "STEM" fields, including the humanities, the fine arts, the social sciences, mathematics, and the natural sciences. For many or even most people, their HEWC would fall between

(i) the end of their high school education at age 18 and the corresponding availability of eco-jobs, and

(ii) the beginning of their TGUBI at age 21.

But HEWC would be open to anyone with a high school degree, no matter how old they are, provided they are mentally and physically capable of doing the program. Some people would opt to do HEWC part-time, along with eco-jobs, while others would opt to do HEWC full-time, either with or without their TGUBI. HEWC would involve no credentialing whatsoever, and in particular, no degrees or diplomas. Therefore, the current system of job-oriented education, or job-training, with credentialing—for example, business school, education school, law school, medical school, engineering school, social work school, forestry school, architecture school, communications and media school, film school, etc., etc., and technical-vocational schools of all kinds—would be entirely independent of HEWC and subject to the standard service-industry fee-structure of all such institutions, provided that this is also non-exploitative and non-oppressive. Above all, HEWC would NEITHER prepare people for jobwork, NOR be a necessary condition of any sort of jobwork.

The HEWC system would consist in a series of open-enrollment courses offered by HEWC instructors, either in person or online. HEWC instructors would normally belong to at least one *open research community*, modelled on *the borderless philosophy communities* proposed earlier in this section, each one consisting of some voluntarily-associated, like-minded people wholeheartedly engaged in individual or collective research projects together with one another, belonging to a worldwide network of such groups— although this is not *strictly required*, merely *highly recommended*. HEWC instructorship would fall under the general rubric of *eco-ed jobs*, hence each HEWC instructor would receive a yearly salary of \$25,000 for a 15-hour workweek teaching HEWC courses in some HEWC subject(s), over and above her/his \$25,000 TGUBI.

In turn, anyone could become a HEWC instructor, provided that:

(i) they meet the requirements for any eco-job, and

(ii) either they already have a PhD in the subject for which they propose to work as a HEWC instructor or they have already taught a minimum of 28 courses (= 7 years x 4 courses per year, roughly the same as what is required for tenure in most academic departments currently) in that subject.

Every HEWC instructor would be free to design her/his HEWC courses as s/he sees fit, provided that s/he assigns some written or performed coursework, to be submitted by a certain date falling within the same calendar year as the course. HEWC instructors would make analytical-critical comments on all written or performed coursework, but there would no grades or other systematized method of evaluation. Students would *complete* a given HEWC course if and only if they have finished the assigned coursework by the date determined by the HEWC instructor. Students would be able to take as many or as few HEWC courses in a given calendar year as they want to. At the end of every calendar year, HEWC students would receive a list of the HEWC courses they have completed during that year; but there would be no official record of uncompleted courses. All HEWC courses would fall under one of three classifications:

(i) introductory,(ii) advanced, or(iii) research-level.

Students would be able to take *advanced* HEWC courses in a given subject if and only if they have completed a specified number and kind of *introductory* courses in that subject; and students would be able to take *research-level* HEWC courses if and only if they have completed a specified number and kind of *advanced* courses in that subject. The classification-level and specific requirements for any given HEWC course would be determined by the HEWC instructor for that course. Students would enroll in a given HEWC course simply by formally declaring their intention to take the course, to that course's instructor. The enrollment for a given HEWC course would be fixed by a certain date, to be determined by the HEWC instructor, and after that date no one would be able to take that course until the next time it is offered. Nevertheless audits would also be permitted, provided that the HEWC instructor agreed. Finally, there would be no official HEWC course evaluations by students: if students did not like a course, the instructor, the subject, or the assigned coursework, they could either formally declare their intention to drop the course by simply not submitting the assigned coursework.

Looked at synoptically, the HEWC system has two basic purposes.

The first basic purpose of the HEWC system is to enable people to pursue higher education for its own sake, for three years minimum, *but also for their entire lives, if they wanted to, as an integral part of their lifework.* The underlying two-part thought here is:

(i) that an essential part of the Utopia Now program is our collective self-liberation from commodification and, correspondingly, our collective active recognition of human moral and spiritual values, and

(ii) that higher education pursued for its own sake will substantially promote and sustain this collective self-liberation and active recognition.

And the second purpose of the HEWC system is to make it really possible for people pursuing higher education to devolve, dismantle, and exit the professional academy, aka *The Professional Academic State*, as we know it, and therefore to liberate intellectual inquiry, the pursuit of knowledge, the pursuit of aesthetic/spiritual experiences of all kinds, and the pursuit of creative art, from their commodification, so that all of these activities can return, in a suitably updated way, to the ancient Greek Cynic, Socratic/Platonic, Kantian, and Schillerian ideals of free, dialogical, enlightened, aesthetic/spiritual, and creative artistic higher education.

3.6 HEALTHCARE HELL AND UNIVERSAL FREE HEALTHCARE

In another Wiki-nutshell, this is is what I call *healthcare hell in the USA*:

The United States life expectancy of 78.4 years at birth, up from 75.2 years in 1990, ranks it 50th among 221 nations, and 27th out of the 34 industrialized OECD countries, down from 20th in 1990. Of 17 high-income countries studied by the National Institutes of Health in 2013, the United States had the highest or near-highest prevalence of obesity, car accidents, infant mortality, heart and lung disease, sexually transmitted infections, adolescent pregnancies, injuries, and homicides. On average, a U.S. male can be expected to live almost four fewer years than those in the top-ranked country, though notably Americans aged 75 live longer than those who reach that age in other developed nations. A 2014 survey of the healthcare systems of 11 developed countries found the U.S. healthcare system to be the most expensive and worst-performing in terms of health access, efficiency, and equity.

Gallup recorded that the uninsured rate among U.S. adults was 11.9% for the first quarter of 2015, continuing the decline of the uninsured rate outset by the Affordable Care Act. A 2004 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report said: "The United States is among the few industrialized nations in the world that does not guarantee access to health care for its population." A 2004 OECD report said: "With the exception of Mexico, Turkey, and the United States, all OECD countries had achieved universal or near-universal (at least 98.4% insured) coverage of their populations by 1990." Recent evidence demonstrates that lack of health insurance causes some 45,000 to 48,000 unnecessary deaths every year in the United States. In 2007, 62.1% of filers for bankruptcies claimed high medical expenses. A

2013 study found that about 25% of all senior citizens declare bankruptcy due to medical expenses, and 43% are forced to mortgage or sell their primary residence.

Of 17 high-income countries studied by the National Institutes of Health in 2013, the United States was at or near the top in infant mortality, heart and lung disease, sexually transmitted infections, adolescent pregnancies, injuries, homicides, and rates of disability. Together, such issues place the U.S. at the bottom of the list for life expectancy. On average, a U.S. male can be expected to live almost four fewer years than those in the top-ranked country.

The U.S. Census Bureau reported that 49.9 million residents, 16.3% of the population, were uninsured in 2010 (up from 49.0 million residents, 16.1% of the population, in 2009). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the United States spent more on health care per capita (\$7,146), and more on health care as percentage of its GDP (15.2%), than any other nation in 2008. The United States had the fourth highest level of government health care spending per capita (\$3,426), behind three countries with higher levels of GDP per capita: Monaco, Luxembourg, and Norway. A 2001 study in five states found that medical debt contributed to 46.2% of all personal bankruptcies and in 2007, 62.1% of filers for bankruptcies claimed high medical expenses. Since then, health costs and the numbers of uninsured and underinsured have increased. A 2013 study found that about 25% of all senior citizens declare bankruptcy due to medical expenses.

The U.S. pays twice as much as Canada yet lags behind other wealthy nations in such measures as infant mortality and life expectancy. Currently, the U.S. has a higher infant mortality rate than most of the world's industrialized nations. In the United States life expectancy is 42nd in the world, after some other industrialized nations, lagging the other nations of the G5 (Japan, France, Germany, U.K., U.S.) and just after Chile (35th) and Cuba (37th).

Life expectancy at birth in the U.S., 78.49, is 50th in the world, below most developed nations and some developing nations. Monaco is first with 89.68. Chad is last with 48.69. With 72.4% Americans of European ancestry, life expectancy is below the average life expectancy for the European Union. The World Health Organization (WHO), in 2000, ranked the U.S. health care system as the highest in cost, first in responsiveness, 37th in overall performance, and 72nd by overall level of health (among 191 member nations included in the study). In 2008 the Commonwealth Fund, an advocacy group seeking greater government involvement in US healthcare, then led by former Carter administration official Karen Davis, ranked the United States last in the quality of health care among similar countries, and notes U.S. care costs the most.

The United States ranks close to the bottom compared to other industrialized countries on several important health issues affecting mortality: low birth weight and infant mortality, injuries and murder, teen pregnancy and STDs, HIV and AIDS, deaths resulting from drug overdoses, obesity and diabetes, heart disease, COPD, and general disability.

A 2004 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report said: "The United States is among the few industrialized nations in the world that does not guarantee access to health care for its population." A 2004 OECD report said: "With the exception of Mexico, Turkey, and the United States, all OECD countries had achieved universal or near-universal (at least 98.4% insured) coverage of their populations by 1990." The 2004 IOM report observed "lack of

health insurance causes roughly 18,000 unnecessary deaths every year in the United States," while a 2009 Harvard study conducted by co-founders of Physicians for a National Health Program, a pro-single payer advocacy group, estimated that 44,800 excess deaths occurred annually due to lack of health insurance.¹⁷⁶

In view of the self-evidently obvious two-part fact that *universal free healthcare*, aka "single payer healthcare," is not only *the norm amongst industrialized countries, hence it could be easily afforded by the USA too*, but is also infinitely superior to the *healthcare hell* that exists in the USA, then I ask you: how did this happen? Well, consider this:

Health care in the United States is provided by many distinct organizations. Health care facilities are largely owned and operated by private sector businesses. 58% of US community hospitals are non-profit, 21% are government owned, and 21% are for-profit. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the United States spent more on health care per capita (\$8,608), and more on health care as percentage of its GDP (17.2%), than any other nation in 2011. 64.3% of which was paid for by the government in 2013.¹⁷⁷

So the self-evidently obvious answer to that question is this: healthcare hell in the USA is the direct result of *big capitalism in the USA*, in the form of privately-owned healthcare providers, privately owned healthcare insurance companies, and rich doctors.

What is to be done? In sections 3.3 to 3.5, I have argued that we should demand, wholeheartedly work towards, and ultimately implement, as the first three parts of a six-part realistic, collective altruist project in neo-utopian global ethics and politics, from an existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist point of view, these three radical proposals—

1. Truly Generous Universal Basic Income (TGUBI):

Anyone 21 years of age or over and living permanently in the US, who has a personal yearly income of \$50,000 USD or less, and who is mentally and physically capable of requesting their UBI, would receive \$25,000 USD per year, with no strings attached.

2. A 15-Hour Workweek for Universal Basic Jobs (FHW-for-UBJs):

Anyone 18 years of age or older who is living permanently in the US, who has completed a high school education, and is mentally and physically capable of doing a job, would be offered an *eco-job*, paying a yearly wage of \$25,000.00 USD, for *no more than* fifteen hours of work per week.

3. Universal Free Higher Education Without Commodification (HEWC):

Everyone would be offered, beyond their high-school education, a free, three-year minimum, optional (but also open-ended beyond those three years, as a further option), part-time or full-time universal public education program in the so-called "liberal arts," and also in some of the so-called "STEM" fields, including the humanities, the fine arts, the social sciences, mathematics, and the natural sciences.

Now what about healthcare? According to my *Universal Free Healthcare* (UFH) proposal:

Every human person living permanently in the USA would receive free lifelong healthcare.

And here are two individually excellent and conjointly decisive reasons for implementing UFH, together with TGUBI *and* FHW-for-UBJs/Eco-Jobs.

First, although it is true that, under the system of TGUBI together with FHW-for-UBJS/eco-jobs, not only would no one ever suffer from poverty or economic oppression again, forever; not only would no one who is mentally and physically capable of working ever have to be either unemployed or do a shit job instead of pursuing their lifework, forever; not only would no one who has completed a high school education ever be denied access to higher education again, forever; nevertheless, *if UFH were not also simultaneously implemented*, then most people living permanently in the USA would *still* suffer the slings and arrows of healthcare hell.

Second, therefore, under the collective system of TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, *and* UFH, not only would no one ever suffer from poverty or economic oppression again, forever; not only would no one who is mentally and physically capable of working ever have to be either unemployed or do a shit job instead of pursuing their lifework, forever; not only would no one who has completed a high school education be denied access to higher education again, forever; but also *healthcare hell in the USA would be ended, forever*.

3.6 CULTURAL CONFLICT, IDENTITY POLITICS, BORDERS, AND EMPATHY POLITICS

"Okay," [Rick] said, nodding. "Now consider this. You're reading a novel written in the old days before the war. The characters are visiting Fisherman's Wharf in San Francisco. They become hungry and enter a seafood restaurant. One of them orders lobster, and the chef drops the lobster into the tub of boiling water while the characters watch."¹⁷⁸

Tyrell: "Is this to be an empathy test? Capillary dilation of the so-called blush response? Fluctuation of the pupil. Involuntary dilation of the iris..."

Deckard: "We call it Voight-Kampff for short."¹⁷⁹

By *cultural conflict* I mean the mutual antagonism that arises between groups of people with different skin color, different languages, different ethnicity, different religions or religious traditions, different gender, different sexuality, different age groups or generations, different social castes, different economic classes, different political parties, and so-on, or who simply live in different places from one another. Such conflict ranges all the way from mutual distrust and insults, to mutual coercion including threats of violence or actual violence, to systematic mutual or one-way persecution including imprisonment, torture, and murder, to war, "ethnic cleansing," mass murder, or genocide.

The very idea of cultural conflict, in any one of its instances, implies the existence of a centered group, *Us*, that is the *agent* and first participant in a given cultural conflict, and an external group, or set of groups, that is the *target* and second participant in that conflict, *Them.* Let us call the agent-group, *Our People*, and the target-group or set of groups, *Other People*. To the extent that *Our People* have Our own (relatively) unique political practices and policies, that set Us apart from Them, the *Other People*, these practices and policies in *identity politics*.

Now The Age of Trump is going to last at least another 2 years, perhaps 6 years. Throughout the 2016 Presidential election campaign, and especially since Trump's election, the following highly disturbing cultural and and social fact has become vividly manifest. On the one hand, we find President Trump's Republican, nativist, racist, antifeminist, anti-LGBTQ, big capitalist, right-(neo)liberal, Know-Nothings,¹⁸⁰ unified by their identity-politics. And on the other hand, we find the Clinton(s)-Obama era Democratic, anti-nativist, anti-racist, pro-feminist, pro-LGBTO, big capitalist, left-(neo)liberal, Social Justice Warriors,¹⁸¹ unified by their identity-politics. Indeed, the 2016 US Presidential election was, at bottom, all about cultural conflict, as Mark Lilla's controversial essay, "The End of Identity Liberalism,"¹⁸² clearly shows. Trump's Know-Nothings fear and hate foreigners, people with different skin color, people with different languages, people with different ethnicity, people with different religions or religious traditions, and people with different sexuality, and above all, they fear and hate the Clinton(s)-Obama era Social Justice Warriors. And, in return, above all, the Clinton(s)-Obama era Social Justice Warriors fear and hate Trump's Know-Nothings, which in turn is but a specific manifestation of a general problem with the identity politics of the Social Justice Warriors that John Gray, bang-on aptly, calls hyper-liberalism.¹⁸³ In short, there is fear and hatred everywhere in the contemporary US, cultural conflict everywhere, and it is all fundamentally driven by *identity politics*, whether of the big capitalist (neo)liberal Republican right or the big capitalist (neo)liberal Democratic left.

Another serious, and even more fundamental, problem with the identity politics of the Social Justice Warriors, however, is something I discussed earlier, The Paradox of Distributive Social Justice. This says that insofar as principles of distributive social justice are applied to an oppressive social system, then even despite its ideological overlay of "justice-as-fairness," this actually turns out to be the most effective way to perpetuate the oppressive system itself. Relatedly, the concept of *intersectionality* has been used by critical identitarians to stress the ways in which members of very different identity groups can suffer essentially the same kinds of oppression. But as Kwame Anthony Appiah has rightly pointed out, intersectionality is in fact an implicit rejection of identity politics.¹⁸⁴ For if intersectionality appeals to the ways in which very different kinds of people can all be oppressed in essentially the same ways, for essentially the same bad reasons, then, as autonomous individuals who possess human dignity and are worthy of respect, those oppressed people are also fully capable of thinking, speaking, and acting against oppression for themselves, in solidarity with other oppressed people of all kinds, without the need for any sort of of identity politics. It is therefore causally and explanatorily *overdetermined* that big capitalist left-(neo)liberal Democratic identitarianism is a moral and political dead letter, just as Lilla and Gray have argued, even despite its widespread popularity.

Well, what is to be done? In sections 3.3 to 3.6, I have argued that we should demand, wholeheartedly work towards, and ultimately implement, as the first four parts of a six-part realistic, collective altruist project in contemporary utopian global ethics and politics, from an existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist point of view, these four radical proposals—

1. Truly Generous Universal Basic Income (TGUBI):

Anyone 21 years of age or over and living permanently in the US, who has a personal yearly income of \$50,000 USD or less, and who is mentall and physically capable of requesting their UBI, would receive \$25,000 USD per year, with no strings attached.

2. A 15-Hour Workweek for Universal Basic Jobs (FHW-for-UBJs):

Anyone 18 years of age or older who is living permanently in the US, who has completed a high school education, and is mentally and physically capable of doing a job, would be offered an *eco-job*, paying a yearly wage of \$25,000 USD, for *no more than* fifteen hours of work (normally, three 5-hour days) per week.

3. Universal Free Higher Education Without Commodification (HEWC):

Everyone would be offered, beyond their high-school education, a free, three-year minimum, optional (but also open-ended beyond those three years, as a further option), part-time or full-time universal public education program in the so-called "liberal

arts," and also in some of the so-called "STEM" fields, including the humanities, the fine arts, the social sciences, mathematics, and the natural sciences.

