# The Rational Human Condition

Preface and General
Introduction, Supplementary
Essays, and
General Bibliography

## VOLUME 1

World Philosophy

# ROBERT HANNA

NOVA

# THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION

# VOLUME 1

## PREFACE AND GENERAL INTRODUCTION, SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS, AND GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

# WORLD PHILOSOPHY

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# THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION

## VOLUME 1

## PREFACE AND GENERAL INTRODUCTION, SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS, AND GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

## ROBERT HANNA

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*All five volumes of THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION*
*are dedicated to the people I love—you know who you are.*
*But especially Martha and Beth.*
*And also to all those who helped me with its ideas and arguments.*

# CONTENTS

"The Human Condition," by Thomas Whitaker/Prison Arts Coalition

# A NOTE ON REFERENCES

Throughout the four-volume series THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, for convenience, I refer to Kant's works infratextually in parentheses. The references include both an abbreviation of the English title and the corresponding volume and page numbers in the standard "Akademie" edition of Kant's works: *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Königlich Preussischen (now Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. Reimer [now de Gruyter], 1902-). I generally follow the standard English translations, but have occasionally modified them where appropriate. For references to the first *Critique*, I follow the common practice of giving page numbers from the A (1781) and B (1787) German editions only. Here is a list of the relevant abbreviations and English translations:

BL      "The Blomberg Logic." In *Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic*. Trans. J. M. Young. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992. Pp. 5-246.

C      *Immanuel Kant: Correspondence, 1759-99*. Trans. A. Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999.

CF      *Conflict of the Faculties*. Trans. M. Gregor. Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1979.

CPJ      *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000.

CPR      *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997.

CPrR      *Critique of Practical Reason*. Trans. M. Gregor. In *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. Pp. 139-271.

DiS      "Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space." Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992. Pp. 365-372.

*DSS* "Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics." Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770*. Pp. 301-359.

*EAT* "The End of All Things." Trans. A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni. In *Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology.* Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. Pp. 221-231.

*GMM* *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. M. Gregor. In *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy.* Pp. 43-108.

*ID* "On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World (Inaugural Dissertation)." Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770*. Pp. 373-416.

*IUH* "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim." Trans. A. Wood. In *Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Eduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007. Pp. 107-120.

*JL* "The Jäsche Logic." Trans. J. M. Young. In *Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic*. Pp. 519-640.

*LE* *Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Ethics*. Trans. P. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997.

*MFNS* *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Trans. M. Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.

*MM* *Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. M. Gregor. In *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy.* Pp. 365-603.

*OP* *Immanuel Kant: Opus postumum*. Trans. E. Förster and M. Rosen. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993.

*OPA* "The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God." Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770*. Pp. 107-201.

*OT* "What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?" Trans. A. Wood. In *Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology.* Pp. 7-18.

*Prol* *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Trans. G. Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.

*PP* "Toward Perpetual Peace." Trans. M. Gregor. In *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy.* Pp. 317-351.

*Rel* *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.* Trans. A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni. In *Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology.* Pp. 57-215.

*RTL* "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy." Trans. M. Gregor. In *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*. Pp. 611-615.

*VL* "The Vienna Logic," Trans. J. M. Young. In *Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic*. Pp. 251-377.

*WiE*     "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'" Trans. M. Gregor. In
          *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy.* Pp. 17-22.

# PART 1.  PREFACE AND GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION

The field of philosophy … can be brought down to the following questions:

1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?
4. What is the human being?

Metaphysics answers the first question, morals the second, religion the third, and anthropology the fourth. Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of this as anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one. The philosopher must be able to determine

1. the sources of human knowledge
2. the extent of the possible and profitable use of all knowledge, and finally
3. the limits of reason.

The last [question, What is the human being?] is the most necessary but also the hardest. (JL 9: 25)

Quarrels between professors are never entirely disconnected from larger quarrels. There was a hidden agenda behind the split between old-fashioned "humanistic" philosophy (of the Dewey-Whitehead sort) and the positivists, and a similar agenda lies behind the current split between devotees of "analytic" and of "Continental" philosophy. The heavy breathing on both sides about the immorality or stupidity of the opposition signals passions which academic power struggles cannot fully explain.[1]

For … non-Kantian philosophers, there are no persistent problems—save perhaps the existence of Kantians.[2]

Here there is no place that does not see you. You must change your life.[3]


# 1.0. WHAT IT IS

THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION is a five-volume book series, including—

- Volume 1. Preface and General Introduction, Supplementary Essays, and General Bibliography
- Volume 2. *Deep Freedom and Real Persons: A Study in Metaphysics*
- Volume 3. *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence: A Study in Moral Philosophy*
- Volume 4. *Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism: A Theological-Political Treatise*
- Volume 5. *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge*.

For various logistical reasons, the fifth and last volume in the series, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, was actually published first in the order of time, by Oxford University Press, in 2015. But with the present publication of the first four volumes in the series by Nova Science, in 2018, all five volumes of THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION now exist in the intellectual (or, depending on your view of text-based culture, nether) world of hardcover books and e-books.

With the exception of this volume—whose triple purpose is (i) prefatory/introductory, (ii) supplementary, and (ii) bibliographical—each of the other four books in the five-volume series is a self-standing study in systematic philosophy. And they can be read in any sequence whatsoever. Nevertheless, all five books share a common aim, which is to work out a true general theory of human rationality in a thoroughly nonideal natural and social world. I call this philosophical project *rational anthropology*.

With this aim before me, I have been writing up various parts of THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION since 2005 or 2006. But there is also a very real sense in which I have been working, working, working on the very same project ever since I started thinking seriously about philosophical issues in the mid-to-late 1970s, like the proverbial hedgehog who—unlike the equally proverbial fox, who knows many things—knows only one big thing.

THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION was originally intended as a sequel to *Rationality and Logic* (published in 2006). Then later, as the project steadily grew in breadth, depth, and scope, I began to think of it as a comprehensive sequel to *Rationality and Logic* and also to *Embodied Minds in Action* (co-authored with Michelle Maiese, and published in 2009). In short, it got bigger and bigger. For a few years, it was one BIG book manuscript, weighing in at 1200+ pages, threatening to grow even BIGGER, like huge

unfortunate Alice crammed up against the walls of her tiny room. But this one-book version, paradoxically, was at one and the same time both *too long* for anyone but a sleepless zealot ever to have the time and energy to read, and also *too short* to discuss everything that absolutely, positively, undeniably, and self-evidently *needed* to be discussed—not to mention its also being, as Henry James notoriously said of Dostoevsky's novels, a "loose, baggy monster."

So the long and the short of it is, that I ultimately split up the one loose, baggy BIG monster into five separate volumes, each of them a leaner, meaner, LITTLER monster, and have been hedgehogging away at them all ever since.

## 1.1 BOUNDED IN A NUTSHELL

Bounded in a nutshell, THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION is my attempt to do *real philosophy* on a large-ish scale. By "real philosophy" I mean *authentic, serious* philosophy, as opposed to *inauthentic, superficial* philosophy. *Authentic* philosophy is committed, wholehearted philosophy pursued as a calling or vocation, and as a way of life; and *inauthentic* philosophy is professionalized, Scholastic, half-hearted philosophy treated as a mere job or a mere "glass bead game."[4] *Serious* philosophy is philosophy with critical, deep, and synoptic or wide-scope content; and *superficial* philosophy is philosophy with dogmatic, shallow, and narrow or trivial content.

In turn, I think that real philosophy is what I call *rational anthropology*.

In the 11th and most famous of his *Theses on Feuerbach*, Marx wrote that "philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in different ways; the point is to *change* it." I completely agree with him that the ultimate aim of philosophy is to *change* the world, not merely *interpret* it. So Marx and I are both *philosophical liberationists*: that is, we both believe that philosophy should have radical political implications.[5] But I also sharply disagree with him, insofar as I think that the primary aim of real philosophy, now understood as rational anthropology, and its practices of synoptic reflection, writing, teaching, and public conversation, is *to change our lives* for the better—and ultimately, for the sake of the highest good. Then, and only then, can we act upon the world in the *right* way.

## 1.2 RATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY VS. ANALYTIC METAPHYSICS, THE STANDARD PICTURE, AND SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM

Here are two fundamental metaphysical notions in rational anthropology.

First, by *a veridical appearance* I mean anything *X* that appears as *F*, or appears *F*-ly, or appears to be *F*, to any or all rational human cognizers, *just insofar as, and precisely*

*because, X is F*. For example, if I say "It appears that Sweetpea the cat is looking at me from her cat-cave," and what I say is indeed the case, as per this —



Figure 1. Sweetpea the cat is looking at me from her cat-cave.

or "It appears that $2 + 2 = 4$," or "It appears that The Minimal Law of Non-Contradiction[6] applies universally," and again what I say is indeed the case, as per basic arithmetic and pure logic, then all the things I am talking about are veridical appearances.

Second, by the manifestly real world, I mean the world as it can veridically appear, or does veridically appear, to any or all rational human cognizers or agents.

Correspondingly, a statement (judgment, belief, proposition, meaningful sentence, etc.) is true if and only if what it states (means, says, etc.) is manifestly real. But the theory of truth is another story for another day.

Granting those notions as background, rational anthropology is committed to what I call real, human-faced, or anthropocentric metaphysics. Real metaphysics in this sense

starts with the primitive, irreducible fact of purposive, living, essentially embodied, conscious, intentional, caring, rational and moral human experience in the manifestly real world, and then reverse-engineers its basic metaphysical theses and explanations in order to conform strictly to all and only what is phenomenologically self-evident in human experience.

By "phenomenologically self-evident" I mean the following—

> A claim C is phenomenologically self-evident for a rational human subject S if and only if (i) S's belief in C relies on directly-given conscious or self-conscious manifest evidence about human experience, and (ii) C's denial is either logically or conceptually self-contradictory, really metaphysically impossible, or pragmatically self-stultifying for S.

This leads directly to what I call *the criterion of phenomenological adequacy for metaphysical theories*:

> A metaphysical theory is phenomenologically adequate if and only if that metaphysical theory is evidentially grounded on all and only phenomenologically self-evident theses.

Real metaphysics therefore rejects the idea of any theoretically fully meaningful, non-paradoxical ontic commitment or cognitive access to non-manifest, non-apparent, "really real" entities that are constituted by intrinsic non-relational properties—that is, "noumena" or "things-in-themselves."[7] Such entities are logically, conceptually, or "weakly metaphysically" possible, but strictly unknowable by minded animals like us, both as to their nature, and as to their actual existence or non-existence. In this sense, real metaphysics is *methodologically* eliminativist about noumena. Therefore, real metaphysics rejects all *noumenal realist metaphysics*, including contemporary *Analytic metaphysics*.[8]

In the first half of the 20th century, the new and revolutionary anti-(neo)Kantian, anti-(neo)Hegelian philosophical programs were Gottlob Frege's and Bertrand Russell's *logicism*, G. E. Moore's *Platonic atomism*, and the "linguistic turn" initiated by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, which yielded The Vienna Circle's *logical empiricism*, and finally its nemesis, W. V. O. Quine's critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction.[9] Logical empiricism also produced a domestic reaction, *ordinary language philosophy*. Powered by the work of H. P. Grice and Peter Strawson, ordinary language philosophy became *conceptual analysis*. In turn, Strawson created a new "connective," namely, holistic, version of conceptual analysis, that also constituted a "descriptive metaphysics."[10] Strawson's connective conceptual analysis gradually fused with John Rawls's holistic method of "reflective equilibrium" and Noam Chomsky's psycholinguistic appeals to intuitions-as-evidence, and ultimately became the current *Standard Picture* of mainstream Analytic philosophical methodology.[11]

Coexisting in mainstream contemporary Analytic philosophy, alongside the Standard Picture, is also the classical Lockean idea that philosophy should be an "underlaborer" for the natural sciences, especially as this idea was developed in the second half of the 20th century by Quine and Wilfrid Sellars, as the reductive or eliminativist, physicalist, and scientistic[12] doctrine of *scientific naturalism*, and again in the early 21st century in even more sophisticated versions, as "experimental philosophy," aka "X-Phi," and the doctrine of *second philosophy*.[13]

From the standpoint of rational anthropology and its real metaphysics, what is fundamentally wrong with the Standard Picture is its intellectualist, coherentist reliance on networks of potentially empty, non-substantive *concepts*,[14] and above all, its avoidance of the sensible, essentially non-conceptual side of human experience and human cognition, which alone connects it directly to what is manifestly real.[15] Correspondingly, what is wrong with scientific naturalism/X-Phi/second philosophy is its reduction or elimination of the primitive, irreducible fact of human experience.[16]

Rational anthropology and its real metaphysics are all about *the rational human condition*, and *not* about noumenal entities, *not* about coherent networks of concepts no matter how devoid of humanly-meaningful content they might be, and *not* about fundamentally physical, essentially non-mental, facts.

## 1.3 PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY: NO DEEP DIFFERENCE

Rational anthropology is a contemporary version of *Kant's* philosophy. And in freely going back and forth between Kant's philosophy and contemporary philosophy, I am applying the following strong metaphilosophical principle that I call *The No-Deep-Difference Thesis*:

> There is no fundamental difference in philosophical content between the history of philosophy and contemporary philosophy.

In other words, in doing contemporary philosophy one is thereby directly engaging with the history of philosophy; and in doing the history of philosophy one is thereby directly engaging with contemporary philosophy. In real philosophy, there is no essential distinction to be drawn between the two.

What I mean by The No-Deep-Difference Thesis is that every authentic, serious philosophical work is a logically governed attempt to say something comprehensive, illuminating, and necessarily (or at least universally) true about the rational human condition and our deepest values, including our relationships to each other and to the larger natural and social worlds that surround us; and also that in order to convey this basic content it does not matter at all *when* the work was created or *when* the work is interpreted.

If I am right about The No-Deep-Difference Thesis, then it cuts three ways: first, it means that everything in the history of philosophy also belongs substantively to contemporary philosophy; second, it means that everything in contemporary philosophy also belongs substantively to the history of philosophy; and third and finally, it means that Quine was completely wrong when he wickedly and wittily said (reportedly—there seems to be no published source for this) that there are two kinds of philosophers: those who are interested in the history of philosophy, and those who are interested in philosophy. In fact, however, *there is really only one kind of authentic, serious philosopher*, and whether s/he likes it or not, s/he should be deeply interested in the history of philosophy. The sub-discipline called "History of Philosophy" is philosophy, as philosophical as it gets, and all philosophy is also History of Philosophy, as historical as it gets.

Those who on the contrary are Deep Differentists must hold that History of Philosophy is at best an enterprise in historical scholarship with a superficial philosophical inflection, but *not* philosophy as such, and that philosophy in effect always begins anew, from argumentative Ground Zero, with every new philosophical work that is created. This *metaphilosophical occasionalism* seems to me not only very implausible as a way of thinking about the relation between philosophy and its own history, but also apt to trivialize and undermine the very practice of real philosophy itself.

## 1.4  WORKS OF PHILOSOPHY VS. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES: PRESENTATIONAL HYLOMORPHISM AND POLYMORPHISM

In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant says that there are "aesthetic idea[s]," by which he means,

> [a] representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible…, [and] [o]ne readily sees that it is the counterpart (pendant) of an idea of reason, which is, conversely, a concept to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate. (*CPJ* 5: 314, boldfacing in the original)

In other words, an aesthetic idea is a non-empirical, metaphysical representation, like an "idea of pure reason," but also *non*-discursive and *non*-conceptual, hence linguistically *inexpressible* by means of concepts, propositions, or Fregean "thoughts," precisely to the extent that it is a product of human sensible imagination.

Kant himself does not make this point, but I think that the doctrine of aesthetic ideas has profound meta-philosophical implications: *philosophy need not necessarily be*

*theoretically expressed*. Correspondingly, I think that there is that there is a fundamental distinction between

(i) works of philosophy, and
(ii) philosophical theories,

such that the category of "philosophical works" is essentially wider and more inclusive than the category of philosophical theories—and more generally, philosophical theorizing is only one way of creating and presenting philosophy, as important as it is.

The aim of philosophical theories, according to rational anthropology, is to provide philosophical explanations that lead to essential, synoptic insights about the rational human condition, guided by the norms of propositional truth and logical consistency, by means of conceptual construction and conceptual reasoning that are non-reductively grounded in human experience. A similarly open-minded conception of philosophical theorizing, in the tradition of connective conceptual analysis, was developed by Robert Nozick in his influential book, *Philosophical Explanations*.[17] But I think that Nozick's conception is still too much in the grip of the deeply wrongheaded, *scientistic* idea that all philosophy *must* be modeled on natural science, mathematics, or logic.

According to rational anthropology, the aim of philosophical works, *as such*, is to present insights about the rational human condition and the larger world around us, with synoptic scope, and a priori/necessary character, tracking categorical normativity and our highest values, with the ultimate goal of *radical enlightenment*.[18] But this can also be achieved *even without* concepts, propositions, arguments, or theories, in an essentially non-conceptual way, by presenting imagery, pictures, structures, etc., that have strictly universal and strongly modal implications, and categorically normative force. These essentially non-conceptual insights could *also* be called "truths," if we use the term "truth" sufficiently broadly—as in "the truth shall set you free."

My basic point is that philosophy should be as much aimed at being *inspiring and visionary*, as it is at being *argumentative and explanatory*. Pivoting on that basic point, here is a proposal for five disjunctively necessary, individually minimally sufficient, and collectively fully sufficient criteria for something *W*—where *W* is a "work," that is, any intentional human product, whether an object (material or intentional), or performance— to count as a "work of philosophy":

(i) W provides a philosophical theory or a visionary worldview (or both),
(ii) W negatively or positively engages with earlier or contemporary philosophical ideas,
(iii) W expresses and follows a philosophical method,
(iv) W contains an explicit or implicit "philosophy of philosophy," a metaphilosophy,
(v) W deals with some topic or topics germane to the rational human condition, within a maximally broad range of issues, encompassing epistemology, metaphysics, ethics,

history, culture, society, politics, aesthetics, art, formal and natural science, religion, and so-on.[19]

Given how I defined the term "work," by my use of the term "works" in the phrase "works of philosophy," I mean something at least as broad as its use in "works of art." So there is no assumption or presupposition whatsoever here that works of philosophy must be *written or spoken texts*, although obviously many or most works of philosophy have been and are written or spoken texts. Correspondingly, I want to put forward two extremely important metaphilosophical theses of rational anthropology:

> (i) the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy, and
> (ii) the thesis of presentational polymorphism in works of philosophy.

> The thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy says:

> There is an essential connection, and in particular, an essential complementarity, between the presentational form (morphê) of philosophical works and their philosophical content (hyle).

"Content" here is *cognitive-semantic content*, but this content can be

> either (i) conceptual,
> or (ii) essentially non-conceptual,[20]

and also it can be

> either (iii) theoretical content,
> or (iv) non-theoretical content, including, aesthetic/artistic, affective/emotive, pragmatic, moral, political, or religious content.

Moreover, (i) and (ii) cross-cut with (iii) and (iv). Hence there can be conceptual content that is either theoretical (for example, in the natural or formal sciences) or non-theoretical (for example, in everyday life), and there can be essentially non-conceptual content that is either theoretical (for example, in pure or applied mathematics[21]) or non-theoretical (for example, in our everday, essentially embodied, affective/emotional, sense-perceptual, imaginative, or practical lives).

The first thing that the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy implies, is the intimate connection between truly creative, ground-breaking works of philosophy, and truly creative, original forms of literary and spoken philosophical expression. Thus Socrates created philosophical works entirely by conversation; Plato did it by writing dialogues; Aristotle did it by presenting (it seems) nothing but lectures;

Descartes wrote meditations; Locke and Hume wrote treatises; Kant wrote the Critiques; Kierkegaard wrote strange pseudonymous books; Nietzsche wrote poetry and aphorisms; Wittgenstein wrote the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, both of them completely original, completely different, and equally uncategorizable; and so on.

The second thing that the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy implies is that since all works of written and spoken philosophy are essentially connected to their literary style and expressive vehicles, then it is a mistake to impose a needlessly restrictive stylistic and expressive straight-jacket on works of philosophy, for example, the standard professional "journal essay," "200+ page book," and "philosophy talk."

And a third thing that the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy implies is that since the standard view of philosophical content in the Analytic tradition— whether as logical analysis, linguistic analysis, conceptual analysis, Analytic metaphysics, or scientific naturalism—is that the content of philosophy is exclusively conceptual and theoretical, then recognizing the essential non-conceptuality and non-theoreticality of philosophical content, completely opens up the way we should be thinking about works of philosophy, in three ways.

First, all written and spoken philosophy is in fact shot through with imagery, poetry, rhetorical devices, and speech-acts of various kinds.

Second, philosophy need not necessarily be presented (exclusively) in written or spoken form. There could be works of philosophy that are cinematic, diagrammed or drawn, painted, photographed, musical (instrumental or voiced), sculpted, performed like dances or plays, etc., etc., and perhaps above all, mixed works combining written or spoken forms of presentation and one or more non-linguistic forms or vehicles.

Third, if philosophical content is as apt to be essentially non-conceptual or non-theoretical as it is to be conceptual or theoretical, then there are vast realms of philosophical meaning that very few philosophers, even the most brilliant and great ones, have ever even attempted to explore.

Therefore, in full view of the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy, we also have the thesis of presentational polymorphism in works of philosophy:

> Philosophy can be expressed in any presentational format whatsoever, provided that it satisfies the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy.

From the standpoint of rational anthropology, and looking towards the philosophy of the future, this is a truly exciting thesis.

## 1.5 ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY, AND RATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY

When I was a graduate student in the 1980s, I belonged to the first wave of young philosophers who were taking it upon themselves to reject, overcome, and transcend the seemingly unbridgeable gap, or Great Divide, between "Analytic" and "Continental" philosophy. Indeed, at the time, that was how I framed to myself my ultimate goal in philosophy. So in my graduate school discussion-&-research group we studied the *Tractatus*/early Wittgenstein, Hilary Putnam on reference and meaning, Saul Kripke on ditto, David Kaplan on ditto, Husserl against logical psychologism and on consciousnesss and intentionality, Heidegger on existential phenomenology, Sartre on ditto, Merleau-Ponty on ditto, Gareth Evans on reference and intentionality, and Richard Rorty on everything. The *Logical Investigations*, *Being and Time*, the *Phenomenology of Perception*, *Varieties of Reference*, *The Linguistic Turn* (edited, with an amazing Introduction, by Rorty), and *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* were my bibles, each one at various times carried under my arm all day long, getting worn and sweaty, so that I could quote them chapter-and-verse.

At the same time, and later, I read Kant. Lots of Kant. Everything I could lay my hands on. And Frege, Russell, Moore, Carnap, Quine, Austin, Strawson, Grice, and Searle. Everything by them that I could lay my hands on. And then more Husserl, more Heidegger, more Sartre, more Merleau-Ponty.

The first half of my PhD dissertation was mostly historical, on Kant's theory of judgment. The second half was systematic and original, on the semantics, philosophical psychology, and epistemology of singular "Russellian" propositions. Husserl and Evans were the primary inspirations of my thinking in that second half. But since the dissertation as a whole was intended to express one single line of argument, even back then The No-Deep-Difference Thesis was stirring in my soul.

After I graduated and got a tenure-track job in 1989, I thought long and hard about all of this philosophical material, and in the early-to-mid 00s, wrote two books in the history of philosophy, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* (2001) and *Kant, Science and Human Nature* (2006), in order to work out the nature of the relationship between Kant's philosophy and the Analytic tradition.

Also in the mid-00s, I wrote a systematic, original book about the nature and metaphysical/epistemological status of logic, *Rationality and Logic* (2006), trying to come to grips with what I took to be the core theoretical foundations of the Analytic tradition, namely, logic and analyticity. Along the way, I also attempted to explain logical knowledge in terms of irreducible consciousness and intentionality, which I took to be the core theoretical foundations of the Continental tradition. My basic idea was to ground them all (namely: logic, analyticity, and logical knowledge) in the innately-specified a priori

spontaneous, conscious, intentional capacities of rational human animals for constructing all logics, whether classical, conservatively non-classical, or deviant. Or in other words, my basic idea was broadly Kantian.

Finally, after all that philosophical soul-searching, in the late 00s, I published a paper in which I wrote this:

> Twentieth-century philosophy in Europe and the USA was dominated by two distinctive and (after 1945) officially opposed traditions: the analytic tradition and the phenomenological tradition. Very simply put, the analytic tradition was all about logic and analyticity, and the phenomenological tradition was all about consciousness and intentionality. Ironically enough however, despite their official Great Divide, both the analytic and the phenomenological traditions were essentially continuous and parallel critical developments from an earlier dominant neo-Kantian tradition. This, by the end of the nineteenth century had vigorously reasserted the claims of Kant's transcendental idealism against Hegel's absolute idealism and the other major systems of post-Kantian German Idealism, under the unifying slogan "Back to Kant!" So again ironically enough, both the analytic and phenomenological traditions were alike founded on, and natural outgrowths from, Kant's Critical Philosophy.

> By the end of the twentieth century however, and this time sadly rather than ironically, both the analytic and phenomenological traditions had not only explicitly rejected their own Kantian foundations and roots but also had effectively undermined themselves philosophically, even if by no means institutionally. On the one hand the analytic tradition did so by abandoning its basic methodological conception of analysis as the process of logically decomposing propositions into conceptual or metaphysical "simples," as the necessary preliminary to a logical reconstruction of the same propositions, and by also jettisoning the corresponding idea of a sharp, exhaustive, and significant "analytic-synthetic" distinction. The phenomenological tradition on the other hand abandoned its basic methodological conception of phenomenology as "seeing essences" with a priori certainty under a "transcendental-phenomenological reduction," and also jettisoned the corresponding idea of a "transcendental ego" as the metaphysical ground of consciousness and intentionality.

> One way of interpreting these sad facts is to say that just insofar as analytic philosophy and phenomenology alienated themselves from their Kantian origins, they stultified themselves. This is the first unifying thought behind this [paper], and it is a downbeat one. The second unifying thought, which however is contrastively upbeat, is that both the analytic and phenomenological traditions, now in conjunction instead of opposition, could rationally renew themselves in the twenty-first century by critically recovering their Kantian origins and by seriously re-thinking and re-building their foundations in the light of this critical recovery. Or in other words: *Forward to Kant*.[22]

My line in the late 00s, then, was that both Analytic and Continental philosophy are nothing but outgrowths from and spins on Kantian philosophy: a series of footnotes to Kant. Or otherwise put, they are at bottom nothing but *Kantalytic* philosophy and *Kantinental*

philosophy. So now it is time for everyone to recognize this and go *forward to Kant!* And I continue to think I am right about that.