4. Universal Free Healthcare (UFH):

Every human person living permanently in the USA would receive free lifelong healthcare.

Furthermore, as the perhaps surprising solution to the problem of cultural conflict, I am proposing *2-Phase Universal Open Borders* (2P-UOB):

Phase 1: Starting in 2021, there will be universal open borders with Canada and Mexico, and everyone who moves across those borders and then claims residence in the USA, will receive *temporary or permanent residence in the USA* and also *full membership in the system of UBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH in the USA*, with the precise number of new temporary or permanent residents to depend on the current availability of

(i) adequate funding for TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJS/eco-jobs, and UFH, and (ii) adequate living accommodation,

in the USA, provided that all new residents also fully respect the human dignity of everyone else in the US and elsewhere in the world.

Phase 2: Also starting in 2021, the USA, Canada, and Mexico will collectively form a Global Refugee Consortium (GRC), with three-way open borders to any political refugee, economic refugee, or asylum seeker from anywhere in the world (aka "global refugees"), who will receive temporary or permanent residence in the USA, Canada, or Mexico, and also full membership in the system of TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/ecojobs, HEWC, and UFH in the three GRC countries, with the precise number of new temporary or permanent residents, and the precise distribution of new residents among the three members of the GRC, to depend on the current availability of

(i) funding for TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH, and (ii) adequate living accommodation,

in the three GRC countries, provided that all new residents also fully respect the human dignity of everyone else in the GRC and elsewhere in the world.

It is crucial to note that Phase 2 of 2P-UOB, and the corresponding creation of the GRC, both presuppose that USA, Canada, and Mexico, by 2021, will have each implemented social systems equivalent to TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH.

Here is an obvious objection to 2P-UOB, which I will call *The Inevitability of Cultural Conflict:*

Since people are by nature egoistic and mutually antagonistic, then whenever they group together and become an Us, they will naturally and inevitably engage in cultural conflict with *Them*, the *Other People*. So universal open borders with Canada and Mexico, or to global refugees, will *never* work, precisely because they would *inevitably lead to even more and greater cultural conflicts than already exist*, and perhaps even *lead to war*. Therefore, *the USA should always have (more or less) closed borders to everyone, forever*.

And here is my reply to that objection, in three parts.

First, as I argued in section 3.2 above, it is simply empirically false either that all human beings are inherently egoistic and mutually antagonistic by nature or neurobiology, or that all human beings are even all-but-inevitably egoistic and mutually antagonistic by virtue of culture. Moreover, the very belief that people are inherently or inevitably egoistic and mutually antagonistic, is nothing more and nothing less than a cognitive illusion and myth that directly serves the self-interests of big capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic Statists.

Second, as far as can be determined from the archaeological, historical, and socialanthropological evidence, cultural conflict exists, and has existed in varying degrees, from minor, to moderate, to major, to intense, all the way to catastrophic, near-satanically evil, holocaust levels, as long as *States* have existed. Moreover, as J. C. Scott points out in his study of the earliest States, in addition to a territorial monopoly on the power to coerce, a hierachical and stratified social structure, sedentary grain cultivation, taxation, and the emergence of writing for the purposes of making lists, *walls, aka borders, make States*.¹⁸⁵ Therefore, it is entirely reasonable to hold that, conversely, *States and walls, aka borders, make cultural conflict*.

Third, and following on from the crucial thesis that cultural conflict is actually an artifact of Statism, it is self-evident that people are most inclined to cultural conflict with others, via their identity politics, when they are already very angry, anxious, bitter, frustrated, or frightened about other things, for whatever reasons—for example, poverty and economic oppression, being unemployed or having to do a shit job, the inaccessibility of higher education, or healthcare hell—and then they project those powerful negative emotions onto Other People. In so doing, Our People thereby cognitively demonize and stigmatize the Other People, then actively fear and hate the Other People, or even, in the most extreme cases, cognitively de-humanize the Other People, by seeing them as wild beasts or vermin, or even as human garbage or human offal, fit only to be eliminated and exterminated.

Nevertheless, holding fixed the brute fact that we live in a world of States and Statelike institutions, overt cultural conflict is generally a *somewhat extreme, pathological* *situation*, and very far being the *normal situation* between people in different cultural groups. Of course, there are always some difficulties and tensions. Consider, for example, the commonplace difficulties and tensions between men and women, or between older people and younger people, not to mention between the currently "hot button" and mediatouted difficulties and tensions between people of different sexual orientations, or between cisgendered and transgendered people, etc., etc. Nevertheless, it is not all uncommon for *sharply* different cultural groups, even a *multiplicity* of sharply different cultural groups, to get along just fine, all things considered, to their mutual aid and benefit, with only the ordinary sorts of "human, all too human" problems, *whenever the larger economic, social, and political backgrounds are appropriately supportive*. Real-world examples of this abound: happy marriages and other intimate partnerships, happy families, good camaraderie and friendships across even sharply different cultural groups, and so-on. Indeed, *the city of Toronto, Canada*, is an excellent real-world example of all of this.

I hasten to add that I am *not* saying that people are perfect, or somehow magically more than "human, all-too-human," whether in Toronto, or anywhere else: *far from it*. But the essential point is that people of even sharply different cultural groups inside both past and present States and State-like institutions *really can* and *often do* get along pretty well, provided that, whether by design or sheer luck, there is the right background-setting of sufficiently supportive economic, social, and political structures. The amazing thing, then, is how often we forget or overlook this self-evident fact.

Therefore, *the very best thing that could possibly be done in the face of cultural conflict in the US* is to create a two-phase UOB situation in which everyone in the US, Canada, and Mexico is moving freely across borders between the three countries and living wherever they want to, global refugees are given universal safe-haven in the Global Refugee Consortium (GRC) consisting of the US, Canada, and Mexico, and therefore people from all over the US, Canada, Mexico, and global refugees from the rest of the world, can thereby all actually see each other, hear each other, and interact as neighbors, without wire fences, walls, or fear of any sort of persecution or violence, so that everyone is committed to universal respect for human dignity, everyone over 21 has a truly generous universal basic income and also the option of a 15-hour workweek for universal basic jobs/eco-jobs, everyone over 18 has free access to higher education without commodification, and everyone of any age has universal free healthcare.

What, then, is the genuine alternative to the cognitively illusory *false dilemma* that consists in our being seemingly compelled to choose between the identity politics of the big capitalist (neo)liberal Republican right on the one hand, and the identity politics of the big capitalist (neo)liberal Democratic left, on the other, *tertium non datur*?

In Philip K. Dick's brilliant classic science-fiction novel, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, and again in Ridley Scott's equally brilliant classic science-fiction film *Blade Runner*, it is philosophically highly insightful and significant that *the Voight-Kampff*

test for telling *human persons* apart from "replicants" or *androids*, is an *empathy* test. Indeed, the psychological capacity for empathy is *an innate capacity of all human persons*.¹⁸⁶ In turn, the essential key to understanding the perhaps surprising existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchist solution to the problem of cultural conflict, namely 2P-UOB, is what I call *empathy politics*, which is the diametric opposite of *identity politics*.

Frequently it is said that the alternative to the corrosive influence of identity politics, which emphasizes *difference*, *exclusion*, and *exceptionalism*, is a politics of *commonality* or *universality*, and *shared interests and values*. That is true, but still too superficial. What in fact lies at the ground of a politics of commonality and universality is *treating all people in all and only the ways that express sufficient respect for human dignity*. In turn, what evokes and sustains respect for human dignity is the emotion of *empathy*: the ability to mirror and simulate inside oneself the consciousness or subjective experiences—especially including desires, feelings, and emotions—and, more generally, the subjectively-centered beliefs and perspectives, or worldviews, of other people, *particularly*: all you have to do is to be able to *empathize with them*, and *respect them*. Empathy is inherently outward-looking, not inward-looking, self-absorbed, navel-gazing, or narcissistic. Empathetic people are naturally inclined towards generosity, graciousness, kindness, and tolerance, and, at a minimum, towards politeness, and *not* towards arrogance, callousness, cruelty, rudeness, or intolerance.

Creating and cultivating personal and cultural practices of empathy are therefore the moral and political antidote to the morally and politically poisonous and pathological influence of identity politics in States and State-like institutions. Q: What do I mean by practices of empathy? A: There are obviously many different ways of opening yourself to other minds, other languages, other nations, other traditions, and other ways of living and being human: studying their history, reading their literature, watching their movies, etc., etc. But above all, what I mean is that we should all engage in frequent domestic and foreign travel, including actually living in many different places, all over the US, Canada, Mexico, and the rest of the world. In short, to that extent, and in effect, we should all become modern-day, cosmopolitan nomads. We would thereby recapitulate the best aspects of the lives of the ancient, pastoral nomads tribes that (pre)historically preceded, and then surrounded, States and other State-like institutions-so invidiously and threateningly called "barbarians," "primitives," "savages," and "uncivilized brutes" by early and later Statists (think, for example, of the sad and morally scandalous fates of the nomadic indigenous peoples of North America, South America, Africa, and the Antipodes)—without also suffering, of course, the many natural difficulties of human life more than 5200 years ago. Then, once we are all modern-day, cosmopolitan nomads, and once all sorts of different people are actually our next door neighbors, then we will naturally and inevitably see how ordinary and pretty much similar everyone really is, everywhere, even despite their interesting differences, hence we will all be able to empathize with them

and sufficiently respect them as real human persons with dignity, just like us. But in order to make this modern-day, cosmopolitan nomadism really possible for most people, we need the two-phase UOB system, together with UBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH.

To sum up, here are two individually excellent and conjointly decisive reasons for implementing all of these proposals, *right now*.

First, although it is true that, under the system of TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH, not only would no one ever suffer from poverty or economic oppression again, forever; not only would no one who is mentally and physically capable of working ever have to be either unemployed or do a shit job instead of pursuing their lifework, forever; not only would no one who has completed high school ever be denied access to higher education again, forever; and not only would no one would ever suffer from healthcare hell again; nevertheless, *if two-phase UOB were not implemented starting in 2021*, then most people living permanently in the US *would still suffer from cultural conflict and the institutional sociopathy of closed borders*.

Second, therefore, under the collective system of TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, UFH, and two-phase UOB, not only would no one ever suffer from poverty or economic oppression again, forever; not only would no one who is mentally and physically capable of working ever have to be either unemployed or do a shit job instead of pursuing their lifework, forever; not only would no one who has completed high school ever be denied access to higher education again, forever; and not only would no one would ever suffer from healthcare hell again; but also *cultural conflict in the US and the institutional sociopathy of closed borders would be ended forever*.

3.8 THE SECOND "PECULIAR INSTITUTION," GUN VIOLENCE, AND UNIVERSAL NO-GUNS

Framed in Biblical terms, the birth of the US in 1776 was attended by *two original* sins.

The first original sin was what John C. Calhoun later infamously called the "peculiar institution" of slavery in the US.¹⁸⁷ Here, in turn, are some things that Calhoun said about slavery:

I hold that in the present state of civilization, where two races of different origin, and distinguished by color, and other physical differences, as well as intellectual, are brought together, the relation now existing in the slaveholding States between the two, is, instead of an evil, a good—a positive good ... I may say with truth, that in few countries so much is left to the share of the laborer, and so little exacted from him, or where there is more kind attention paid to him in sickness or infirmities of age. Compare his condition with the

tenants of the poor houses in the more civilized portions of Europe—look at the sick, and the old and infirm slave, on one hand, in the midst of his family and friends, under the kind superintending care of his master and mistress, and compare it with the forlorn and wretched condition of the pauper in the poorhouse ... I hold then, that there never has yet existed a wealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did not, in point of fact, live on the labor of the other.¹⁸⁸

The "peculiar institution" of slavery was of course the primary cause of the US Civil War; and although it was abolished by Lincoln in 1865, its evil consequences have been experienced throughout US history right up to today—as the Black Lives Matter movement¹⁸⁹ vividly demonstrates. From an existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist point of view, slavery is *fundamentally morally wrong*,

(i) because it treats human persons as mere things, mere chattel and commodities, and thereby directly violates their human dignity, and also

(ii) because it is inherently coercive, insofar as it treats as mere instruments to the masters/slave owners' self-interested ends, and forces them to serve these ends by means of violence or the threat of violence, hence again it directly violates their human dignity.

And the second original sin was what I call *the second "peculiar institution,"* that is, *the right to own and use guns in the USA*, entrenched in the 2nd Amendment to the US Constitution, ratified in 1788, which says this:

A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

Fast-forwarding now to the second decade of the 21st century, here are some contemporary facts about gun violence:

Gun violence results in thousands of deaths and injuries in the United States annually. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in 2013, there were 73,505 nonfatal firearm injuries (23.23 per 100,000 U.S. citizens); 11,208 homicides (3.5 per 100,000); 21,175 suicides; 505 deaths due to accidental/negligent discharge of a firearm; and 281 deaths due to firearms-use with "undetermined intent," included in a total of 33,636 deaths due to "Injury by firearms," or 10.6 deaths per 100,000 people. Of the 2,596,993 total deaths in the US in 2013, 1.3% were related to firearms. The ownership and control of guns are among the most widely debated issues in the country.

In 2010, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 67% of all homicides in the U.S. were committed using a firearm. According to the FBI, in 2012, there were 8,855 total firearm-related homicides in the US, with 6,371 of those attributed to handguns. In 2012, 64% of all gun-related deaths in the U.S. were suicides. In 2010, there

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were 19,392 firearm-related suicides, and 11,078 firearm-related homicides in the U.S. In 2010, 358 murders were reported involving a rifle while 6,009 were reported involving a handgun; another 1,939 were reported with an unspecified type of firearm.

Firearms were used to kill 13,286 people in the U.S. in 2015, excluding suicide. Approximately 1.4 million people have been killed using firearms in the U.S. between 1968 and 2011.

In 2010, gun violence cost U.S. taxpayers approximately \$516 million in direct hospital costs.

Gun violence is most common in poor urban areas and frequently associated with gang violence, often involving male juveniles or young adult males. Although mass shootings have been covered extensively in the media, mass shootings account for a small fraction of gun-related deaths and the frequency of these events steadily declined between 1994 and 2007, rising between 2007 and 2013.¹⁹⁰

Correspondingly, here is a short but decisive argument *against* guns and the 2nd Amendment, and *for* gun abolitionism. (I will also provide a longer and more fully detailed version of this argument a few paragraphs below).

(1) Coercion is forcing people to do things, by using violence or the threat of violence.

(2) Coercion is always rationally unjustified and immoral, because it treats people as mere instruments or mere things, and directly violates their human dignity.

(3) The primary functions of guns is coercion.

(4) Therefore, owning and using guns is rationally unjustified and immoral.

(5) But the 2^{nd} Amendment to the US Constitution entrenches the right to own and use guns.

(6) Therefore, the 2nd Amendment is rationally justified and immoral, and should be repealed.¹⁹¹

(7) Therefore, *gun abolitionism* is rationally justified, morally right, and what we ought to do, by means of repealing the 2^{nd} Amendment.

Have you ever wondered how many people have been killed by guns within the borders of the US since 1776? Since 1968, more than 1.5 million people have been killed by guns. Since the American Revolution, 1.4 million people have died in *wars on US soil*, most of them by means of guns. So that is close to 2.9 million people killed by guns over a period spanning roughly only one-quarter of US political history, namely, roughly 60 years. Now, how many people were killed by guns in the US during the 192 years between 1776 and 1968, but *not in wars*? Let us say, conservatively, 3 million people. That would mean that the total number of people killed by guns in the history of the US *is roughly the same as the number of people murdered by the Nazis during the Holocaust, that is, somewhere between 5 and 6 million*. Therefore, if gun violence is not a fundamental source of human oppression in the US, *then nothing is*. So I am saying not only *that slavery is fundamentally morally wrong*, but also, for logically independent but also highly analogous reasons, *that*

gun violence is fundamentally morally wrong too. Therefore, just as we abolished slavery, so we should abolish the ownership and use of guns too.

Moreover, the morally half-hearted and politically expedient 21st century so-called "liberal" doctrine of *gun-control* is strictly analogous to the morally half-hearted and politically expedient pre-Civil War so-called "liberal" doctrine of *abolishing slavery in all states except where it already existed*. If slavery is morally wrong, then it is morally wrong always and everywhere, and should be abolished always and everywhere; if gun violence is wrong, *then owning and using guns is wrong always and everywhere*, and *should be abolished always and everywhere*. The fact that some gun-owners do not actually kill other people or themselves with their guns no more morally counts against the abolition of guns than the fact that some masters/slave-owners actually treated their slaves fairly well morally counted against the abolition of slavery.

Indeed, so-called "commonsense gun-control" is precisely as morally absurd as "commonsense slavery-control" would be. "Commonsense gun-control" is just like addressing the moral scandal of slavery by banning certain kinds of especially vicious "semi-automatic" whips and chains, requiring "background checks" on prospective slave owners, and making it difficult for prospective slave owners with "mental health issues" to buy and keep slaves. Yes, "slavery reform" and "commonsense slavery-control" would "improve" the system of slavery. But the moral scandal of slavery would still exist just the same, essentially untouched. So too, "gun reform" and "commonsense gun-control" leave the moral scandal of guns essentially untouched.

Now here are some of the things the current President of the US, Donald Trump, has said about guns:

No limits on guns; they save lives

Q: Are there any circumstances that you think we should be limiting gun sales of any kind in America?

TRUMP: No. I am a 2nd Amendment person. If we had guns in California on the other side where the bullets went in the different direction, you wouldn't have 14 or 15 people dead right now. If even in Paris, if they had guns on the other side, going in the opposite direction, you wouldn't have 130 people plus dead. So the answer is no....¹⁹²

Make concealed-carry permits valid across all states

I have a concealed-carry permit that allows me to carry a concealed weapon. I took the time and the effort to get that permit because the constitutional right to defend yourself doesn't stop at the end of your driveway. That doesn't apply just to me either. It applies to all our driveways or front doors.

That's why I'm very much in favor of making all concealed-carry permits valid in every state. Every state has its own driving test that residents have to pass before becoming licensed to drive. Those tests are different in many states, but once a state licenses you to drive, every other state recognizes that license as valid.