But there is still an important leftover problem. Even supposing for a moment that I am indeed right that all philosophy since Kant is really, at bottom, all about Kant's philosophy and Kantian philosophy, then what explains the robustly persistent opinion amongst contemporary professional academic philosophers that there is a genuine, important, and even unbridgeable difference between Analytic and Continental philosophy? Here is what I also wrote in that same paper from the late 00s, in an attempt to answer that question:

In Davos, Switzerland, from 17 March to 6 April 1929, an "International University Course," sponsored by the Swiss, French, and German governments, brought together the leading neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer, famous author of the multi-volume *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1925, 1927, 1929), and the soon-to-be leading phenomenologist Martin Heidegger, famous author of *Being and Time* (1927), in an official and more or less explicit attempt to bring about a philosophical reconciliation between Marburg (or science-oriented) neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. The soon-to-be leading logical positivist Rudolf Carnap was there too, along with many other professors and students from across Europe. And a good time was had by all: "It appears that the Davos encounter itself took place in atmosphere of extraordinarily friendly collegiality."[23]

The key sessions at Davos were two lecture series by Cassirer and Heidegger, followed by a public disputation between them. Strikingly, both the lectures and the disputation dealt with the question of how to interpret the *Critique of Pure Reason* correctly. In other words, it was all about Kant and the neo-Kantian origins of phenomenology. Now for this reason it can be argued, and indeed has been argued, that the Davos conference was emblematic of the death-by-mitosis of the neo-Kantian tradition, during the 1930s, into two fundamentally distinct and irreconcilable philosophical traditions: the analytic tradition (whose paradigm case was logical positivism), and the phenomenological tradition (whose paradigm case was existential phenomenology).

According to this historical reconstruction, the basic disagreements between analysis and phenomenology were latent in the period 1900–30, during which … Moore, Russell, and Carnap all started their philosophical careers as neo-Kantians, went on to reject neo-Kantianism and Kant by means of foundational work in philosophical logic and the influence of the contemporary exact sciences, and then correspondingly worked out various new logically-driven conceptions of a priori analysis. And then, so the story goes, the latent eventually became manifest, and the post-Kantian stream of philosophical influence consisting of Brentano → Husserl/ Meinong → Heidegger was officially divided from the other post-Kantian stream consisting of Moore→ Russell → Wittgenstein → Carnap, basically because the phenomenologists rejected the Frege–Russell conception of pure logic while contrariwise the analysts affirmed pure logic. And never the twain shall meet. But although this makes a conveniently neat story, it is at least arguably not quite true to the historico-philosophical facts. The highly collegial atmosphere at Davos was no polite put-on. Obviously there were some important differences and disagreements between

logical positivism and existential phenomenology. Nevertheless Heidegger took Carnap very seriously as a philosopher well into the 1930s, and Carnap also took Heidegger very seriously as a philosopher well into the 1930s. (As did Wittgenstein, and as also did Gilbert Ryle at Oxford – who, according to Michael Dummett, "began his career as an exponent of Husserl for British audiences and used to lecture on Bolzano, Brentano, Frege, Meinong, and Husserl"[24] throughout the 1920s and 1930s.) For his part, Heidegger was every bit as dismissive of traditional metaphysics as Carnap was. And while it is quite true that Heidegger significantly criticized the Fregean and Russellian pure logic of the *Begriffsschrift* and *Principia Mathematica*, and challenged its metaphysical commitments, so too did Carnap; after all, that is the main point of the *Logical Syntax of Language*.

Furthermore, objectively considered, Heidegger's existential phenomenology is not essentially more different from or opposed to pure logic, or logical positivism for that matter, than is Dewey's pragmatism, which despite its radical critical philosophical implications … cohabited very comfortably with mainstream analytic philosophy in the USA after 1945. Nor, objectively speaking, is Heidegger's existential phenomenology essentially more different from or opposed to either pure logic, or logical positivism, than is Wittgenstein's later philosophy as expressed in his *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), which despite its equally radical critical philosophical implications, also cohabited very comfortably with mainstream analytic philosophy in the USA and England after 1945.

So it appears that the Great Divide between analytic philosophy and phenomenology did not actually happen in the 1930s. And it also appears that the Divide is not the consequence of any fundamental philosophical disagreements between analysts and phenomenologists about pure logic. On the contrary, it appears that the Divide happened almost entirely after 1945, and that it was the joint result of the three following factors:

(1) The sharply divisive cultural politics of anti-fascism and anti-Communism in Anglo-American countries after World War II: Heidegger publicly and notoriously supported the Nazis in the mid-thirties; Vienna Circle exiles in the USA were understandably very eager to avoid being persecuted during the McCarthy Communist-trials era for their pre-war radical-socialist and Communist sympathies, so were generally playing it safe (Carnap however being a notable exception) by not rocking the boat; and the leading French phenomenologists Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty were both closely politically associated with the radical Left.
(2) The sharply divisive debate about the cultural-political significance and philosophical implications of the exact sciences after World War II; taking his cue from Heidegger's Being and Time, but also reflecting on the worsening cultural-political situation in Europe, Husserl had seriously criticized the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the exact sciences in his Crisis of European Sciences; and then taking his cue directly from Husserl, Merleau-Ponty further deepened and developed this critique in his Phenomenology of Perception (1945).
(3) The sharply divisive struggle for control of the major Anglo-American philosophy departments after World War II: given the aging and retirement of historically- trained philosophers, neo-Kantians, and neo-Hegelians, it was going to be either the analysts or the phenomenologists who took over, but not both.

In other words, I am suggesting that although the Great Divide between analytic philosophy and phenomenology is real enough, nevertheless it didn't happen until after 1945, and was essentially the result of cultural-political factors, together with one serious philosophical disagreement about the foundations of the exact sciences.[25]

Now what about that "one serious philosophical disagreement about the foundations of the exact sciences"? In an essay called "Wittgenstein and Kantianism," this is what I have written about it:

As Quine,[26] Reichenbach,[27] and Sellars so clearly saw in the 1950s, after the successive downfalls of Logicism and Logical Empiricism/Positivism during the first half of the 20th century, Analytic philosophy became, essentially, a series of minor variations on the theme of scientific philosophy:

In the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not.[28]

This is philosophy in Sellars's Scientific Image.[29] But later Wittgenstein, following Kant's lead, radically challenges and rejects this essentially scientistic conception of philosophy:

I cannot even **assume God, freedom, or immortality** for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason unless I simultaneously **deprive** speculative reason of its pretensions to extravagant insights; because in order to attain to such insights, speculative reason would have to help itself to principles that in fact reach only to objects of possible experience, and which, if they were to be applied to what cannot be an object of possible experience, then they would always transform it into an appearance and thus declare all **practical extension** of pure reason to be impossible. Thus I had to deny **scientific knowing** (Wissen) in order to make room for **faith** (*Glauben*). (*CPR* Bxxix-xxx, boldfacing in the original)

It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific (*wissenschaftliche*) ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible think such-and-such'—whatever that may mean… And we may not advance any kind of [scientific] theory…. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in spite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known.[30]

In this way, [rational][31] anthropology as practised by Kant and Wittgenstein does not either seek a humanly impossible, absolutely justifying, pure rational insight into things-in-themselves, or draw Pyrrhonian skeptical conclusions from our inevitable and tragic failure to achieve a godlike 'intellectual intuition' of ourselves and the world (*CPR* B72), or fall

into scientism. For all three of these philosophical projects, whether dogmatically rationalistic, destructively skeptical, or reductively naturalistic, are equally inherently self-alienating and 'inauthentic' in the Existentialists' sense. Indeed, it is significant that even when, in 1986, [Peter] Hacker officially rescinds his earlier Kant-oriented interpretation of Wittgenstein from 1972, he still admits that

> [m]ore than any other philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein were concerned with the nature of philosophy itself and sought to curb its metaphysical pretensions by clarifying its status and circumscribing what one may rationally hope for in philosophical investigation. Both saw philosophical and metaphysical pretensions of reason as at least a large part of the subject, and the eradication of such illusions as a major goal of their work.[32]

Otherwise put, with a tragic sense of life, Kant and Wittgenstein both fully recognize that we must renounce every variety of the bad faith of reason in order to make room for an authentic, autonomous, rational human life, and in turn, in order to make room for an anthropocentric rationalist version of Kierkegaard's 'knighthood of faith', as it were, the knighthood of rational faith, whereby you can radically change your life, or change the direction of your life—and this is the deepest lesson of [rational][33] anthropology.[34]

So what I am saying here, is that to the extent that there is any serious philosophical disagreement between Analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy since 1945, it is actually a philosophical disagreement between *scientistic* Quinean, Sellarsian philosophy on the one hand, and *anti-scientistic* Kantian,[35] Wittgensteinian philosophy on the other. Scientistic philosophy, in turn, is very closely associated with "the military-industrial complex," which has heavily funded and importantly controlled Anglo-American universities since 1945, and therefore it is highly unsurprising that scientistic thinkers would do extremely well, in an institutional sense, at Anglo-American universities in the post-1945 world.

What do I mean by that? In his farewell presidential address in 1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower said this:

> This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military

machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper together.[36]

In other words, the military-industrial complex is the unholy alliance and economic-political interlinkage of "an immense military establishment," a "large arms industry," and more generally multinational corporate capitalism, heavily influencing the legislative process via lobbyists and Political Action Committees. A perfect example would be the Lockheed Martin Corporation.[37]

Now in order for Big Guns and Big Money and Big Influence to exist, Big Science is needed, which in turn is heavily funded by government-sponsored and multinational corporate grants. In turn, Anglo-American universities that have Big Science (for example, Caltech, MIT, Cambridge, Harvard, Stanford, plus Oxford, Yale, and Princeton to a slightly lesser extent, and all the major state universities, especially in the California system) are *all* rich universities, with *highly-ranked* philosophy departments, *all* of which are *Analytic* philosophy departments.

This is not a coincidence. Scientism, as I mentioned above, is nicely captured by the Sellarsian epistemic and ontological thesis that "science is the measure of all things."[38] Now scientism is explicitly or implicitly presupposed by Analytic philosophy. Hence Analytic philosophy, via scientism, fully supports the basic aims of Big Science, which fully services Big Guns, Big Money, and Big Influence, which in turn collectively heavily fund Big Science and Analytic philosophy in the highly-ranked departments. Therefore, what I am saying is that (to borrow Rorty's lovely formulations) the "hidden agenda" that "lies behind the current split between devotees of 'analytic' and of 'Continental' philosophy," and, correspondingly, what adequately explains how the "heavy breathing on both sides about the immorality or stupidity of the opposition signals passions which academic power struggles cannot fully explain," is that the real and continuing passion-driven difference between Analytic and Continental philosophy is nothing more and nothing less than a rationally unjustified *political* difference. By this, I mean that it is nothing more and nothing less than a rationally unjustified difference in cultural, social, and economic power-relations and beliefs about them, a false and hegemonic ideology, that all contemporary philosophers should clearly and distinctly expose, critically examine, cognitively resist, and then systematically subvert.

We need to do all this *for the sake of the real philosophy of the future*, which I think is is essentially the same as rational anthropology, and *for the sake of our own cognitive liberation and self-fulfillment,* which I think is essentially the same as our wholehearted pursuit of principled, authentic lives as rational human animals.

## 1.6 WHAT IS A RATIONAL HUMAN ANIMAL?

Rational human animals are *what* we really are and *who* we really are. More precisely, according to my account, rational human animals are individual living organisms in the human species, and also unique persons who are innately and irreducibly capable of consciousness, intentionality, and caring, including affect, desire, and emotion, sense perception and imagination, memory and thought, logical and mathematical cognition and inference, empirical knowledge, a priori knowledge, reasons-sensitivity of all kinds, and above all, free agency and moral responsibility. In three words, rational human animals are *real human persons*.

Rational human animals, real human persons, consciously care intensely about themselves, about one another, and also about other things that affect themselves and one another. They effectively desire things, and they thereby intentionally move their bodies, sometimes spontaneously, sometimes habitually, and sometimes self-reflectively and deliberatively. They consciously perceive things through their senses, they make judgments and have beliefs about things, and they know some things. They formulate and recognize reasons. On the basis of these reasons, they establish normative principles for themselves, which they then attempt to follow consistently and with appropriate generalizability. They try to justify themselves, both theoretically and practically. They can also deceive themselves, and they are very good at making mere rationalizations. They can be insincere and lie. But even more importantly, and correspondingly, they can also be sincere and tell the truth.

Rational human animals, real human persons, have complete, finite, unique lives, in the sense that every such life has a definite beginning with the emergence of conscious experience, a definite middle in which human personhood is fully actualized and sustained, and then a definite ending in the destruction of their essentially embodied real human personal lives at death. They can intensely enjoy themselves.

They can be enthralled or enthused. They can be amused or bemused. They can be embarrassed, frustrated, bored stiff, or deeply depressed. Hence they can also suffer intensely. They worry a great deal about dying. Sometimes, in despair, they deliberately take their own lives. And sometimes they are very wicked. They can torture others, and they can treat each other like mere garbage or offal. They can ignore each other, unfairly criticize each other, envy each other, betray each other, hate each other, and kill each other. They can also respect each other, trust each other, like each other, lust after each other, copulate with each other, love each other with all their hearts, jointly produce other rational human animals from inside their own bodies, live with each other as friends, partners, or families, and also look after each other compassionately until death finally parts them.

Rational human animals, real human persons, are aware of reasons, and they try to be moved by the highest reasons, which in turn express the Highest or Supreme Good. They

also want to be *happy* in all the senses of that equally deeply ambiguous and deeply morally important term. This includes, at least,

> (i) human happiness as the egoistic "lower" or else "higher" pleasures (in John Stuart Mill's terminology) and/or the reduction of pain or suffering,
> (ii) human happiness as the egoistic or else public-minded satisfaction of desires and preferences,
> (iii) human happiness as privately virtuous self-perfection,
> (iv) human happiness as publicly virtuous flourishing,
> (v) human happiness as wholehearted self-fulfillment, that is, psychic coherence, active self-realization, and volitional self-sufficiency, that is, authenticity,

and perhaps other distinct forms of human happiness as well.

Rational human animals, real human persons, can freely choose and act, and they can take causal and moral responsibility for their choices and acts. They can also take causal and moral responsibility for things over which they had no control. In this way, they have both Kantian autonomy in the robustly potential, dispositional sense of possessing an innate capacity for rational self-legislation, and also authenticity in the robustly potential, dispositional sense of possessing an online innate capacity for purity of heart, single-mindedness, or wholeheartedness. Together these innate capacities make really possible the fact of a free, self-legislating wholehearted adherence to one's moral principles, including some absolutely general moral principles, together with sometimes taking causal and moral responsibility for brute contingent facts, at least partially and to some salient degree or extent, that I call *principled authenticity*. Principled authenticity is morally better than human happiness alone, although of course human happiness is extremely good too, and also an intrinsic proper part of a completely good rational human animal's life.

That rational human animals, real human persons, really do have lives in which there is both a Highest or Supreme Good (principled authenticity) and also a Complete Good (happiness guided by principled authenticity), and furthermore an at least partial achievement or realization, to some salient degree or extent, of these highest goods in their lives, even if they never can fully attain these highest goods, is the same as to say *that their lives have meaning*. Only creatures whose lives really *do* have meaning would be capable of intense suffering because they can, falsely and tragically, come to believe and feel in their hearts that their lives are meaningless. In this way, as rational human animals, real human persons, capable of principled authenticity, we are *the animals with meaningful lives*. We are always and inherently governed by reasons, and we are always and inherently looking for reasons. We crave grounding and validation, both contextual and ultimate.

This is not to say, however, that we ever actually manage to live up adequately to our own nature or to our own principles. We can feel, choose, and act as if we were nothing but complex machines or tricked-up puppets, and not living animals, not free, and not real persons, and therefore as if our lives were utterly without meaning. That is where the

inauthenticity part comes in. Moreover, we can screw things up, and very frequently we do screw things up, both colossally and trivially. That is where the evil and suffering part comes in. We can do horrendous, terrible things to one another, and/or to ourselves. Also, it can happen that either we are not what we want ourselves to be, or other people are not what we want them to be, or the world is not the way we want it to be. Any of these facts, or all of these facts together, can make us feel sick unto death. So we are, also, *the animals capable of evil and suffering*. That is the tragic side of us.

Nevertheless, as the necessary flip side of our innate capacities for inauthenticity, evil, and suffering, we are also essentially the animals innately capable of principled authenticity and happiness.

What I have just sketched is a working characterization of rational human animals, of real human persons, of ourselves. Let us suppose for the purposes of argument that it is actually true. It does not follow from this working characterization of our nature, however, that it is in any way easy *to explain how this can be true*, or as Kant might put it, to explain "the conditions of its (real, not merely logical) possibility." Indeed, here are nine deep and difficult philosophical problems directly related to our nature:

(1) What accounts for the existence and specific character of conscious, intentional, caring, rational human animal minds in a natural, physical world? (*the problem of the mind-body relation*)

(2) What accounts for the causal relevance and causal efficacy of conscious, intentional, caring, rational human animal minds in a natural, physical world? (*the problem of mental causation*)

(3) What accounts for the identity of rational human animals, real human persons, over time? (*the problem of personal identity*)

(4) What accounts for the difference between the things that rational human animals, real human persons, consciously, intentionally, and caringly do, and the things that just happen to us? (*the problem of action*)

(5) How can rational human animals, real human persons, really and truly choose or do things with negative freedom, positive freedom, and responsibility in a natural, physical world? (*the problem of free will*)

(6) What accounts for the sufficient justification of true beliefs? (the problem of knowledge)

(7) What accounts for the sufficient justification of motivating reasons and moral principles? (*the problem of practical agency and morality*)

(8) Is it possible to prove that an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good being—namely, God—exists, and if so or if not, then what? (*the theological problem*)

(9) Can the de facto coercive authority of the State over those who belong to it, to compel them to heed and obey the commands of its government, be rationally and morally justified or legitimated, and if so or if not, then what? (*the problem of political authority*)

Obviously these nine problems differ from one another in many important respects. But rational human animals, real human persons, are at one and the same time conscious, intentional, caring, living organisms, and also complete, finite, unique individuals over time, whose intentional actions have both causal relevance and causal efficacy. They are capable of negative freedom, positive freedom, and moral responsibility in a deterministic or non-deterministic natural, physical world. They are also cognizers and practical agents capable of knowledge or sufficiently justified true belief. They are also capable of right action and of adopting sufficiently justified motivating reasons and moral principles. They also think about the ultimate origins and ends of all creatures and things, and naturally wonder and worry about the provability of the existence or non-existence of God. And they all live alongside each other inside States or other state-like institutions that possess the coercive power to compel their compliance to the commands of governments, so they naturally wonder and worry whether the *de facto* coercive authority of these institutions over them has any rational and moral justification or legitimacy. Therefore, there is at least one respect in which all nine philosophical problems, when specifically focused on rational human animals, real human persons, are ultimately the *same* deep and difficult problem:

> What accounts for the existence and specific character of rational human animals, real human persons, and their complete, finite, and unique individual lives, lived alongside all the other rational and non-rational minded animals, all of us ineluctably embedded in this thoroughly nonideal world, both natural and social? (the problem of the rational human condition)

So THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION is nothing more and nothing less than my attempt to solve the problem of the rational human condition.

## 1.7  AN IMPORTANT WORRY AND A PRELIMINARY REPLY

Here's an important worry about what I am arguing and philosophically trying to do in THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION:

> "So you are saying that reality must and does conform to the phenomenology of our conscious experience of ourselves as rational human animals, real human persons, and to the specific details of our fundamental self-conception? OK. But even if you are correct about the basic structure and details of our phenomenology and our fundamental self-conception, then obviously there is no direct inference from them to (manifest or non-manifest) reality, since equally obviously we could be systematically deceived or mistaken about that. In other words, an 'error-theory' might well be true about our phenomenology and our fundamental self-conception: so (manifest or non-manifest) reality need not and might not conform to them."[39]

Yes, clearly I need to say something in reply to this objection before getting the project of rational anthropology properly underway.

Given my views about radical agnosticism and the metaphysical irrelevance of *non-manifest* or *noumenal* reality (see section 1.2 above), I leave it aside. But even so, I agree completely that there is no logically valid inference from the phenomenology of our conscious experience of ourselves as rational human animals, real human persons, and from our fundamental self-conception, to *manifest* (that is, *veridically apparent*) reality as such. So as a matter of logical, conceivable possibility, manifest reality need not and might not conform to our phenomenology and to our fundamental self-conception. Nevertheless, I do regard our phenomenology and our fundamental self-conception *as genuine, primitive, philosophical data and evidence*, along with other kinds of data and evidence of course, especially including all the formal constraints and correct information provided by logic, mathematics, and the basic natural sciences. Then, in full view of those formal constraints and that correct information, my project in these five books is to say what both rational human animals and also the manifestly real world *would have to be like* if our phenomenology and our fundamental self-conception *were to be truly indicative of manifest reality*.

This, in turn, allows me to transfer the burden of philosophical proof back to my critic:

"If my account is intelligible and coherent, and if it conforms to the formal and natural sciences at least as well as the other competing accounts do, and if it provides cogent criticisms of the alternative competing accounts—then which is a better overall explanation:

> either (i) my account, which faithfully preserves all the appearances, including all our basic rational human animal and real-human-person-oriented values,
> or (ii) the theory that we are systematically deceived by or mistaken about manifest reality and about ourselves?

In other words, should we have the metaphysical, cognitive, epistemic, and moral courage of our own convictions in our own rational human animality, our own real human personhood, or should we be deflationists, nihilists, and radical skeptics?"

I think it is *gob-smackingly obvious* that "impartial reason," to the extent that this is humanly possible, *would strongly favor my account*. This is because the "debunking strategy" and/or "error-theory" alternative is itself clearly *self-refuting*, or at least clearly *self-stultifying*. And although this self-refuting or anyhow self-stultifying character is *not generally true* of debunking strategies and/or error-theories, it is nevertheless a gob-smacking consequence of debunking strategies and/or error-theories *about human rationality*.

What I mean is that if it were *true* that we are systematically deceived and mistaken about the nature of reality and about ourselves as rational human animals, real human persons, then why would the debunking strategy and/or error-theory *themselves, as theories,* be any more likely to be correct than any other arbitrarily-chosen strategy and/or theory, given that the debunking strategy and/or error-theory are of course themselves the products of human rationality? Indeed, the debunking strategy and/or error-theory projects as applied to human rationality simply make no sense at the end of the day. For they presuppose and use a metaphysically, epistemically, and normatively robust human capacity or power for cognitive and practical rationality in order to attempt to prove the metaphysical, epistemic, and normative bankruptcy of human rationality. *So they are trying to prove rationally that we are really incapable of rationally proving anything.* This is just cognitive suicide, or at the very least, cognitive self-stultification. Hence it is even more than merely "impartially reasonable" to hold that any debunking strategy and/or error-theory as applied to human rationality is self-refuting or self-stultifying—it is also epistemically, metaphysically, morally, and vitally *imperative* for us to debunk the debunking strategies and/or error-theories by demonstrating their vicious circularity.

As I noted in passing earlier, Kant wrote in the B edition Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* that "I had to deny **scientific knowing** (*Wissen)* in order to make room for **faith** (*Glauben*)" (*CPR* Bxxx, boldfacing in the original). He was not talking about so-called "blind faith," if by that one means a rationally unjustified faith. What he meant was that he had to deny the putatively unbounded scope of scientific knowledge, in order to make room for *moral certainty* (*CPR* A828-829/B856-857). Kantian moral certainty, moreover, is not merely the kind of purely *ethical* moral certainty that flows from practical freedom and autonomy, but also, and perhaps more surprisingly, the kind of *religious* moral certainty that Pascal was seeking to induce or trigger by means of his so-called "Wager," and that Kierkegaard also called "the leap." Similarly, we must ourselves deny the debunking strategies and /or error-theories in order to make room for human reason's moral certainty about its own rationality-project, in all its dimensions. *That* sort of cognitive and practical circularity, whereby human reason freely and fully commits itself to itself and its own fundamental rational human project, is entirely benign, indeed *self-supporting*, and flows from our own nature.

## 1.8 THE BIGGEST WINDMILLS

Primed by the Delphic Oracle, Socrates said "know thyself." Rational anthropology says, somewhat more longwindedly, but also more explicitly: "know the manifestly real world by knowing yourself; then change your life; and then change the manifestly real world accordingly, by acting autonomously in pursuit of principled authenticity, and also in moral and political solidarity with everyone else, everywhere."

My goal in writing THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, then, is to launch rational anthropology by working out a true general theory of rational human animals in a thoroughly nonideal manifestly real world, both natural and social. But there is a hitch. Even if, as I argued in section 1.7, the error-theory project is rationally self-refuting or at least self-stultifying, nevertheless it remains at least logically and really or metaphysically *possible* that a true general theory of the nature of rational human animals is simply a *humanly impossible* philosophical goal. Perhaps, then, I am engaged in a Quixotic task. If so, *alas*.

Yet on the other hand, even though it is logically and really or metaphysically possible that this philosophical goal is humanly impossible, on the other hand, perhaps it is *actually not* a humanly impossible goal. Perhaps, in fact and on the contrary, it is humanly *really possible*. Consider the simple yet compelling epistemic principle, "it takes one to know one," meaning, roughly, "other things being equal and on the face of it, we have epistemic authority where our own individual lives and our own kinds of lives are concerned." This is a principle so simple and so compelling that even children can spin off it as a joke. Hence it does seem to me really possible that a conscious, intentional, caring rational human animal, a real human person, ceteris paribus and prima facie, would be capable of working out a true general theory of the nature of *her own kind of life*; assuming, of course, that she worked at it hard enough and long enough, and did not mind breaking a few logical lances, or taking the occasional dusty tumble off her philosophical horse.

Which leads me into a directly relevant side-passage, by way of concluding this philosophical beginning—I mean this Preface and General Introduction.

Like a great many other admiring readers of Miguel de Cervantes's lovely, massive *Don Quixote*, I see it as a truly amazing novel that started out to be nothing but a picaresque parody of misguided ideals of chivalry, and ended up being a sublime early statement of literary Existentialism. It teaches us that, paradoxically, ridiculously tilting at windmills, on a ragged horse, with a broken lance, can be something well worth spending a lifetime doing. Now at any rate, as for me, I would far rather spend my life that way, and risk all the risible dusty tumbles, than play the glass bead game. So even if I am just ridiculously tilting at *philosophical* windmills, at least they are the *biggest* windmills I can imagine.

At the same time, however, what Wittgenstein wrote at the end of his Preface to the *Tractatus* is also entirely apt:

> I am conscious that I have fallen far short of the possible. Simply because my powers are insufficient to cope with the task. —May others come and do it better.[40]

# PART 2. SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS TO THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION

## ESSAY 2.1  EXITING THE STATE AND DEBUNKING THE STATE OF NATURE

And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscription? They say unto him, Caesar's. Then saith he unto them, Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's.[41]

Our age is the genuine age of **criticism**, to which everything must submit. **Religion** through its holiness, and **legislation** through its **majesty** commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination. (*CPR* Axi n., boldfacing in the original)

Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his own self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another. This immaturity is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding! is thus the motto of Enlightenment. (*WiE* 8: 35)

That kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings is not to be expected, but is also not to be wished for, since possession of power unavoidably corrupts the free judgment of reason. (*PP* 8: 369)

When nature has unwrapped, from under this hard shell, the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to think freely, the latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of

freedom in acting) and eventually even upon the principles of government, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, who is now more than a machine, in keeping with his dignity. (*WiE* 8: 41-42)

### 2.1.1  Introduction: Two Kinds of Enlightenment, and Religion Only Within the Limits of Pure Practical Reason

I think that there is a fundamental difference between

(i) what I call *Enlightenment Lite*, and
(ii) what I call Heavy-Duty Enlightenment.

Enlightenment Lite says: Argue and write as much as you like, about anything you like, *provided that* you still slavishly obey and "render unto Caesar," that is, "render unto" coercive political authority, the government, the State, and also slavishly obey and "render unto" other State-like institutions, at the end of the day. A widely-disseminated contemporary example of Enlightenment Lite is Steven Pinker's *Enlightenment Now*.[42] But Heavy-Duty Enlightenment says: You must exit your self-incurred immaturity, dare to know/think for yourself (*Sapere aude!*), and then dare to act for yourself. —Period: that is, *without* ultimately slavishly obeying and "rendering unto" coercive political authority, the government, the State, and other State-like institutions. Heavy-Duty Enlightenment is the same as what I call *radical enlightenment*.[43]

The confusion between Enlightenment Lite and Heavy-Duty Enlightenment has had huge, dire cultural and political implications. Enlightenment Lite is deeply misguided, because it presupposes *instrumental rationality*, and leads to *rationality-nihilism* if it is not ultimately grounded on a deeper, non-instrumental, categorically normative conception of rationality. The rationality-nihilist believes not only, along with Hume, that "reason is the slave of the passions," but also that reason is ultimately *otiose* and *eliminable* in the face of brute coercive power. Worst of all, then, Enlightenment Lite is deeply complicit with coercive authoritarianism, or *Statism*, right up to *totalitarianism*, and equally deeply complicit with technocratic, large-scale capitalism and its valorization—or what we now call *neoliberalism*—as Adorno and Horkheimer carefully spell it out in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.[44]

Unfortunately, the primary historical source of the dire Enlightenment Lite/Heavy-Duty Enlightenment confusion is Kant's "What is Enlightenment?," which is *really* about Heavy-Duty Enlightenment, aka radical enlightenment, but superficially appears to be about Enlightenment Lite. And this is mostly Kant's own fault. In "What is Enlightenment?," he is philosophically super-cagey, and indeed *duplicitous* about what he really meant, due to (in fact, well-justified) fears about censorship and political repression.

Now according to Harry Frankfurt's highly insightful analysis, "bullshit" is a philosophical quasi-technical term, meaning *inauthentic verbiage or actions, put forward as if authentic, strongly tending to undermine the pursuit of truth and the highest good alike*.[45] In other words, in "What is Enlightenment?," Kant is philosophically bullshitting us. Above all, his deeply conflicted and ultimately incoherent doctrine of "the private use of reason" vs. "the public use of reason" in that essay epitomizes this philosophical super-cageyness, duplicity, and bullshitting.[46]

To his credit, however, Kant finally said what he *really* meant about enlightenment, ethics, and politics in *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* in 1793. *Religion* is in fact a treatise in Heavy Duty Enlightenment/radical enlightenment and a defense of philosophical and political *anarchism*, or more precisely, what I call *existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism*. In turn, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism says:

> There is no adequate rational justification for coercive political authority, the government, the State, or any other State-like institution, and we should reject and exit the State and other State-like institutions, in order to create, belong to, and sustain a real-world, cosmopolitan ethical community in a world without any States or State-like institutions.[47]

It is deeply philosophically and politically ironic that virtually no one has ever recognized the radicalism of *Religion*. This, I think, is in part because *Religion* is much too long and because its surface rhetoric is far too Christian/religious for Enlightenment philosophers to stomach, especially 20th and 21st century Kantians. A second part of the problem is its title, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*. When Kant placed "mere" or "*bloßen*" right in front of "reason" or "*Vernunft*," it made his basic point about religion almost unrecognizable. What is "mere reason"? No one knows. But as he makes clear in the Preface to the second edition of *Religion*, responding to everyone who complained they couldn't understand the original title, what he's *actually* trying to say is: *religion is possible only within the limits of pure practical reason*. But the third and most important part of the problem about recognizing that *Religion* is actually a treatise in Heavy-Duty Enlightenment/radical enlightenment and a defense of existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism, is the fact that Kant's neo-Hobbesian liberal political philosophy in the first part of the 1797 *Metaphysics of Morals*, *The Doctrine of Right*, is really nothing but a scandalous philosophico-political *red-herring*. I will demonstrate the truth of this "deeply shocking" claim in the next section.

## 2.1.2 The Unbridgeable Gap between Right and Virtue

In the *Notes and Fragments*, aka the *Reflexionen*, in the late 1770s, Kant says that "an axiom is an immediate intuitional judgment a priori" (16: 673, 3135), and in 1771 he says that among "all immediately certain propositions," the *axiomata* are "objective principles of synthesis, space and time" (17: 522, 4370).

One paradigm of axioms is the straight-line law in Euclidean geometry, namely, "[t]he principle: a straight line is the shortest line between two points," which Kant in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* explicitly describes as one of the "simplest axioms" of pure mathematics (*Prol* 4: 301). Correspondingly, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant explicitly includes "the Axioms of Intuition" (*CPR* A161/B202) in his Principles of Pure Understanding. In that connection, he says that "axioms [are] synthetic *a priori* propositions" and also that "the axioms that properly concern only magnitudes (quanta) as such" include, for example, that "between two points only one straight line is possible" and that "two straight lines do not enclose a space" (*CPR* A164/B204-205). Hence there are also axioms in *the transcendental metaphysics of human experience*, the prime examples of which are the Axioms of Intuition (governing first-order synthetic a priori truths about extensive quantity) and the Anticipations of Perception (governing first-order synthetic a priori truths about intensive quantity).

But in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant also speaks of the synthetic a priori "axiom of right" (*MM* 6: 250), and in "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy," he says that the axiom of right is "an apodictically certain proposition that issues immediately from the definition of external right" (*RTL* 8: 429). All axioms of any kind are necessarily true, general, primitive, non-hypothetical, synthetic a priori propositions that we can know with immediate certainty or self-evidence. Since axioms are synthetic, they are consistently deniable and intuition-based, hence grounded in human sensibility. Now just as the scope of axiomatic rationality extends from mathematics to transcendental metaphysics, so too it extends to the metaphysics of morals via *pure practical* axioms. Kant says, for example,, that every immediately certain synthetic a priori proposition about "right" (*Recht*) is a pure practical "axiom of right" (*MM* 6: 250) or "axiom of outer freedom" (*MM* 6: 267-268). Correspondingly, there must also be pure practical *axioms of virtue* (*Tugend*), that is, *axioms of inner freedom or autonomy*, moral principles flowing directly from the Categorical Imperative, which would be *the ultimate axiom of virtue*, although Kant never says this *explicitly*. In the metaphysics of morals, pure practical axioms are sensibly grounded in *egoistic human empirical desires* (for outer freedom) and non-sensibly grounded in *the non-egoistic a priori feeling of respect* (for inner freedom).

The mutual incompatibility, and indeed outright inconsistency, between egoistic axioms of right and non-egoistic axioms of virtue is one of the deepest and hardest problems in Kant's political theory (*Rel* 6: 95-102). Here is how it unfolds.

Kant's neo-Hobbesian liberal political theory in *The Doctrine of Right*—namely, the doctrine of right (*Recht*)—starts from *an assumption* he calls "the axiom of right":

> Now, in order to progress from a metaphysics of right (which abstracts from all conditions of experience) to a principle of politics (which applies these concepts to cases of experience) and, by means of this, to the solution of a problem of politics in keeping with the universal principle of right, a philosopher will give 1) an axiom, that is, an apodictically certain proposition that issues immediately from the definition of external right (consistency of the freedom of each with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law); 2) a postulate (of external public law, as the united will of all in accordance with the principle of equality, without which there would be no freedom of everyone); 3) a problem of how it is to be arranged that in a society, however large, harmony in accordance with the principles of freedom and equality is maintained (namely, by means of a representative system); this will then be a principle of politics, the arrangement and organization of which will contain decrees, drawn from experiential cognition of human beings, that have in view only the mechanism for administering right and how this can be managed appropriately. Right must never be accommodated to politics, but politics must always be accommodated to right. (*RTL* 8: 429).

But the axiom of right (the axiom of external freedom, or negative freedom) is directly contradictory with what I have called "the ultimate axiom of virtue" (the ultimate axiom of internal freedom, or autonomy, namely, the Categorical Imperative). This is because on the one hand, the axiom of right says:

> (i) that we ARE essentially self-interested and need to be protected from each other by the coercion of the State, which secures external freedom,

whereas, on the other hand, the axiom of virtue says:

> (ii) that we are NOT essentially self-interested, but on the contrary we are essentially capable of acting in a non-egoistic way, autonomously, for the sake of the Categorical Imperative, and indeed we are morally REQUIRED to do this.

As I mentioned above, the synthetic a priori *axiom of right* is grounded on *the empirical fact of human egoistic self-interested desires*, whereas the *axiom of virtue* is grounded on *the a priori feeling of respect*. Hence the axiom of right is to the axiom of virtue as *natural science*, grounded on *the empirical intuition of matter*, is to *mathematics*, which is grounded on *the pure intuition of space and time*. And just as no truth of natural science can override a truth of mathematics—for example, if natural science claimed to show that 2+2=5, this would be overridden by arithmetic—so too, no obligation in the doctrine of right can override an obligation in the doctrine of virtue. But unlike the science-mathematics relationship, right and virtue are not only *asymmetric*, they are actually

*contradictory*. In still other words, then, Kant's political philosophy starts from an enabling assumption, the axiom of right, which in effect says that we are all essentially egoistic/self-interested—that is, we are essentially decision-theoretic animals; indeed, we are essentially decision-theoretic *biochemical puppets*,[48] hence nothing but *natural machines*. As he himself says, "the problem of establishing a state, no matter how hard it may sound, is soluble even for a nation of devils (if only they have understanding)" (*PP* 8: 366), and that the State-establishing problem

> goes like this: "Given a multitude of rational beings all of whom need universal laws for their preservation but each of whom is inclined covertly to exempt himself from them, so to order this multitude and establish their constitution that, although in their private dispositions they strive against one another, these yet so check one another that in their public conduct the result is the same as if they had no such evil dispositions." Such a problem must be soluble. For the problem is not the moral improvement of human beings but only the mechanism of nature, and what the task requires one to know is how this can be put to use in human beings in order so to arrange the conflict of their unpeaceable dispositions within a people that they themselves have to constrain one another to submit to coercive law and so bring about a condition of peace in which laws have force. (*PP* 8: 366)

Since the "the problem is not the moral improvement of human beings but only the mechanism of nature," the external freedom of the devils and essentially egoistic/self-interested human beings alike is only that of a compatibistic/soft deterministic "turnspit," as Kant puts it in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (*CPrR* 5: 97).

Slavoj Žižek aptly observed that "liberalism [is] politics for a race of devils."[49] But even more to the point, *liberalism is politics for a devilish race of biochemical puppets*. Therefore, we need to be protected from arbitrarily coercing/compelling each other (that is, external freedom), lest we fall back in the Hobbesian war of all against all/state of nature, and (w)hack each other to death, Mad-Max style. So State government is nothing but an *executive control mechanism*, plus a centralized power to coerce (for example, the police, the army, the National Security Administration, etc., etc.), designed for guaranteeing mutual external freedom in the universal pursuit of egoism/self-interest by all the State's citizens, a Hobbesian "leviathan," a decision-theoretic *mega-machine State,* a mechanical totality made out of individual biochemical-puppet human beings.

On the contrary, however, Kant's ethics starts from the primitive assumption—the ultimate axiom of virtue, the Categorical Imperative—which directly implies that the Highest Good is a *good will*, namely, acting for the sake of the Categorical Imperative, and also that *we freely can do so, because we ought to do so*, hence that we are NOT essentially egoistic or self-interested, and that we are practically free or autonomous and NOT machines. So, as we saw earlier, there is a direct contradiction between Kant's axiom of right and Kant's ultimate axiom of virtue. It is as if physics were to "discover" empirically

that actually, 2+2=5 (cf. the axiom of right), as opposed to what the pure mathematics—that is, the basic arithmetic—of the natural numbers (cf. the ultimate axiom of virtue), says about that. Therefore, just as pure mathematics/basic arithmetic trumps physics, since Kantian ethics trumps Kantian neo-Hobbesian liberal political theory, the enabling assumption of Kant's own political philosophy in the *Doctrine of Right* is *false* by virtue of Kant's own ethics. In this way, again, in the *Doctrine of Right*, just as in "What is Enlightenment?," Kant is being highly philosophically duplicitous and seriously bullshitting us.

Now traditionally, it was held by Kant scholars that the doctrine of right is somehow *entailed by* the doctrine of virtue; and recent Kant scholars have managed to recognize that the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue are *logically independent of one another*.[50] But the amazing fact is, that 200+ years of Kant scholarship on *The Metaphysics of Morals* and *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* has been completely taken in by Kant's bullshit, and and no one, until now, has ever recognized

> either (i) the outright contradiction between Kant's axiom of virtue and his ultimate axiom of right,
> or (ii) the further fact that Kant's ethics directly falsifies his political philosophy.

Surely, only the hegemony of classical (neo-)Hobbesian and Millian (neo)liberal political theory in mainstream post-WW II European and Anglo-American political philosophy can possibly explain this stunning example of apparently permanent professional academic philosophical blindness. *Since the end of WW II, mainstream Anglo-American professional academic political philosophy has all been about (neo)liberalism*, from Rawls and Nozick to yesterday.[51] Yet if I am correct, then the true philosophical children of Kant's *Religion* are the *Frankfurt School Critical theory neo-Marxists,* including Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Axel Honneth,[52] and *social anarchists*, including Thoreau, Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, Chomsky, Robert Paul Wolff, and Murray Bookchin. Nevertheless, the impact of the Frankfurt School and social anarchists on mainstream 20th and 21st century Anglo-American professional academic political philosophy, not to mention their impact on mainstream Anglo-American political life since the McCarthy era, except for the very brief New Left flare-up period during the late 1960s and early 70s, alongside the Vietnam War protests, *has been effectively zero*.[53]

### 2.1.3  From Radical Enlightenment
### To Existential Kantian Cosmopolitan Social Anarchism,
### By Means of Religion Only Within the Limits of Pure Practical Reason

Here are the key texts in part 3, division 1, sections I-III of *Religion*:

I. CONCERNING THE ETHICAL STATE OF NATURE

A juridico-civil (political) state is the relation of human beings to each other inasmuch as they stand jointly under public juridical laws (which are all coercive laws). An ethico-civil state is one in which they are united under laws without being coerced, Le. under laws of virtue alone.

Now, just as the rightful (but not therefore always righteous) state of nature, i.e. the juridical state of nature, is opposed to the first, so is the ethical state of nature distinguished from the second. In these two [states of nature] each individual prescribes the law to himself, and there is no external law to which he, along with the others, acknowledges himself to be subject. In both each individual is his own judge, and there is no effective public authority with power to determine legitimately, according to laws, what is in given cases the duty of each individual, and to bring about the universal execution of those laws.

In an already existing political community all the political citizens are, as such, still in the ethical state of nature, and have the right to remain in it; for it would be a contradiction (in adjecto) for the political community to compel its citizens to enter into an ethical community, since the latter entails freedom from coercion in its very concept. Every political community may indeed wish to have available a dominion over minds as well, according to the laws of virtue; for where its means of coercion do not reach, since a human judge cannot penetrate into the depths of other human beings, there the dispositions to virtue would bring about the required result. But woe to the legislator who would want to bring about through coercion a polity directed to ethical ends! For he would thereby not only achieve the very opposite of ethical ends, but also undermine his political ends and render them insecure. – The citizen of the political community therefore remains, so far as the latter's lawgiving authority is concerned, totally free: he may wish to enter with his fellow citizens into an ethical union over and above the political one, or rather remain in a natural state of this sort. Only insofar as an ethical community must rest on public laws and have a constitution based on them, must those who freely commit themselves to enter into this state, not [indeed] allow the political power to command them how to order (or not order) such a constitution internally, but allow limitations, namely the condition that nothing be included in this constitution which contradicts the duty of its members as citizens of the state – even though, if the ethical bond is of the genuine sort, this condition need not cause anxiety.

II. THE HUMAN BEING OUGHT TO LEAVE THE ETHICAL STATE OF NATURE IN ORDER TO BECOME A MEMBER OF AN ETHICAL COMMUNITY

Just as the juridical state of nature is a state of war of every human being against every other, so too is the ethical state of nature one in which the good principle, which resides in each human being, is incessantly attacked by the evil which is found in him and in every other as well. Human beings (as we remarked above) mutually corrupt one another's moral

predisposition and, even with the good will of each individual, because of the lack of a principle which unites them, they deviate through their dissensions from the common goal of goodness, as though they were instruments of evil, and expose one another to the danger of falling once again under its dominion.

Further, just as the state of a lawless external (brutish) freedom and independence from coercive laws is a state of injustice and of war, each against each, which a human being ought to leave behind in order to enter into a politico-civil state, so is the ethical state of nature a public feuding between the principles of virtue and a state of inner immorality which the natural human being ought to endeavor to leave behind as soon as possible.

Now, here we have a duty sui generis, not of human beings toward human beings but of the human race toward itself. For every species of rational beings is objectively – in the idea of reason – destined to a common end, namely the promotion of the highest good as a good common to all. But, since this highest moral good will not be brought about solely through the striving of one individual person for his own moral perfection but requires rather a union of such persons into a whole toward that very end, toward a system of well-disposed human beings in which,and through the unity of which alone, the highest moral good can come to pass, yet the idea of such a whole, as a universal republic based on the laws of virtue, differs entirely from all moral laws (which concern what we know to reside within our power), for it is the idea of working toward a whole of which we cannot know whether as a whole it is also in our power: so the duty in question differs from all others in kind and in principle. – We can already anticipate that this duty will need the presupposition of another idea, namely, of a higher moral being through whose universal organization the forces of single individuals, insufficient on their own, are united for a common effect.

## III. THE CONCEPT OF AN ETHICAL COMMUNITY IS THE CONCEPT OF A PEOPLE OF GOD UNDER ETHICAL LAWS

If an ethical community is to come into being, all individuals must be subjected to a public legislation, and all the laws binding them must be capable of being regarded as commands of a common lawgiver. Now if the community to be founded is to be a juridical one, the mass of people joining in a union must itself be the lawgiver (of constitutional laws), because legislation proceeds from the principle of limiting the freedom of each to the conditions under which it can coexist with the freedom of everyone else, in conformity with a universal law, and the universal will thus establishes an external legal constraint. If, however, the community is to be an ethical one, the people, as a people, cannot itself be regarded as legislator. For in such a community all the laws are exclusively designed to promote the morality of actions (which is something internal, and hence cannot be subject to public human laws) whereas these public laws (and in this they constitute a juridical community) are on the contrary directed to the legality of actions, which is visible to the eye, and not to (inner) morality which alone is at issue here. There must therefore be someone other than the people whom we can declare the public lawgiver of an ethical community.

But neither can ethical laws be thought of as proceeding originally merely from the will of this superior (as statutes that would not be binding without his prior sanction), for then they would not be ethical laws, and the duty commensurate to them would not be a free virtue but an externally enforceable legal duty. Therefore only such a one can be thought of as the supreme lawgiver of an ethical community, with respect to whom all true duties, hence also the ethical, * must be represented as at the same time his commands; consequently, he must also be one who knows the heart, in order to penetrate to the most intimate parts of the dispositions of each and everyone and, as must be in every community, give to each according to the worth of his actions. But this is the concept of God as a moral ruler of the world. Hence an ethical community is conceivable only as a people under divine commands, i.e., as a people of God, and indeed in accordance with the laws of virtue. (*Rel* 6: 95-102)

*Religion* was published in the face of governmental religious censorship, and in 1794 Kant also published a very edgy essay in the philosophy of religion, called "The End of All Things." As a consequence, Kant was officially reprimanded in 1794:

The … action against Kant finally took the form of an official letter from King Frederick William [II], dated October 1 and signed on his behalf by Wollner's hand. It accused Kant, both in the Religion and in the shorter treatises, of "misusing" his philosophy to "distort and disparage many of the cardinal and basic teachings of the Holy Scriptures and Christianity"; and it demanded that the philosopher both "give an account of himself" and be guilty of no similar faults in the future, lest he be the object of "unpleasant measures" for his "continuing obstinacy."[54]

In other words, Kant was accused of "unprofessional conduct," and threatened with fairly serious disciplinary measures. For better or worse, he caved in to the pressure, and stopped publishing and lecturing about religion until Frederick William II died.

I think we must frankly say that Kant, personally, was not very courageous. But how many philosophers have actually been courageous enough to risk losing their jobs and/or being imprisoned for their radical beliefs, like Bertrand Russell did for his pacifism during World War I, or even to die for their radical beliefs, like Socrates?[55]

In any case, what Kant explicitly says in *Religion*, part 3, division 1, sections I-III, is that the "juridico-civil community" (namely, the State) is inherently incompatible with the existence of an "ethical community," and also inherently incompatible with our exiting "our self-incurred immaturity" and daring to think/know and act freely, for ourselves, and thereby NOT thinking/knowing and acting like a machine—as Kant explicitly states in the amazing last sentence of "What is Enlightenment?" This is because, since we are citizens of the State, and therefore must play this designated functional role within the Leviathan-machine of the State, it requires us all to be *civil functionaries*, in accordance with "the private use of reason." That is: as citizens of the State, we are *juridico-civil machines* who can argue and write as much as we like, but must ultimately obey and "render unto Caesar,"

that is, render unto coercive political authority, the State's government; and in so doing, we must also "render unto God," that is, render unto religious authority, the priests, the social institution of the Church, directly aligned with the State and its government. Hence the State stands to the autonomy-driven ethical community as an "ethical state of nature" stands to authentic ethics and morality, which is why we morally *must* exit the State in order to join a cosmopolitan ethical community, the real-world, worldwide realm of ends, namely, *the true Church*, not the actual social institution of the Church, which in reality is always aligned with the State, even despite hollow official phrases about the separation of Church and State. In contemporary USA, this shows up vividly in The Pledge of Allegiance, memorized and intoned by all school-children and patriots: "one nation, under God, etc., etc."

So, essentially, Kant's real view is that *if* you assume, as an axiom, that everyone is always and necessarily motivated by psychological and ethical egoism or self-interest and needs to be protected from everyone else in order to pursue her own self-interest, according to the axiom of right, aka the axiom of external freedom, *then and only then* do you need the (neo-)Hobbesian liberal State. And in this State, as per Enlightenment Lite, you can argue and write as much as you like, provided that you obey and "render unto Caesar," namely, render unto Frederick William II, that is, render unto coercive political authority, the government, the State, and other coercive State-like institutions like the social institution of the Church. But *if* you realize that actually we are *not* nothing but decision-theoretic, self-interest-driven machines, but, on the contrary, we are all inherently capable of inner freedom and autonomy, obligated by and for the sake of the Categorical Imperative, and all normatively driven by the teleology of our rational human nature, according to the ultimate axiom of virtue, aka the axiom of internal freedom or autonomy, *then* you morally *must* exit your mental slavery and also you morally *must* exit the (neo-) Hobbesian liberal State, in order to join a cosmopolitan ethical community, the real-world worldwide realm of ends on Earth, the true Church. Or, more succinctly, as Kant puts it explicitly in the titles of *Religion*, sections II and III:

> THE HUMAN BEING OUGHT TO LEAVE THE ETHICAL STATE OF NATURE IN ORDER TO BECOME A MEMBER OF AN ETHICAL COMMUNITY

> THE CONCEPT OF AN ETHICAL COMMUNITY IS THE CONCEPT OF A PEOPLE OF GOD UNDER ETHICAL LAWS.

In this real-world, worldwide ethical community, namely, *humanity*, the rational idea of God is nothing more and nothing less than the rational idea of *the Highest Good*: namely, the good will (in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*), aka God (in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and *Religion*), with happiness proportioned to moral virtue, extended over all of humanity, on this Earth, which, because of its spherical, finite-but-unbounded

shape, we all must share together, in an indefinitely extended future. Therefore, in order to join this cosmopolitan ethical community you must exit your self-incurred immaturity, and dare to think or know for yourself (*Sapere aude!*), and also to act for yourself (according to Heavy-Duty Enlightenment/radical enlightenment), and then you should reject and exit the State and other State-like institutions, in order to create, belong to, and sustain a real-world, cosmpolitan ethical community, humanity, in a world without any States or State-like institutions (according to existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism), for God's (that is, the Highest Good's) sake.