If we can do that for driving—which is a privilege, not a right—then surely we can do that for concealed carry, which is a right, not a privilege. That seems logical to me.¹⁹³

Now doesn't that vividly remind you of John C. Calhoun defending slavery?

And here is something else. The gun and ammunition industry in the US is *an exceptionally BIG big-capitalist enterprise*, with an annual revenue of \$13.5 billion USD.¹⁹⁴ And doesn't that make you wonder who *really* benefits from the continued existence of the second "peculiar institution"?

I am now going to argue again, this time in full detail, that

not only (i) owning or possessing and using guns, but also (ii) the 2nd Amendment,

are both rationally unjustified and immoral. In order to do that, however, and for clarity's sake, I will quickly (re)introduce and explicate some terminology. All human persons, aka *people*, are

(i) absolutely, non-denumerably infinitely, intrinsically, objectively valuable, beyond all possible economics, which means they have *dignity*, and

(ii) autonomous rational animals, which means they can act freely for good reasons, and above all they are

(iii) morally obligated to respect each other and to be actively concerned for each other's well-being and happiness, as well as their own well-being and happiness.

Therefore, it is rationally unjustified and immoral to undermine or violate people's dignity, under any circumstances. People have dignity as an *innate endowment of their humanity*. Dignity is neither a politically-created right, nor an achievement of any sort. Nor can anyone *lose* their dignity by thinking, choosing, or acting in a very morally or legally bad way. By *coercion* I mean

either (i) using violence (for example, injuring, torturing, or killing) or the threat of violence, in order to manipulate people according to certain purposes of the coercer (*primary coercion*),

or (ii) inflicting appreciable, salient harm (for example, imprisonment, termination of employment, large monetary penalties) or deploying the threat of appreciable, salient harm, even if these are not in themselves violent, in order to manipulate people according to certain purposes of the coercer (*secondary coercion*).

So all coercion is *manipulation*, and, as such, it directly violates human dignity by treating people as mere means. Therefore, whether it is primary or secondary, coercion should be

carefully distinguished from what I will call minimal sufficiently effective, last resort, defensive, protective, and preventive moral force:

as a last resort, only either using the smallest sufficiently effective level of violence or threat of violence, or deploying the smallest sufficiently effective threat of appreciable, salient harm, in order to defend against, protect against, or prevent, oneself or someone else being primarily or secondarily coerced, or having their rational human dignity directly violated.

Granting all that, then it is self-evident that the primary function of guns *is for their owners/possessors or users to manipulate, threaten, or kill other people for self-interested or Utilitarian reasons*, namely, *coercion*. That coercion really and truly *is* the primary function of guns, is clearly proven by the history of firearms.¹⁹⁵ Indeed, that coercion really and truly is the primary function of guns is even *explicitly admitted and stated* by The American Firearms Institute,¹⁹⁶ since in their historical timeline they trace the invention of the firearm back to its earliest origins as a weapon of conquest and warfare. Needless to say, The American Firearms Institute would of course be exceptionally unwilling to admit *anything* they thought would be somehow prejudicial to the pro-gun, pro-2nd Amendment movement.

Notice that I said that the *primary function* of guns is coercion. Please do not let the fact that guns can have secondary or tertiary functions, say, for hunting non-human animals, or for recreational shooting, or for holding doors closed on windy days, conceptually confuse you.

Notice too, that if it turns out that owning/possessing and using guns according to their primary function is rationally unjustified and immoral, then owning/possessing and using guns according to their secondary and tertiary functions will be equally rationally unjustified and immoral. If it is rationally unjustified and immoral for you to own/possess and use a bomb that would violence oblow up the Earth, then it is equally rationally unjustified and immoral for you to own/possess and use that bomb for hunting non-human animals, for recreational bombing, or for holding doors closed on windy days.

Now *arbitrarily coercing* other people is rationally unjustified and immoral because it undermines and violates their dignity. Notice that I said "*arbitrarily coercing* other people." That means manipulating people by the use of violence or the threat of violence

either (i) for no good reason or (ii) for no reason at all, much less a good reason.

"For no good reason" does not imply *that there could be a good reason for coercion*: all manipulation is inherently bad. People who act coercively either have bad *motivating* reasons for so acting (for example, selfishness), or they simply coerce *without a reason*, in

a spontaneously bad way. Therefore, since it fully permits arbitrary coercion, owning/possessing and using guns is rationally unjustified and immoral.

And please do not let the fact that in some circumstances *minimal sufficiently effective*, *last-resort, defensive, protective, and preventive moral force* is rationally justified and morally permissible, conceptually confuse you. Notice, again, that I said *owning/possessing AND using guns*. Correspondingly, please do not let the fact that under some special critical (in the sense of "involving a crisis") conditions, when other things are not equal, when all else has failed, and when the only way to stop someone doing something horrendously immoral, and in direct violation of human dignity—for example, rape, torture, murder, mass murder, genocide—to you, to someone else, or to many other people, that it is rationally justified and morally permissible *to USE a gun for the purposes of minimal sufficiently effective, last-resort, defensive, protective, and preventive moral force* against that evil person, conceptually confuse you. No one may permissibly *own/possess AND use a gun*, but sometimes, under some special critical conditions, it is morally permissible to *USE* one *WITHOUT* also owning or possessing it. But even this special permissible use is *only* for last-resort, defensive, preventive, and protective purposes: it is *never* morally permissible to use a gun for coercion.

One very important moral and political consequence of the preceding argument is its direct bearing on the 2nd Amendment to the US Constitution, already quoted above but worth repeating, which says this:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, **the right of the people to keep and bear Arms**, shall not be infringed. (Boldfacing added)

In other words, focusing on the material in boldface, the 2nd Amendment says that "the people," that is, *all Americans*, have the moral and legal right "to keep and bear arms," that is, the moral and legal right to own/possess and use guns, *unconditionally*. This means that *the 2nd Amendment fully morally and legally permits not only coercion generally but also arbitrary coercion in particular*. The further historical question of whether the original intention of the 2nd Amendment was to establish a legal right to own/possess and use guns for militias only, or for all Americans, is irrelevant. And in any case, if the 2nd Amendment really were intended to hold for militias *only*, and *not* for all Americans, presumably the writers of the 2nd Amendment would have stated that *explicitly*.

But coercion in general and arbitrary coercion in particular are rationally unjustified and immoral. Therefore the 2nd Amendment is rationally unjustified and immoral. More generally, *no one*, which includes *all* Americans, and *which especially includes all members of the police and the army*, namely, the "Militia," has the moral right "to keep and bear arms," that is, *to own/possess AND use guns*, other things being equal. This recognition, in turn, will have profound implications for the USA's legal justice system, or what I call *The Crime-&-Punishment System*, as I will argue in section 3.10 below.

In the devolutionary period after the repeal of the 2nd Amendment, particularly, it might be necessary to create a small public caches of guns, owned by no one, in certain communities, for use under special, critical conditions, for last-resort, defensive, protective, and preventive moral force, by those who have volunteered to help others in this way. But eventually, even these would not be needed and then they could be phased out and abolished.

In sections 3.3 to 3.7, I have argued that we should demand, wholeheartedly work towards, and ultimately implement, as the first four parts of a six-part realistic, collective altruist project in contemporary utopian global ethics and politics, from an existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchist point of view, these five radical proposals—

1. Truly Generous Universal Basic Income (TGUBI):

Anyone 21 years of age or over and living permanently in the USA, who has a personal yearly income of \$50,000 USD or less, and who is mentally and physically capable of requesting their UBI, would receive \$25,000 USD per year, with no strings attached.

2. A 15-Hour Workweek for Universal Basic Jobs (FHW-for-UBJs):

Anyone 18 years of age or older who is living permanently in the USA, who has completed a high school education, and is mentally and physically capable of doing a job, would be offered an *eco-job*, paying a yearly wage of \$25,000 USD, for *no more than* fifteen hours of work per week.

3. Universal Free Higher Education Without Commodification (HEWC):

Everyone would be offered, beyond their high-school education, a free, three-year minimum, optional (but also open-ended beyond those three years, as a further option), part-time or full-time universal public education program in the so-called "liberal arts," and also in some of the so-called "STEM" fields, including the humanities, the fine arts, the social sciences, mathematics, and the natural sciences.

4. Universal Free Healthcare (UFH):

Every human person living permanently in the USA would receive free lifelong healthcare.

5. 2-Phase Universal Open Borders (2P-UOB):

Phase 1: Starting in 2021, there will be universal open borders with Canada and Mexico, and everyone who moves across those borders and then claims residence in

the USA, will receive *temporary or permanent residence in the USA* and also *full membership in the system of UBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH in the* USA, with the precise number of new temporary or permanent residents to depend on the current availability of

(i) adequate funding for TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, and UFH, and (ii) adequate living accommodation,

in the USA, provided that all new residents also fully respect the human dignity of everyone else in the USA and elsewhere in the world.

Phase 2: Also starting in 2021, the USA, Canada, and Mexico will collectively form a Global Refugee Consortium (GRC), with three-way open borders to any political refugee, economic refugee, or asylum seeker from anywhere in the world (aka "global refugees"), who will receive temporary or permanent residence in the USA, Canada, or Mexico, and also full membership in the system of TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH in the three GRC countries, with the precise number of new temporary or permanent residents, and the precise distribution of new residents among the three members of the GRC, to depend on the current availability of

(i) funding for TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, and UFH, and (ii) adequate living accommodation,

in the three GRC countries, provided that all new residents also fully respect the human dignity of everyone else in the GRC and elsewhere in the world.

Now I am also proposing Universal No-Guns (UNG), which says:


No one in the US, including police, internal security forces of all kinds, armies, and intelligence forces of all kinds, has the moral right to possess or use guns of any kind, for any purpose whatsoever, because the primary function of guns is coercion, and coercion is rationally unjustified and immoral.

In turn, UNG would be implemented by repealing the 2nd Amendment to the US Constitution in 2021 and then universally banning the possession or use of guns thereafter. Many countries already seriously restrict the possession and use of guns, with significant benefits for all involved; therefore UNG would radically extend and increase those benefits. It is of course obvious that UNG would have to be implemented in very carefully-designed stages, so as to ensure a non-violent, safe transition from gun-free sub-zone1 to gun-free sub-zone2, etc. And as I mentioned above, in the devolutionary period immediately after the repeal of the 2nd Amendment, particularly, it might be necessary to create a small public caches of guns, owned by no one, in certain communities, for use under special, critical conditions, for last-resort, defensive, protective, and preventive

moral force, by those who have volunteered to help others in this way. But these would be designed to wither away. In any case, I hereby emphasize and re-emphasize what I noted earlier, namely, that UNG would be implemented by, first, repealing the 2nd Amendment and then, second, universally banning the possession or use of guns thereafter in a step-by-step, zone-by-zone way, by COMBINING the process of civilian gun abolition with a step-by-step, zone-by-zone police, internal security, military, and intelligence force disarmament, and "the end of policing."

Whenever I describe the very idea of UNG to American acquaintances and friends– including the most thoughtful, open-minded, left-leaning, or politically radical among them–they initially or typically get a wide-eyed, horrified look on their faces, shake their heads convulsively, and say that repealing The 2nd Amendment is "impossible." As they do this, I am vividly reminded of the mind-controlled characters in The Manchurian Candidate who, when questioned, automatically intone that "Raymond Shaw is the kindest, bravest, warmest, most wonderful human being I've ever known in my life," even when they know in their hearts that this is completely false.

So it is exceptionally important to point out explicitly what every American already knows in their heart-of-hearts, namely, that there is a perfectly clear and effective democratic procedure for repealing Constitutional amendments; and that other Constitutional amendments have actually been repealed: so in that sense, repealing the 2nd Amendment is actually easy and simple, not in any way "impossible." The people of the USA created and instituted the Second Amendment; and the repeal process is written into the Constitution itself; therefore, the people of the US can repeal the Second Amendment.






Figure 1. The U.S. Constitutional Amendment Process.

In this way, The Constitution of the US *was originally made to be amended*. And in order to prove this, just read the following description provided by the U.S. National Archives.¹⁹⁷

Constitutional Amendment Process

The authority to amend the Constitution of the United States is derived from Article V of the Constitution. After Congress proposes an amendment, the Archivist of the United States, who heads the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), is charged with responsibility for administering the ratification process under the provisions of 1 U.S.C. 106b. The Archivist has delegated many of the ministerial duties associated with this function to the Director of the Federal Register. Neither Article V of the Constitution nor section 106b describe the ratification process in detail. The Archivist and the Director of the Federal Register follow procedures and customs established by the Secretary of State, who performed these duties until 1950, and the Administrator of General Services, who served in this capacity until NARA assumed responsibility as an independent agency in 1985.

The Constitution provides that an amendment may be proposed either by the Congress with a two-thirds majority vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate or by a constitutional convention called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures. None of the 27 amendments to the Constitution have been proposed by constitutional convention. The Congress proposes an amendment in the form of a joint resolution. Since the President does not have a constitutional role in the amendment process, the joint resolution does not go to the White House for signature or approval. The original document is forwarded directly to NARA's Office of the Federal Register (OFR) for processing and publication. The OFR also assembles an information package for the States which includes formal "red-line" copies of the joint resolution, copies of the joint resolution in slip law format, and the statutory procedure for ratification under 1 U.S.C. 106b.

The Archivist submits the proposed amendment to the States for their consideration by sending a letter of notification to each Governor along with the informational material prepared by the OFR. The Governors then formally submit the amendment to their State legislatures or the state calls for a convention, depending on what Congress has specified. In the past, some State legislatures have not waited to receive official notice before taking action on a proposed amendment. When a State ratifies a proposed amendment, it sends the Archivist an original or certified copy of the State action, which is immediately conveyed to the Director of the Federal Register. The OFR examines ratification documents for facial legal sufficiency and an authenticating signature. If the documents are found to be in good order, the Director acknowledges receipt and maintains custody of them. The OFR retains these documents until an amendment is adopted or fails, and then transfers the records to the National Archives for preservation.

A proposed amendment becomes part of the Constitution as soon as it is ratified by three-fourths of the States (38 of 50 States). When the OFR verifies that it has received the required number of authenticated ratification documents, it drafts a formal proclamation for the Archivist to certify that the amendment is valid and has become part of the

Constitution. This certification is published in the Federal Register and U.S. Statutes at Large and serves as official notice to the Congress and to the Nation that the amendment process has been completed.

Moreover, the US Constitution *has actually been amended many times*. And in order to prove this, here is a brief summary of the 27 ratified amendments.¹⁹⁸

Ratified amendments

Synopsis of each ratified amendment

No.	Subject	Date submitted for Ratification ^[4]		Ratification time span
<u>1st</u>	Prohibits Congress from making any law respecting an establishment of religion, impeding the free exercise of religion, abridging the freedom of speech, infringing on the freedom of the press, interfering with the right to peaceably assemble or prohibiting the petitioning for a governmental redress of grievances.	September 25, 1789	December 15, 1791	2 years 2 months 20 days
<u>2nd</u>	Protects the <u>right to keep and bear arms</u> .	September 25, 1789	1791	2 months 20 days
<u>3rd</u>	Places restrictions on the <u>quartering</u> of soldiers in private homes without the owner's consent, prohibiting it during peacetime.	September 25, 1789	December 15, 1791	2 years 2 months 20 days
<u>4th</u>	Prohibits unreasonable <u>searches and seizures</u> and sets out requirements for <u>search warrants</u> based on <u>probable cause</u> as determined by a neutral judge or magistrate.	September 25, 1789	December 15, 1791	2 years 2 months 20 days
<u>5th</u>	Sets out rules for <u>indictment</u> by <u>grand jury</u> and <u>eminent domain</u> , protects the right to <u>due</u> <u>process</u> , and prohibits <u>self-incrimination</u> and <u>double jeopardy</u> .	September 25, 1789	December 15, 1791	2 years 2 months 20 days
<u>6th</u>	Protects the right to a <u>fair</u> and <u>speedy public</u> <u>trial by jury</u> , including the rights to be notified of the <u>accusations</u> , to <u>confront the accuser</u> , to <u>obtain witnesses</u> and to retain <u>counsel</u> .	September 25, 1789	December 15, 1791	2 years 2 months 20 days
<u>7th</u>	Provides for the right to <u>trial by jury</u> in certain <u>civil cases</u> , according to <u>common law</u> .	September 25, 1789	December 15, 1791	2 years 2 months 20 days
<u>8th</u>	Prohibits excessive <u>fines</u> and excessive <u>bail</u> , as well as <u>cruel and unusual punishment</u> .	September 25, 1789	December 15, 1791	2 years 2 months 20 days
<u>9th</u>	Protects <u>rights not enumerated</u> in the Constitution.	September 25, 1789	December 15, 1791	2 years 2 months 20 days

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<u>10th</u>	Reinforces the principle of <u>federalism</u> by stating that the <u>federal government</u> possesses only those powers delegated to it by the states or the people through the Constitution.	September 25, 1789	December 15, 1791	2 years 2 months 20 days
<u>11th</u>	Makes states immune from suits from out-of- state citizens and foreigners not living within the state borders; lays the foundation for <u>sovereign immunity</u> .	March 4, 1794	February 7, 1795	11 months 3 days
<u>12th</u>	Revises <u>presidential election</u> procedures.	December 9, 1803	June 15, 1804	6 months 6 days
<u>13th</u>	Abolishes <u>slavery</u> , and <u>involuntary servitude</u> , except as punishment for a crime.	January 31, 1865	December 6, 1865	10 months 6 days
<u>14th</u>	Defines <u>citizenship</u> , contains the <u>Privileges or</u> <u>Immunities Clause</u> , the <u>Due Process Clause</u> , the <u>Equal Protection Clause</u> , and deals with post- <u>Civil War</u> issues.	June 13, 1866	July 9, 1868	2 years 0 months 26 days
<u>15th</u>	Prohibits the denial of <u>the right to vote</u> based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude.	February 26, 1869	February 3, 1870	11 months 8 days
<u>16th</u>	Permits Congress to levy an <u>income tax</u> without apportioning it among the <u>states</u> or basing it on the <u>United States Census</u> .	July 12, 1909	February 3, 1913	3 years 6 months 22 days
<u>17th</u>	Establishes the direct election of <u>United States</u> <u>Senators</u> by popular vote.	May 13, 1912	April 8, 1913	3 10 months 26 days
<u>18th</u>	Prohibited the <u>manufacturing or sale of alcohol</u> within the United States. (Repealed December 5, 1933)	December 18, 1917	January 16, 1919	1 year 0 months 29 days
<u>19th</u>	Prohibits the denial of <u>the right to vote based</u> on sex.	June 4, 1919	August 18, 1920	1 year 2 months 14 days
<u>20th</u>	Changes the date on which the terms of the President and Vice President (January 20) and Senators and Representatives (January 3) end and begin.	March 2, 1932	January 23, 1933	10 months 21 days
<u>21st</u>	Repeals the <u>18th Amendment</u> and makes it a federal offense to transport or import intoxicating liquors into US states and territories where such transport or importation is prohibited by the laws of those states and territories.	February 20, 1933	December 5, 1933	9 months 15 days

22nd Limits the number of times that a person can be elected president: a person cannot be elected president more than twice, and a person who has served more than two years of a term to which someone else was elected cannot be elected more than once.	e March 24, 1947	February 27, 1951	3 years 11 month 6 days
<u>23rd</u> Grants the <u>District of Columbia</u> electors (the number of electors being equal to the least populous state) in the <u>Electoral College</u> .	June 16, 1960	March 29, 1961	9 months 12 days
24th Prohibits the revocation of voting rights due to the non-payment of a <u>poll tax</u> or any other tax.	September 14, 1962	January 23, 1964	1 year 4 months 27 days
25th Addresses succession to the Presidency and establishes procedures both for filling a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, as well as responding to Presidential disabilities.	July 6, 1965	February 10, 1967	1 year 7 months 4 days
<u>26th</u> Prohibits the denial of the right of US citizens, eighteen years of age or older, to vote on account of age.	March 23, 1971	July 1, 1971	3 months 8 days
27th Delays laws affecting Congressional salary from taking effect until after the next election of <u>representatives</u> .	September 25, 1789	May 5, 1992 ^[5]	202 years 7 months 10 days

Figure 2. Summary of ratified amendments to the US Constitution.