### 2.1.4  Human Antagonism, Hobbesian Cognitive Walls, Reverence for Humanity, and Political Aesthetics

In a seeming paradox, Kant is at once a highly realistic and even *cynical* philosophico-political *social scientist* of human antagonism and also a highly idealistic and even *romantic* philosophico-political *poet* of reverence for humanity:

> By "antagonism" I mean the unsocial sociability of men, i.e., their propensity to enter into society, bound together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society. Man has an inclination to associate with others, because in society he feels himself to be more than man, i.e., as more than the developed form of his natural capacities. But he also has a strong propensity to isolate himself from others, because he finds in himself at the same time the unsocial characteristic of wishing to have everything go according to his own wish. Thus he expects opposition on all sides because, in knowing himself, he knows that he, on his own part, is inclined to oppose others. This opposition it is which awakens all his powers, brings him to conquer his inclination to laziness and, propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and avarice, to achieve a rank among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he cannot withdraw. Thus are taken the first true steps from barbarism to culture, which consists in the social worth of man; thence gradually develop all talents, and taste is refined; through continued enlightenment the beginnings are laid for a way of thought which can in time convert the coarse, natural disposition for moral discrimination into definite practical principles, and thereby change a society of men driven together by their natural feelings into a moral whole. Without those in themselves unamiable characteristics of unsociability from whence opposition springs-characteristics each man must find in his own selfish pretensions-all talents would remain hidden, unborn in an Arcadian shepherd's life, with all its concord, contentment, and mutual affection. Men, good-natured as the sheep they herd, would hardly reach a higher worth than their beasts; they would not fill the empty place in creation by achieving their end, which is rational nature. Thanks be to Nature, then, for the incompatibility, for heartless competitive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess and to rule! Without them, all the excellent natural capacities of humanity would forever sleep, undeveloped. Man wishes concord; but Nature knows better what is good for the race; she wills discord. He wishes to live

comfortably and pleasantly; Nature wills that he should be plunged from sloth and passive contentment into labor and trouble, in order that he may find means of extricating himself from them. The natural urges to this, the sources of unsociableness and mutual opposition from which so many evils arise, drive men to new exertions of their forces and thus to the manifold development of their capacities. They thereby perhaps show the ordering of a wise Creator and not the hand of an evil spirit, who bungled in his great work or spoiled it out of envy. (*IUH* 8: 20-22, underlining added)

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not need to search for them and merely conjecture them as though they were veiled in obscurity or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. The first begins from the place I occupy in the external world of sense and extends the connection in which I stand into an unbounded magnitude with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, and moreover into the unbounded times of their periodic motion, their beginning and their duration. The second begins from my invisible self, my personality, and presents me in a world which has true infinity but which can be discovered only by the understanding, and I cognize that my connection with that world (and thereby with all those visible worlds as well) is not merely contingent, as in the first case, but universal and necessary. The first view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an animal creature, which after it has been for a short time provided with vital force (one knows not how) must give back to the planet (a mere speck in the universe) the matter from which it came. The second, on the contrary, infinitely raises my worth as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world, at least so far as this may be inferred from the purposive determination of my existence by this law, a determination not restricted to the conditions and boundaries of this life but reaching into the infinite. (*CPrR* 5: 161-162, underlining added)

The basic assumption of the Hobbesian "state-of-nature" is what Kant calls human *antagonism*: universal, inherent human egoism/self-interest, and "unsocial sociability," namely an inherent and necessary natural tendency towards the Hobbesian "war of all against all." This assumption, as we have seen, is an essential condition of the doctrine of right, namely, political (neo)liberalism, since human antagonism propels us into the juridico-civil condition, that is, the coercive (neo)liberal State. And this State, as the "Doctrine of Right" in the *Metaphysics of Morals* shows, is essentially a mega-machine made out of human beings—a *leviathan*, governed by a sovereign coercive power of some kind—that guarantees mutual external freedom and the pursuit of egoistic or self-interested pleasure and the corresponding total state of "happiness," construed as the totality of instrumentally good consequences for any and all self-interested individual human animal-machines, that follow from these.

But human egoism and antagonism are not only essential assumptions of political (neo)liberalism, they are a state-of-mind: an *aesthetico-political attitude*, and a *cognitive myth*, vividly expressed by, for example, William Golding's *Lord of the Flies*, and in post-Apocalyptic fiction and post-Apocalyptic movies like *Mad Max: Fury Road*, more generally. The same aesthetico-political attitude and cognitive myth of human egoism and antagonism was originally and perhaps most brilliantly expressed in Dante's *Inferno*, which of course draws on biblical representations of the Apocalypse. The primary function of the cognitive myth of human egoism and antagonism is to evoke extreme visceral fear and terror, which mechanically motivates our acceptance of coercive (neo)liberal States: so in this way, classical Hobbesian liberalism and neo-Hobbesian (neo)liberalism alike are *politics for a race of devilish biochemical puppets*.

Nevertheless, although the doctrine of Statism both *needs* and also *draws directly on* and *fully exploits* this pre-theoretical aesthetico-political attitude and myth, it is simply *false* that a pre-State or post-State human condition either *logically entails* or *naturally necessitates* human egoism and antagonism. Indeed, in actual fact, in a pre-State or post-State condition, people are about as likely to be mutually respectful, kind, and prepared to provide mutual aid for each other, altruistically, as they are to be antagonistic. Or even *more* likely. This is brilliantly and clearly shown, for example, by Rebecca Solnit's study of "disaster communities" in San Francisco, Halifax, Mexico City, New York City, and New Orleans.[56] *So I am saying that human nature is NOT essentially egoistic or antagonistic, and that the human capacity for altruism and mutual respect is innate*. That sounds like another "deeply shocking" claim, doesn't it?

But even if *were not* actually true that we are as likely to be non-egoistic and non-antagonistic, namely, altruistic, as we are to be egoistic and antagonistic, and even if people were non-egoistic, non-antagonistic, altruistic, and mutually respectful *only very RARELY*, or even if it happened *only ONCE in all human history*, nevertheless it necessarily follows that it is *really possible* for people in a pre-State or post-State condition to be non-egoistic, non-antagonistic, and mutually respectful. And this self-evidently shows that the thesis of human egoism and antagonism *is false*, and indeed nothing but *a cognitive myth*, since that thesis claims to be a logically or naturally *necessary truth* about human nature. *Indeed, Solnit has shown this empirically, not just for one actual case, but for five actual cases.* Therefore, we need to face up to this self-evidently sound argument:

1. As a matter of modal logic, one actual counterexample undermines a supposed necessary truth.
2. Given Solnit's five actual-world cases, it is simply false that human beings are necessarily egoistic and antagonistic.
3. As a matter of modal logic, the actual entails the really possible.
4. Therefore there is no necessity for us, as rational human animals and real human persons, to enter into the juridico-civil condition, and correspondingly it is really possible for us all to reject and exit the State and other State-like institutions, in order to create and belong to

a real-world, cosmopolitan ethical community in a world without any States or State-like institutions.

Again, more briefly:

> We freely created the State and Statelike-institutions; therefore, we really can freely reject and exit the State and other State-like institutions, in order to create, belong to, and sustain a real-world, cosmopolitan ethical community in a world without any States or State-like institutions.

I know from sad personal experience, however, that almost without exception, presenting this argument to people who have grown up in contemporary big-capitalist neoliberal majoritarian representative democratic states, literally boggles their minds. It is as if, in the face of a lifetime of powerful people telling them that $2 + 2 = 5$, they are suddenly presented with self-evident proof that $2 + 2 = 4$. They see it, are boggled and deeply disoriented, and then, like brainwashed characters out of *The Manchurian Candidate*, they quickly collapse back into rotely asserting some or another version of the myth of human egoism and antagonism. They are, in effect, *The Hobbesian Candidates*.

Actually, as it turns out, the cognitive causes of what I will call *The Hobbesian Candidates Effect* lie in the empirically well-confirmed sociologiocal and psychological phenomena known as *the persistence of false beliefs* and *the backfire effect*.[57] The persistence of false beliefs and the backfire effect, in turn, are sub-species of what I call *cognitive walls*. A cognitive wall is an entrenched or habitual belief, memory, stereotypical mental image, feeling, or emotion that acts as *an effective screen against reality and the truth* as it actually presented by sense perception, reliable testimonial evidence, or rational argument. A simple, morally benign, and non-institutional example of a cognitive wall is the fact that ordinary, healthy people with normal stereoscopic vision all have their noses right in the middle of their visual fields, yet normally don't see them at all. Hence the familiar admonishing comment, "it's as plain as the nose on your face!" Of course, the nose-blindness phenomenon can be easily corrected by someone else's touching (or punching) your nose, or by self-consciously touching your own nose, crossing your eyes inwards, or looking in a mirror.

Nevertheless other cases of cognitive walls, by sharp contrast, are not only extremely hard to correct, but also morally and politically malignant, precisely because they flow from our belonging to neoliberal democratic states. Indeed, as in Orwell's *1984*, and in real-world 21st century socipolitical life, a significant and indeed massive amount of time, money, and media-driven effort in contemporary big-capitalist neoliberal majoritarian representaive democratic states is devoted precisely to building up, maintaining, and reinforcing cognitive walls. Tristan Bridges writes that

[f]acts about all manner of things have made headlines recently as the Trump administration continues to make statements, reports, and policies at odds with things we know to be true. Whether it's about the size of his inauguration crowd, patently false and fear-mongering inaccuracies about transgender persons in bathrooms, rates of violent crime in the U.S., or anything else, lately it feels like the facts don't seem to matter. The inaccuracies and misinformation continue despite the earnest attempts of so many to correct each falsehood after it is made. It's exhausting. But why is it happening?....

There is more than one reason this is happening. But, one reason I think the alternative facts industry has been so effective has to do with a concept social scientists call the "backfire effect." As a rule, misinformed people do not change their minds once they have been presented with facts that challenge their beliefs. But, beyond simply not changing their minds when they should, research shows that they are likely to become more attached to their mistaken beliefs. The factual information "backfires." When people don't agree with you, research suggests that bringing in facts to support your case might actually make them believe you less. In other words, fighting the ill-informed with facts is like fighting a grease fire with water. It seems like it should work, but it's actually going to make things worse.

To study this, Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler (2010) conducted a series of experiments. They had groups of participants read newspaper articles that included statements from politicians that supported some widespread piece of misinformation. Some of the participants read articles that included corrective information that immediately followed the inaccurate statement from the political figure, while others did not read articles containing corrective information at all.

Afterward, they were asked a series of questions about the article and their personal opinions about the issue. Nyhan and Reifler found that how people responded to the factual corrections in the articles they read varied systematically by how ideologically committed they already were to the beliefs that such facts supported. Among those who believed the popular misinformation in the first place, more information and actual facts challenging those beliefs did not cause a change of opinion—in fact, it often had the effect of strengthening those ideologically grounded beliefs.[58]

In other words, the backfire effect shows that cognitive walls, especially those concerning persistent false beliefs, memories, sterotypical mental images, feelings, or emotions generated by media-driven, sociopolitical mechanisms in contemporary neoliberal states, are *self-reinforcing*. The more you try to confront a person's cognitive walls with contrary correct facts, the higher and thicker he builds his walls, without even knowing what he is doing and fully convinced that he is in the right. So cognitive walls are the basic vehicles of *self-induced, self-deceiving mental slavery*.

The reason for this, clearly, is that a person's cognitive walls are essentially of two kinds:

(i) walls concerning his sense of individual identity as a person, and

(ii) walls concerning his sense of group identity as a card-carrying member of some important social community or institution.

Breaking through or tearing down those cognitive walls in any way, therefore, would mean that the subject would have to undertake a fundamental change of heart or a fundamental shift in group allegiance—in effect, *a cognitive-affective revolution*—and most people are desperately afraid of doing this.

Now Statists generally, including all tyrants and totalitarians, but especially including all classical Hobbesian liberals and neo-Hobbesian (neo)liberals, desperately want and need you to believe in the cognitive myth of human egoism and antagonism, so that they can frighten and terrorize you into the juridico-civil condition, whereby *you* give up your moral integrity and autonomy and *they* immorally control your life. So the aesthetico-political attitude and myth of human egoism and antagonism really *is* a Hobbesian cognitive *myth*, a pernicious, politically expedient Hobbesian cognitive *illusion*: moreover, it is nothing but a deeply ingrained, deeply enslaving *Hobbesian cognitive wall*, virtually impossible to dislodge or undermine by conceptual reasoning alone.

Here it is crucial to remember that what holds cognitive walls together, and constitutes *the psychological bricks and mortar* of cognitive walls, is a set of *affective facts about human minds*: facts about our desires, feelings, and emotions. In turn, all affective facts about human minds belong to what Kant (following Baumgarten) called the philosophical science of *aesthetics* (*CPR* A21/B35-36). Therefore, the critical study of, for example, the Hobbesian cognitive wall of human egoism and human antagonism, falls under the existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist philosophical science of *political aesthetics*.

From the standpoint of existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist political aesthetics, the only way to debunk this Hobbesian cognitive myth *decisively*, and, correspondingly, the only way to break through this Hobbesian cognitive wall *effectively*, is to appeal to a fundamentally *different* aesthetico-political attitude. This attitude is what I call *reverence (Ehrfurcht) for humanity*: that is, awe, amazement, and wonder directed at human nature and the human animal, as a real human *person* possessing *dignity*, therefore as both the subject and object of respect and kindness for all humanity, and a transcendentally free, practically free autonomous agent, guided by and acting for the sake of the Categorical Imperative, "the moral law within me."

This aesthetico-political attitude of reverence for humanity is fully analogous to what I have called *natural piety*, namely, reverence directed to the non-human natural world, "the starry heavens above me," which is also an experience of the sublime, a kind of *proto-respect*, applied to all aspects of the non-human natural world, as filled with teleological structure, and the real possibility of organismic life, emergent mind, and emergent agency.[59] Moroever, as Kant argues in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, our

experience of the sublime in nature is directly, that is, essentially non-conceptually, connected by us to our dignity and our capacity for autonomy (*CPJ* 5: 244-278).

Given the aesthetico-political attitude of reverence for humanity, it becomes immediately self-evident that neither the pre-State nor post-State conditions entail or naturally necessitate the Hobbesian state-of-nature and war of all against all. That is, *as soon as you freely adopt this attitude*, it becomes self-evident that it is *really possible* that we will act non-egoistically/non-self-interestedly and non-antagonistically, on the basis of mutual respect and kindness for humanity. Therefore, any fully compelling rational argument for radical enlightenment or existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism is going to have to appeal, in an essentially non-conceptual way, to reverence for humanity, just as any fully compelling argument for scientific pietism in the philosophy of nature and natural science is going to have to appeal, in an essentially non-conceptual way, to natural piety.

Such an appeal to natural piety would certainly include, for example, early Romantic nature painting, and early Romantic nature poetry and (in a brilliantly negative way) *Frankenstein*: Caspar Friedrich, J. M. Turner, the Shelleys, Wordsworth, Coleridge, et al. This art and its corresponding fundamental aesthetico-scientific attitude of natural piety directly and essentially non-conceptually undermines *the natural-mechanistic attitude* and its Baconian/Cartesian "mastery of nature."

Now what would be the aesthetico-political analogue of early Romantic nature painting/poetry/*Frankenstein*, such that it is a direct *cognitive counterpoise* to the Hobbesian aesthetico-political attitude, cognitive myth, and cognitive wall of human egoism and antagonism? In attempting to answer this question, we face a hard problem. The hard problem is that there are literally *mountains* of books, poetry, art, movies, etc., conveying "stirring affirmations of the human spirit," yet most of this cultural material is *kitsch* in the sense of this term that implies moral inauthenticity and bullshit. There is some interesting conceptual complexity here, because the term *kitsch* is frequently used by sociocultural/political elitists and snobs, which in turn, ironically, implies *moral inauthenticity and bullshit on the side of those who apply that term to others*.[60] But having noted that interesting complexity, I will lay it aside for the purposes of this essay. In any case, I strongly suspect that many or even most jaded modern or post-modernist neoliberal readers of the *Critique of Practical Reason* read Kant's reverential "moral law within me" text as 18th century *kitsch*.

The upshot is that the aesthetico-political counterpoise to the Hobbesian aesthetico-political attitude, cognitive myth, and cognitive wall of human egoism and antagonism, that is, *the aesthetic and artistic representation of reverence for humanity*, has to be *non*-kitsch and *also* affectively powerful enough to shock jaded modern or post-modernist neoliberals, and awaken them from their fearful, terrorized dogmatic slumbers. Hence, as existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchists, our aesthetico-political task is this:

We must find find the aesthetic and artistic equivalent of early Romantic nature painting/poetry/Frankenstein, expressing reverence for humanity, that is NOT kitsch, and also powerful enough to jolt jaded modern or post-modernist neoliberals out of their fearful/terrorized dogmatic slumbers, so that they can break through their Hobbesian cognitive wall, and make progress towards Heavy-Duty Enlightenment/radical enlightenment**.**

Solnit's *A Paradise Built in Hell* is a very good starting-place. But here is my worry about it. Consider this brief "Publishers Weekly" review posted on the Amazon site for her book:

> Natural and man-made disasters can be utopias that showcase human solidarity and point the way to a freer society, according this stimulating contrarian study. Solnit … reproves civil defense planners, media alarmists and Hollywood directors who insist that disasters produce terrified mobs prone to looting, murder and cannibalism unless controlled by armed force and government expertise. Surveying disasters from the 1906 San Francisco earthquake to 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, she shows that the typical response to calamity is spontaneous altruism, self-organization and mutual aid, with neighbors and strangers calmly rescuing, feeding and housing each other. Indeed, the main problem in such emergencies, she contends, is the elite panic of officials who clamp down with National Guardsmen and stifling regulations. <u>Solnit falters when she generalizes her populist brief into an anarchist critique of everyday society that lapses into fuzzy what-ifs and uplifting volunteer testimonials.</u> Still, this vividly written, cogently argued book makes a compelling—and timely—case for the ability of ordinary people to collectively surmount the direst of challenges.[61]

In the underlined sentence, you can literally *see* the cognitive-affective collapse of the reviewer back into the Hobbesian cognitive myth of human egoism and antagonism, and of (neo-)Hobbesian neoliberal Statism. You can literally *see* the reviewer reinforcing his cognitive wall with *more* affective bricks and mortar. Again, that's the backfire effect.

The problem here, I think, is that Solnit's book, for all its excellence and self-evidence, unfortunately does *not* provide the cognitive equivalent of a bedside alarm going off at 5am. Therefore, in order to jolt jaded modern neoliberals out of their dogmatic slumbers, I think that we need to appeal to something even *stronger* than empirically well-grounded, beautifully-written, philosophically compelling non-fiction like Solnit's. More specifically, I think we need to appeal to *resistance* aesthetics and *resistance* art. This can be found, for example, in the music of Woody Guthrie, Pete Seeger, John Lee Hooker, Lightnin Hopkins, Muddy Waters, many other guitar-playing poets of protest and the blues,[62] and more recently in the work of radical political hip-hoppers, rockers, and rappers, including

The Roots
Rage Against the Machine
Public Enemy
Cyprus Hill, and
Prophets of Rage.

It can also be found in the best dystopian science fiction, that represents people rebelling against future totalitarian societies, including

Zamyatin's *We*
Huxley's Brave New World
Orwell's *1984*
Bradbury's *Fahrenheit 451*, and
The Matrix.

And it can also be found in classic political films about resistance, including:

Eisenstein's *Battleship Potemkin*
Dreyer's *Passion of Joan of Arc*
*Salt of the Earth*
*Lonely Are the Brave*
Costa Gravas's *Z,* and
Salles's *The Motorcycle Diaries*.

Correspondingly, the best *anti-Nazi, anti-fascist* resistance-art has the same basic character, including

Rosselini's *Rome: Open City*, and
Melville's Army of Shadows

And this reminds us of earlier anti-imperialist or anti-monarchist resistance-art or resistance-legends, like Spartacus and Robin Hood. These are all, in effect, just like Solnit's real-world case-studies, representations of *emergent existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist communities*.

Resistance-aesthetics and resistance-art evoke our reverence for humanity, and clearly show us that outside the State, *we really can be* mutually respectful, and kind, and *truly* free and *deeply* happy, by way of autonomy and self-fulfullment. *But Statists have a vested interest in blinding us to this by building cognitive walls inside us.* So that is my first basic point in this section, which I will repeat for emphasis:

Statists generally, including all tyrants and totalitarians, but especially including all classical Hobbesian liberals and neo-Hobbesian (neo)liberals, desperately want and need

you to believe in the cognitive myth of human egoism and antagonism, and create a cognitive wall to screen out any countervailing evidence or criticism, so that they can frighten and terrorize you into the juridico-civil condition, whereby you give up your moral integrity and autonomy and they immorally control your life.

And that leads directly to my second basic point here, which is this:

> Even over and above Solnit's brilliant empirical study, *A Paradise Built in Hell*, the best resistance-aesthetics and resistance-art self-evidently show us what humanity essentially is and can be, in direct opposition to tyrannical, totalitarian, classical Hobbesian liberal, or neo-Hobbesian neoliberal political control, outside the coercive authoritarianism of the State.

And those two points together lead to my third and final basic point in this section, which is that the best resistance-aesthetics and resistance-art make it as self-evident as a bedside alarm-clock going off at 5am that

> the Hobbesian aesthetico-political attitude, cognitive myth, and cognitive wall of human egoism and antagonism, especially including the very idea of the Hobbesian state of nature and war of all against all, is nothing but a pernicious, politically expedient cognitive myth, which we must debunk, and a cognitive wall, which we must break through and cognitively liberate ourselves from, if we want to be able to pursue Heavy-Duty Enlightenment/radical enlightenment.

What we are looking for, in fact, is *rage*: rage *against* coercive authoritarianism and oppression of any kind, and rage *for* human autonomy and human dignity.

## 2.1.5  Conclusion: *Rage for Humanity*

Kant explicitly says that the contradiction between (i) the juridico-civil axioms and laws of right, and (ii) the ethical ultimate axiom of virtue, the Categorical Imperative, in all its basic formulations, and including the moral principles that fall under them, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the corresponding contradiction between (i*) the juridico-civil demand to obey, even if you are allowed to argue and write as much as you like about whatever you like, and (ii*) the categorical ethical demand to reject and exit the State for God's sake, "need not cause anxiety." But for the reasons we have seen in sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, and 2.1.3**,** sadly, *this is probably the biggest bullshit-line in the history of political philosophy and political theology*.

Again to his credit, Kant *also* says, however, that we naturally experience reverence for humanity, and that this fundamental aesthetic, ethical, and natural-religious attitude

strongly motivates our wholehearted pursuit of Heavy-Duty enlightenment/radical enlightenment. But as we have also seen in section 2.1.4, we cannot follow our reverential hearts to Heavy-Duty Enlightenment/radical enlightenment unless we debunk the Hobbesian cognitive myth, and break through the Hobbesian wall, of human egoism and human antagonism, and the Hobbesian state of nature along with its war of all against all. And although Solnit's *A Paradise Built in Hell* makes this point as self-evidently as 2+2=4, nevertheless cognitive myths *die hard*, via the persistence of false beliefs; and cognitive walls are self-reinforcing, via the backfire effect. In turn, these are, at bottom, *affective facts about human minds*. Correspondingly, political aesthetics shows us that anything even remotely resembling *kitsch* simply will not do the job, due to its aesthetic inauthenticity.

Hence, it appears that the only truly effective way to debunk the Hobbesian cognitive myth and break through the Hobbesian cognitive wall, is by means of *resistance-aesthetics* and *resistance-art*. So, as proponents of radical enlightenment and as existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchists, we must go directly from "What is Enlightenment," via the self-evidence of Solnit's *A Paradise Built in Hell*, to the cognitive 5 am wake-up calls of Woody Guthrie and Muddy Waters, The Roots and Prophets of Rage, *We* and *1984*, *Salt of the Earth* and *Z*, then finally onward, outward, and upward to the shining philosophical, ethical, and political daylight of Heavy-Duty Enlightenment/radical enlightenment. In other words, *we must rage for humanity*.

And then rationally hope for the best.


# ESSAY 2.2   KANT, NATURE, AND HUMANITY


> Natural science will one day incorporate the science of human beings, just as the science of human beings will incorporate natural science; there will be a *single* science.[63]


## 2.2.0  Introduction

This long essay is a radical sequel to my book *Kant, Science, and Human Nature*, published in 2006. How radical can a sequel be? Its aim is nothing more and nothing less than to begin to realize, from a specifically contemporary Kantian point of view, the "*single* science" that Marx predicted in 1844. Let's call this Kantian "*single* science" *organicism*. It is at once *rigorously mathematical*, *liberally naturalistic,* and *naturally pietistic*. By means of organicism, the supposedly never-to-be-bridged dichotomous difference between "natural science" (*Naturwissenschaft*) and "human science" (*Geisteswissenschaft*) will

simply *disappear*, but without either *relativizing* the mathematical, objective core of natural science or *mechanizing* the teleological, normative core of human science.

Here is how that radical thought unfolds.

### 2.2.1  Natural Piety and the Limits of Science

The truly apocalyptic view of the world is that things do not repeat themselves. It isn't absurd, for example, to believe that the age of science and technology is the beginning of the end for humanity; that the idea of great progress is a delusion, along with the idea that the truth will ultimately be known; that there is nothing good or desirable about scientific knowledge and that mankind, in seeking it, is falling into a trap. It is by no means obvious that this is not how things are.[64]

Time comes into it.
Say it. Say it.
The universe is made of stories,
not of atoms.[65]

[R]ational intelligibility is at the root of the natural order.[66]

It is of course fully recognized by Kantians and widely known even outside Kantian philosophy, that Kant is a serious metaphilosophical critic of classical Rationalist metaphysics, especially in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Nevertheless it is far less well-known and sometimes even completely overlooked, even by Kantians and Kant-scholars alike, not to mention non-Kantians, that Kant is also an equally serious metaphilosophical and also first-order-philosophical critic of both *scientific naturalism*—that is, the doctrine that everything in the world, including ourselves, is ultimately physical, and that "science is the measure of all things"— and also *natural mechanism*—that is, the doctrine that all natural processes are ultimately composed of purely physical, inert physical items operating according to strict natural laws and primitive-recursive algorithms—especially in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.

I think that the main reason for this is that Kant-scholars in particular and Kantians more generally have tended and still tend to focus quite narrowly on the Critical and pre-Critical periods, to the serious neglect of what I call the *proto-Critical* period from 1768 to 1772 and also what I and some others have called the *post-Critical* period after 1787. In a recent essay, "Directions in Space, Non-Conceptual Form, and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism,"[67] I offered reasons for taking the proto-Critical period very seriously; and I have also developed and defended Kant's critique of scientific naturalism in detail in *Kant, Science, and Human Nature*.[68] As I mentioned at the outset, this essay is a radical sequel to that book; and what I call *Kantian anti-mechanism* or *Kantian*

*organicism* is the metaphysical key to that radicalism. Indeed, as I will also argue in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 below, I think that Kant's anti-mechanism is the most seriously overlooked and underexploited part of what I call Kant's *real metaphysics,*[69] in contemporary philosophy.