Again: the US Constitution was originally made to be amended and has actually been amended many times.

Now, why has the Constitution been amended? I draw your special attention to the 13th, 14th, 18th, 19th, and 21st amendments. These amendments abolished slavery, introduced Prohibition of the manufacture or sale of alcohol, abolished the denial of the right to vote based on sex, and repealed Prohibition. In other words, the US Constitution has been amended whenever the American people collectively deem that the existing Constitution is rationally unjustified and immoral, and must be changed for the better.

I know full well that pro-gun, pro-Second Amendment people are very apt to fulminate against those who disagree with them, in an attempt to silence their anti-gun "enemies of the people" or "public enemies"¹⁹⁹ even to the point of threatening to shoot them, or actually shooting them. But that these pro-gun, pro-2nd Amendment people would be willing threaten to shoot or actually shoot other people merely for disagreeing with them and rationally defending the contrary, in view of the 1st Amendment, which politically protects freedom of expression, only provides a further self-evident proof of the political goodness and rightness of UNG.

Here are two individually excellent and conjointly decisive reasons for implementing UNG together with TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, UFH, and 2-Phase UOB.

First, although it is true that, under the system of TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, UFH, and 2-Phase UOB, not only would no one ever suffer from poverty or economic oppression again, forever; not only would no one who is mentally and physically capable of working ever have to be either unemployed or do a shit job instead of pursuing their lifework, forever; not only would no one who has completed high school ever be denied access to higher education again, forever; not only would no one ever suffer from cultural conflict and the institutional sociopathy of closed borders again, forever; nevertheless, if UNG were not implemented starting in 2021, then everyone living permanently in the US would still be constantly at risk of being coerced or killed by guns.

Second, therefore, under the system of TGUBI, FHW-for-UBJs/eco-jobs, HEWC, UFH, and two-phase UOB, not only would no one ever suffer from poverty or economic oppression again, forever; not only would no one who is mentally and physically capable of working ever have to be either unemployed or do a shit job instead of pursuing their lifework, forever; not only would no one who has completed high school ever be denied access to higher education again, forever; not only would cultural conflict in the US and the institutional sociopathy of closed borders be ended forever; but also gun violence in the US would be ended, forever.

3.9 NOTHING WILL BE LEFT UNAFFECTED 1: MARRIAGE REFORM

It is more than merely reasonable to think that implementing the six-part *Utopia Now* package *will not leave any other important social facts unaffected*.

A leading example is marriage. Under *Utopia Now*, it would be highly reasonable to conceive of marriage as strictly a consensual moral bond for interpersonal mutual love and mutual caring, including natural or adopted children, with minimal legal requirements and implications. Anyone 18 years of age or over who is capable of consenting would be able to marry anyone else just by mutually consenting. Polygamy would be legalized: hence marriage could involve any number of people, provided they were all 18 years of age or older and mutually consented. Divorce, in turn, would be declarative and unilateral: hence anyone who is capable of making a divorce declaration would be able to divorce any or all their spouses just by officially stating this. Care of children of marriages ended by divorce would be arranged by mutual or mediated negotiation.

These reforms, in turn, would interact in extremely liberating ways with TGUBI, FHW-for-UNBJs, HEWC, and UFH. It is self-evident—even if, initially, somewhat shocking and unconventional—how *all sorts* of flourishing and permanent households could be formed with several married adults sharing their individual TGUBI + eco-job incomes, enjoying the benefits of free healthcare for everyone, taking turns looking after

children, if any, while also pursuing other lifework projects, and intellectually supplementing these projects by engaging in regular higher education without commodification. If that emancipatory picture of family life is not neo-utopian, nothing is.

3.10 NOTHING WILL BE LEFT UNAFFECTED 2: Abolishing Crime-and-Punishment

MIRANDA: O, wonder! How many goodly creatures are there here! How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world, That has such people in't!²⁰⁰

Under *Utopia Now*, given UNG, gun violence would no longer exist. And without gun violence, America would truly be *a brave, new world* in Shakespeare's original *utopian* sense—the sense optimistically and unironically intended by Miranda, not Aldous Huxley's mid-20th century pessimistic, ironic, *dystopian* sense. Just how brave and just how new? Here are two ways of thinking about it.

First, in his breakthrough book, *The End of Policing*, Alex Vitale compellingly argues this—

The massive increases in policing and incarceration over the last forty years rest on an ideological argument that crime and disorder are the results of personal failing and can only be reduced by harsh punitive sanctions. This neoconservative approach protects and reinforces the political, social, and economic disenfranchisment of millions who are tightly controlled by aggressive and invasive policing or warehoused in jails and prisons.

We must break these intertwined systems of oppression. Every time we look to the police and prisons to solve our problems, we reinforce these processes. We cannot demand that the police get rid of those "annoying" homeless people or the "threatening" youth on the corner an simultaneously call for affordable housing and youth jobs, because the state is only offering the former and will deny us the latter every time. Yes, communities deserve protection from crime and even disorder, but we must always demand them without reliance on the coercion, violence, and humiliation that undergird our criminal justice system.²⁰¹

Second, in a fascinating *New York Times* article,²⁰² Khalil Gibran Muhammed accurately and movingly describes what I will call *The Crime-&-Punishment Machine in America*:

Two new books offer timely and complementary ways of understanding America's punitive culture and, in the process, stark pleas to abolish it. In "Locking Up Our Own," James Forman Jr. explains how and why an influx of black "firsts" took the municipal reins

of government after the civil rights movement only to unleash the brutal power of the criminal justice system on their constituents; in "A Colony in a Nation," Chris Hayes shows that throughout American history, freedom—despite all the high-minded ideals—has often entailed the subjugation of another....

Drawing heavily on personal experiences as a white kid growing up in the crack-era Bronx and attending a magnet school on the border of East Harlem, much of Hayes's book unfolds along the axis of two "distinct regimes" in America. One for whites, what he calls the Nation; the other for blacks, what he calls the Colony. "In the Nation, you have rights; in the Colony, you have commands," Hayes explains. "In the Nation, you are innocent until proven guilty; in the Colony, you are born guilty."....

Many historians have long noted that black folk are simultaneously overpoliced and underprotected. Hayes writes that violence by police or by gangs are "two sides of the same coin." As such, the Nation evinces a peculiar circular logic: The harm black people do to one another "justifies" the harm the state does in their name. By contrast, the premium on white victimization in the Nation is "painfully clear to people living in the Colony," Hayes writes. "White lives matter, and it hardly needs to be spoken."

In other words, what has happened in America—the wages of its original sin of slavery—is that coercive, punitive laws and a corresponding system of incarceration applying to everyone, whether white or non-white, are then specifically applied in a brutal, discriminatory way to non-white people, especially black people. Notice, moreover, that the very idea of a "criminal act" is defined wholly in terms of *the coercive authoritarian, punitive laws that forbid that act, backed up by the threat of legal violence via the police and legal punishment via the prison system*: without the coercive authoritarian, punitive law that forbids an act, there is no such thing as a "criminal act" that violates that law, and therefore no ground whatsoever for legal violence or legal punishment.

Now in America, when anyone, especially non-white people and extra-especially black people, *react against* the coercive authoritarian, punitive laws that are used to criminalize them, imprison them in large numbers, or kill them—whether by police gun violence or by capital punishment—by committing even more "crimes," then this fact, which has actually been caused and created by the coercive authoritarian, punitive laws and their brutal, discriminatory application, is self-servingly used as a sufficient reason to create and justify *harsher, more coercive authoritarian, more punitive laws*, that are then applied to everyone, but in an increasingly brutal, discriminatory way to non-white people and especially black people.

On top of that, as the two books (one of which won a Pulitzer Prize) discussed by Muhammed show, it is *not only white people in America* who create and self-servingly "justify" these harsher, more coercive, more punitive laws, and the corresponding incarceration system, that are then applied to everyone, but in an increasingly brutal, discriminatory way to non-white people, and especially black people: it is also *non-white people, and especially black people, who do this very same thing to other non-white, and*

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especially black, people. This bizarre, tragic, sociopolitical twist by which oppressed people become themselves the oppressors of other oppressed people is simply yet another case, here extended over a whole generation of post-Civil-Rights-era, non-white, and especially black, law-makers and law-enforcement officers, of internalizing the oppressor.

Here is how Muhammed eloquently concludes his article:

Taken together "A Colony in a Nation" and "Locking Up Our Own" compel readers to wrestle with some very tough questions about the nature of American democracy and its deep roots in racism, inequality and punishment. Both authors find hope in a shared vision of a future society that protects human dignity and seeks accountability rather than vengeance. "What would the politics of crime look like in a place where people worried not only about victimization but also about the costs of overly punitive policing and prosecution?" Hayes asks. Forman imagines redefining our core values: "What if we strove for compassion, for mercy, for forgiveness? And what if we did this for everybody, including people who have harmed others?"

Because, finally, there may be no pathway to end mass incarceration without reconsidering our handling of all crimes, not just nonviolent ones. Fifty-three percent of all state prisoners are serving time for violent offenses, most commonly robbery. Racism and mass incarceration are systemic problems, but both Forman and Hayes show that the solution will lie not only with policy changes but with individual changes of heart too.

Forman recalls that a 16-year-old he defended was saved from incarceration by the testimony of the victim, who told the judge he didn't want the teenager to be sent to prison. A system built to make "teeth rattle," as described by Atlanta's first black mayor, Maynard Jackson, is not a system capable of transformation; we need to build a new foundation. We need to choose to do it. "Mass incarceration," Forman writes, "was constructed incrementally, and it may have to be dismantled the same way."²⁰³

From an existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist point of view, I could not agree more with both Vitale and Muhammed. More precisely, all punishment is coercive. And all coercion is rationally unjustified and immoral because it inherently involves treating people as mere means or mere things, backed up by violence or threats of violence, in order to promote self-interested, Utilitarian, or other consequentialist ends of the coercer. Hence *all punishment is immoral*, whether its purported justification is retributive, deterrent, rehabilitative, or restitutional. Moreover, "crimes" are so-defined in relation to coercive authoritarian, punitive laws. But all coercive authoritarian, punitive laws are rationally injustifed and immoral. Therefore all "crime-&-punishment" systems, whether in the USA or in any other State, are also rationally unjustified and immoral.

So let me now "wrestle with some very tough questions about the nature of American democracy and its deep roots in racism, inequality and punishment," by going directly to the heart of the matter, and raising this amazingly hard question:

How can we go about devolving, dismantling, and exiting The Crime-&-Punishment Machine in America?

Here are two radical thoughts in that direction.

First, as I argued in section 3.8, given UNG, by means of repealing the 2nd Amendment, we would have universally abolished the legal right to the possession and use of guns in the USA, *especially including their possession and use by the police*. Correspondingly, whether most Americans believe it or not,²⁰⁴ there are at least five other contemporary States in which police do *not* use guns—Iceland, Ireland, Britain, New Zealand, and Norway—and yet everything works out quite well. Above all, in then abolishing the possession and use of guns in the USA, especially including their possession and use by the police, we would thereby *end police gun violence*, which is an essential feature of The Crime-&-Punishment Machine in America.

Second, and most importantly, we would de-criminalize everything, and shut down all prisons, by simply getting rid of all coercive authoritarian, punitive laws. Non-coerciveauthroritarian, non-punitive "laws," aka social principles, would still be acceptable, important, and even necessary for society: but their purpose would be solely to provide wise, apt guidelines for creating, operating, and sustaining all and only constructive, enabling social institutions for our mutual aid, benefit, and self-realization, guided above all by universal respect for human dignity and universal resistance against human oppression.

The most obvious objection to what we have just argued is this:

"Supposing that these radical proposals for dismantling The Crime-&-Punishment Machine in America were enacted, then how then could we ever defend and protect innocent people against the bad acts of bad people or prevent these bad acts from happening?"

Here is my reply. Although all coercion is rationally unjustified and immoral, nevertheless, as I have argued above, *minimal sufficiently effective, last resort, defensive, protective, and preventive moral force* is *morally permissible*, precisely because its fundamental aim is to support and sustain human dignity. Correspondingly, I will contextually define "minimal sufficiently effective, last resort, defensive, protective, and preventive moral force" as follows:

A rational human agent *X* is using minimal sufficiently effective, last resort, defensive, protective, and preventive moral force if and only if *X*, as a last resort, only either uses the smallest sufficiently effective level of violence or threat of violence, or deploys the smallest sufficiently effective threat of appreciable, salient harm, in order to defend against, protect against, or prevent, *X* her/himself, or someone else, being coerced, or having their human dignity directly violated.

In view of that, when people are threatened, or about to be harmed, by bad people, we not only *morally can* but also *morally should* protect and defend those people against those bad people, and prevent this harm from happening. But this protection, defense, and prevention would *not* involve crime-&-punishment, and would *never* involve either the ownership or possession and use of guns²⁰⁵ or incarceration.

This leads me to a doctrine I call *Existential Kantian Cosmopolitan Social Anarchism About Crime-&-Punishment*. Existential Kantian Cosmopolitan Social Anarchism About Crime-&-Punishment rejects The Crime-&-Punishment Machine, whether in America or anywhere else, from top to bottom. Now The Crime-&-Punishment Machine is a monstrous, Leviathan-size fusion of

- (i) institutionalized vengeance,
- (ii) Utilitarian social engineering, and
- (iii) Statism.

Correspondingly, this monstrous fusion is directly reflected in the retributive, deterrent, rehabilitative, and restitutional philosophical theories of punishment.²⁰⁶ Therefore, under *Utopia Now*, in order to reject the very idea of crime-&punishment, and along with that, in order to dismantle The Crime-&-Punishment Machine in America, or anywhere else, the core assumptions of

- (i) institutionalized vengeance,
- (ii) Utilitarian social engineering, and
- (iii) Statism

must *all* be rejected. So as per *Utopia Now*, I hereby make three radical counter-offers to those rejected assumptions.

First, instead of institutionalized vengeance, we would counter-offer institutionalized *forgiveness*. This means that in a post-crime-&-punishment world, there would be no coercive, punitive laws, hence there would be *no guilt under the law*. It also means that since there would be no criminalization, there would also be *no criminals*.

Second, instead of Utilitarian social engineering, we would counter-offer *Kantian existential responsibilism*. This means providing a social-institutional backdrop that makes it really possible for people *to take deep moral responsibility*²⁰⁷ for the bad and wrong things they have done, and change their lives for the better, in pursuit of principled authenticity, which includes serious commitments to respect for human dignity, resisting oppression, and mutual aid, hence a serious commitment to helping victims.

And third, instead of Statism, we would counter-offer *existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism*.

In a post-crime-&-punishment world, there would be *no legal violence*, especially including *no capital punishment*, which is simply legalized State coercion, by means of killing someone in order to punish them after the unchangeable and irreversible fact of some (actual or supposed) wrongdoing. There would be no possession and use of guns, hence *no gun violence*, hence *no legal gun violence on the part of the police*. Indeed, *there would no such thing as the police*, as we currently know them. And there would be *no prisons*, hence no *mass incarceration*. The protection of the innocent, and of people generally, from being threatened or harmed by bad people, would be guaranteed by the principle of minimal sufficiently effective, last resort, defensive, protective, and preventive moral force.

It remains true that if the state of things were to reach a special crisis situation, such that the well-being or lives of people were imminently threatened, or they were on the verge of being coerced or otherwise harmed, then we *might* have to use some minimally sufficiently effective, last resort, defensive, protective, and preventive means for neutralizing gun violence or other forms of violence, or for temporarily restraining someone. And in some extreme cases, this *might* involve the permissible use of guns, although never the ownership or possession of guns. So, again, *legal gun violence*, especially by the police, *capital punishment*, and *prisons* would all be abolished. And in this way, the racist, discriminatory use of police gun violence, capital punishment, and prisons, whether in America or anywhere else, would also all be abolished. Hence the violence-neutralizing or temporary restraining that would sometimes be necessary in special crisis situations, would be as infinitely far from The Crime-&-Punishment Machine in America as *Utopia Now* is from *earthly hell*.

3.11 ON COGNITIVE WALLS

Does what I have been arguing and proposing feel bad, disobedient, and shocking to you, even if you are able to understand, and also, in some sense, rationally accept my arguments? If so, then there is a psychological reason for this, that I am going to explore in this section.

As Robert Frost famously and rightly wrote,²⁰⁸ "something there is that doesn't love a wall." When President Donald Trump called for the construction of a *physical wall* along the southern US border in order to exclude and persecute Mexicans, or when he signed an executive order creating a *legal wall* in order to exclude and persecute travelers, immigrants, or refugees from predominantly Muslim countries, those acts were and are both rationally unjustifiable and immoral, if what I have argued about culture wars and open borders in section 3.6 is sound. But there is another kind of wall that is even more morally insidious and pernicious: what I call a *cognitive wall*.

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A cognitive wall is an entrenched or habitual belief, memory, stereotypical mental image, feeling, or emotion that acts as an effective screen against reality and the truth as it actually presented by sense perception, reliable testimonial evidence, or rational argument. A simple, morally benign example of a cognitive wall is the fact that ordinary, healthy people with normal stereoscopic vision all have their noses right in the middle of their visual fields, yet normally do not see them at all. Hence the familiar admonishing comment, "it's as plain as the nose on your face!" Of course, the nose-blindness phenomenon can be easily corrected by someone else's touching (or punching) your nose, or by self-consciously touching your own nose, crossing your eyes inwards, or looking in a mirror. Nevertheless other cases of cognitive walls, by sharp contrast, are not only extremely hard to correct, but also morally malignant.

Take, for example, the sociological and psychological phenomena known as *the persistence of false beliefs* and *the backfire effect*.²⁰⁹ By way of a helpful brief summary of the relevant empirical research, Tristan Bridges writes this:

Facts about all manner of things have made headlines recently as the Trump administration continues to make statements, reports, and policies at odds with things we know to be true. Whether it's about the size of his inauguration crowd, patently false and fear-mongering inaccuracies about transgender persons in bathrooms, rates of violent crime in the U.S., or anything else, lately it feels like the facts don't seem to matter. The inaccuracies and misinformation continue despite the earnest attempts of so many to correct each falsehood after it is made. It's exhausting. But why is it happening?....

There is more than one reason this is happening. But, one reason I think the alternative facts industry has been so effective has to do with a concept social scientists call the "backfire effect." As a rule, misinformed people do not change their minds once they have been presented with facts that challenge their beliefs. But, beyond simply not changing their minds when they should, research shows that they are likely to become more attached to their mistaken beliefs. The factual information "backfires." When people don't agree with you, research suggests that bringing in facts to support your case might actually make them believe you less. In other words, fighting the ill-informed with facts is like fighting a grease fire with water. It seems like it should work, but it's actually going to make things worse.

To study this, Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler (2010) conducted a series of experiments. They had groups of participants read newspaper articles that included statements from politicians that supported some widespread piece of misinformation. Some of the participants read articles that included corrective information that immediately followed the inaccurate statement from the political figure, while others did not read articles containing corrective information at all.

Afterward, they were asked a series of questions about the article and their personal opinions about the issue. Nyhan and Reifler found that how people responded to the factual corrections in the articles they read varied systematically by how ideologically committed

they already were to the beliefs that such facts supported. Among those who believed the popular misinformation in the first place, more information and actual facts challenging those beliefs did not cause a change of opinion—in fact, it often had the effect of strengthening those ideologically grounded beliefs.²¹⁰

In other words, the backfire effect shows that cognitive walls, especially those concerning false beliefs, memories, stereotypical mental images, feelings, or emotions are *self-reinforcing*. The more you try to confront a person's cognitive walls with contrary correct facts, the higher and thicker he builds his walls, without even knowing what he is doing and fully convinced that he is in the right. So cognitive walls are the basic vehicles of self-induced, self-deceiving mental slavery.

The reason for this, clearly, is that a person's cognitive walls are essentially of two different kinds:

(i) walls concerning her/his sense of *individual identity* as a real human person, and(ii) walls concerning her/his sense of *group identity* as a "card-carrying" member of some important social community or institution.

Breaking through or tearing down those cognitive walls in any way, therefore, would mean that he would have to undertake a fundamental change of heart or a fundamental shift in group allegiance—in effect, *a cognitive revolution*—and most people are desperately afraid of doing this. Paradoxically, moreover, as George Orwell's *1984* and the psychological literature on "mind control"²¹¹ clearly show,

(i) although cognitive walls themselves not only *can be* but also almost always *are* coercively compelled or imposed from the outside, most often without our even realizing it,

(ii) nevertheless breaking through or tearing down cognitive walls is a *self-conscious act of free will* whereby the subject takes moral responsibility for who he is as an individual or as a social being, hence it cannot be coercively compelled or imposed from the outside.

Self-liberation from mental slavery can only be encouraged, or primed, by a public process of critical, radically enlightening self-education in which the students and educators are reciprocally learning from and teaching each other. That being so, what can be done about breaking through and tearing down the rationally unjustified and immoral physical, legal, and cognitive walls in a contemporary context?

First, we must clearly recognize that cognitive walls are the underlying psychological causes of Trump-style physical and legal walls.

Second, therefore, if we want to resist Trump-style physical and legal walls in a way that is truly effective, then we will have to address their underlying causes, people's cognitive walls, by means of a public process of critical, radically enlightening selfeducation in which the students and the educators are reciprocally learning from and teaching each other. Putting the same basic point graphically, this is precisely what Stephan Lewandowsky and his co-researchers propose in "Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and Successful Debiasing"²¹²—




Figure 3. Techniques for successful cognitive debiasing.

Third, above all, as philosophical educators in the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist tradition, rationally responding to the backfire effect by "affirming worldview" and "affirming identity" means that cognitively and morally resisting Trump-

style physical and legal walls is only the initial step in the public process of radically enlightening reciprocal self-education. All the really important work would lie in reaching out *not only* to the people who voted for Trump and who falsely believe in his physical or legal walls, *but also* to all those those *other* people who demonize, fear, and hate such people—and in both cases, reaching out with empathy, critical insight, a passionate concern for all humanity, rational self-discipline, and infinite intellectual and moral patience.

The existence of cognitive walls and our burning need for cognitive revolution and a public process of mutual cognitive self-liberation, do not obey traditional political party divisions. Or if they have any party affiliation at all, then it is only to what the 18th century French radical Enlightenment philosophers—Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau—called "the party of humanity."²¹³ And that allegiance was explicitly intended, just like Diogenes's self-description as a "citizen of the cosmos," as not only a critical rejection of all traditional political parties, but also an expression of passionate respect for human dignity and rage against human oppression. In turn, this passionate respect and this rage can both be expressed in *speech*, which is my next topic.

3.12 FREE SPEECH AND EMANCIPATORY SPEECH

Free speech is the liberty of unfettered expression in opinion, thought, and lifestyle, hence the liberty to engage in what John Stuart Mill called "experiments of living,"²¹⁴ aka *experiments in living*, and above all the liberty to express edgy, challenging beliefs and ideas by means of talk, writing, or any other communicative medium. Free speech has many important values, including scientific truth, aesthetic beauty, profound artistic or philosophical insight, and authentic self-realization—and their pursuit. But the highest value of free speech is manifest when we exercise the liberty to engage in peaceful criticism of and protests against violations of respect for human dignity and human oppression, and in peaceful resistance against immoral uses of power. This morally and politically exemplary kind of free speech is not merely "speaking truth to power," because, over and above truth per se, it is also *ethically*-driven and peacefully *rebellious*. It is, therefore, *emancipatory* speech.

There are three serious contemporary problems about free speech.

The first problem is that by virtue of his Presidential Oath of Office, which he took on 20 January 2017, Donald Trump was required to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States"; and the First Amendment to the US Constitution says that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press"; yet Trump tweeted this on 17 February 2017:

The FAKE NEWS media (failing <u>@nytimes</u>, <u>@NBCNews</u>, <u>@ABC</u>, <u>@CBS</u>, <u>@CNN</u>) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People!

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In other words, Trump spoke out publicly, *in his role as President*, against the freedom of the press, thereby *explicitly violating his Oath of Office*. This is nothing short of stupefying.

The second serious problem is that, following in Trump's faulty footsteps, others have also begun to restrict and suppress freedom of speech. Not long after Trump's stupefying Oath-of-Office-violating tweet, Tom Miles, a journalist for Reuters, wrote this:

Nineteen U.S. states have introduced bills that would curb freedom of expression and the right to protest since Donald Trump's election as president, an "alarming and undemocratic" trend, U.N. human rights investigators said on Thursday.

Concerns for free speech in the United States have risen in part because of the Republican Trump's antagonistic relations with prominent U.S. media, which he has branded "the enemy of the American people" as it has reported on policy missteps and dysfunction in his administration.

The push for stricter laws on expression has come as Trump's liberal foes have pursued public protest against his policies on issues ranging from immigration to abortion and climate change.

Maina Kiai and David Kaye, independent U.N. experts on freedom of peaceful assembly and expression respectively, said in a statement that the state bills were incompatible with international human rights law.

"The trend also threatens to jeopardize one of the United States' constitutional pillars: free speech," they said in a statement, calling for action to reverse such legislation.

"From the Black Lives Matter movement, to the environmental and Native American movements in opposition to the Dakota Access oil pipeline, and the Women's Marches, individuals and organizations across (American) society have mobilized in peaceful protests," Kiai and Kaye said.

They said it was their fundamental right to do so, but that bills in Republican-governed states like Indiana, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan and Missouri sought to stop them exercising that right.²¹⁵

But the third and perhaps most serious problem is that, clearly, neither Trump nor his followers—not to mention many, or perhaps even most, other people in the USA and other big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States—seem to be able to tell us *either* what rationally justifies free speech *or* what the moral and political limits of free speech really are.

What rationally justifies free speech? In *On Liberty*, chapter II, Mill famously attempts to provide an adequate justification of free speech on Utilitarian grounds. But Mill's attempt fails, since it is always possible that the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people, relative to that historical context and relative to what we are capable of doing by way of action in that context, will consist, precisely, *in our collectively restricting and suppressing free speech*. Mill tries to finesse this problem by re-defining the concept of utility:

I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.²¹⁶

Nevertheless, Mill's "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being" is *nothing like* the concept of utility as he defines it in *Utilitarianism*:

The creed which accepts as the foundations of morals "utility" or the "greatest happiness principle" holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness [i.e., utility] is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness [i.e., disutility], pain and the privation of pleasure.... [P]leasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and ... all desirable things ... are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.²¹⁷

Now it is of course possible to refine the Utilitarian concept of "happiness" or "utility" by defining it in terms of preference-satisfaction, or whatever. But no matter how the concept of utility is refined, when it is understood in terms of *the greatest happiness principle*, it always picks out a certain class of "felicific" or happiness-making consequences for as many people as possible, relative to that agent-centered historical context. That being so, then the Utilitarian concept of utility has nothing inherently to do either with any person's "permanent"—that is, *innate, universal, unconditional*—interests, or with any person's nature as a "progressive being," which is necessarily underdetermined by, although still consistent with, her actual or possible happiness: namely, a person's nature as *a being capable of radical enlightenment in the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist sense*.

Another standard attempt to justify free speech can be discerned in the U.N. experts' reference to "one of the United States' constitutional pillars: free speech," quoted in Miles's *Reuters* article. This is turn implies the thesis that the very idea of a modern big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democracy, as per the US, essentially requires free speech. So, according to this line of reasoning, free speech is rationally justified by the very idea of a modern big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democracy. But this in turn raises the question: what is *democracy*?

In fact, there are at least *three* different concepts of democracy at play in modern bigcapitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States:

(i) democracy as the rule of the majority of all the people qualified to vote, who then hand over the control of coercive power to an elected or appointed minority, aka *majoritarian-representative democracy*,

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(ii) democracy as the open process of critical discussion and critical examination of opinions and social institutions, and, simultaneously, the unfettered expression of different opinions and lifestyles, aka *libertarian democracy*, and

(iii) democracy as the unwavering commitments to universal respect for human dignity and autonomy, and universal resistance to human oppression, aka *ethicalemancipatory democracy*.

Notice, particularly, that the fact or phenomenon of free speech initially shows up under the *second* concept of democracy, libertarian democracy. Notoriously, however, the three concepts of democracy are *mutually logically independent*, in that they do not necessarily lead to or follow from one another.

It is really possible that what is decreed by the majority of all the people qualified to vote is in fact morally evil and wrong, aka *the problem of the tyranny of the majority*—and that is exactly what happened when the Nazis were elected by a majority of German voters in 1932–1933.²¹⁸

It is also really possible that what is decreed by the majority of the people qualified to vote is a system in which an elected or appointed powerful minority of those people can actually override the majority, aka *the problem of the tyranny of the minority*—and that is exactly what happens whenever the US Electoral College votes to elect someone, like Trump in 2016, who did not actually win the popular vote.

And finally, it is also really possible that there could be an open process of critical discussion and critical examination of opinions and social institutions, and simultaneously the unfettered expression of different lifestyles and opinions, which nevertheless leads to a situation in which universal respect for human dignity and autonomy, and universal resistance against human oppression, are in fact undermined and weakened, aka *the problem of an unconstrained, value-neutral process*—and that is exactly what happened in the case of Trump's election, via the multiple-Party system, the Primaries, and psychologically-manipulative uses of social media and the internet.²¹⁹

Therefore, the only morally and politically acceptable concept of democracy is the *third* concept, *ethical-emancipatory* democracy: democracy as the unwavering commitments to universal respect for human dignity and autonomy, and universal resistance to human oppression. This in turn entails that free speech, even though it initially shows up under the *second* concept of democracy, libertarian democracy, is in fact adequately justified *only* under the *third* concept of democracy, ethical-emancipatory democracy. And that in turn entails that the *only* adequate justification of free speech is robustly non-consequentialist and "Left Kantian."²²⁰

Correspondingly, from a robustly non-consequentialist and Left Kantian point of view, the *only* moral and political limits of free speech are:

(i) incitement to or triggering of violence,

(ii) slander (that is, malicious, false or at best half-true, and injurious speech) about individuals, and(iii) coercion.

In other words, the *only* moral and political limits of free speech are the very things that give free speech its highest value when we use it peacefully to criticize them, protest against them, and resist them, by means of *emancipatory speech*:

- (i) violations of respect for human dignity,
- (ii) human oppression, and
- (iii) immoral uses of power.

This means that merely *being offended* by someone else's speech, even *being deeply* or mortally offended by that speech, is not a moral or political limitation on their free speech. Thus profane or scatalogical speech, erotic or otherwise sexual speech, shockingly religious or shockingly anti-religious speech, "politically incorrect" speech of any kind, politically subversive speech, and emancipatory speech of all kinds, are all fully morally and politically permissible, provided that this speech does not include incitement to or triggering of violence, slander about individuals, or coercion.

Moreover, as the highest kind of free speech, emancipatory speech even transcends *democracy*, if and insofar as democracy is taken according to its first concept, the rule of the majority of all the people qualified to vote, who then hand over the control of coercive power to an elected or appointed minority, aka majoritarian-representative democracy. That is because the majority of all people qualified to vote, by means of their government, can collectively rule to restrict and suppress free speech, especially emancipatory speech. But if emancipatory speech transcends the governmental rule of the majority of all the people qualified to vote, then since the concept of the coercive social power of the votequalified majority of the people falls directly under the wider concept of the coercive social power of all or some of the people, including one person only, which are the limiting cases of "rule by the people," then emancipatory speech also implicitly transcends the rule of any human government, and directly implies philosophical and political social anarchism. Then, when we combine this social anarchist conclusion with the thesis that the only adequate justification of free speech is robustly non-consequentialist and Left Kantian, it follows that emancipatory speech is *anarcho-speech*, and also that its adequate justification flows naturally from existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism.

3.13 SINGER & ME: UTOPIA NOW VERSUS ONE WORLD NOW

The era that followed the Treaty of Westphalia was the high-water mark of the independent sovereign state. Behind the supposed inviolability of state borders, liberal democratic institutions took hold in some countries, while in others, rulers carried out genocide against their own citizens or permitted their more favored citizens to do it to less favored ones. At intervals, bloody wars broke out between the independent states. Though we may look back on that era with some nostalgia, we should not regret its passing. Instead we should be developing the ethical foundations of the coming era of a single world community.²²¹

According to the blurb on its copyright page, Peter Singer's *One World Now*, published in late 2016, is "a substantially revised version of *One World*, the first edition of which was published in 2002." I think that *One World Now*, both the book and the global ethical and political project described in it, are excellent and important; yet also, from an existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist point of view, I think that they are ethically, politically, and more generally philosophically, misguided.

Singer's basic eight-part doctrine in One World Now is that

(i) we should adopt a *fully global perspective* on ethics and politics in order to address the most pressing problems of contemporary humanity, including *global climate change, poverty and its consequences, the global crisis of displaced people, and genocide* (chs. 1-4),

(ii) where the ethical foundations are specifically Act-utilitarian and more generally act-consequentialist (esp. pp. 178-191) and

(iii) the meta-ethical foundations are provided by *non-reductive biological ethical naturalism* (esp. pp. 13, and 127-128), and

(iv) the proposed political system *transcends national state sovereignty* (esp. chs. 4-5), in order to

(v) become a single world community (ch. 5, and p. 224), by means of

(vi) creating a single coercive, interventionist, big-capitalist (neo)liberal democratic world-state (pp. 69-70, and chs. 4-5),

(vii) on a Federalist model (p. 225), that

(viii) politically supervenes on the United Nations.