This overlooking and underexploiting is ironic, because Kant's anti-mechanism had a heavy influence on post-Kantian German idealism up to and including Hegel.[70] And although Kant's anti-mechanism has had a non-trivial impact in philosophical aesthetics and the philosophy of biology, an impact that in turn has been well-covered and well-studied in recent Kant-scholarship in those areas, this has not been, ironically enough, worked out in its specifically *metaphysical* implications, but instead only in either its *history-of-ideas* influence or its *epistemological* implications.[71] But most ironically of all, Kant's anti-mechanism has had an exceptionally deep and wide impact *outside* professional academic philosophy, in literature and other fine arts, and in the environmental movement. But from the 1920s until now, non-Kantian and even many Kantian professional academic philosophers have been *cognitively amnesic* about it, and *cognitively blind* to it. I will explore the reasons for this philosophical amnesia and blindness in section 2.2.4.

What I want to focus on particularly in the rest of this section are

(i) Kant's critique of natural mechanism in his post-Critical period, specifically developed as a thesis in real metaphysics, that as I already mentioned, I call Kantian anti-mechanism, and

(ii) developing Kantian anti-mechanism into a larger-scope, contemporary, radical Kantian philosophy of nature, including a radical philosophy of natural science, that I call natural piety.[72]

Why do I say that the doctrine of natural piety is "radical"? By *radical*, I mean "edgy, critically robust, theoretically or morally controversial, philosophically unorthodox, and politically highly progressive, even liberationist." In view of that, the doctrine of natural piety is radical because

(i) it is explicitly and robustly metaphysical—committed to what I call liberal naturalism—not merely epistemological,

(ii) it is explicitly and robustly value-driven, committed to what I call the primacy of the normative, with serious aesthetic, ethical, natural-religious, and sociocultural-political implications, and

(iii) it is explicitly and robustly pro-science without being in any way scientistic, where "scientism" is scientific naturalism, plus the dogmatic epistemic thesis that all methods of inquiry and knowledge are ultimately reducible to natural-scientific methods, plus the Baconian/Cartesian ideological-technocratic thesis that natural science is essentially a "lordship and mastery" over nature, including inert physical nature, non-human living or animal nature, and human nature alike.

The radical sociocultural-political character of the doctrine of natural piety is also perfectly captured by Wittgenstein's apocalyptic thoughts about the nature and limits of science, already quoted in the first epigraph of this section:

> [T]he age of science and technology is the beginning of the end for humanity; … the idea of great progress is a delusion, along with the idea that the truth will ultimately be known; [and] there is nothing good or desirable about scientific knowledge and … mankind, in seeking it, is falling into a trap.

As we will see, natural piety is the normative gateway to a radical philosophy of science that provides what I think is the *one and only* rational ground of hope humanity has for escaping this "trap."

### From Kant's anti-mechanism to Kantian anti-mechanism

It is well-known that in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, and especially the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Kant is a self-described *Newtonian mechanist* about the manifest natural spacetime world, in which, as human animals, we must live, move, and have our being. But as early as 1763, in his pre-Critical or Leibnizian/Wolffian period, in "The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God," Kant explicitly rejected the preformationist conception of biological generation and embryogenesis, according to which creatures pre-exist in their basic forms or structures, and require only the mechanical addition of bulk in order to develop. Instead, he defended the *epigenetic* view, whereby the basic forms or structures of creatures themselves are emergently generated by the spontaneous but also rule-governed operations of a goal-oriented or teleological vital source of some kind. He even went so far as to assert that:

> it would be absurd to regard the initial generation of a plant or an animal as a mechanical effect incidentally arising from the universal laws of nature. (*OPA* 2: 114)

In the *Prolegomena* he asserted the identity (or at least the strong continuity) of mind and life: "life is the subjective condition of all our possible experience" (*Prol* 4: 335). In the Introduction to *Metaphysical Foundations*, he denied that there could ever be a naturally mechanistic science of psychology (*MFNS* 4:471). In the second half of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, he not only asserted that "the mind is for itself entirely life (the principle of life itself)" (*CPJ* 5: 278) and also that

> it would be absurd for humans ever to … hope that there might yet arise a Newton who could make comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws (*CPJ* 5: 400),

but also worked out a number of fundamental concepts and methodological themes in the philosophy of biology, including the notion of a living organism, or self-organizing system, the various distinct kinds of teleology, and the special role of teleological concepts and teleological thinking in the natural sciences. Finally, in the unfinished "Transition" project in the *Opus postumum*, Kant also hypothesized the dual emergence of natural mechanisms and organismic life (including mind) alike from a single ontologically neutral but also non-static material substrate, the dynamic aether (*OP* 21: 206-233, and 241).

So Kant's commitment to Newtonian mechanism is, at the very least, somewhat conflicted. Indeed, it is fully arguable that Kant is at bottom an *anti-mechanist*. This, in turn, is the upshot of Jennifer Mensch's fascinating philosophical-historical study, *Kant's Organicism*,[73] which

> starts by tracing the history of the life sciences as Kant would have come to know them, focusing especially on those philosophers and life scientists whose works directly engaged Kant during his intellectually formative years. Once Kant's connection to the life sciences has been established, the remainder of the book moves to an examination of the exact nature of the influence of these sciences on the emerging critical system. When viewed from the perspective the life sciences in this manner, Kant's theoretical philosophy becomes reframed as a philosophical project whose development was deeply influenced by the rise of organicism.[74]

According to Mensch, the thesis of *organicism* "can be defined by its view of nature as something that cannot be reduced to a set of mechanical operations."[75] This is crisp and cogent as an initial formulation. But I will also spell out the notion of organicism more carefully in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 below.

Amongst other things, *Kant's Organicism* nicely describes the intellectual state-of-play in natural history in the 17th and early 18th centuries. The first players are the mechanist corpuscularian Boyle, and Locke:

> Locke was both a nominalist regarding species determination and a realist in believing that there were inner features contributing to species as well. In a similar fashion, Locke was both comfortable with a mechanical portrait of animal functioning and cognizant of the need for "inner principles" and "transformative forces" when it came to understanding the processes of organic life. And all this contributed to Locke's views of both nature and the proper task of classification. Reviewing Locke's early considerations of organic processes aginst the backdrop of corpuscular ontology reveals his sensitivity to the problems facing Boyle in the case of organic life. While Locke remained committed to the

essential features of corpuscular science, he was nonetheless hesitant in the face of a straighforward endorsement of mechanical accounts of generation.[76]

A similar hesitation as between mechanism and anti-mechanism can be found in the work of the second major player, Leibniz, who, heavily influenced by the Dutch microscopist Leeuwenhoek, took the view that "individuals were composed of living monads arranged hierarchically under a dominant entelechy or soul."[77]

In the *Monadology*, anticipating both the Turing test for artificial intelligence and also Searle's Chinese Room argument against machine functionalism and the strong thesis of artificial intelligence, Leibniz famously argued, by means of a thought-experiment whereby the goal-directed conscious processes of mind cannot be reduced to the external behaviors of an enormously complicated mill, that mentality cannot be reduced to physical mechanical operations. But at the same time, Leibniz also thought of the living monads as *spiritual automata* pre-programmed by a 3-O (that is, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent) God, the supreme monad, and endorsed preformationism.

One philosophical moral of this part of the story, I think, is that the very idea of natural mechanism is a hybrid that combines

(i) physical causal necessitation under natural laws,
(ii) Turing-computability, and
(iii) natural determinism.

But although physical causal necessitation under natural laws is sufficient for Turing-computability and determinism, it is not necessary. According to the Leibnizian account, there can be non-physical automata. Therefore we need to distinguish between

(i) causal mechanisms (for example, Coke machines) which are necessarily physical, and
(ii) formal mechanisms (for example, Turing-computable processes) which, although they are physically realizable, are not necessarily physical: in principle, disembodied Cartesian souls could run Turing-computable sequences.

Kant is at least implicitly aware of this important distinction between causal mechanisms and formal mechanisms, because in the *Critique of Practical Reason* he explicitly rejects the reduction of all spontaneous activity, including life, but also especially including free will, to the operations of Leibnizian spiritual automata, deriding the latter as "the freedom of a turnspit" (*CPrR* 5: 97).

Mensch also traces the origins of organicism to Georges Buffon's highly influential epigenesist treatise, *Natural History*, the first three volumes of which appeared in 1749:

With Buffon natural history … became an attempt to grasp a living nature, to grasp species across time and, as a consequence, to base the classification of species upon

genealogy. This marked a dramatic transformation in the history of a discipline that until then had been first and foremost a science oriented by its search for the means of discovering nature's divisions and, for that reason, not at all by the patterns of its underlying unity.[78]

Strictly speaking, Buffon's version of epigenesis is still compatible with mechanism (whether causal or formal). Correspondingly, the full theory of epigenesis would have to await the further postulation, in the 1780s, of organic vital forces or emergent vital forces, "like Caspar Wolff's *vis essentialis* and Johan Blumenbach's *Bildungstrieb*"[79]—which of course anticipate later more famous 19th and 20th century vitalist notions like Schopenhauer's *Wille zum Leben* and Bergson's *élan vital*. Nevertheless, the ground was prepared for Kant's organicism.

Mensch also provides an account of Kant's pre-Critical work on cosmological and biological questions of origin, and shows how this work not only smoothly fused with, but also primed, his Critical concern with the origins, scope, and limits of cognition and knowledge. As Mensch puts it, there was

> an intimate connection, in Kant's view, between attempts to discover a "principle of life" within natural organisms and the search for something beyond the limits of the everyday world.[80]

In other words, Kant found a paradigm case of the burning need for his Critical distinctions between *phenomena and noumena* on the one hand, and between *the transcendental and the empirical* on the other hand, in the debate about the origins of life:

> It was the unity of purposes within organic life, the fact that organisms could be both self-sustaining and vigilant regarding the need for repair, that made natural products amazing, not the mechanical operations themselves. For Kant it was thus the principle of life, the capacity for a being's generation and self-organization that needed explaining, and recourse to neither supernatural nor purely mechanical grounds of explanation could satisfy that need.[81]

Basically, what is humanly cognizable and knowable about life (or what I will call *the organicist phenomena*) are the non-mechanical, spontaneous activities of the perceivable organism, not some vital substance with an intrinsic non-relational essence hiding behind the appearances (or what I will call *the organicist noumenon*).

Kant's organicism, as Mensch's book so effectively shows, captures his brilliant insight that mechanical principles and facts cannot explain the organicist phenomena, namely:

(i) natural teleology or organismic life, including plants and animals,

(ii) any organism with proprioceptive enantiomorphic awareness of the difference between its right side and its left side (or top and bottom, or front and back, etc.), or an awareness of the difference between its own past, present, and future: the feeling of egocentrically-centered (here) embodied orientation in a global space-structure with intrinsic directions, and egocentically-centered (now) asymmetric duration in a global time-structure, i.e., the feeling of organismic, conscious life, whose phenomenal characters are all modes of pleasure or pain,

(iii) human mentality, including consciousness, intentionality, imagination, conceptualizing, judging, and inferential reasoning,

(iv) human spontaneity, agency, and source-incompatibilist free will, and

(v) human non-instrumental normativity.

But at the same time, Kant himself could never fully advance beyond the thesis that organicist concepts have only a *regulative* use, not a *constitutive* use.

Why not? It seems to me that Kant was needlessly bedazzled by the very ideas of Newtonian mechanics and Newtonian mechanism, as jointly constituting a hyper-successful research program in 17th and 18th century natural science. *Over*-impressed by this (admittedly still very impressive) Newtonian program, Kant could not see that the existence of a natural world that fundamentally contains significantly many causal-mechanical and formal-mechanical deterministic processes is perfectly consistent with the manifest organicist fact that the natural world *also* fundamentally contains significantly many *non-mechanical*, *non-deterministic* processes in it, including teleological and mental processes, as well as inherent non-instrumentally normative rules guiding these processes. Indeed, we already know from Gödel's second incompleteness theorem that formal-mechanical processes of Turing-computable *proof* presuppose non-mechanical semantic processes of non-Turing-computable *truth-determination*. So universal formal mechanism is provably false. Why then should we accept universal *causal* mechanism, especially when one of its necessary conditions is the supposed universality of formal mechanism?

In other words, what I am proposing is that, with the organicist phenomena as a starting-point, we can metaphysically postulate that the natural world is fundamentally *dual aspect*, and that it is at once mechanical-deterministic in one of its fundamental dual aspects, and also non-mechanical-non-deterministic (in a word, *organicist*), in the other of its fundamental dual aspects, including the irreducible existence of both causally non-mechanical processes and also formally non-mechanical processes. So, quite apart from Kant's own needless deference to the Newtonian research program, we can, in a fully Kantian spirit, put forward the radical thought that there is a fully *constitutive* use of organicist concepts, *insofar as they are required by a transcendental inference to the best explanation of all the organicist phenomena*. Or, as Thomas Nagel formulates essentially the same point in *Mind and Cosmos* (for which, predictably, he received a torrent of angry criticism from scientific naturalists[82]), we can metaphysically postulate a "cosmic

predisposition to the formation of life, consciousness, and the value that is inseparable from them."[83]

In any case, here is the basic line of reasoning behind that radical Kantian thought. Kant's fundamental philosophical problem, the one that he struggled with throughout his long philosophical career, is this:

> How can the existence of non-mechanical, non-deterministic facts that are necessary for the purposes of morality, be made consistent and coherent with the thesis that necessarily, all the natural objects studied by physics (namely, the "objects of experience") are mechanical and deterministic?

Since all organisms, including conscious rational human organisms, or human persons, are non-mechanical and non-deterministic, then Kant's fundamental problem becomes focused like a laser beam on this specific formulation of his fundamental problem:

> How can the existence of living conscious rational human animals, namely, human persons, capable of genuine incompatibilistic free will, necessary for the purposes of morality, be made consistent and coherent with with the thesis that necessarily, all the natural objects studied by physics (namely, the "objects of experience") are mechanical and deterministic?

Now as every reader of the first *Critique* knows, for Kant, there are two basic kinds of objects in his ontological framework:

> (i) phenomena, namely spatiotemporal objects directly accessible to and knowable by human sensory intuition and sense perception, that are constituted by relational properties, especially including relations to actual or possible human sensible minds, and
> (ii) noumena, namely non-spatiotemporal, humanly sensorily inaccessible, unperceivable, and unknowable objects, which may or may not exist, but even if they do exist, are constituted by intrinsic non-relational properties, and are at best barely consistently thinkable by means of concepts.

Of course, as every reader of the first *Critique* also knows, the question of the actual, real existence or non-existence of noumena is deeply controversial. But what many readers of the first *Critique* have *not* noticed is that equally important for Kant is the distinction, exclusively within the domain of phenomena, between:

> (ia) undetermined objects of empirical intuition, aka, appearances, and
> (ib) fully determined objects of empirical intuition, empirical concepts, empirical judgments, and pure a priori concepts of the understanding, aka objects of experience.

For Kant, as a Newtonian mechanist and also a LaPlacean determinist about physical nature insofar as it is correctly described by physics, *mechanism necessitates natural determinism*,

and conversely, *natural determinism entails mechanism*. So all the actual and possible objects of experience are mechanical and deterministic. But here's the rub: all and *only* the actual and possible objects of experience are mechanical and deterministic, but *not* all the actual or possible appearances. Since the total set of pure *a priori* concepts of the understanding specifies a world of objects inherently governed by Newtonian mechanistic principles and laws, then, although all the fully determined objects, namely, the objects of experience, are inherently governed by Newtonian mechanistic principles and laws, and therefore are *deterministic* and not free, it does *not* follow that all the *un*determined objects, namely, the appearances, are either mechanical (whether causal-mechanical or formal-mechanical) or deterministic. In other words, since for Kant the sensible intuitability of an object, independently of concepts, is the criterion of the object's real possibility, then it is either actual or at least really possible that at least *some appearances* are non-mechanical and non-deterministic, and that they are cognitively accessible by means of *essentially non-conceptual sensible intuitions*.[84]

Let us call such essentially non-conceptually sensibly intuitable appearances, insofar as they actually exist, or were they to exist, *rogue objects*, since they fall outside the Categories and the system of transcendental principles, or at least fall outside Kant's "constitutive" *causal-dynamical principles* (namely, the Analogies of Experience, and the Postulates of Empirical Thought) and therefore outside the deterministic causal laws of nature,[85] even if they do continue to fall under the "regulative" *mathematical principles* (namely, the Axioms of Intuition, and the Anticipations of Perception). The actual existence or real possibility of rogue objects would mean that the phenomenal natural world, that is, the manifest world, the world of Wilfrid Sellars's "manifest image,"[86] actually or really possibly includes some *appearances* that are also not *objects of experience*, namely the rogue objects, and that we can access these rogue-object phenomena only through essentially non-conceptual intuition.

These non-mechanical, non-deterministic rogue-object phenomena, in turn, would include *all and only the organicist phenomena*, as specified above, and this would in turn directly imply that the phenomenal natural or manifest world includes some objects that are also *not* objects of mechanistic physics, mechanistic chemistry, and mechanistic biology, and therefore also that mechanistic natural science is *not*, to borrow Sellars's famous phrase, "the measure of all things."[87] So *scientific* or *physicalist* naturalism (whether reductive or non-reductive) would be false, and mechanistic natural science would apply to all and only the natural objects and facts to which it applies, but not to all actual or possible natural objects and facts. In short, mechanistic natural science would have *philosophical limits within nature itself*.

Contrary to scientific or physicalist naturalism, then, the thesis of *liberal* or *organicist-idealist* naturalism would be true. More precisely, the liberal naturalist, or organicist-idealist naturalist, thesis says that the manifest world fundamentally contains the real existence or real possibility of organismic life, the feeling of life, mind, source-

incompatibilist free will, persons, and non-instrumental normativity as basic organicist facts of nature, along with the basic formal-mechanical and causal-mechanical physical facts, and that the basic kind of item is *dynamic systems, or dynamic processes*, both mechanical/deterministic and non-mechanical/non-deterministic, such that the mechanical/deterministic kind presupposes either the actual existence or the real possibility of the non-mechanical, non-deterministic kind.[88] Bluntly put: *source-incompatibilist free will is a fact of organismic life, and partially constitutive of physical nature*. Or in Nagel's words again, "rational intelligibility is at the root of the natural order," and there is a "cosmic predisposition to the formation of life, consciousness, and the value that is inseparable from them."

This, in turn, would solve Kant's fundamental problem, not by appealing to anything *super*natural, but instead *by liberalizing our concept of physical nature*. In turn, this revolutionary philosophical move—liberalization of our concept of physical nature—is the essential entry gate to the radical philosophy of science I want to defend.

## Organicism, natural piety, and the limits of natural science

Anti-mechanism or organicism in its classical early 20th century guise, as "British emergentism," has its original intellectual roots in Aristotle's *De Anima* and *Physics*, and in the 17th and 18th century epigenesist-organicist tradition so well described by Mensch, when these accounts are combined with late 18th and early 19th century Romantic conceptions of nature, expressed for example in the seventh of Rousseau's *Reveries of a Solitary Walker*, Wordsworth's and Percy Shelley's poetry, and their notion of "natural piety," by Mary Shelley's stunning critique of mechanistic-reductive scientific sins against natural piety, in *Frankenstein*, and by Caspar David Friedrich's and J. M. Turner's nature paintings.

All or most of these, in turn, have their proximal intellectual sources in Kant's assertions of the cognitive-semantic limits of science and scientific knowledge in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, of anti-mechanism/organicism in his moral and political philosophy, and also of a direct epistemic, metaphysical, and moral link, via immediate reverential consciousness, between the "starry heavens above me" and the "moral law within me" at the end of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, taken together with the closely-related a priori intuitional starting points of his "transcendental aesthetics": the experiences of *the beautiful in nature* and *the sublime*; with the non-discursive creative capacity for *genius*; and with the anti-mechanistic/organicist and teleological concepts of *life* and *purposiveness-without-a-purpose* in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.

Correspondingly, here are some of the most important texts in this "natural piety" tradition, running from Rousseau and Kant through Wordsworth, and the Shelleys to the British emergentist, Samuel Alexander:

A deep and sweet revery seizes your senses, and you lose yourself with a delicious drunkenness in the immensity of this beatiful system with which you identify yourself. Then all particular objects fall away; you see nothing and feel nothing except in the whole… I never meditate or dream more delightfully than when I forget my self. I feel indescribable ecstasy, delirium in melting, as it were, into the system of beings, in identifying myself with the whole of nature.

Brilliant flowers, enamelled meadows, fresh shades, streams, woods, verdure, come, purify my imagination … My soul, dead to all strong emotions, can be affected now only by sensory objects, and it is only through them that pleasure and pain can reach me.[89]

[I] had to deny **scientific knowing** (Wissen) in order to make room for **faith** (Glauben). (*CPR* Bxxx, boldfacing in the original)

When nature has unwrapped, from under this hard shell, the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to think freely, the latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of freedom in acting) and eventually even upon the principles of government, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, who is now more than a machine, in keeping with his dignity. (*WiE* 8: 41-42, underlining added)

All necessity of events in time in accordance with the laws of natural law of causality can be called the mechanism of nature…. Here one looks only to the necessity of the connection of events in a time series as it develops in accordance with natural law, whether the subject in which this development takes place is called automaton materiale, when the machinery is driven by matter, or with Leibniz spirituale, when it is driven by representations; and if the freedom of our will were none other than the latter…, then it would at bottom be nothing other than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, also accomplishes its movements of itself. (*CPrR* 5: 97, underlining added)

[T]wo things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not need to search for them and merely conjecture them as though they were veiled in obscurity or on the transcsndent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. (*CPrR* 5: 161-162, underlining added)

An organized being is … not a mere machine, for that has only a **motive** power, while the organized being possesses in itself a **formative** power, and indeed one that it communicates to matter, which does not have it (it organizes the latter): thus it has self-propagating formative power, which cannot be explained through the capacity for movement alone (that is, mechanism). (*CPJ* 5: 374, underlining added, boldfacing in the original)

It is quite certain that we can never adequately come to know the organized beings and their internal possibility in accordance with merely mechanical principles of nature, let alone explain them; and this is so certain that we can boldly say that it would be absurd for humans to make an attempt or to hope that there could ever arise a Newton who could make comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws that no intention has ordered; rather we must absolutely deny this insight to human beings. (*CPJ* 5: 400, underlining added)

My heart leaps up when I behold
A rainbow in the sky:
So was it when my life began;
So is it now I am a man;
So be it when I shall grow old,
Or let me die!
The Child is father of the Man;
And I could wish my days to be
Bound each to each by natural piety.[90]

Earth, ocean, air, belov'd brotherhood!
If our great Mother has imbued my soul
With aught of natural piety to feel
Your love, and recompense the boon with mine.[91]

One of the phaenomena which had peculiarly attracted my attention was the structure of the human frame, and, indeed, any animal endued with life. Whence, I often asked myself, did the principle of life proceed? ….To examine the causes of life we must first have recourse to death. I became acquainted with the science of anatomy: but this was not sufficient; I must also observe the natural decay and corruption of the human body…. Now I was led to examine the cause and progress of this decay, and forced to spend days and nights in vaults and charnel houses….I paused, examining and analysing all the minutiae of causation, as exemplified in the change from life to death, and death to life, until from the midst of this darkness, a sudden light broke in upon me…. After days and nights of incredible labour and fatigue, I succeeded in discovering the cause of genertion and life; nay, more, I became capable of bestowing animation upon lifeless matter…. I see by your eagerness, and the wonder amd hope which your eyes express, my friend, that you expect to be informed of the secret with which I am acquainted; that cannot be; listen patiently until the end of my story, and you will easily perceive why I am so reserved upon that subject. I will not lead you on, unguarded and ardent as I then was, to your destruction and infallible misery. Learn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge, and how much happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he who aspires to become greater than his nature will allow.[92]

I do not mean by natural piety exactly what Wordsworth meant by it–the reverent joy in nature, by which he wished that his days might be bound to each other–though there is enough connection with his interpretation to justify me in using his phrase. The natural piety I am going to speak of is that of <u>the scientific investigator, by which he accepts with loyalty the mysteries which he cannot explain in nature and has no right to try to explain. I may describe it as the habit of knowing when to stop in asking questions of nature.</u>

[T]hat organization which is alive is not merely physico-chemical, though completely resoluble into such terms, but has the new quality of life. No appeal is needed, so far as I can see, to a vital force or even an élan vital. It is enough to note the emergence of the quality, and try to describe what is involved in its conditions…. <u>The living body is also physical and chemical. It surrenders no claim to be considered a part of the physical world. But the new quality of life is neither chemical nor mechanical, but something new</u>.

We may and must observe with care our of what previous conditions these new creations arise. We cannot tell why they should assume these qualities. <u>We can but accept them as we find them, and this acceptance is natural piety</u>.[93]

Because I am taking Kant's transcendental idealism to be *a real*, and in particular, *an empirically realistic or manifest-realist* metaphysics of nature, and not merely epistemology, it follows with synthetic a priori necessity that space, time, quantity, movement, organismic life and natural teleology, consciousness, feeling and emotion, aesthetic form including beauty and sublimity, and morality, are all manifestly real, ontologically basic structures in the natural world of human experience. The Kantian-Romantic-British-emergentist philosophical doctrine of *natural piety*, as I understand it, then, counsels a radically agnostic, empirically realistic or manifest-realist, and metaphysically sane (where the criteria of metaphysical sanity are determined by Kant's critique of modal metaphysics in the Transcendental Dialectic), aesthetically-sensitive, ethically-sensitive, natural-religious, and above all anti-mechanistic/organicist, non-reductive, non-dualist, primitivist approach to investigating nature, that is *pro-science but not scientistic*, by virtue of knowing the inherent scope and limits of natural-scientific investigation.

Natural piety, in turn, as a thesis in real metaphysics and also as an aesthetic, emotional, and natural-religious, action-guiding, and above all life-guiding, respectful, and reverential attitude towards manifest nature, is intended as an essential corrective to the epistemic and metaphysical arrogance, and also to the aesthetic insensitivity and military-industrial coercive authoritarianism, of the noumenally realistic, reductive, naturally mechanistic epistemology and metaphysics of the "scientific conception of the world" and its corresponding deeply exploitative "lordship and mastery of nature" ideology, fully aligned with global corporate capitalist technocracy, [94] as it has been explicitly or implicitly

developed, defended, and disseminated by Bacon,[95] by Descartes,[96] by The Vienna Circle,[97] and by recent and contemporary scientific naturalists.