More specifically, according to Singer, the United Nations

could remain open to all governments, irrespective of their form of government or observance of human rights, but it could replace the present General Assembly with a World Assembly consisting of delegates allocated to its member states in proportion to its population. The United Nations could then supervise democratic elections, in every member country, to elect this delegation. A country that refused to supervise the election of its delegation would have only one delegate, irrespective of its population. That system would provide experience in democracy for the citizens of most countries but would retain the inclusiveness that is an important feature of the United Nations.²²²

I *fully agree* with (i), (iv), and (v). And I also *quasi-agree* with (vii) and (viii), in the sense that I do think that Federalism as a political structure, detached from Statism itself, and deployed for specifically existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist purposes, as *quasi-Federalism*, can be an effective mechanism for dismantling and devolving States and State-like institutions towards a post-big-capitalist, post-(neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic, post-State, and post-State-like institutional world (see section 2.7 above). But I *sharply disagree* with (ii), (iii), and (vi).

Let me start with (vi). If existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism is correct, then Statism is rationally unjustified and immoral, no matter how a government obtains *power*, including (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States. Therefore, a (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic world-State is no more rationally justified or morally right than any other kind of State. As we have seen, the fundamental problem with Statism, whether pre-modern tyranny, oligarchy, plutocracy, theocracy, and nation-Statism of any sort, including totalitarian or non-totalitarian communism or fascism, or world-Statism, lies in its fundamental claim that we have an obligation to heed and obey the commands of governments, regardless of the moral content of those commands, simply because governments possess the coercive power to compel us to accept these commands. The kicker, of course, as I argued in part 2, is that the fundamental claim of Statism is selfevidently false. For, just as in Divine Command Ethics, a command is not rationally justified or morally right merely because an all-powerful God commands it, so too in Statism, a command is not rationally justified or morally right merely because a coercive authoritarian government commands it. If a command is rationally unjustified and morally wrong, on independent ethical grounds, then it is rationally unjustified and morally wrong, no matter what God or the government says. Therefore, Statism in general is rationally unjustified and immoral, that is, philosophical social anarchism is true, and more specifically, big capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic world-Statism is also rationally unjustified and immoral.

At one point, Singer even implicitly admits the cogency of this argument, as applied to democracy:

Democracy, in the sense of the rule of the majority, does not guarantee that human rights will be respected.²²³

Here is how the Singerian enthymeme can be filled in. Since "some degree of democracy,"²²⁴ namely, some degree of democracy under *the first or majoritarian*-*representative concept of democracy* I spelled out in section 3.12, is also being used by Singer as the criterion of moral legitimacy for States,²²⁵ it follows by Singer's own

admission that no State is morally legitimate simply by virtue of its being democratic in the sense of majoritarian-representative democracy, and therefore no State is morally legitimate simply by virtue of its being a State: that is, it follows that philosophical social anarchism is true.

Nevertheless, in the very next four sentences, without further argument or sign-posting, Singer also does an amazing philosophical switcheroo:

But a democratic process requires that the policies of government must be publicly defended and justified. They cannot simply be implemented from above. Although some of us may have the capacity to commit terrible crimes, many of us do have a moral sense, that is, a capacity to reflect on the rights and wrongs of what we are doing and what our rulers are doing. That capacity emerges in the public arena.²²⁶

This truly *is* an amazing philosophical switcheroo, by which I mean that it is a straight-up equivocation on the terms "democratic" and "democracy." Correspondingly, we need to remind ourselves explicitly of the three distinct concepts of democracy I spelled out in section 3.12:

(i) democracy as the rule of the majority of all the people qualified to vote, who then hand over the control of coercive power to an elected or appointed minority, aka majoritarian-representative democracy,

(ii) democracy as the open process of critical discussion and critical examination of opinions and social institutions, and, simultaneously, the unfettered expression of different opinions and lifestyles, aka libertarian democracy, and

(iii) democracy as the unwavering commitments to universal respect for human dignity and autonomy, and universal resistance to human oppression, aka ethicalemancipatory democracy.

In Singer's first sentence, "democratic" and "democracy" mean *socio-political facts flowing from the rule of the majority of all the people qualified to vote, who then hand over the control of coercive power to an elected or appointed minority*, that is, he is talking about majoritarian-representative democracy. In the next four sentences, however, "democratic" and "democracy" mean *socio-political facts flowing from publicly open procedures and unfettered rational scrutiny, and from our individual and collective moral sense*. In other words, in *those* four sentences, he is now talking about the *second* and *third* concepts of democracy, libertarian democracy and ethical-emancipatory democracy, and he is also running those two concepts together. As I demonstrated in section 3.12, however, the three distinct concepts of democracy are not only mutually *non-synonymous*, but also, more importantly, they are *mutually logically independent of one another*: that is, each one can apply, while the other fails to apply. Moreover, as I also argued in section 3.12, the *only* concept of democracy that is adequately justified morally and politically is the third

concept of democracy, ethical-emancipatory democracy, which in turn flows smoothly *only* from non-consequentialism and "Left Kantianism," that is, *only* from radical enlightenment in the Kantian sense, that is, *only* from existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism. Therefore, Singer's *actual*, yet rhetorically-hidden, criterion of moral and political legitimacy, covertly entails existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism.

This brings me to Singer's (ii) and (iii), namely his normative ethical commitment to act-Utilitarianism and act-consequentialism, and his meta-ethical commitment to non-reductive biological ethical naturalism. Obviously, this is not the place to undertake full-dress critiques of act-Utilitarianism and act-consequentialism, or non-reductive ethical naturalism, or full-dress defenses of existential Kantian ethics, principled non-consequentialism, or ethical anti-naturalism, for that matter. On those points, see *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence*, especially chapter 1. So instead, I will restrict myself here to pointing up some untoward and seemingly knock-down consequences of Singer's normative ethical and meta-ethical commitments for his global ethics and politics.

Act-consequentialism in general says that everyone always ought to act in such a way as to bring about good consequences for as many people (or sentient beings) as possible, and act-Utilitarianism specifically says that everyone always ought to act in such a way as to bring about pleasant, preference-satisfying, or happiness-producing and/or painreducing, preference-frustration-reducing, or unhappiness-reducing consequences for as many people (or sentient beings) as possible. It is a classical objection to actconsequentialism and act-Utilitarianism alike, that acting in strict accordance with them is not only perfectly consistent with, but might even require, a great many human rights violations, right up to genocide and other crimes against humanity. Therefore, Singer's global ethics and politics, even under conditions of perfect compliance, are not only consistent with but might even require a great many human rights violations, right up to genocide and other crimes against humanity. To put it more bluntly: according to actconsequentialism and act-utilitarianism, if, by "eliminating" 6 million+ people-namely, of course, the number of deaths usually attributed to the Nazi Holocaust, including Jews, Roma, and other kinds of people despised by the Nazis—very good consequences could be brought about for, say, 100 million other people, then we are not only morally permitted, but also morally obligated, to commit genocide and other crimes against humanity. But that is clearly morally unacceptable and also makes a mockery of Singer's explicit strong commitment to preventing genocide and other crimes against humanity in chapter 4.

Finally, what about Singer's non-reductive biological ethical naturalism?

On the face of it, there is something philosophically odd about holding on the one hand, that

(i) "[the thesis that] a sizable number of human males have the potential to be perpetrators of genocide is, in view of the evidence from ethnology, anthropology, and history, highly plausible,"²²⁷

presumably because human males are determined by evolutionary biology to be that way, while *also* holding, on the other hand, that

(ii) many of us have a "moral sense" that can counteract this bio-determinism.

Now one way to reconcile these apparently misfitting claims is to hold that

(i*) *many or most human males* are biologically determined to selfishness, mutual antagonism, and violence—that is, they are Hobbesian biochemical puppets,

and also that

(ii*) *a few human males and almost all human females (or at least, human non-males) are not so determined* but are actually capable of "forming mutually beneficial cooperative relationships,"²²⁸ and also possess a "moral sense" upon which they can act—that is, they are *not* Hobbesian biochemical puppets, but in fact morally good rational animals.

But this is prima facie absurd, even silly, and in effect reduces to the patently scientistic, overtly sexist claim that, by virtue of *their* nasty biochemical constitution, almost all human males are wicked, unsociable brutes, whereas by virtue of *their* nice biochemical constitution, almost all human females, or at least human non-males, are morally good, or at least kind, sociable creatures.

And that's not all. If non-reductive ethical naturalism is true, then the moral sense is *epiphenomenal and has no causal efficacy of its own*. So even those lucky human animals who are capable of acting on the dictates of their moral sense, *are actually naturally determined and not really free*. At this point, we are verging on some very heavy-duty metaphysical issues about *freedom* vs. *Universal Natural Determinism, Incompatibilism* vs. *Compatibilism*, and *Soft Determinism* vs. (what I call) *Natural Libertarianism*. But obviously, as before in the case of fundamental issues in meta-ethics and normative ethical theory, this is not the place to undertake full-dress discussions of fundamental issues in the metaphysics of free will and practical agency. On all those points, see *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, especially chapters 1-5.

Nevertheless, it seems very clear that any global ethics and politics grounded on actconsequentialism, act-Utilitarianism, non-reductive ethical naturalism, and Soft Determinism has many prima facie serious problems that are *not* encountered by a view, like existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism, that is grounded on principled nonconsequentialism, existential Kantian ethics, ethical anti-naturalism, and Natural Libertarianism. So I conclude that the *Utopia Now* model of global ethics and politics is all-around ethically, politically, and more generally philosophically *superior* to Singer's model in *One World Now*, while also *sharing* Singer's admirably globalist ethical and political orientation.

3.14 How to Be a Citizen of the Cosmos

[T]wo things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence (*Ehrfurcht*), the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: *the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me*. I do not need to search for them and merely conjecture them as though they were veiled in obscurity or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. (*CPrR* 5: 161-162)

II. THE HUMAN BEING OUGHT TO LEAVE THE ETHICAL STATE OF NATURE IN ORDER TO BECOME A MEMBER OF AN ETHICAL COMMUNITY

Just as the juridical state of nature is a state of war of every human being against every other, so too is the ethical state of nature one in which the good principle, which resides in each human being, is incessantly attacked by the evil which is found in him and in every other as well. Human beings (as we remarked above) mutually corrupt one another's moral predisposition and, even with the good will of each individual, because of the lack of a principle which unites them, they deviate through their dissensions from the common goal of goodness, as though they were *instruments of evil*, and expose one another to the danger of falling once again under its dominion. Further, just as the state of a lawless external (brutish) freedom and independence from coercive laws is a state of injustice and of war, each against each, which a human being ought to leave behind in order to enter into a politico-civil state, so is the ethical state of nature a *public* feuding between the principles of virtue and a state of inner immorality which the natural human being ought to endeavor to leave behind as soon as possible.

Now, here we have a duty *sui generis*, not of human beings toward human beings but of the human species (*menschlichen Geschlechts*) toward itself. (*Rel* 6: 96-97, italics in the original)

The human being knows himself only inasmuch as he knows the world; he knows the world only within himself and he is aware of himself only within the world. Each new object truly recognized, opens up a new organ [of sensibility] within ourselves.²²⁹

This final section presents four arguments in strong support of what I call *Cosmopolitan Natural Piety*.²³⁰ What I am both asserting and indeed advocating is nothing more and nothing less than an absolutely universal Kantian "cosmopolitan *moral community*" (*Rel* 6: 200) that is beyond *all* States and State-like institutions, and encompasses not just the Earth but also, in a Greek Cynic-inspired way, *the entire natural universe*. Cosmopolitan Natural Piety radically extends the existential Kantian moral

theology I defended in part 1 and the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism I defended in part 2, and also completes the *Utopia Now* program I have been presenting and defending in part 3.

The first three arguments in this section are needed in order to set up the fourth argument, which is the most important one for our purposes in this book. Bounded in a transcendental nutshell, what I want to argue by means of these four arguments is this:

Because it is as true to say that "the natural universe is inside me" as it is to say that "I am inside the natural universe," and because I have *dignity*, then the natural universe has *proto-dignity*. But since all States and State-like institutions—and specifically, big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States and State-like institutions—violate my dignity and oppress me, and must be *resisted and exited*, therefore those States and State-like institutions must also oppress *the natural universe* via, for example, their *technocracy*. So the natural universe must also be *protected by me* from this oppression, precisely to the extent that I am resisting and exiting the State and other State-like institutions.

That's Cosmopolitan Natural Piety for you.

Kant discovered the metaphysics of *transcendental idealism* between the publication of his seminal proto-Critical essay of 1768, "Concerning the Ground of the Ultimate Differentiation of Directions in Space," and 1772. Indeed, the philosophical implications of the "Directions in Space" essay almost certainly triggered the major proto-Critical philosophical break though that Kant famously reports when he says in one of the *Reflexionen* that "the year '69 gave me great light" (R 5037, 18: 69). More precisely, what Kant had discovered between 1768 and 1772 is what I have called transcendental idealism for sensibility.²³¹ In 1772, Kant told Marcus Herz that if the human mind conformed to the world, whether phenomenal or noumenal, then a priori knowledge would be impossible (PC 10: 130-131); but by 1770 Kant already also held that a priori knowledge of the phenomenal world is actual and therefore really possible in mathematics, hence the phenomenal world must conform to the non-empirical sensible structure of the human mind, and more specifically must conform to our a priori representations of space and time, since that is what makes mathematics really possible (ID 2: 398-406). So transcendental idealism for sensibility says that the apparent or phenomenal world fundamentally conforms to the essentially non-conceptual a priori forms of human sensibility, our representations of space and time.

Kant worked out explicit proofs for transcendental idealism for sensibility in the Inaugural Dissertation and again in the Transcendental Aesthetic in the first *Critique*. The simplest version of the proof, provided in the Transcendental Aesthetic, is the following.

1. Space and time are

either (i) things in themselves, or (ii) properties of/relations between things in themselves, or (iii) transcendentally ideal.

2. If space and time were either things in themselves or properties of/relations between things in themselves, then a priori mathematical knowledge would be impossible.3. But mathematical knowledge is actual, via our pure intuitions of space and time, and therefore really possible.

4. Therefore, space and time are transcendentally ideal. (CPR A 23/B37-38, A38-41/B55-58)

Briefly put, Kant's thesis of transcendental idealism says that the basic structure of the apparent or phenomenal world necessarily conforms to the pure or non-empirical (hence a priori) structure of human cognition, and not the converse (*CPR* B xvi-xviii). Or in other words, Kant is saying that the phenomenal world fundamentally conforms to the a priori structure of the human mind, and it is also *not* the case that the human mind fundamentally conforms to the phenomenal world, or indeed to any non-apparent or *noumenal* world. So if Kant is correct, then he is saying that the world in which we live, move, and have our being (by which I mean the phenomenal natural and social world of our ordinary human existence) is fundamentally dependent on *our* minded nature, and not the converse.

If transcendental idealism is true, then we cannot be inherently alienated from the world we are trying to know, as global epistemic skeptics claim, and human knowledge—not only a priori knowledge, but also a posteriori knowledge—is therefore really possible.²³²

In part 2, I presented several arguments for philosophical social anarchism. But for the purposes of this section, I will re-use this particular one.

ARGUMENT 2: Philosophical Social Anarchism

1. There is no adequate rational justification, according to the set of basic existential Kantian moral principles, for an individual real person's, or any group of real persons,' immorally commanding other people and coercing them to obey those commands as a duty.

2. Neverthless, the very idea of political authority entails that special groups of people within States or State-like institutions, namely governments, have not only the power

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to coerce, but also the right to command other people and to force them to obey those commands as a duty, even when the commands and forcing are immoral.3. So there is no adequate rational justification for political authority, States, or any other State-like institutions—therefore, philosophical social anarchism is true.

Or in other and even fewer words:

Human *governments* have no moral right to do to other people what *human persons* have no moral right to do to other people, according to the set of basic existential Kantian moral principles; yet *all* human governments falsely claim this supposed moral right; hence philosophical social anarchism is true.

Kantian transcendental idealism for sensibility, when taken together with some central claims of Kantian aesthetics and some self-evident Kantian phenomenology, jointly provide an argument for this thesis:

The natural universe is the metaphysical ground of all human persons and their autonomous dignity.

I will call this thesis *The Natural Universe is Our Spiritual Home*. The seven-step argument for The Natural Universe is Our Spiritual Home thesis fuses the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first *Critique* with a Kantian aesthetics of the beautiful and the sublime in the natural environment in the third *Critique*, and a Kantian self-evident phenomenology of our experience of "reverence" (*Ehrfurcht*) for the manifestly real natural universe and human nature, at the very end of the second *Critique*.

ARGUMENT 3: The Natural Universe is Our Spiritual Home

1. Given the truth of transcendental idealism for sensibility, then we can take fully seriously the sensibility-grounded, essentially non-conceptual evidence provided by the aesthetic experience of beauty in the natural universe, as veridically tracking natural purposive form, without a purpose, in a way that is inherently disinterested and therefore divorced from all possible self-interest (CPJ 5: 204-211). In short, our experience of beauty in the natural universe shows us that the natural universe cannot be and ought not to be regarded or treated purely instrumentally, that is, merely as a means, or exploited.

2. Given the truth of transcendental idealism for sensibility, and our experience of beauty in the natural universe , then we can also take fully seriously the Romantic/natural-religious/natural-theological reverential experience of what Kant calls "the mathematically sublime in nature," for example, "the starry heavens above

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me." To make this kind of "Romantic/natural-religious/natural-theological reverential experience" phenomenologically vivid to yourself, either stand outside on a clear, moonless night at 2:00 am in a place without too many nearby city lights and then look straight up, or else consider, for example, Van Gogh's 1889 masterpiece painting, "The Starry Night."

3. Now since, according to Kant, via the human experience of the mathematically sublime in nature, the natural universe is thereby experienced as having a specific character and normative value that is expressible only as a transcendently infinite, transfinite, or non-denumerably infinite, quantity, it follows that the natural universe inherently cannot reduced to any denumerable quantity, no matter how great (CPJ 5: 244-260).

4. Hence the natural universe, experienced as mathematically sublime, cannot have a "market price" and is experienced as beyond price, or priceless, since all "market prices," or exchangeable economic values (say, monetary values) "related to general human interests and needs" (GMM 4: 434), are expressible only as denumerable (natural number, rational number) quantities, even infinite ones. Otherwise put, the specific character and normative value of the natural universe, experienced as mathematically sublime, inherently transcends any economic calculus.

5. Steps 1 to 4 jointly entail what I call the proto-dignity of the natural universe. Dignity according to Kant, is the absolute, non-denumerably infinite, intrinsic, objective value of persons, or rational animal agents, especially human persons. The natural universe is not itself a person, and more specifically it is not itself a human person, and therefore it does not have dignity per se; nevertheless, the natural universe, as beautiful and sublime, inherently cannot (without eco-disaster) and inherently ought not (without moral scandal) be merely exploited, merely bought or sold, or otherwise treated as a mere capitalist resource or commodity (aka "commodified").

6. But human nature itself belongs to the natural universe.

7. Therefore transcendental idealism for sensibility, plus the self-evident phenomenology of our reverential experience of beauty/sublimity in the natural universe ("the starry heavens above me"), plus our equally reverential experience of respect for the autonomous dignity of human nature ("the moral law within me"), transcendentally prove that the natural universe is the metaphysical ground of all human persons and their autonomous dignity. That is: the natural universe is our spiritual home.

The fourth and final argument, the argument for Cosmopolitan Natural Piety, employs a Kantian logical distinction between two sharply different types of universal sets or totalities:

(i) absolutely universal sets, and

(ii) restrictedly universal sets.

Absolutely universal sets include, for example, Kant's omnitudo realitatis (CPR A576/B604), Russell's set w of all sets that are not members of themselves,²³³ and Cantor's universal set C, corresponding to the greatest cardinal number.²³⁴ Now the logical technical term "impredicativity" means, roughly, "constructibility or definability by means of selfreference or iterative self-inclusion." Absolutely universal sets are then what I call vicious impredicative totalities, because they are impredicative and paradoxical. Above all, however, vicious impredicative totalities are transcendent, noumenal, and ungrounded in empirical intuition. By sharp contrast, restrictedly universal sets include Kant's transcendentally ideal/empirically space and time as infinite given magnitudes, and Cantor's *transfinite* sets—for example, the set of real numbers—as constructed by the power set operation on denumerably infinite sets. All such sets are what I call benign *impredicative totalities*, because although they are impredicatively constructed by virtue of including everything in some infinite class of things, including themselves, they are logically consistent and not paradoxical. Above all, however, benign impredicative totalities are transcendental, a priori forms of the phenomenal, and grounded in empirical intuition. In turn, ARGUMENT 4 exploits the notion of a benign impredicative totality.

ARGUMENT 4: Cosmopolitan Natural Piety

1. We have reverence for nature and its proto-dignity (as mathematically sublime): the starry heavens above me.

2. The starry-heavens-above-me experience perfectly exemplifies what I call transcendental normativity, by which I mean the unconditional and strictly universal highest ends, goals, ideals, standards, and values of the several different kinds of rational human activity, aka categorical normativity.²³⁵ This shown by the following sub-argument.

2.1. When experiencing the starry heavens above me as having proto-dignity, it is every bit as as true to say that I am in space (empirical realism) as it is to say that space is in me (pure intuition of space as an infinite given whole + the transcendental ideality of space). This metaphysically unique relation of subjective-objective, enantiomorphic, symmetrical containment is beautifully and crisply captured by Goethe's remark that the human being "knows the world only within himself and he is aware of himself only within the world." And as a deliciously evocative pictorial analogue of this metaphysically unique relation as also occuring in a non-denumerably infinite structure, consider, for example, placing a person between two mirrors facing each other, as in the famous "hall of mirrors" scene in Orson Welles's 1941 masterpiece movie, Citizen Kane.²³⁶ In the context of this section, this is also a deliciously ironic pictorial analogue, since the Orson Welles character, Charles Foster Kane [= William Randolph Hearst], a highly politically ambitious, ruthless, and xenophobic newspaper tycoon, both is in the movie [Welles/Kane] and also was in reality [Hearst], the very antithesis of a citizen of the cosmos.

2.2. Therefore, the totality with proto-dignity that is constituted by the starryheavens-above-me experience is an impredicative totality: a nondenumerably infinite totality constituted by including (a complete representation of) the totality itself as a member of the totality.

2.3. But this totality with proto-dignity is also a benign impredicative totality, since it is both well-grounded in human experience and also includes a (complete representation of a) universal set that is also a member of itself, without entailing a contradiction.

2.4. There is no contradiction in the constitution of this totality, precisely because not only is manifest realism generally consistent with transcendental idealism, but also manifest realism and transcendental idealism mutually synthetically a priori entail each other under the weak or counterfactual interpretation of transcendental idealism: necessarily, if the manifestly real world exists, then were we also to exist, we would be able to cognize the manifest real world veridically, to some salient extent.²³⁷

3. But, by virtue of the ethical demands of existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism, we must also exit the State (as a coercive and therefore oppressive social system) and all State-like institutions (as also coercive and therefore oppressive) in order to create and belong to an absolutely universal ethical or moral community.

4. Therefore, we must simultaneously protect the natural world and also systematically deconstruct/dismantle and constructively replace all State and Statelike institutional mechanisms that are damaging or destroying the natural universe, especially big-capitalist ones, insofar as those mechanisms oppress people, of whom it is every bit as as true to say that they are in space as it is to say that space is in them, and therefore perfectly exemplify transcendental normativity in the special form of human dignity.

In other words, as citizens of the cosmos, we have a *transcendental political and spiritual obligation* to protect the natural universe against damage or destruction by big capitalism, States, and State-like institutions, especially including big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States like the USA.

Thus Cosmopolitan Natural Piety constitutes *a new kind of radical environmentalism*, insofar as it is robustly grounded on manifest realism/weak or counterfactual transcendental idealism, Kantian aesthetics, Kantian ethics, transcendental normativity, existential Kantian moral theology, and existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism. But it also directly implies that the neo-utopian program I have been presenting and defending in part 3 is not merely a radical *humanistic* program, but also a radical *environmentalist* program. Remember, for example, the Universal Basic Jobs, *eco-jobs*?

So let's start realizing this neo-utopian program—all of it—right now.

REFERENCES

- ¹ In his excellent but also highly controversial *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), and its two sequel volumes, Jonathan Israel traces the origins of the very idea of a radical enlightenment project back to Spinoza, pantheism, and metaphysical monism. I certainly agree with Israel that Spinozism is at least one important source of the radical enlightenment tradition. Kant's own contribution to the controversy about Spinozism is presented in "What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?"
- ² I borrow the helpful label "maximalist" from S. Fleischacker *What is Enlightenment*? (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 7. Fleischacker himself defends a "minimalist" version of Kantian enlightenment; see *What is Enlightenment*?, pp. 169-193.
- ³ To be sure, not only does "the Enlightenment" stands for an era whose historical interpretation is controversial, but also there are many distinct philosophical conceptions of enlightenment, some of them highly critical. See, for example, the Frankfurt-school classic, M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. E. Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2002); Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*; Fleischacker, *What is Enlightenment*?; J. Heath, *Enlightenment 2.0* (New York: HarperCollins, 2014); and S. Pinker, *Enlightenment Now* (New York: Allen Lane, 2018). In this book, just to keep things relatively simple, I won't attempt either to compare and contrast the different conceptions of enlightenment or to critically negotiate between them, but will instead concentrate exclusively on developing and defending my own radical Kantian conception. But for a critique of what I call *enlightenment lite* and a corresponding defense of what I call *heavy-duty enlightenment*, aka radical enlightenment, see Hanna, "Exiting the State and Debunking the State of Nature," THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 1, essay 2.1.
- ⁴ Confusingly, in the *Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR* 5: 110-111), Kant uses the term "the highest good" to mean the same as what he had called "the sole and complete good" in the *Groundwork*, namely the ethical totality consisting of human happiness proportioned to moral virtue (*GMM* 4: 396). The notion of this ethical totality, in turn, is the same as the third Postulate of Pure Practical Reason, the moral belief in God's existence as a regulative Idea, since only an all-powerful and all-good God could create such an ethical totality (*CPrR* 5: 124-132). By contrast, in the *Groundwork*, "the highest good" means *a good will (GMM* 4: 393-394), which is the same as what he calls "the supreme good" in the second *Critique (CPrR* 5: 111). To be sure, all of these slightly different notions are essentially connected, since the supreme good (namely, a good will) is the formal essence and immanent structure of the sole and complete good (that is, the ethical totality consisting of human happiness proportioned to moral virtue) that only an all-powerful and all-good God could create. Finally, when this ethical totality is not merely a moral belief or regulative Idea of pure practical reason, but is actually implemented in the world, spread out over all of humanity, over the long haul, then it is *the sole and complete good on Earth*, or *God's kingdom on Earth*—or what, in this book, I am calling *The Kosmopolis* and *Utopia Now*.
- ⁵ R.M. Rilke, "Archaic Torso of Apollo," trans. S. Mitchell, in R.M. Rilke, *Selected Poetry and Prose of Rainer Maria Rilke* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), pp. 60-61, line 14.
- ⁶ O. Wilde, "The Soul of Man Under Socialism," available online at URL = <<u>https://www.</u> marxists.org/reference/archive/wilde-oscar/soul-man/>.
- ⁷ S. Kierkegaard, "Stages on Life's Way," in S. Kierkegaard, *The Essential Kierkegaard*, trans. H. Hong and E. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997), pp. 170-186, at p. 182; see also Kant (*Rel* 6: 57-202).
- ⁸ F. Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, trans. D. Magarshack (2 vols., Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1958), vol. 2, p. 743.
- ⁹ L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. C.K. Ogden (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), prop. 6.43, p. 185.
- ¹⁰ See also, for example, L. Tolstoy, *A Confession* (1882), available online at URL = <<u>https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Confession</u>>.
- ¹¹ A rational Idea is a special kind of concept. For the purposes of this book, *concepts* are humanly cognitively-accessible, partially analyzable, general representations that correspond to the meanings of non-relational or relational predicates in natural language, that refer to worldly properties or relations, that have a comprehension consisting of all the actual or possible things falling under those properties or satisfying those relations, that are the basic logical constituents of propositions, and that fall under universal minimal logical laws and norms. See also Hanna, *Content, Cognition, and the A Priori*, esp. ch. 4. In the first *Critique*, Kant says that a concept is either an **empirical** or a **pure concept**, and the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding... is called *notio* [i.e., a notion]. A concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the possibility of experience, is an **idea** or a concept of reason. (*CPR* B377, boldfacing in the original)

So in other words, a rational Idea is a *higher-order concept*, corresponding directly to nothing in human experience, and therefore *transcending all human experience*, that nevertheless guides our use of both empirical and pure concepts.

- ¹³ "Transcendental freedom," in Kant's terminology, is the metaphysically-grounded, and not merely psychological, ability to be a spontaneous, non-deterministic causal source of choices and actions, whereas "practical freedom" is the further ability—again metaphysically-grounded and not merely psychological—presupposing but also going beyond transcendental freedom per se, to choose and act in a self-legislating way (hence with "autonomy"), for the sake of non-hedonistic, non-egoistic, and non-instrumental, moral principles, and not merely as determined by pleasure, self-interest, or good consequences (*CPR* A533-534/561-562). See also Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, ch. 3.
- ¹⁴ See, for example, S. Crowell (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Existentialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012).
- ¹⁵ B. Russell, Autobiography (London: Unwin, 1975), p. 330.
- ¹⁶ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, pp. 183, 185, 187, and 189.
- ¹⁷ See, for example, C. Firestone, *Kant and Theology at the Boundaries of Reason* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009); L. Pasternack, *Guidebook to Kant on Religion with the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (London: Routledge, 2014); and the discussion between Pasternack and Allen Wood in *Critique* (2016): A. Wood, "Allen Wood on Lawrence Pasternack's 'Kant on Religion', Part A," A. Wood, "Allen Wood on Lawrence Pasternack's 'Kant on Religion', Part B," L. Pasternack, "Reply to Allen Wood," A. Wood, "Rejoinder to Pasternack," and L. Pasternack, "Response to Allen Wood," all available online at URL = <<u>https://virtualcritique.wordpress.com/</u>>.
- ¹⁸ Objectivity in a Kantian framework does *not* imply the necessary mind-independence of what is objectively known or knowable, for that leads inexorably to cognitive skepticism and, in effect, "the end of the world as we know it." On the contrary, in a Kantian framework, objectivity implies a weak but still necessary mind-*dependence* on the existence of rational human animals: X is objective if and only if it is necessarily the case that if any rational human animals *were* to exist, then any or all of them *would be able* to cognize X veridically, at least to some salient extent. This is what I call "weak or counterfactual transcendental idealism." Objectivity for Kant is therefore universal intersubjective weak counterfactual transcendental idealism, and the basic rationale for defending this view is that it, and it alone, adequately undermines cognitive skepticism and prevents the end of the world as we know it. See also Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, esp. chs. 1 and 6-8.
- ¹⁹ See R. Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), ch. 2, esp. section 2.2.
- ²⁰ A striking and entirely philosophically original feature of Kant's theory of sensibility is that sensory intuitions can be either empirical (based on contingent manifestly real natural facts, hence a posteriori) or non-empirical (pure and formal, and not based on contingent manifestly real natural facts, hence a priori). The very idea of "sensory, but non-empirical" cognitions may seem strange and paradoxical. But in fact, the idea is fairly simple: our immediate awareness of *the spatial and temporal framework* in which ordinary objects are sense-perceived is sensory, but not empirical.
- ²¹ A correspondingly striking feature of Kant's theory of the understanding is that, just like sensory intuitions, concepts can also be either empirical or non-empirical. The idea of non-empirical concepts was not original to Kant, however, and can be found in the Cambridge platonists and early-modern classical Rationalists. What was philosophically original to Kant was the idea that it is not the *concepts* (or intuitons for that matter) that are innate, but instead only *the innate, spontaneous capacity*, aka "faculty," or "power" (*Kraft*) for actively generating concepts (or intuitions) that is innate. Hence Kant is a faculty-innatist about non-empirical concepts (and non-empirical intuitions), not a *content-innatist*.
- ²² See, for example, D. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996).
- ²³ See R. Hanna, "Kant, the Copernican Devolution, and Real Metaphysics," in M. Altman (ed.), Kant Handbook (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 761-789.
- ²⁴ Two beliefs, propositions, or statements are formal contradictories if and only if, by virtue of their logical form, they cannot both be false and they cannot both be true—one of them has to be true, and one of them has to be false. By contrast, two beliefs, propositions, or statements are formal contraries if and only if, by virtue of their logical form, they cannot both be true, although they can both be false. Famously or notoriously, Kant holds in the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason that "Agent-causal, noumenal freedom exists, and universal natural determinism is impossible" and "Everything in the world is naturally determined, and agent-causal, noumenal freedom is impossible" are contraries, and indeed both false, not contradictories.
- ²⁵ By "coercive States and other State-like institutions," I mean social organizations with governments or other ruling bodies, comprising special groups of authoritative people, according to whom any command C that they issue is legitimate and right, and therefore that you must recognize and obey C, merely because they tell you that C is legitimate and right, independently of the actual moral permissibility or impermissibility of C, that is, independently of the correct set of ethical principles, just because they also have the power to compel you to recognize and obey C. In other words, they are The Law and The Man; they control and possess massively most of the property and money; they have closed circuit TV cameras everywhere; and they have a well-armed police-

¹² See note 45 below.

force, and jails, etc., to show you who is really the boss. In part 2, I will criticize the very idea of coercive States and other State-like institutions, and also argue that insofar as they actually exist and actually control our lives, we should all be wholeheartedly trying to reject and exit or transcend them in order to create and belong to a real-world cosmopolitan ethical community. That is, I will defend a specifically existentialist, Kantian, and cosmopolitan version of *social anarchism*, both philosophical and political.

- ²⁶ See L. Stevenson, "Opinion, Belief or Faith, and Knowledge," *Kantian Review* 7 (2003): 72-101, at p. 85.
 ²⁷ R. Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy," in R. Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. J. Cottingham et al. (3 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), vol. 1, pp. 177-291, article 205 (first sentence of the French edition), p. 289 (AT 327).
- ²⁸ R. Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences," in Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1, pp. 109-151, at p. 130 (AT 37-38).
- ²⁹ M. Kuehn, Kant: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001), p. 3.
- ³⁰ See, for example, Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy; and L. Anderson, The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015).
- ³¹ See Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, ch. 3.
- ³² There is a subtle point lurking here, which is the Kantian distinction between (i) a concept's being "contained in" another concept, which entails analyticity, and (ii) a concept's "belonging" to a belief, judgment, proposition, or statement merely as a semantic constituent, which does not in and of itself entail analyticity. Necessarily, every belief, judgment, etc., whatsoever, whether it is analytic or synthetic, includes some concepts as semantic constituents, and furthermore, necessarily, every concept belongs to some beliefs, judgments, etc. ("the understanding can make no other use of ... concepts than that of judging by means of them" (CPR A68/B93). But not every concept is "contained in" another concept within the same belief, judgment, etc., which is simply another way of saying that all beliefs, judgments, etc., even synthetic ones, must include some concepts as semantic constituents.
- ³³ See Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, ch. 4.
- ³⁴ See Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, ch. 5.
- ³⁵ There are many such purported analytic proofs of God's existence, generically called "ontological arguments." See, for example, G. Oppy, "Ontological Arguments," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). E.N. Zalta (ed.), available online at $URL = \langle http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/$ spr2015/entries/ontological-arguments/>.
- ³⁶ For more details on the Dialectic, see, for example, M. Grier, "Kant's Critique of Metaphysics," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), available online at URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/kant-metaphysics/>.
- ³⁷ The paradox of analysis says that since a correct analysis of a given concept would have to represent something that is intensionally *identical* to that concept, it could never convey any further information about that concepthence it would be trivial. So every analysis of a concept is either incorrect (if it is significant) or trivial. Too bad for conceptual anaysis! The Kantian solution to the paradox is this: prior to analysis, we merely use concepts pre-reflectively, without being self-consciously aware of their decompositional structures; but a correct analysis makes self-consciously explicit what was previously pre-reflectively tacit; and it thereby gives us non-trivial direct reflective insight into the nature of our own conceptual repertoire.
- ³⁸ Contemporary post-Fregean, post-Russellian logic normally allows only one kind of negation, namely, propositional negation, which reverses the truth-value of any proposition to which it is applied. Even so, there is a systematic ambiguity in negating complex propositions, for example, in negating 'All cats are on mats," as between "external" negation, which reverses the truth-value of the entire complex proposition (for example, "Not all cats are on mats"), and "internal" negation, which reverses only the truth-value of one of the propositional constituents of the complex (for example, "All cats are not on mats"). Russell, for one, strategically deployed this external negation/internal negation distinction in his paradigmatically famous logical analysis of definite descriptions. But Kant's logic also includes a distinct operation of concept-negation or predicatenegation that he fairly unhelpfully calls the "infinite quality" of a judgment (CPR A70/B95). Nevertheless, the basic idea is simple: applying concept-negation to any concept C turns it into the concept non-C.
- ³⁹ See, for example, Oppy, "Ontological Arguments," sections 3 and 6-9.
- ⁴⁰ For more on arguments for atheism from the existence of evil, see section 1.4 below.
- ⁴¹ See K. Gödel, "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of *Principia Mathematica* and Related Systems," in J. Van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gödel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 596-617.
- ⁴² See Oppy, "Ontological Arguments," section 6.
- ⁴³ See, for example, K. Gödel, "What in Cantor's Continuum Problem?," in P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings (2nd edn., Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 470-485
- ⁴⁴ And as I will argue in part 2, Kantian commitment is also radically enlightened. That is, to commit personally in this profound way is necessarily also to endeavor to reject and exit all States and other State-like institutions, in

order to create and belong to a real-world cosmopolitan ethical community, namely, it is existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism.