Thus the real-metaphysical-thesis-and-life-guiding-respectful-and-reverential attitude of natural piety gives a rich sense to the radical poet Muriel Rukeyser's deep insight that "the universe is made of stories, not of atoms."[98] The real universe, the one that really matters for rational but also "human, all too human" creatures like us, is made of minded animals, especially human persons, and their manifestly real normative "stories," NOT of fundamentally physical, life-excluding, mind-excluding, freedom-excluding matter and its noumenal-microphysical "atoms." That is: not only, in Nagelian terminology, is "rational intelligibility is at the root of the natural order," such that there is a "cosmic predisposition to the formation of life, consciousness, and the value that is inseparable from them," but also our philosophical recognition of these facts puts inherent epistemic, metaphysical, aesthetic, ethical, natural-religious, and sociocultural-political critical limits on the scope of natural science.

### Natural piety and the primacy of the normative

In short, Kantian natural piety is a branch of real metaphysics—"metaphysics with a human face"—but above all it is committed to *the primacy of the normative*, that is, to the thesis that metaphysics has axiological foundations, and also direct aesthetic, ethical, natural-religious, and sociocultural-political implications, that are all in direct opposition to the deeply wrong-headed 20th and 21st conception of metaphysics as supposedly value-free (but actually aesthetically, ethically, anti-religiously, socioculturally, and politically deeply-committed, via scientism,[99] global corporate capitalism, and neoliberal poltics), "scientific philosophy" and "rigorous science," *strenge Wissenschaft*. As Kant so brilliantly anticipated in the 1780s and 1790s, and as Wittgenstein so rightly explicitly pointed out in the 1930s, in accepting the reductive, mechanistic, ideological-technocratic, and ultimately Frankensteinian "scientific conception of the world," we are *falling into a trap* that *is the beginning of the end for humanity*; and what I am saying is that humanity can avoid this death-trap *only* by theoretically adopting, taking to heart, and then freely acting according to, the real-metaphysical, epistemological, aesthetic, ethical, natural-religious, and sociocultural-political doctrine of natural piety.[100]

### 2.2.2  Scientific Pietism and Scientific Naturalism

Here are three texts we looked in section 2.2.1, each characteristic of natural piety—

It is quite certain that we can never adequately come to know the organized beings and their internal possibility in accordance with merely mechanical principles of nature, let alone

explain them; and this is so certain that we can boldly say that it would be absurd for humans to make an attempt or to hope that there could ever arise a Newton who could make comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws that no intention has ordered; rather we must absolutely deny this insight to human beings. (*CPJ* 5: 400)

> After days and nights of incredible labour and fatigue, I succeeded in discovering the cause of genertion and life; nay, more, I became capable of bestowing animation upon lifeless matter…. I see by your eagerness, and the wonder and hope which your eyes express, my friend, that you expect to be informed of the secret with which I am acquainted; that cannot be; listen patiently until the end of my story, and you will easily perceive why I am so reserved upon that subject. I will not lead you on, unguarded and ardent as I then was, to your destruction and infallible misery. Learn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge, and how much happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he who aspires to become greater than his nature will allow.[101]

> My heart leaps up when I behold
> A rainbow in the sky:
> So was it when my life began;
> So is it now I am a man;
> So be it when I shall grow old,
> Or let me die!
> The Child is father of the Man;
> And I could wish my days to be
> Bound each to each by natural piety.[102]

Now *Pietism* was a European reformist religious movement of the 17th and 18th centuries, whose central emphasis was on religious feeling or sensibility, direct religious experience of the holy, and experiential faith, as the cognitive and practical grounds of religion and theology. Kant was raised in the Pietist tradition, but strongly rejected its mystical fideism, its dogmatic noumenal theology, and its sociocultural/political coercive moralism.[103] Nevertheless, Kant retained a small-p but still fundamentally *pietistic* idea in his Critical philosophy, namely his thesis that all theoretical cognition, scientific knowledge, practical cognition and practical motivation, including specifically moral cognition and moral motivation, aesthetic cognition, artistic cognition, religious cognition, and sociocultural/political cognition are all primitively grounded on the faculty or innate mental power of *sensibility* (*Sinnlichkeit*), in a broad sense that includes our capacities for sense perception, imagination, feeling, desire, emotion, and volition. This small-p pietistic way of thinking about Kant's theory of cognition, epistemology, and metaphysics in particular is what I have called *Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism*,[104] and correspondingly, this small-p pietistic way of thinking about Kant's ethics and practical philosophy in particular is what I call *Kantian Non-Intellectualism*.[105] Moreover, in order to give this new, unified

approach to the interpretation of Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy a single, easy-to-remember label, I call it the *Sensibility First* approach.[106] As applied to the philosophy of nature and natural science, Kant's small-p pietism entails the anti-mechanistic/organicist, anti-physicalist (including both reductive and non-reductive physicalism), and natural-dynamicist (as opposed to ontological-vitalist or property-vitalist/supervenient-emergentist) epistemological, metaphysical, aesthetic/artistic, practical/moral, religious, and sociocultural/political attitude of *Kantian natural piety* towards nature itself, and also towards the natural sciences, that I spelled out in section 2.2.1.

Roughly speaking, and put in terms of the history of 17th, 18th, and early 19th century ideas, Kantian natural piety, as I am conceiving it, is what you get when

> (i) you start out with Spinoza's pantheistic monistic metaphysics of deus sive natura in the Ethics, that is, the one universal dual-aspect substance that is the weak disjunction of god-or-nature, and classical Pietism, then
> (ii) rigorously apply the Critical philosophy and transcendental idealism to Spinozist pantheism and Pietism alike, then
> (iii) fuse that Critically-filtered result with Critically-filtered versions of the nature-romanticism and natural-religion-without-god-or-the-church of Rousseau, Byron, Percy Shelley, Mary Shelley, Coleridge, and Wordsworth, and then finally
> (iv) round it all off with Critically-filtered versions of Rousseau's, William Godwin's, and Mary Wollstonecraft's radical liberationist political philosophies.[107]

Otherwise and more briefly put, Kantian natural piety is Kant's transcendental-philosophical-political *Sentimental Journey*,[108] standing in essential complementarity with his *Copernican Revolution*.

What I want to do in this section is to apply the doctrine of Kantian natural piety directly to the *natural sciences*, and especially physics, by showing how they have a cognitive, epistemic, metaphysical, practical/moral, aesthetic/artistic, religious, and sociocultural/political grounding in Kantian sensibility, both pure and empirical. This is what I call *Kantian scientific pietism*, and it is to be directly and radically opposed to *scientific naturalism*, by which I mean the philosophical doctrine consisting of

> (i) universal deterministic or indeterministic natural mechanism,[109]
> (ii) physicalism (whether reductive or non-reductive), and above all
> (iii) scientism, including
> (iiia) epistemic empiricism (whether classical empiricism, as per Locke, Hume, and Mill, or radical Quinean empiricism),
> (iiib) the Lockean epistemological "underlaborer" conception of the relation between natural science and philosophy, such that philosophy is the underlaborer of the sciences,[110] which is also re-affirmed in Sellars's mid-20th century slogan that "science is the measure of all things,"[111] and

(iiic) the Baconian and Cartesian technocratic ideology according to which, as natural scientists, we are "the lords and masters of nature."[112]

As the direct and radical philosophical opponent of scientific naturalism, Kantian scientific pietism entails the denial and rejection of natural mechanism, physicalism, and scientism alike. In a word, Kantian scientific pietism entails a *thoroughly sensible approach to natural science*, in both basic senses of the term "sensible," that is,

(i) essentially having to do with the complex faculty for sensibility, and
(ii) expressing a fundamentally healthy and sane common sense,
hence it is
(iii) consistently pro-natural-science, but without natural mechanism, physicalism, or scientism.

In view of the deep, seemingly irreversible, and indeed hegemonic sociocultural/political and ideological connection between modern and contemporary natural science, the military-industrial complex, mastery-of-nature technology, big capitalism in the post-Cold War age of neoliberalism, especially in majoritarian representative democracies like the USA, and the apocalyptic threat of permanent eco-disaster (whether by nuclear holocaust, biochemical holocaust, slow-moving global-warming-driven disasters, or whatever), it is *not* going too far to claim that rational hope for the future of humanity itself is closely bound up with the philosophical fate of Kantian scientific pietism and natural piety.[113]

## How to ground natural science on sensibility

The thesis of Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism says

(i) that not all of the intentional or representational contents of our cognition are either necessarily or sufficiently determined by our conceptual capacities, housed in the faculty of understanding or *Verstand*, and
(ii) that on the contrary, at least some of the intentional/representational contents of our cognition are both
(iia) concept-autonomous = they are not necessarily determined by our conceptual capacities = their existence and specific character are determined by our non-conceptual capacities housed in sensibility without any concepts whatsover, for example, the cognitions of pre-linguistic human children and other non-rational human cognizers, and non-human animals, and also
(iib) concept-independent = they not sufficiently determined by our conceptual capacities = their existence and specific character are necessarily underdetermined by any and all concepts—for example, our cognition of "incongruent counterparts" (*DS* 2: 378-383), and our cognition of the temporal ordering of the spontaneously-chosen, "entirely arbitrary"

(ganz beliebig) subjective sequence of perceptions in inner sense (*CPR* A193-197/B238-243).

Indeed, as regards the point about the concept-independence of inner sense, in the Introduction to *Metaphysical Foundations* Kant explicitly denies that there could ever be a naturally mechanistic science of psychology (*MFNS* 4:471), because orderings in inner sense cannot be arithmetized, that is, they cannot be reduced to primitive recursive functions like addition, subtraction, and so-on, that is, they cannot be denumerably quantified or counted. If orderings in inner sense cannot be arithmetized, then they cannot be fully or objectively conceptualized either, since as the Axioms of Intuition and Anticipations of Perception show, arithmetization in terms of either extensive quantity or intensive quantity, namely, in terms of natural or rational numbers, is a necessary condition of the application of objective science to nature (*CPR* A162-176/B202-218).

Now Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism closely corresponds to what I call *transcendental idealism for sensibility*:[114]

> necessarily, the manifestly real world that we veridically cognize in an essentially non-conceptual way through sensory intuition or *Anschauung* structurally conforms to the specific formal character of our faculty of sensibility.

More precisely, then, transcendental idealism for sensibility says that the veridically apparent, manifestly real world fundamentally conforms to the essentially non-conceptual a priori forms of human sensibility, our representations of space and time. Kant worked out explicit proofs for transcendental idealism for sensibility in the Inaugural Dissertation and again in the Transcendental Aesthetic in the first *Critique*. The simplest version of the proof, provided in the Transcendental Aesthetic, goes like this:

> (1) Space and time are either (i) things in themselves, (ii) properties of/relations between things in themselves, or (iii) transcendentally ideal.
> (2) If space and time were either things in themselves or properties of/relation between things in themselves, then a priori mathematical knowledge would be impossible.
> (3) But mathematical knowledge is actual, via our pure intuitions of space and time, and therefore really possible.
> (4) Therefore, space and time are transcendentally ideal. (CPR A 23/B37-38, A38-41/B55-58)

There is, of course, much more that can and should be said about this highly controversial argument. What is most crucial for my purposes here, however, is that this version of transcendental idealism relies *only* on essentially non-conceptual content and the nature of human sensibility, and *neither* relies on concepts and the nature of human understanding,

*nor* does it entail that the authentically apparent or manifestly real world necessarily conforms to our concepts and the nature of human understanding.

Now what about natural science, and in particular, physics? In *Kant, Science and Human Nature,* part 1, I argued that for Kant, natural science knows the manifestly real essences of veridical appearances, given in direct perception, via natural science's synthetic a priori knowledge of the general and specific causal laws of nature, which in turn track strongly modal intrinsic spatiotemporal and dynamic structures of objects of actual or really possible human experience. Let us call this *scientific manifest realism*, or *scientific empirical realism*, as opposed to scientific noumenal realism, for example, scientific essentialism. In *Kant, Science, and Human Nature*, part 2, I also argued for the claim that Kant defends the primacy of practical reason over the theoretical reason, and in particular, defends *categorical epistemology*, that is, non-instrumentally normative and perfectionist epistemology.[115] According to Kant's categorical epistemology, as he spells it out in the Introduction to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, authentic science, including both a priori knowledge of the truths of mathematics and a priori knowledge of the most general causal laws of nature, is *synthetic a priori knowledge with objective certainty*, grounded on rational insight or *Einsicht*, and all such knowledge is in turn a categorically normative achievement, and a "perfection" of our normally more or less imperfect cognitive activity, by means of the transcendental imagination.

If Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism, Kantian transcendental idealism for sensibility, Kantian scientific manifest realism, and Kantian categorical epistemology are all true, then natural science, and in particular physics, is cognitive-semantically, metaphysically, and epistemically grounded on sensibility in the Kantian sense.

**Sensible science 1: natural science without natural mechanism**

According to what, in section 2.2.1, I called *Kant's anti-mechanism*, there is a fundamental ontological and metaphysical difference between

(i) natural mechanisms, that is, deterministic, mechanistic processes in nature, and
(ii) natural purposes, that is, spontaneous, teleological, self-organizing, living organismic processes in nature, including mental processes, all of which are also self-organizing, living, organismic processes:

[L]ife is the subjective condition of all our possible experience. (*Prol* 4: 335).

[T]he mind is for itself entirely life (the principle of life itself). (*CPJ* 5: 278)

But although natural science can and actually does know natural mechanisms, it *cannot* know natural purposes, as this thrice-quoted text shows:

> It is quite certain that we can never adequately come to know the organized beings and their internal possibility in accordance with merely mechanical principles of nature, let alone explain them; and this is so certain that we can boldly say that it would be absurd for humans to make an attempt or to hope that there could ever arise a Newton who could make comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws that no intention has ordered; rather we must absolutely deny this insight to human beings. (*CPJ* 5: 400)

Hence, according to Kant in the second half of the third *Critique*, although natural science cannot know the difference between natural mechanisms and natural purposes, it must also investigate nature *as if there were a such a difference between them*, as a regulative Idea for the purposes of a coherent and progressive natural-scientific investigation of nature.

Now although this "regulative" (hypothetical-practical) conception of natural purposes is not "constitutive" (assertoric-theoretical), nevertheless it also directly entails the synthetic a priori subjunctive conditional truth that necessarily, *if* natural purposes *were to exist*, then universal natural mechanism *would be* false. But since Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism is true, we can also advance from Kant's necessary subjunctive conditional thesis to a corresponding assertoric thesis that, also in section 2.2.1, I called *Kantian anti-mechanism*. According to Kantian anti-mechanism, although natural science cannot *know* either natural purposes or the difference between natural mechanisms and natural purposes, nevertheless we human cognizers can and actually do also have *veridical essentially non-conceptual cognition of natural purposes*, by means of the "feeling of life" in our aesthetic experience of the beautiful and the sublime in nature (*CPJ* 5: 204). Therefore natural purposes actually exist in manifestly real nature, because *we* actually exist in manifestly real nature and because *we veridically feel our own life* and *we are living organisms*: therefore, not everything in veridically apparent or manifestly real nature is a natural mechanism.

Since we actually exist in veridically apparent or manifestly real nature, and we are natural purposes, and since it is *not only* the case,

> (i) according to the third section of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, that we must conceive ourselves under a regulative Idea of our own free agency and act as if we were transcendentally and practically free,

and also *not only* the case

> (ii) according to the third Postulate of Pure Practical Reason in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, that we must have moral faith (*Glaube*) in our freedom,

*but also* the case,

(iii) according to the "Fact of Reason" in the second *Critique*, that we have a direct essentially non-conceptual awareness of our own freedom,

then it follows directly, according to what I have called *Kant's biological theory of freedom*[116] and have also called his *Embodied Agency Theory* of free will and practical agency, in chapter 8 of *Kant, Science and Human Nature*, that transcendental, practical, and autonomous freedom really and truly exist in the manifestly real world, as biological facts about our own lives, at the source of our self-determining, creative agency. More specifically, just as conscious, intentional, affective, desiderative, volitional mind is essentially a mechanistically/deterministically and physicalistically *irreducible* form of life, so too our self-determining, creative, deeply free agentive sourcehood is essentially a mechanistically/deterministically and physicalistically irreducible form of life. Or in other words, as per Kant's biological theory of freedom and Embodied Agency Theory of free will and practical agency, Kant is an anti-mechanistic/organicist *source incompatibilist*.

According to Kant in the first Critique and in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, matter is essentially a nomologically-governed totality of dynamic attractive and repulsive forces. Moreover, in the unfinished *Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics* project contained in the *Opus postumum*, Kant argues in the so-called "Aether Deduction" that an a priori *material* condition of the possibility of experience is an actual material correlate of the supersensible substrate, namely, the universal dynamic aether, as the unified totality of attractive and repulsive forces, as the dual causal source of inert matter (natural mechanisms) and also natural purposes (living organisms) alike (*OP* 21: 206-233). Kant's universal dynamic aether is, in effect, what we would now call "fields of force" or "energy flows." Indeed, viewed in this retrospective light, with 20-20 philosophical hindsight, it is clear that Kant's dynamic aether theory is fully compatible with contemporary quantum field theory, holding fixed and bracketing the standard competing interpretations of the quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics.

In turn, the universal dynamic aether minimally obeys the Conservation Laws and Turing-computability, in the sense that it is universally compatible/consistent with the Conservation Laws, and also the basic constraints of Turing-computability, in that it can be simulated post hoc on a universal Turing-machine, given a complete set of discrete physical "digits" over which computation occurs, and holding all the general laws of nature fixed; and to the extent that natural processes are necessarily nomologically determined by the Conservation Laws, together with all the settled quantity-of-energy facts about the past, and also Turing-computable from those laws and facts, then those processes are natural mechanisms.

Nevertheless, just because *X* is metaphysically compatible/consistent with *Y*, it does NOT follow that *Y* necessarily determines *X*. Therefore, just because a natural process in the universal dynamic aether is metaphysically compatible/consistent with the

Conservation Laws and Turing-computability, it does NOT follow that it is a natural mechanism. A natural process in the universal dynamic aether is a natural mechanism if and only if it is necessarily determined by the Conservation Laws, together with all the settled quantity-of-energy facts about the past, and Turing-computable from those laws and facts. Or in other words, any natural process within the dynamic aether is a natural mechanism if and only if it is *inherently governed by* the Conservation Laws and Turing-computable algorithms. But if the existence and specific character of any given natural process within the universal dynamic aether are minimally *in conformity with* the Conservation Laws and Turing-computability, then it need not be a natural mechanism. Indeed, it is really possible for that natural process to be a natural purpose, while still minimally obeying the Conservation Laws and the basic constraints of Turing-computability, that is, post hoc simulation on a universal Turing-machine, given a complete set of discrete physical "digits" for computing over, and holding all the general laws of nature fixed.

A natural purpose, via its spontaneity, therefore, does *not* bring more matter or energy into the world, which would violate the Laws: on the contrary, it only brings *irreducibly new and uncomputable self-organizing forms of the universal dynamic aether* into the world, which is still minimally in conformity with the Conservation Laws, and post hoc simulation on a Turing-machine. It increases the amount of structural "information" in the world in an uncomputable way, but does *not* increase the amount of matter or energy. This in turn suggests a Kantian anti-mechanist advertising slogan:

*Reverse entropy!: just do it.*

Like an artistic genius, who "gives the law to nature," spontaneous natural purposes, including especially including free minded animal intentional agents, *creatively self-organize*, but they are not *causa sui*.

We already know from the first section of the *Groundwork* that there is a categorical distinction between

(i) choice and action that is minimally in conformity with the Categorical Imperative, and
(ii) choice and action that is inherently governed by the Categorical Imperative.

Therefore, the distinction between

(i*) natural processes that are minimally in conformity with causal natural laws, and
(ii*) natural processes that are inherently governed by causal natural laws,

is simply a theoretical-nomic Kantian generalization of that Kantian practical-nomic distinction. In any case, in the *Opus postumum*, as we just saw, according to Kant, the

universal dynamic aether is *also* the synthetic a priori real metaphysical ground of organismic life, mind, and freedom, insofar as the irreducible structures of organismic life, mind, and freedom emerge in intrinsic-relational orientable space and through intrinsic-relational irreversible time.

Because the metaphysical grounding of life, mind, and freedom in the universal dynamic aether is synthetic a priori and based on natural purposes in intrinsic-relational orientable space and intrinsic-relational irreversible time, then, over and above their compatibility/consistency with the Conservation Laws and post hoc Turing-simulation, this is what I call *dynamic emergence*, as opposed to *supervenient emergence*, which, sharply unlike dynamic emergence, is inherently *insensitive* to manifest essence, spatiotemporal asymmetry, and spatiotemporal spread/duration, and also *fully open* to either physicalist reduction (logical supervenience) or causal-explanatory exclusion/epiphenomenalism (nomological supervenience).[117] In dynamic emergence, novel irreducible structure is *immanently integrated* with existing simpler structures, in essentially the same way that the irreducible but inherently more complex systems of the real numbers and complex numbers occur *between* the systems of the rational numbers and natural numbers, not "over and above" the rational numbers and natural numbers.[118] By sharp contrast, superveniently emergent properties, as extrinsic properties, merely metaphysically "pop out" of their supervenience-bases, and dualistically-epiphenomenally exist "over and above" those bases.

Notice that in the mathematical analogy, Turing-computability operates via the primitive recursive functions characteristic of the rational and natural number systems: therefore Turing-computation *runs on top of* the novel integrated complex and real number structures, which are the deeper, "mathematically efficacious" structures. Or in other words, Turing-computation is "mathematically epiphenomenal" in relation to the complex and real number structures. Hence, by analogy, in dynamic emergence it's the simpler pre-emergent natural processes and structures that are dualistic-epiphenomenal in the new complex thermodynamic system, "running on top of" everything else, NOT the more complex novel integrated immanent structures, which are the causally efficacious structures in the new system. In supervenient or "pop-out" emergence, it is precisely the other way around.

Therefore, by the time of his post-Critical period after 1787, Kant is (more or less) explicitly committed to the following dual or two-part robustly non-reductive real-metaphysical continuity/grounding thesis:

(i) *mind-in-life* = mind is irreducibly metaphysically grounded in life = life metaphysically contains all that is needed for the dynamic emergence of mind, but in a less complex form—"mind is for itself entirely life (the principle of life itself)," and

(ii) *life-in-unversal-dynamic-aether* (aka *life-in-energy*) = life is irreducibly metaphysically grounded in the universal dynamic aether (energy) = the universal dynamic aether

metaphysically contains all that is needed for the dynamic emergence of life, but in a less complex form.

In order to understand them correctly, we should explicitly compare and contrast

(i) Kant's or Kantian dynamic emergentism, mind-in-life, and life-in-universal-dynamic-aether theses (aka *Kant's dynamic world conception*), with
(ii) *hylozoism*, which says that everything in nature is alive, and with
(iii) *panpsychism* or *panexperientialism*, which says that everything in nature is conscious or protoconscious or has experiences of some primitive sort.

According to Kant's dynamic world conception,

(ia) *not* everything in nature is either alive or has consciousness/intentionality, or freedom, but also
(ib) necessarily, there is nothing in nature that could not, in principle, become a part of life or conscious/intentional mind, or freedom, that is, necessarily, everything in *nature is inherently open to the real possibility of life, conscious/intentional mind, and freedom,* and
(ic) life, mind, and freedom dynamically emerge in orientable space and over irreversible time, as irreducible forms of the universal dynamic aether (energy), as dynamic complexity increases.

It should also be noted, before moving on, that hylozoism and panpsychism or panexperientialism are *not* metaphysically "crazy" theses: they are merely too strong. It seems fairly unlikely that rocks and beer bottles have life or consciousness or proto-consciousness, whether macroscopically or microscopically. But hylozoism and panpsychism/panexperientialism are on *the metaphysical side of the angels*, because at least they acknowledge that the "conceptual dualisms" of

(i) inherently-matter-excluding mind vs. inherently-mind-excluding matter, and
(ii) inherently-matter-excluding life vs. inherently life-excluding matter,

really and truly *are* metaphysically "crazy," since they deny what is phenomenologically self-evident: the essential embodiment of our minds. So, diametrically on the contrary, only *the dogmatic belief in scientific naturalism*, especially including ist sub-theses of universal natural mechanism and physicalism, makes hylozoism and panpsychism/panexperientialism *seem* metaphysically "crazy."

But what is even more directly to the point, since *we* are, phenomenologically self-evidently, minded AND alive AND essentially embodied beings, then *clearly it is actually scientific naturalism that is metaphysically "crazy,"* since it denies what is phenomenologically self-evident in our own first-person case of essentially embodied consciousness, intentionality, caring, and rationality: mind-in-life and life-in-

matter/energy, hence mind-in-matter/energy. Everything is thermodynamically energetic, potentially or actually: free agency is a complex form of life, mind is a complex form of life, and life is a complex form of energy. What is phenomenologically self-evident, then, is universal dynamicism, and metaphysical continuity, all the way through nature, from free agency to matter=energy. Dualism and materialism/physicalism are therefore phenomenologically self-evidently *bonkers*. Or in other words, scientific naturalism fails the basic metaphysical evidential criterion of *phenomenological adequacy* (see THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION's Preface and General Introduction, part 1of this volume, section 1.2).

### Sensible science 2: natural science without physicalism

If transcendental idealism for sensibility is true, then it not only vindicates mathematics and natural science, but also entails the denial of physicalism, in two ways.

First, the vindication of mathematics, alone, is sufficient for the denial of reductive physicalism. As against Mill, arithmetic is a priori, not empirical; as against Frege, arithmetic is synthetic a priori, not analytic; and natural science presupposes arithmetic. Hence natural science presupposes the synthetic a priori, and is grounded on pure sensibility and its forms of intuition, the a priori intuitional representation of time and the a priori intuitional representation of space. But pure sensibility is neither reducible to the physical facts, because it is a priori, nor is it necessarily determined by/nomologically supervenient on the physical facts. For example, there is no nomologically determined causal pairing relation that discriminates between the actual world effect *E* of a physical cause, and its mirror-reflected counterpart, or enantiomorph, *E\**. As Kant's "Directions in Space," Inaugural Dissertation, and the Transcendental Aesthetic collectively show, the non-physical a priori intuitional representation of space is required for recognizing the difference between incongruent counterparts.