- ⁴⁵ Strictly speaking, the very idea of personal immortality—that is, of an endless or infinite human personal existence—is incoherent and impossible; see Hanna, *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence*, section 6.3. So I will, with rational charity, interpret Kant's immortality postulate as entailing the conception of a *super-long* personal human existence, where by "super-long" I mean *any finite number of years greater than roughly 120 years*, that is, any finite number of years greater than the longest normal actual human life.
- ⁴⁶ Notoriously, Kant was a retributivist about punishment, and I do not accept this view. Indeed, retributivism is sharply *inconsistent* with Kantian ethical theory, in that it coercively treats criminals as mere instruments or mere things—in effect, mere pawns of the State-based legal system, arbitrarily and mechanically receiving punishments supposedly proportional to their crimes—*after the fact* of whatever they actually did or didn't do, over and above any question of their moral guilt, moral innocence, or moral responsibility. Moreover, according to what I call *Existential Kantian Cosmopolitan Social Anarchism About Crime-&-Punishment*, all punishment is rationally unjustified and immoral, whether its purported justification is retributive, deterrent, rehabilitative, or restitutional. See section 3.10 below. In any case, my disagreement with Kant about retributivism in particular, and about punishment more generally, partially determines how I will rationally charitably interpret the immortality postulate for the purposes of existential Kantian theology. I will assume that Kant simply made a mistake about punishment, as he also did about the very idea of personal immortality (see note 45 directly above), and *not* construe punishment retributively.
- ⁴⁷ See, for example, M. Tooley, "The Problem of Evil," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2010 Edition), E.N.Zalta (ed.), available online at URL = <<u>http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/evil/></u>.
- ⁴⁸ —Where "immortality of the soul" is understood to be equivalent *only* to the Idea that there is a super-long human personal existence, long enough for everthing to come out in the moral wash and time enough for everyone to take full responsibility for their own wickedness, in a world created and governed by a 3-O+2 God, and *not* equivalent either to the incoherent and impossible pseudo-Idea of endless or infinite human personal existence or to the morally rebarbative doctrine of retributivism about punishment. See notes 45-46 above.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

- ⁵⁰ L. Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914-1916*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (2nd edn., Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 74e.
- ⁵¹ See note 48 above.
- ⁵² See note 48 above.
- ⁵³ Kierkegaard, "Fear and Trembling," in Kierkegaard, The Essential Kierkegaard, pp. 93-101.
- ⁵⁴ See note 48 above.
- ⁵⁵ See, for example, R. Iemhoff, "Intuitionism in the Philosophy of Mathematics," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2009 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), available online at URL = <<u>http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/intuitionism/</u>>; and M. van Atten, "The Development of Intuitionistic Logic," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2009 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), available online at URL = <<u>http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/intuitionistic-logic-development/</u>>.
- ⁵⁶ It is important to recognize that *I am not going all the way* to claiming that believing-in God's existence and immortality of the soul (as per note 48 above), and acting accordingly, *are exactly the same as, or semanically equivalent to,* proofs in Intuionistic constructivist mathematics or logic—that is much too strong. What I am claiming, instead, is only *that there is a significant and illuminating analogy between the two.*

- ⁵⁸ See note 48 above.
- ⁵⁹ This account of the transcendental freedom vs. psychological freedom distinction is adequate for my philosophical purposes here. But in a deeper and longer treatment, it requires refinement to account for a distinction between the *veridical* phenomenology of freedom (real psychological freedom) and the *illusory* phenomenology of freedom (merely apparent psychological freedom), in order to avoid skeptical worries about the phenomenology of freedom, whether old-evil-demon style or new-evil-demon style. See Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, section 5.3.

⁶⁰ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, pp. 109 and 181.

- ⁶¹ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, pp. 183, 185, and 187.
- ⁶² A very similar point is made by Christine Korsgaard in *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), ch. 5, pp. 84-89. Oddly enough, however, she concludes her highly insightful discussion by saying that "my point in bringing all this up is not to make a brief for Kant's philosophy of religion, or for the need for agency to be supported by faith" (p. 89). My question is: *why not*?
- ⁶³ In addition to Pascal and Kierkegaard, see also Nicholas of Cusa, Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: A Translation and Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia, trans. J. Hopkins (Minneapolis MN: Banning Press, 1981); and K. Rahner, The Content of Faith (New York: Crossroads, 1993).
- ⁶⁴ This is very close to what Kant calls "intuition" or *Anschauung*, but is also understood more broadly, so as to cover "sensibility" in imaginational, affective-emotional, and moral-practical terms as well.

⁵⁷ See note 48 above.

- ⁶⁵ This includes the content of sense-perception, but is also understood more broadly, so as to cover the content of imagination, feelings, desires, moral and non-moral emotions, and willing as well. See Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, ch. 2.
- ⁶⁶ See. for example A. Byrne and H. Logue (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009); and A. Haddock and F. Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008).
- ⁶⁷ See A. Chapman, A., Ellis, R. Hanna, T. Hildebrand, and H. Pickford, *In Defense of Intuitions: A New Rationalist Manifesto* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, esp. chs. 2 and 6-8.
- ⁶⁸ See, for example, R. Hanna, *Rationality and Logic* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).
- ⁶⁹ See Hanna, Content, Cognition, and the A Priori, ch. 2.
- ⁷⁰ See Hanna, *Content, Cognition, and the A Priori*, chs. 6-8.
- ⁷¹ R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press/London: Humphrey Milford, 1936).
- ⁷² W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York: New American Library, 1958).
- ⁷³ See, for example, W. Alston, *Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991); and K. Yandell, *The Epistemology of Religious Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994).
- ⁷⁴ M. Huemer, *The Problem of Political Authority* (London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 332-334.
- ⁷⁵ See B. Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, trans. R.H.M. Elwes (London: George Routeldge and Sons, 1966). Available online at URL = <<u>https://archive.org/details/tractatustheolog00elweuoft</u>>. For more on the Spinoza-Kant connection, see also note 1 above.
- ⁷⁶ See Kant's Doctrine of Right (MM 6: 231-233 and 311-318); and M. Weber, "The Profession and Vocation of Politics," in P. Lassman and R. Spiers (eds.), Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 309-369 at p. 310.
- ⁷⁷ J.C. Scott, Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2017), p. 118.
- ⁷⁸ For an earlier argument for philosophical and political anarchism from Kantian ethical premises, see R. P. Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism* (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1970/1998), esp. pp. 3-19, also available online at URL = <<u>http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/robert-paul-wolff-in-defense-of-anarchism</u>>.
 ⁷⁹ See note 1 above.
- ⁸⁰ P.J. Proudhon, *What is Property?*, available online at URL = <<u>http://www.gutenberg.org/files/360/360-h/360-h.htm</u>>.
- ⁸¹ See, for example, Percy Bysshe Shelley's late 18th century radical poem, *The Masque of Anarchy*. Shelley's title which means that authoritarian regimes disguise their true nature, namely, violent social chaos and moral nihilism, behind a facade of legitimacy—is, from my point of view, unintentionally highly ironic, since Shelley was a passionate follower of William Godwin's political philosophy, and therefore a fervent social anarchist in almost precisely the sense specified and defended in this book. So Shelley's poem is a perfect illustration of the apparent paradox *that social anarchists are sworn enemies of "anarchy."* To be sure, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchists are *radicals*. Nevertheless, by virtue of their moral and political commitments, social anarchists are also deeply caring, decent, empathetic, tolerant, morally principled, respectful people: just the kind you would want as your next-door neighbors, provided you are not inclined to be moralistically offended by their non-conformism. Otherwise put, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchists are *the diametric opposite* of terrorists. It's just that they are unlikely to be *conventionally respectable*.
- ⁸² See, for example, D. Clarke, "Blaise Pascal," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2012 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), available online at URL = <<u>http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/pascal/</u>>, esp. section 6.
- ⁸³ See, for example, P. Kleingeld and E. Brown, "Cosmopolitanism," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2013 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, available online at URL = <<u>http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/cosmopolitanism/</u>>, esp. section 1.
- ⁸⁴ See, for example, M. Philp, "William Godwin," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2013 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, available online at URL = <<u>http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/godwin/></u>, esp. section 3; W.M. van der Weyde, "Thomas Paine's Anarchism," available online at URL = <<u>https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/william-m-van-der-weyde-thomas-paine-s-anarchism</u>>; and C. Bertram, "Jean Jacques Rousseau,"*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2012 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), available online at URL = <<u>http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/rousseau/</u>>, section 3.1.

- ⁸⁶ See also, for example, S. Crowell (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Existentialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012). For an extended response to the classical "formalism," "rigorism," and "universalism" worries about Kant's ethics, see Hanna, *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence*, ch. 2.
- ⁸⁷ By "real person," I mean an essentially embodied person, or a rational minded animal, as opposed to either disembodied persons (for example, souls) or collective persons (for example, business corporations). On essential embodiment, see, for example, R. Hanna and M. Maiese, Embodied Minds in Action (Oxford: Oxford)

⁸⁵ See note 2 above.

Univ. Press, 2009). And for a general theory of real personhood, see Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, chs. 6-7.

88 See, for example, Kleingeld and Brown, "Cosmopolitanism."

- ⁹⁰ See also, for example, P. Kropotkin, "Anarchism," first published in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1910, available online at URL = <<u>http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/kropotkin-peter/1910/britannica.htm</u>>; M. Bookchin, *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (2nd edn., Montreal, CA: Black Rose Books, 1986), available online at URL = <<u>http://libcom.org/files/Post-Scarcity%20Anarchism%20-%20Murray%20Bookchin.pdf</u>>; and M. Bookchin, *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism*, available online at URL = <<u>http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist Archives/bookchin/soclife.html</u>>.
- ⁹¹ See, for example, K. Marx, Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology & Social Philosophy, trans. T.B Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); and E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1966).
- ⁹² See, for example, Horkheimer and Adorno, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*; M. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1947); H. Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1964); R. Geuss, *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981); M. Hartmann and A. Honneth, "Paradoxes of Capitalism," *Constellations* 13 (2006): 41–58; and A. Honneth, *Pathologies of Reason: On the Legacy of Critical Theory*, trans. J. Ingram (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2009).
- ⁹³ By non-compulsive I mean "that which avoids, or constitutes the opposite of, the malign psychological effects of living within and under the control of States and other State-like institutions." The classical Existentialist analyses of *inauthenticity*, and the Marxist analyses of *alienation*, can then be brought under the general critical analysis of the *compulsiveness* of States and State-like institutions. The fact of the compulsiveness of States and other State-like institutions also verifies, in the special case of those who directly belong to governments, or are officers of governments, the truth of Kant's observation that "possession of power unavoidably corrupts the free judgment of reason" (*PP* 8: 369).
- ⁹⁴ See Hanna, Kantian Ethics and Human Existence.
- ⁹⁵ See, for example, J.C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1990); and J.C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2009).
- ⁹⁶ But I also think there's nothing wrong with a certain measured amount of constructive, morally-constrained, nonviolent, *ludic* mayhem, if it's properly aimed at exposing, resisting, or subverting the moral evils of actual-world nation-states or other coercive and compulsive social institutions. See, for example, Jean Vigo's 1933 film, *Zéro de* Conduite; Ola Simonsson's and J.S. Nilsson's 2010 film, Sound of Noise; J.C. Scott, Two Cheers for Anarchism (Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2012), ch. 1; and The Pirate Party—see, e.g., Wikipedia, "Pirate Party," available online at URL = <<u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pirate_Party></u>.
- ⁹⁷ See Hanna, Kantian Ethics and Human Existence, esp. chs. 1-2. Huemer's Problem of Political Authority, by contrast, appeals only to common-sense moral intuitions, and remains officially neutral about moral realism and ethical intuitionism. But in fact, Huemer is elsewhere committed to moral realism and ethical intuitionism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). For an alternative view about the nature of intuitions, Kantian Intuitionism, see Hanna, Cognition, Content, and the A Priori, chs. 6-8.
- ⁹⁸ See Hanna, Kantian Ethics and Human Existence, chs. 3-5.
- ⁹⁹ I mean: heterosexual or non-heterosexual—including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, queer, or whatever; and monogamous or polyamorous.
- ¹⁰⁰ "Bullshit" is, of course, a philosophical technical term, meaning "inauthentic verbiage or actions, put forward as if authentic, strongly tending to undermine the pursuit of truth and principled authenticity alike." See, for example, H. Frankfurt, "On Bullshit," in H. Frankfurt, *The Importance of What We Care About* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 117-133, also available online at URL = http://www.stoa.org.uk/topics/bullshit/pdf/on-bullshit.pdf>.

- ¹⁰⁴ This is the argument-strategy of, for example, Huemer's Problem of Political Authority.
- ¹⁰⁵ King James Bible (Matthew 22: 20-22).
- ¹⁰⁶ See, for example, A. Wood, "General Introduction," and G. di Giovanni, "Translator's Introduction," both in Kant, *Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology*, pp. xi–xxiv and 41-54 respectively, esp. pp. xv-xxii and 41-50.
- ¹⁰⁷ See Hanna, "Exiting the State and Debunking the State of Nature," THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 1, essay 2.1.
- ¹⁰⁸ A few; but not many professional academic philosophers. See C. Bradatan, *Dying for Ideas: The Dangerous Lives* of the Philosophers (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).

⁸⁹ K.A. Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), p. xiv.

¹⁰¹ (Dir. G. Miller, 2015).

¹⁰² See, for example, Huemer, The Problem of Political Authority, ch. 6.

¹⁰³ Scott, Two Cheers for Anarchism.

- ¹⁰⁹ For contrasting interpretations, see also see A. Chignell, "Rational Hope, Moral Order, and the Revolution of the Will," in E. Watkins (ed.), *Divine Order, Human Order, and the Order of Nature* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), pp. 197-218; and A. Chignell, *What May I Hope?* (London: Routledge, 2014).
- ¹¹⁰ A. Føllesdal, "Federalism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), available online at URL = <<u>http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/federalism/</u>>.
- ¹¹¹ In conversation, Føllesdal has said to me that "we're probably on the same team." Of course, I wouldn't want to saddle him with a commitment to existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism. I think he meant only that, at the end of the day, we have similar views about the moral and rational justification of Federalism.
- ¹¹² B. Russell, Proposed Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism (Cornwall, NY: Cornwall Press, 1918), available online at URL = <<u>http://www.zpub.com/notes/rfree10.html</u>>.
- ¹¹³ P. Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. M. Ramos (New York: Continuum, 2007).
- ¹¹⁴ R. Solnit, A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extradordinary Communities in Disaster (London: Penguin Books, 2009).
- ¹¹⁵ R. Fisher and W. Ury, *Getting to YES* (3rd edn., London: Penguin Books, 2011).
- ¹¹⁶ S. Kaner, E. Palmer, and D. Berger, "What Can OD Professionals Learn from Grassroots Political Activists?," *Vision/Action* (1987).
- ¹¹⁷ E. Ostrom, *Governing the Commons* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990).
- ¹¹⁸ A. Kaplan, Development Practitioners and Social Process: Artists of the Invisible (London: Pluto Press, 2002).
- ¹¹⁹ S. Kaner, Facilitator's Guide to Participatory Decision-Making (2nd edn., San Francisco, CA: Wiley, 2007).
- ¹²⁰ P. Block, Community: The Structure of Belonging (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2008).
- ¹²¹ See J. Schmidt, Disciplined Minds: A Critical Look at Salaried Professionals and the Soul-Battering System That Shapes Their Lives (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).
- ¹²³ Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, ch. 8.
- ¹²⁴ A recursive principle is a principle that, starting with a "ground level" or "zero" case as input, is successively applied to the result of each prior application until a certain desired output is constructed. So, for example, the arithmetic principle that determines counting to ten in the natural number series is a recursive principle.
- ¹²⁵ A. Vitale, *The End of Policing* (London: Verso, 2017).
- ¹²⁶ This is also what J.C. Scott, borrowing the Greek term for Odysseus's non-discursive social and political insight in the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*, calls "metis" in *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1998).
- ¹²⁷ See Hanna and Maiese, *Embodied Minds in Action*, ch. 5; and M. Maiese, *Embodiment, Emotion, and Cognition* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
- ¹²⁸ See S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity (2 vols., London: Macmillan, 1920), vol. 2, pp. 31-37, available online at URL = <<u>https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Alexander/Alexander_toc.html</u>>; and J. Slaby, "Relational Affect," Academia.edu, available online at URL = <<u>https://www.academia.edu/25728787/Relational_Affect></u>.
- ¹²⁹ See, for example, Bookchin, *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*; and Bookchin, *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism*.
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