Second, even a priori logical knowledge necessarily involves pure sensibility via the schematizing imagination and its cognitive phenomenology; and natural science presupposes pure general logic; but a priori knowledge of pure general logic is neither reducible to the physical facts, nor is it necessarily determined by/nomologically supervenient on the physical facts. For example, there is no nomologically determined relation from the physical facts that discriminates between proposition (i),

(P&Q)

and its De Morgan equivalent, proposition (ii),

~(~Pv~Q)

But (i) and (ii) are distinct propositions, because a priori knowledge that (P&Q) logically entails P is not the same as a priori knowledge that ~(~Pv~Q) logically entails P, for a rational subject *S* who has not learned the De Morgan Equivalences yet, because, when *S* learns the latter, that knowledge is recorded by *S* as new a priori information. Therefore in nomologically identical worlds, all the physical facts can exactly remain the same while proposition (i) is replaced by proposition (ii), or conversely, and thus the propositional difference between those worlds does not nomologically supervene on the physical.

Therefore, transcendental idealism for sensibility entails the denial of both reductive and non-reductive physicalism.

### Sensible science 3: natural science without scientism

If natural science is metaphysically grounded on pure sensibility, and transcendental idealism for sensibility is true, then at least *transcendental philosophy* is *not* the Lockean "underlaborer" of the natural sciences: on the contrary, transcendental philosophy is autonomous from science, epistemically and metaphysically prior to science, and transcendentally presupposed by science, that is, transcendental idealism for sensibility is *the condition of the real possibility of natural science*. Moreover, given the truth of transcendental idealism for sensibility, perhaps very surprisingly, *we can also show that scientism is false on Kantian aesthetic and ethico-religious grounds alone*, in two steps.

First, given the truth of transcendental idealism for sensibility, since natural mechanism and physicalism are both false, then we can take fully seriously the sensibility-grounded, essentially non-conceptual evidence provided by the aesthetic experience of the beautiful in nature outside us, as veridically tracking natural purposive form, without a purpose, in a way that is inherently *disinterested* and therefore *divorced from all possible self-interest* (*CPJ* 5: 204-211). In short, the experience of the beautiful shows us that beautiful nature outside us *cannot be and ought not to be regarded or treated purely instrumentally*, that is, merely as a means, or exploited.

Second, given the truth of transcendental idealism for sensibility, since natural mechanism and physicalism are both false, then we can take fully seriously the Romantic/natural-religious/natural-theological reverential experience of the mathematical sublime ("the starry heavens above me"), which, because nature outside us is thereby experienced as having a specific character and normative value that is expressible only as a *transfinite* quantity, it inherently cannot reduced to a denumerable quantity, no matter how great (*CPJ* 5: 244-260). Hence, nature outside us, experienced as sublime, *cannot have a "market price" and is experienced as beyond price, or priceless*, since all "market prices," or exchangeable economic values (say, monetary values) "related to general human interests and needs" (*GMM* 4: 434), are expressible only as denumerable (natural number, rational number) quantities, even infinite ones. Thus the specific character and normative value of nature outside us inherently transcends any economic calculus. This is

what I call *the proto-dignity of nature outside us*. Nature outside us is not itself a person, and therefore it does not have dignity. Nevertheless, nature outside us, as sublime, inherently cannot (without eco-disaster) and ought not (without moral scandal) to be merely exploited, or merely bought or sold, that is, treated as a mere capitalist resource or commodity, aka *commodified*.

This, in turn, is precisely because our experience of the sublime in nature outside us ("the starry heavens above me") shows us that *nature outside us is the metaphysical real ground and "home" of persons and their dignity and autonomy* ("the moral law within me").[119] In that sense, to borrow Thornton Wilder's lovely phrase, sublime nature outside us is metaphysically *our town*. Or as Mary Shelley's tragic natural scientist, Victor Frankenstein, negatively formulates the same point:

> Learn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge, and how much happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he who aspires to become greater than his nature will allow.

Therefore, on Kantian scientific pietistic grounds alone, it follows that the Baconian/Cartesian technocratic "mastery of nature" attitude towards the natural world outside us is not only deeply philosophically mistaken and *wrongheaded*, but also deeply aesthetically, ethically, and natural-religiously *wronghearted*. Wrong, and wrong again.

### Frankenscience, the future of humanity, and the future of science

If the Baconian/Cartesian technocratic "mastery of nature" attitude towards the natural world is both deeply wrongheaded and deeply wronghearted, then the all-too-familiar and all-too-intimate modern and contemporary sociocultural and political connection between natural science, the military-industrial complex, technocratic global corporate capitalism, and the apocalyptic threat of permanent eco-disaster—aka what I will call, collectively, *Frankenscience*—is completely broken. Indeed, subverting and resisting and exiting the death-trap world of the military-industrial complex, technocratic global corporate capitalism, and the apocalyptic threat of permanent eco-disaster, essentially depends on our philosophically accepting, "taking to heart," and then freely acting on the basis of, Kant scientific pietism.

In this way, Kantian scientific pietism not only motivates and guides the salvation of nature and humanity, but it also saves *natural science itself* from "a fate worse than death," that is, from the senseless and insensible tragic transformation of natural science's supposed endless rational human progress of knowledge and technology into an endless mechanistic, physicalist, and scientistic devolution and regress, namely, the permanent *scientific night of the living dead*, Frankenscience. So the bottom-line message of Kantian scientific pietism is not just that humanity needs to undertake a serious epistemological,

metaphysical, aesthetic, ethical, and sociocultural-political critique of natural science in order to save nature and itself, but also that *natural science itself* needs to be critically saved and liberated from its own scientific naturalist ideology.

According to Kantian scientific pietism, freedom, mind, and life are *NOT* mysteriously metaphysically shot out of matter that is essentially mechanical, unminded, and inert. That way madness lies. *Free minded animals are NOT made out of fundamentally physical atoms*, whether Democritean, Bohrian, or *X*-ian. On the contrary, freedom, mind, and life are nothing more and nothing less than irreducibly novel dynamic immanent structurings and re-structurings of forward-directed energy flows in orientable space and irreversible time. *Dynamic processes*, not *atoms*, are what we are made out of. That being so, one can speculate that if contemporary physics were to incorporate Kantian scientific pietism fully into its own self-concept, then some amazing immanent structural, processual, organicist integration of *phenomenologically-driven cognitive science* and *cognitive ethology*, *ecosystemic organismic biology*, *relativity theory*, and *quantum field-theory* should be really possible, by analogy with the amazing way that complex numbers and real numbers immanently structurally integrate with rational numbers and natural numbers.[120] Then the necessary prologemenon to Grand Unified Theory would be essentially *an attitude*: natural piety, not mastery. Starting with that attitude, then, in the essentially embodied mind or minds of some natural pietist mathematico-biophysical genius or geniuses, the required structure-integrating formalisms would be spontaneously created/discovered, and natural science could authentically move forward.

And in fact, the first natural pietist scientific forward-steps of genius towards a processual, organicist Grand Unified Theory *have already been taken*: in A.N. Whitehead's "philosophy of organism" in *Process and Reality*; in Ilya Prigogine's *The End of Certainty*;[121] and in Stuart Kauffman's *Origins of Order*,[122] *At Home in the Universe*,[123] *Investigations*,[124] and *Humanity in a Creative Universe*.[125] Here, *the mathematics of non-equilibrium thermodynamics and complex systems more generally* jointly provide the right structure-integrating formalisms; *liberal naturalism* provides the right background metaphysics; and *natural piety* provides the right attitude towards nature and natural science. The combined influences of Newton's *Principia* and his natural mechanism, together with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and his transcendental idealism, together with appropriate formal advances in mathematics, produced relativity physics and quantum mechanics; now the combined influences of relativity physics, quantum mechanics, contemporary mathematics, and Kantian scientific pietism are producing *an organicist New Scientific Revolution*.

As I will argue in section 2.2.4, this emergent organicist New Scientific Revolution also marks the beginning of a New Copernican Revolution in philosophy, *the organicist conception of the world*. But before we get there, we need to understand more about how the rational human animal relates to the non-human natural world.

## 2.2.3  Bats, Bears, and Human Cognition,
## *Or*, Sometimes Hell Is Other Species

Intuition and concepts … constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make the mind's concepts sensible — that is, to add an object to them in intuition — as to make our intuitions understandable — that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers, or capacities, cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only from their unification can cognition arise. (*CPR* A50-51/B74-76, underlining added)

Appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity... Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking. (*CPR* A90/B123)

Leaving aside for the moment the question of D.B.'s verbal commentaries, and restricting ourselves to the objectively determined capacities, we can summarize D.B's discriminative skills as follows: He can detect and locate stimuli in his impaired [visual] field by pointing, or, less well, by eye movements.[126]

Even without the benefit of philosophical reflection, anyone who has spent some time in an enclosed space with an excited bat knows what it is to encounter a fundamentally alien form of life. I have said that the essence of the belief that bats have experience is that there is something it is like to be a bat. Now we know that most bats (the microchiroptera, to be precise) perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolation, detecting the reflections, from objects, within range, of their own rapid, subtly modulated, high frequency shrieks. Their brains are designed to correlate the outgoing impulses with the subsequent echoes, and the information thus acquired enables bats to make precise discrminations of distance, size, shape, motion, and texture comparable to those we make by vision. But bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine. This appears to create difficulties for the notion of what it is like to be a bat.[127]

Timothy Treadwell (born Timothy Dexter; April 29, 1957 – October 5, 2003) was an American bear enthusiast, environmentalist, naturalist, documentary filmmaker, and founder of the bear-protection organization Grizzly People. He lived with the grizzly bears of Katmai National Park in Alaska for 13 summers. At the end of his 13th summer in the park, in 2003, he and his girlfriend Amie Huguenard were killed by a 28-year-old brown bear, whose stomach was later found to contain human remains and clothing.[128]

The mediating conceptual and metaphysical term between *external or physical nature* on the one hand, and *human nature* on the other, is *non-human animals*. In the evolutionary natural-historical sequence of things, non-human animals were the means by which external or physical nature came alive, began to move of its own accord, feel itself, and enjoy or suffer consciousness. The first non-human animal with consciousness—the first non-human minded animal—whatever it was, was *a natural-born Prometheus*, bringing the fire of occurrent mindedness to a natural thermodynamic totality heavily pregnant with the rich potentiality for what Schopenhauer so aptly and grimly calls "the sorrows of the world." Hence non-human animals bridge the gap between, on the one hand, fundamental *non-moral value*, or what I call *proto-dignity*, and, on the other hand, fundamental *moral value*, or the full dignity of real persons. Or more tragically put: the world of non-human animals is where *natural evil* meets *moral evil*.

In 1974, Thomas Nagel published his brilliant, ground-breaking essay, "What Is It Like To Be A Bat?" I will start where Nagel ended. More specifically, in this section I will argue that if we adopt what Michelle Maiese and I call *The Essential Embodiment Theory* of the mind-body relation, as well as (what I take to be) the correct contemporary Kantian theories of *non-conceptual content*, *conceptual content*, and *consciousness*, then it follows that even despite their being *really blind* in one intelligible and legitimate sense, at least some blind humans and all normal bats can also *really see* in another equally intelligible and legitimate sense. I call these two perhaps surprising conclusions, respectively, *The Revisionist Blindsight Thesis* and *The Batsight Thesis*. The Batsight Thesis, in turn, raises some fundamental ethical and existential issues about how rational human animals are related to non-human animals.

One important side-implication of this account is that the currently fashionable doctrines of "trans-humanism" and "post-humanism," not to mention classical metaphysical Functionalism, are all *strongly metaphysically impossible*. The necessary and complete embodiment of our consciousness, intentionality, and caring, and correspondingly our animality, for better or worse, are partially constitutive elements of our humanity. It is *a self-deceiving cognitive illusion* and also an ethical and existential *inauthentic dodge* to believe that we can somehow escape from, and float free of, of our necessary and complete, unique, and finite human animal embodiment. Our lives cannot be uploaded from our "human-all-too-human" minded animal bodies to something else that's more amazing and less prone to decay and destruction; and we are all going to die: so stop deceiving yourself that it actually is or really ever could be otherwise, and start facing up to it.[129]

The Oxford English Dictionary tells us that the word 'animal' means "a living organism which feeds on organic matter, usually one with specialized sense organs and nervous system, and able to respond rapidly to stimuli."[130] In the usage of contemporary biologists, the term 'animal' also has a taxonomical sense, in that animals are said to constitute one of the five kingdoms of living things: Monera (bacteria), Protists, Fungi,

Plants, and Animals. The class of animals that is jointly specified by these ordinary language and biological-taxonomical senses includes vertebrates and invertebrates, mammals and non-mammals—including birds, reptiles, amphibians, various kinds of fish, insects, and arachnids.

My usage of 'animal' in this essay, as in other books,[131] is a precisification of the ordinary language and scientific terms, intended to coincide with its normal use in cognitive ethology. To signal this precisification, I have coined the quasi-technical term *minded animal*. By the notion of a "minded animal," I mean any living organism with inherent capacities for

(i) *consciousness*, that is, a capacity for embodied subjective experience,
(ii) *intentionality*, that is, a capacity for conscious mental representation and mental directedness to objects, events, processes, facts, acts, other animals, or the subject herself (so in general, a capacity for mental directedness to *intentional targets*), and also for
(iii) *caring*, a capacity for conscious affect, desiring, and emotion, whether directed to objects, events, processes, facts, acts, other animals, or the subject herself.

And over and above consciousness, intentionality, and caring, in *some* but *not all* minded animals, there is also a further inherent capacity for

(iv) *rationality*, that is, a capacity for self-conscious thinking according to principles and with responsiveness to reasons, hence poised for justification, whether logical thinking (including inference and theory-construction) or practical thinking (including deliberation and decision-making).

As we will see later in this essay, *human nature*, and the essentially connected notion of a *real human person*, are both intimately bound up with the notion of a *rational human minded animal*.

### The blind intuitions thesis

Perhaps the best-known phrase in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is this one: "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (*Denken ohne Inhalt sind leer*, *Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind*) (*CPR* A51/B75). But this is perhaps also the least-well-understood phrase in the first *Critique*. Indeed, if I am correct, then by the notion of "blind intuitions," Kant in fact means *essentially non-conceptual, non-rational animal conceptual, deeply conscious, first-order, immanently reflexive, non-self-consciously, pre-reflectively conscious, veridical sense perceptions,* and *not* failed sense perceptions. Correspondingly, The Blind Intuitions Thesis is this:

> There *are* sense perceptions in this sense, and the cognitive capacities for them are *shared* and *ubiquitous* across sentient human or non-human and rational or non-rational animals alike.

If The Blind Intuitions Thesis is true, then blind intuitions constitute a unique and sentient-animal-universal species of sense perceptions that are distinctively characterized by four individually necessary and jointly sufficient cognitive-semantic and mentalistic features:

> (i) essentially non-conceptual content,
> (ii) non-linguistic, inherently concept-like, non-rational human or non-human minded animal representational content (aka "batty concepts"),
> (iii) the spreading of consciousness throughout the entire living animal organism and all its vital systems (aka "deep consciousness"), and
> (iv) first-order, immanently reflexive, non-self-conscious consciousness (aka "pre-reflective consciousness").

Now I want to spell out these four features in turn.

### Essentially non-conceptual content, conceptual content, and batty concepts

The thesis of *Non-Conceptualism* about mental content says that not all mental contents in the intentional or representational acts or states of minded animals are strictly determined by their conceptual capacities, and that at least some mental contents are strictly determined by their non-conceptual capacities.[132] Non-Conceptualism is sometimes, but not always, combined with the further thesis that non-conceptual capacities and contents can be shared by rational human animals, non-rational human minded animals (and in particular, infants), and non-human minded animals alike. But in any case, Non-Conceptualism is directly opposed to the thesis of *Conceptualism* about mental content, which says that all mental contents are strictly determined by minded animals' conceptual capacities.[133] Conceptualism is also sometimes, but not always, combined with the further thesis that the psychological acts or states of infants and non-human minded animals lack mental content.

There are two importantly different kinds of Non-Conceptualism.[134] What is nowadays called "state" Non-Conceptualism says that the representational content of a given mental state[135] is non-conceptual if and only if the subject of that state does not possess concepts for the specification of that state. So state Non-Conceptualism is based on theories of conceptual possession-conditions. By contrast, "content" Non-Conceptualism says that the content of a given mental state is non-conceptual if and only if the content of that state is of a different *kind* from the conceptual content of any mental act or state. So content Non-Conceptualism is based on theories of the composition, compositional stuff, or formal constitution of mental content, since these seem to be the three basic ways in which contents could differ in kind.

One salient issue in this connection that I will flag for later and more careful discussion is the question of precisely what is meant by the notion of *possessing a concept*. But as a preliminary proposal, it seems to me that there are at least three necessary and partially constitutive factors in concept-possession:

(i) being able *to deploy and use* a concept (for example, with respect to the concept *horse*, the ability to recognize a horse when you perceive it, and being able to distinguish horses from other sorts of things),

(ii) being able *to be self-consciously aware of at least some of the intrinsic descriptive or intensional elements* of the concept (for example, with respect to the concept *horse*, the ability to know that the concept *animal* is necessarily contained in that concept), and following on directly from (ii), and

(iii) being able *to make analytically necessary and a priori logical inferences* that pick out at least some of the intrinsic descriptive or intensional elements of the concept (for example, with respect to the concept horse, the ability to infer in an analytically necessary and a priori way that if *X* is a horse, then *X* is an animal).

It is obvious that, for example, normal human toddlers and other young children are able to recognize a horse when they perceive it and distinguish it from other sorts of things—say, effectively telling horses apart from inanimate objects, people, and many other animals, although they may be a little shakey on the difference between horses and Big Dogs, camels, or cows—even though they are incapable of becoming self-consciously aware of the descriptive or intensional elements of the concept *horse* and carrying out analytic a priori inferences involving *horse*. So it then follows directly from this preliminary account, that it is possible to have the ability to deploy and use a concept *without* also having possession of that concept. In other words, concept-possession requires more and richer abilities than the basic, minimal set of abilities required for concept-deployment and concept-use *alone*.

In any case, there are, I think, at least two very important reasons for being a defender of *content* Non-Conceptualism.

First, if our original cognitive encounter with the world is independent of concepts, and if it is also based on a different kind of content from conceptual content, then on the face of it, the prospects for a very robust (and indeed, *Disjunctivist*) version of direct or naïve perceptual realism look quite good. This is because, in that case, our original encounter with the world is NOT mediated by concepts, and therefore that encounter cannot fail to be veridical due to any failures of conceptualization, belief, judgment, propositions, or theorizing, given the plausible assumption that belief judgment, propositions, and theories always and necessarily involve concepts.

Here, very briefly, is a line of reasoning which supports this claim. *Direct or Naïve Realism* about perception, in general, says

(i) that rational and other minded human or non-human animals stand in immediate, unmediated cognitive relations to external real objects that are consciously and correctly perceived by them, and

(ii) that these external real objects *partially constitute* those veridical perceptual acts or states.

*Disjunctivism* about perception, which is both an intensification and also a specification of direct or naïve perceptual realism, posits a categorical or essential and mutually exclusive difference between veridical perception on the one hand, and non-veridical conscious experiences (for example, complete or partial hallucinations) on the other hand. *Anti-Disjunctivism* about perception, by an opposing contrast, claims that not only is there no categorical or essential difference between veridical perception and hallucination, but also that there is something inherently *shared in common* between veridical perception and hallucination, such that the two either actually always are, or at least can be, *epistemically indiscriminable*. The actual or possible epistemic indiscriminability of veridical and hallucinatory states, in turn, not only *requires* concepts but also is a *necessary condition* of classical Cartesian skepticism about perceptual knowledge. Hence a non-conceptualist approach to direct or naïve realism and Disjunctivism is especially well-positioned to avoid classical Cartesian skepticism about perceptual knowledge.

Indeed, as a direct or naïve realist and also a Disjunctivist, I want to hold the thesis that the categorical or essential difference between veridical perception and hallucination can be both directly attributed to and also adequately explained by the difference between essentially non-conceptual content and conceptual content, together with the perhaps even more surprising thesis that necessarily, veridical conscious experiences and non-veridical conscious experiences are always inherently *discriminable* from one another by suitably attentive conscious subjects under cognitively favorable conditions, although *not always actually discriminated* in context due to perfectly ordinary or perhaps pathological or otherwise unusual lapses in attentive self-awareness by those same human-all-too-human, fallible conscious subjects.[136]

Second, if content Non-Conceptualism is true, and if a Disjunctivist direct or naïve perceptual realism based on content Non-Conceptualism is also true, then I think the prospects for a *bottom-up theory* of the foundations of human rationality look quite good too. According to this bottom-up theory, our conceptual and other intellectual capacities, and the full range of types of mental content—including those specifically associated with sense perception, perceptual knowledge, perception-based intentional action, perceptual self-knowledge, the analytic-synthetic distinction, a priori truth and knowledge in logic, and a priori truth and knowledge in mathematics, and also those capacities and types of mental content specifically associated with practical agency, right action, and practical reasoning—are all able to be explained in terms of the more basic and more primitive essentially non-conceptual psychological capacities shared with infants and non-human

animals, or what I will call collectively *the proto-rational capacities*. Furthermore, this bottom-up explanation entails no deflation, narrowing, or reduction whatsoever in the epistemic scope, modal character, or categorically normative force of human epistemic and practical rationality as classically conceived by, for example, Kant.

In the recent and contemporary literature on mental content, one can identify at least seven different arguments for Non-Conceptualism:[137]

> *(1) From phenomenological richness:* Our normal human perceptual experience
> is so replete with phenomenal characters and qualities that we could not possibly possess a conceptual repertoire extensive enough to capture them. Therefore normal human perceptual experience is always to some extent non-conceptual and has non-conceptual content.
>
> *(2) From perceptual discrimination*: It is possible for normal human cognizers to be capable of perceptual discriminations without also being capable of re-identifying the objects discriminated. But re-identification is a necessary condition of concept- possession. Therefore normal human cognizers are capable of non-conceptual cognitions with non-conceptual content.
>
> *(3) From infant and non-human animal cognition:* Normal human infants and some non-human animals are capable of perceptual cognition, but lack possession of concepts. Therefore normal human infants and some non-humans are capable of non-conceptual cognition with non-conceptual content.
>
> *(4) From the distinction between perception (or experience) and judgment (or thought):* It is possible for normal human cognizers to perceive something without also making a judgment about it. But non-judgmental cognition is non-conceptual. Therefore normal human cognizers are capable of non-conceptual perceptions with non-conceptual content.
>
> *(5) From the knowing-how vs. knowing-that (or knowing-what) distinction:* It is possible for normal human subjects to know *how* to do something without being able to know *that* one is doing it and also without knowing precisely *what* it is one is doing. But cognition which lacks knowing-that and knowing-what is non-conceptual. Therefore normal human subjects are capable of non-conceptual knowledge-how with non-conceptual content.
>
> *(6) From the theory of concept-acquisition:* The best overall theory of concept- acquisition includes the thesis that simple concepts are acquired by normal human cognizers on the basis of non-conceptual perceptions of the objects falling under these concepts. Therefore normal human cognizers are capable of non-conceptual perception with non-conceptual content.
>
> *(7) From the theory of demonstratives:* The best overall theory of the demonstratives
> "this" and "that" includes the thesis that demonstrative reference is fixed perceptually, essentially indexically, and therefore non-descriptively by normal human speakers.[138] But essentially indexical, non-descriptive perception is non-conceptual. Therefore normal human speakers are capable of non-conceptual perception with non-conceptual content.

In an influential paper, Jeff Speaks argues that there is in fact *no* problem about non-conceptual content

because (i) Non-Conceptualists have not established that the standard arguments they offer for the existence of non-conceptual content cannot be accommodated by suitably refined versions of Conceptualism, and

because (ii) Non-Conceptualists have not established that perceptual acts or states have representational content whose semantic structure and psychological function are distinct from the semantic structure and psychological function of conceptual content.[139]

I both agree and disagree with Speaks's challenging claims.

On the one hand, and on the side of agreement with his claim (i), I would want to make two even stronger claims, to the effect that

(i*) it cannot be established that the standard arguments for state Non-Conceptualism cannot be accommodated by suitably refined versions of Conceptualism, and

(ii*) most current versions of content Non-Conceptualism also cannot establish that perceptual acts or states have mental or representational content whose structure and function are any more than just accidentally or contingently distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content.

But on the other hand, I disagree with Speaks that as a consequence there is *no* problem for Conceptualists about non-conceptual content.

This is because I believe that there are in fact perceptual acts or states whose mental or representational contents cannot—even in principle—be conceptual, in the sense that those contents are strictly determined by our conceptual capacities. These are *essentially non-conceptual* contents. It is crucial to note that I am NOT denying that all essentially non-conceptual contents can *in some sense or another* be conceptually grasped or conceptually specified. After all, here I am now writing various things about essentially non-conceptual contents, while obviously *also* using concepts in order to do this. Instead, I am denying only that it is our capacity for conceptual grasping or specification *alone* which strictly determines the semantic structure and psychological function of essentially non-conceptual contents. Or otherwise put, I am denying only that the *nature* of essentially non-conceptual mental contents is conceptual and also that the existence and specific character of essentially non-conceptual contents are *strictly determined* by our conceptual capacities, but NOT denying that essentially non-conceptual mental contents can be conceptualized in some *other* non-essential, non-strictly determining sense. If all this is correct, then at least some perceptual mental acts or states in minded animals have mental or representational contents whose semantic structure and psychological function are necessarily distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content, and are not strictly determined by the conceptual capacities of those minded animals. This is what I call *essentialist content Non-Conceptualism*.

Furthermore, I also believe that the special semantic and psychological character of these essentially non-conceptual contentful perceptual acts or states entails that *all* mental acts or states in minded animals, including of course their perceptual acts or states, contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense—although, to be sure, the presence of this essentially non-conceptual content does not necessarily exhaust the total content of such acts or states. The thesis of the *ubiquity* of essentially non-conceptual content is consistent with the thesis that essentially non-conceptual content is *combinable* with conceptual content. Indeed, I believe that essentially non-conceptual content not only *can* be combined with conceptual content, but also *must* be so combined if perceptual judgments, perceptual knowledge and self-knowledge, analytic truths and synthetic truths of all kinds, and a priori knowledge in logic and mathematics in particular, and also logical and practical reasoning about the perceivable natural world more generally, are to be possible. This is the "proto-rationality" of essentially non-conceptual content. So if I am correct, then the essentially non-conceptual content of an act or state is *underdetermined by* (= is not strictly determined by) the conceptual content of that act or state (= the necessary distinctness of essentially non-conceptual content), and this modal fact about essentially non-conceptual content is perfectly consistent with the further modal fact that in the mental acts and states of rational minded animals, essentially non-conceptual content must be presupposed by conceptual content and also be complementary with conceptual content (= the proto-rationality of essentially non- conceptual content). But in any case the nature of the uncombined or combined essentially non-conceptual content of these perceptual acts or states needs to be explained.

The larger argument I am running in this section also has another important element. Because the explicit arguments I will offer for the existence and specific character of essentially non-conceptual content have a distinctively Kantian provenance, a second implication of my larger argument is that contemporary defenders of content Non-Conceptualism must in effect go "back to Kant" if they are to respond adequately to Speaks's important challenge, by adopting a Kantian version of essentialist content Non-Conceptualism. Defenders of state Non-Conceptualism, in turn, must either just concede defeat to Conceptualism, or else become defenders of Kantian essentialist content Non-Conceptualism—henceforth, for terminological convenience, "Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism." In other words, I am saying that all rationally acceptable roads within Non-Conceptualism lead ultimately to Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism.

If I am correct about this deep historico-philosophical connection between essentialist Non-Conceptualism and Kant's theory of cognition, then it is also a deliciously historically ironic fact, because Kant is almost universally regarded as the founding father of Conceptualism and the nemesis of Non-Conceptualism. York Gunther articulates this view perfectly:

In his slogan, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without

concepts are blind," Kant sums up the doctrine of conceptualism.[140]

Nevertheless, I think that Kant is most accurately regarded as *not only* the founder of Conceptualism but also, and perhaps *even more importantly*, as the founder of Non-Conceptualism, and indeed, as the founder of content Non-Conceptualism and indeed also *essentialist* content Non-Conceptualism alike.[141] In addition to the second epigraph of this section—that is,

> Appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity... Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking. (*CPR* A90/B123)

—here are four other Kant-texts that also more or less strongly confirm these claims:

> Objects can indeed appear to us <u>without necessarily having to be related to the functions of the understanding</u>. (*CPR* A89/B122, underlining added)

> That representation <u>which can be given prior to all thinking</u> is called **intuition**. (*CPR* B132, underlining added, boldfacing in the original)

> The manifold for intuition must already be given <u>prior to the synthesis of the understanding and independently from it</u>. (*CPR* B145, underlining added)

> Concept differs from intuition by virtue of the fact that all intuition is singular. <u>He who sees his first tree does not know what it is that he sees</u>. (*VL* Ak 24: 905, underlining added)

In my opinion, what Kant's famous slogan about blind intuitions and empty thoughts actually means is that intuitions and concepts must always be combined together *for the special purpose of making objectively valid judgments*. But *outside* that context it is also perfectly possible for there to be directly referential intuitions without concepts ("blind intuitions," for example, someone's first cognitive encounter with a tree), and also to have thinkable concepts without intuitions ("empty concepts," for example, concepts of things-in-themselves). Indeed, it is precisely the fact of blind intuitions, whose semantic structure and psychological function are necessarily distinct from the semantic structure and psychological function of concepts, that drives Kant's need to argue in the first *Critique*'s B edition Transcendental Deduction that all and only the objects of actual or possible human experience are necessarily conceptualized or conceptualizable under the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, and necessarily constrained by the transcendental laws of a pure science of nature. Otherwise blind intuitions might pick out *essentially rogue objects* of human experience that are contingently or necessarily

unconceptualizable, and nomologically intractable—causal deviants, and rude violaters of the general causal laws of nature.[142] Timothy Williamson calls these rogue objects "elusive objects," and makes essentially the same critical Kantian point I am making here—namely, that the scope of the Transcendental Deduction is inherently constrained by the possibility of rogue or elusive objects—although in the context of criticizing McDowell's Conceptualism, from the standpoint of Williamson's own noumenal scientific realism:

> For objects, McDowell's claim that the conceptual is unbounded amounts to the claim that any object can be thought of. Likewise for the sort of thing that can be the case: the claim is, for example, that whenever an object has a property, it can be thought, of the object and the property, that the former has the latter…. McDowell's argument in any case seems to require the premise that everything (object, property, relation, state of affairs, …) is thinkable. That premise is highly contentious. What reason have we to assume that reality does not contain *elusive objects*, incapable in principle of being individually thought of?…. Although elusive objects belong to the very same ontological category of objects as those we can single out, their possibility still undermines McDowell's claim that we cannot make "interesting sense" of the idea of something outside the conceptual realm …. We do not know whether there are actually elusive objects. What would motivate the claim that there are none, if not some form of idealism very far from McDowell's intentions? We should adopt no conception of philosophy that on methodological grounds excludes elusive objects.[143]

In this way, Kant's theory of concepts and judgment in the Transcendental Analytic, *if correct*, provides foundations for Conceptualism. But equally and oppositely, Kant's theory of intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic, if correct, provides foundations for Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism, and also inherently constrains what Kant argues in the Transcendental Analytic. I will not re-argue those historical claims here, nor will I critically examine competing versions of Non-Conceptualism, whether state Non-Conceptualism or content Non-Conceptualism.[144] What I want to do now is to offer a unified set of positive arguments for Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism.

An often unnoticed, feature of the debate about non-conceptual content is the lack of any generally-accepted theory of the nature of concepts.[145] But how can we critically evaluate the claim that *non*-conceptual content exists, and, if we are to be essentialist content Non- Conceptualists, that it has such-and-such a necessarily distinct semantic structure and psychological function from that of concepts, if we do not actually know what *concepts* are?

### The nature of concepts

In order to face up to that problem, I am going to make a positive, working proposal about the nature of concepts. Mental content in general is the cognitive or practical

information that is contained in a mental representation—aka an intentional act or state—insofar as that representation is an intersubjectively shareble type that is also tokened in and directly cognitive accessible to individual minded animals on particular occasions and in particular contexts. According to my proposal about the nature of concepts, then, *X* is a concept—or what is the same thing, *X* is a conceptual content—if and only if *X* is a mental content such that

(i) *X* is either a material concept or a formal concept (*the conceptual dualism condition*),

(ii) *X* is a material concept if and only if

(iia) *X* provides for the definite or indefinite categorization, classification, discrimination, identification, and cognitively significant presentation of some actual or possible individual things, or unordered or ordered n-tuples of individual things (which allows for monadic concepts like BACHELOR and also for relational concepts like TALLER THAN), and *X* is thereby inherently descriptive of those individual things, which in turn fall under *X* (*the first-order descriptivity condition*),

(iib) *X* is such that a conscious cognizer need not necessarily be directly acquainted with or confronted by whatever is represented by X right then and there in order to understand *X*, provided that those things, as represented by *X*, have already been encountered, and that the memory of that earlier acquaintance is cognitively accessible (*the non-acquaintance condition*),

(iic) *X* fully supports the truth of some analytic propositions that are necessarily true in virtue of intensional containment (*the containment analyticity condition*), and

(iid) the self-conscious cognition of *X* fully supports some sufficiently justified analytically necessarily true beliefs, i.e., a priori analytic knowledge (*the analytic a priori knowledge condition*),

(iii) *X* is a formal concept if and only if

(iiia) *X* provides for the definite or indefinite categorization, classification, discrimination, identification, and cognitively significant presentation of some material concepts, and *X* is thereby inherently descriptive of those material concepts, which in turn are inherently descriptive of the individual things that fall under them (*the higher-order descriptivity condition*)

(iiib) *X* is such that a conscious cognizer need not necessarily be directly acquainted with or confronted by whatever individual things, or unordered or ordered n-tuples of individual things, that fall under any of the material concepts to which *X* applies (*the higher-order non-acquaintance condition*),

(iiic) *X* partially or wholly provides for the logical consequence relation, logical constants, logical laws and/or logical inference rules of classical truth-functional logic, or classical first-order predicate logic plus identity (aka "elementary logic"), or some conservative or deviant extension of elementary logic (*the logical notions condition*),

(iiid) *X* fully supports the truth of analytic propositions that are necessarily true in virtue of logic, namely, logical truths (*the logical truth condition*), and

(iiiie) the self-conscious cognition of *X* supports some sufficiently justified analytically necessarily true logical beliefs, that is, a priori logical knowledge (*the logical a priori knowledge condition*),

(iv) *X* is intersubjectively cognitively shareable and communicable by means of some or another natural language *L*, precisely because *X* is a linguistically- and logically- structured mental representation type that can be variously tokened in the minds of competent, rational speakers of *L* when they correctly use expressions (and more specifically, n-place predicative expressions like "__is a bachelor" and "__is married to–," sentential modifers like negation, and sentential connectives like conjunction) of *L* that have *X* as their linguistic meaning, by virtue of the innate a priori cognitive capacities that all competent, rational speakers of *L* possess for generating linguistic and logical understanding (*the linguistic cognitivism condition*),[146]

(v) *X* is possessible, which entails that

(va) *X* is deployable and usable, which is to say that *X* makes it possible for cognitive subjects to recognize *X*-type things when they perceive them, and also to distinguish *X*-type things from other types of things,

(vb) it is possible for higher-level rational cognitive subjects to be self- consciously aware of at least some of the intrinsic descriptive or intensional elements of *X*, and

(vc) it is possible for higher-level rational cognitive subjects to make analytically necessary and a priori logical inferences that pick out at least some of the intrinsic descriptive or intensional elements of *X*, but also

(vd) it is possible for (va) to be satisfied by some cognitive subjects (for example, non-rational minded non-human animals, normal human toddlers, and other young children) without their also satisfying either (vb) or (vc), and it is possible for (vb) and (vc) to be satisfied by other cognitive subjects without their also satisfying (va), and in all such cases there is no real possibility of concept- possession, and thus no conceptual contents in the strict sense, although inherently concept-like contents are still present in the mental acts or states of those cognitive subjects (*the concept-possession conditions*), and

(vi) if *X* is a material concept, then some actual or possible rational animal cognizer

(via) uses *X* to detect some essential or accidental in rebus manifest properties and relations of actual macroscopic material objects, which are also their mereological structures[147] (*the world-detection condition*), and also

(vib) accurately mirrors and records this information in the intensional microstructure of the content of *X* when the rational animal cognizer cognitively generates it (*the world-mirroring condition*), nevertheless

(vic) this is not to say that no concepts pick out either ante rem properties/relations or uninstantiated manifest properties/relations. Indeed and precisely on the contrary, all the formal concepts pick out ante rem properties or relations; and every consistent set of material concepts picks out a manifest property or relation, whether or not it is actually instantiated. The fact remains, however, that every material concept picks out at least one in rebus manifest property or relation. So all conceptual content is firmly anchored in the actual manifest natural world (*the world-anchoring condition*).

Just to give this six-part theory of concepts a convenient label, and also because it directly reflects the theory of "Logical Cognitivism" that I defended in *Rationality and Logic*,[148] I will call it *The Logical Cognitivist Theory of Concepts*, or The LCTC for short.

For the specific purposes of this section, here is an extremely important implication of The LCTC. In view of of the conjunction of the linguistic cognitivism condition and the concept- possession conditions, it must be strongly emphasized that The LCTC does *not* entail that there *cannot* be non-linguistic concepts in any sense. On the contrary, it seems to me very plausible to hold that there are *non-linguistic, inherently concept-like, non-rational human or non-human minded animal representational contents*. For convenience, I will call these *batty concepts*, since they are precisely the sorts of concept-like mental representations that non-rational non-human minded animals like bats can have. Here is a four-part characterization of batty concepts:

(i) Many normal pre-linguistic human children—for example, many young children between six months and one year of age, and in the pre-toddler stage, and also many *non-human* minded animals—can effectively deploy and use inherently concept-like contents as object-categorizing, object-classifying, object-discriminating, and object-identifying devices for the purposes of cognition and intentional action—for example, in the case of pre- linguistic children, effectively recognizing their primary care-givers and telling them apart from other things and people—even if they cannot possess these inherently concept-like contents.

(ii) These inherently concept-like contents can also be effectively deployed and used in the absence of the objects represented by them—for example, in the case of pre-linguistic children, insofar as they demand the constant presence of their primary care givers, food, warmth, etc.

(iii) These inherently concept-like contents are intersubjectively shareable by other human minded animals and non-human minded animals alike.

(iv) These inherently concept-like contents are present in their mental lives causally, phenomenologically, and semantically, but *not* by means of linguistic vehicles.

So according to The LCTC, there are indeed some batty concepts, in that the conscious, intentional, caring acts or states of some pre-linguistic humans or non-human minded animals do actually contain psychologically real inherently concept-like contents, as tokens of their corresponding mental representations types, which are effectively deployed and used by those animals in cognition and intentional action. But these batty concepts simply *lack linguistic vehicles*, and thus batty concepts cannot be *possessed* by those creatures, even according to the weakest theories of concept-possession.[149]

The possibility of batty concepts obviously does not in any way rule out the possibility of the sort of relatively weak but still quite substantive necessary connection between concepts and language[150] that The LCTC provides. The LCTC entails—again via its condition (iv), the linguistic cognitivism condition—that no concept is such that it cannot

be conveyed by means of some possible natural language to someone else who is not actually directly acquainted with or confronted by the individual thing or things represented by that concept right then and there, provided that she has already been acquainted with them and that her memory of that earlier acquaintance is cognitively accessible. Every concept is thereby possessible by some higher-level rational animal or another, including of course higher-level rational *human* animals. Thus the possible natural linguistic expressibility of every concept suffices to guarantee the inherently intersubjective and non-solipsistic character of concepts in the strict sense as well as of all concept-like contents, even for pre-linguistic humans and non-human minded animals, whose (inherently) concept(-like)-deployment and (inherently) concept(-like)-use simply lacks linguistic vehicles, and thereby prevents their possessing those concept-like contents, even though they do effectively deploy and use these batty concepts in cognition and intentional action. But the (inherently) concept(-like)-deploying and (inherently) concept(-like)-using animals who simply lack linguistic vehicles, lack them only *contingently*, not necessarily. Obviously, many or even most normal, healthy pre-linguistic children actually grow up to become linguistic animals.

And not only that. According to The LCTC, and as against the later Wittgenstein, counterfactually, if a lion *could* talk, then we *would* be able to understand him. Think, for example, of the leonine Lord Aslan in C. S. Lewis's *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*. Therefore, in these actual and counterfactual senses, all pre-linguistic human proto-conceptualizers and non-human minded animal proto-conceptualizers are also *proto-linguistic* creatures. Or to borrow another Wittgensteinian metaphor and also twist it a little, pre-linguistic human proto- conceptualizers and non-human minded animal proto-conceptualizers, the user of batty concepts, do not live in the center of The City of Language—but they *do* all live in the suburbs.

In any case, the leading theoretical virtue of the LCTC is that it permits me to map the contrast between essentially non-conceptual content and conceptual content directly onto the classical contrast between

(i) *knowledge by acquaintance*, or immediate subjective experience of the world, other minded animals, and oneself, and

(ii) *knowledge by description*, or logico-linguistically mediated thought about the world, other minded animals, and oneself.

Two more things about *this* classical distinction should be noted, however, before I get to the crucial point.

First, knowledge by description or conceptual cognition in my sense—specifically expressed in The LCTC by conditions (iia) and (iiia), the first-order descriptivity condition and the higher-order descriptivity condition—basically captures everything that Frege means by cognition of things via a "mode of presentation" (*Art des Gegebenseins*) or

"sense" (*Sinn*), and also *much more*. Frege held that modes or presentations or senses account for differences in cognitive significance across co- referential expressions; that they uniquely determine (purely attributive or descriptive) reference; and that they help to explain why there are failures of intersubstitutivity salva veritate in opaque contexts.[151] Knowledge by description or conceptual cognition in my sense plays these three roles by satisfying the two descriptivity conditions. Nevertheless it satisfies not *merely* those conditions, but also clearly satisfies the conceptual dualism condition, the non-acquaintance condition, the analyticity condition, the logical-notions condition, the logical truth condition, the a priori knowledge condition, and the linguistic cognitivism condition. And it is not at all clear whether Frege's notion of a mode-of-presentation or sense, in and of itself or without theoretical supplementation, satisfies *any* of the latter seven conditions.

Second, although it is true that, in this way, I do generally support Russell's classical distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description—which in turn, for Russell, was originally an updated version of Kant's intuition (*Anschauung*) vs. *concept* (*Begriff*) distinction, whereby the Brentano-Meinong notion of a *presentation* was used to extend Kant's notion of intuition beyond perceptual contexts to cognitive acquaintance with universals, logical constants, and other platonically abstract objects[152]— nevertheless, I also want to jettison most of early Russell's epistemology. Contrary to Russell, I hold that the primary objects of cognitive acquaintance are just individual macroscopic material beings in the local or extended natural environment of the rational human animals and other kinds of conscious animals who sense-perceive them, and NOT sense data, universals, logical constants, or other platonically abstract objects. And again contrary to Russell, I hold that cognitive acquaintance is always, necessarily, and paradigmatically also a matter of *knowing how to move one's own living organismic body in response to the causal-dynamic powers of macroscopic external material beings in the natural environment*.

So "knowing *X*" is always, necessarily, and paradigmatically also "knowing how to move my body in response to *X*," where '*X*' ranges over the local and distal natural world of causally efficacious macroscopic external material beings. Indeed, as I argue elsewhere,[153] our dynamic, essentially embodied, pre-reflectively conscious perceptual acquaintance with causally efficacious individual macroscopic material beings in our local or extended natural environment, when originally and inherently guided and mediated by essentially non-conceptual content, satisfies all the requirements of a very powerful version of perceptual direct realism, which I call "Radically Naïve Realism." For a full-dress elaboration and defense of Radically Naïve Realism, see *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori,* chapter 3.

But in any case, the crucial point right now is that I am proposing to identify conceptual contents, whether material concepts or formal concepts, with inherently descriptive representations, one of whose functions it must be logico-linguistically to categorize, classify, discriminate, identify, and provide cognitively significant presentations of

individual macroscopic material beings, or unordered or ordered n-tuples of such things, or else to categorize, classify, discriminate, identify, and provide cognitively significant presentations of other (first-order, material) concepts that apply to those things, without our having to be actually cognitively acquainted with or cognitively actually directly confronted by those things right then and there in order to understand those concepts, provided that those things, as represented by those concepts, have already been encountered, and that the memory of that earlier acquaintance is cognitively accessible. Otherwise put, knowledge by description is always either "knowing *X* *as* *F*" (i.e., conceptual descriptive knowledge) or "knowing *that* *X* is *F*" (i.e., propositional descriptive knowledge), without having actually to encounter an *F*-typed *X* right then and there, provided that an *F*-typed *X* has already been encountered, and that the memory of that earlier acquaintance is cognitively accessible. In this way, knowledge by description expresses an inherently context-insensitive, *allocentric or non-egocentric* (whether third-personal or wholly impersonal), shareable, communicable content.

By sharp contrast, knowledge by acquaintance expresses an inherently context-sensitive, *egocentric or first-person-perspectival*, intrinsically spatiotemporally structured content that is not ineffable, but instead shareable or communicable only to the extent that another ego or first-person is in a cognitive position to be actually directly perceptually confronted by the selfsame individual macroscopic material being in a spacetime possessing the same basic orientable and thermodynamically irreversible structure. By "orientable spacetime," I mean a global spacetime with intrinsic directions: up, down, right, left, top, bottom, over, under, inside, outside, backwards, forwards, and so-on. And by "thermodynamic irreversibility" I mean time's asymmetric forward arrow in the actual causally efficacious natural world. So given The LCTC, the very idea of a conceptual content entails the possibility of mental-representation-*without*-actual-direct-confrontation—and if this is not always the possibility of a Nagel-like "view from *nowhere*," then at least it is the possibility of either a "view from *later*" or "a view from *somewhere else*." By contrast, the very idea of essentially non-conceptual content entails mental-representation-*with*-actual-direct-confrontation, embedded in an egocentrically-centered orientable and thermodynamically irreversible spacetime. Hence essentially non-conceptual content is mental representation that necessarily involves a view of *that* actual macroscopic material being right over *there*, from right *here* and right *now*, as directed towards *my/our future*.

### The nature and existence of essentially non-conceptual content

In light of The LCTC, here is my Kantian Non-Conceptualist working analysis of essentially non-conceptual content. According to this analysis, *X* is an essentially non-conceptual content of perception if and only if *X* is a mental content such that

*(i) X* is *not* a conceptual content, as defined by The LCTC, nor does it *require* any such conceptual content,

*(ii) X* is included in a mental state or act that directly refers to some or another actual individual macroscopic material being *B* in the local or distal natural environment of the minded animal subject of *X*—and it is also really possible that the minded animal subject of *X =B*—and thereby both uniquely (if not always perfectly accurately[154]) locates *B* in 3D Euclidean orientable space and also uniquely (if not always perfectly accurately) tracks *B*'s thermodynamically irreversible causal activities in time, in order to guide the subject's conscious intentional desire-driven body movements for the purposes of cognitive and practical intentional agency, and

*(iii) X* is an inherently context-sensitive, egocentric or first-person-perspectival, spatiotemporally structured content that is not ineffable, but instead shareable or communicable only to the extent that another minded animal ego or first-person is in a cognitive position to be actually directly perceptually confronted by the same actual individual macroscopic material being *B* in a spacetime possessing the same basic 3D Euclidean orientable and thermodynamically irreversible structure.

And against the backdrop of that working analysis, here is an initial argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content that I call—pun fully intended—*The Handwaving Argument*. The Handwaving Argument is *not* intended to be decisive, but only to prime you for the next argument.

The Handwaving Argument

(1) Suppose that I am standing right in front of you and saying "All bachelors are males, and all males are animals, so it is analytic that all bachelors are animals, right?" By hypothesis, you are concentrating your thoughts exclusively on what I am saying, and clearly understand it.

(2) Suppose also that as I am saying "All bachelors are males," my arms are held out straight towards you and I am also moving my right hand, rotated at the wrist, in a clockwise circular motion seen clearly from your point of view, which is also a counterclockwise circular motion seen clearly from my point of view.

(3) By hypothesis, in this context, you are looking at this hand-movement, but not also thinking about it. It is quite true that in some *other* context you might be looking at it and also thinking about it. But, by hypothesis, that is not the case in *this* context. By hypothesis, in this context, you are seeing it but not thinking about it—just as, when you are driving a car and your mind is fully focused on some train of thought having nothing to do with driving, you can see all sorts of things passing by you, and you can even skillfully drive, without thinking at all about the things that you are seeing or doing.

(4) Suppose also that as I am saying, "…and all males are animals," I begin moving my left hand, again rotated at the wrist, in a counterclockwise circular motion seen clearly from your point of view, which is also a clockwise circular motion seen clearly from my point of view. As per (3), in this context, by hypothesis, you are looking at this hand-movement,

but not thinking about it. The fact that in some other context you might be looking at it and also thinking about it is irrelevant to what you are doing in this context.

(5) Suppose, then, that as I am saying, "… so it is analytic that all bachelors are animals, right?" I am moving both hands simultaneously in front of you in the ways specified in (2), (3), and (4).

(6) Your conceptual capacities are being used by you to concentrate on what I am saying about bachelors, males, and animals, and to understand it clearly, which by hypothesis, in this context, you do.

(7) Insofar as, in this context, you are using those conceptual capacities exclusively to concentrate on and to understand clearly what I am saying, you are *not* using your conceptual capacities to see clearly what I am doing with my hands.

(8) Yet you *also* see clearly what I am doing with my hands. Your conscious attention in this context is *divided* into linguistic/conceptual understanding and lucid vision, but by hypothesis in this context your capacities for linguistic/conceptual understanding are neither distracted nor divided.

(9) Therefore, in this context, you are using your *non*-conceptual capacities to see clearly what I am doing with my hands.

(10) The kind of mental content that individuates, guides, and mediates the use of non-conceptual capacities is *essentially* non-conceptual content.

(11) Therefore essentially non-conceptual content really exists.

The Handwaving Argument is directly inspired by Kant's famous (or notorious) "argument from incongruent counterparts," for the truth of the thesis of the transcendental ideality of space and time. Next I will explicitly work out this Kantian connection, along with a more carefully-formulated and -defended version of the argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content, including

(i) *material*, empirical, or a posteriori essentially non-conceptual content, and also
(ii) *formal*, non-empirical, or a priori essentially non-conceptual content.

As I just mentioned, the more carefully-formulated and -defended version of the argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content—which I will call *The Two Hands Argument*, or The THA for short—is closely historically related to a famous argument used by Kant in both his pre-Critical and Critical periods, known as the argument from incongruent counterparts.[155] He defines the notion of incongruent counterparts as follows:

I shall call a body which is exactly equal and similar to another, but which cannot be enclosed in the same limits as the other, its *incongruent counterpart*. Now, in order to demonstrate the possibility of such a thing, let a body be taken consisting, not of two halves which are symmetrically arranged relatively to a single intersecting plane, but rather, say, a *human hand*. From all the points on its surface let perpendicular lines be extended to a

plane surface set up opposite to it; and let these lines be extended the same distance behind the plane surface, as the points on the surface of the hand are in front of it; the ends of the lines, thus extended, constitute, when connected together, the surface of a corporeal form. That form is the incongruent counterpart of the first. In other words, if the hand in question is a right hand, then its counterpart is a left hand. The reflection of an object in a mirror rests upon exactly the same principles. For the object always appears as far behind the mirror as it is in front of it. Hence, the image of a right hand in the mirror is always a left hand. If the object itself consists of two incongruent counterparts, as the human body does if it is divided by means of a vertical intersection running from front to back, then its image is congruent with that object. That this is the case can easily be recognized if one imagines the body making half a rotation; for the counterpart of the counterpart of an object is necessarily congruent with that object. (*DS* 2: 382, underlining added).

More briefly put, incongruent counterparts are perceivable mirror-reflected spatial duplicates that share all the same monadic or qualitative properties, have exactly the same shape and size, and correspond point-for-point, but are in different places and cannot be made to coincide by rigid translation within the same global orientable space (as I mentioned above, an orientable space is a space with intrinsic directions). Even more briefly put, incongruent counterparts are *enantiomorphs*. Enantiomorphs are qualitatively identical but topologically non-identical. On Kant's view, the non-identity of incongruent counterparts, or enantiomorphs, is non-logically or synthetically necessary and a priori.

By contrast, *homomorphs* are pairs of perceivable objects that share all the same monadic or qualitative properties, have exactly the same shape and size, and correspond point-for- point, but are in different places and *can* be made to coincide by rigid translation within the surrounding space. So they are both qualitatively and topologically *identical*. Although Kant was not in a position to know this, homomorphism for mirror-reflected objects is in fact logically possible if the local Euclidean space in which the paired objects are embedded, like that of the Möbius Strip or Klein Bottle, is also *non-orientable* or without intrinsic directions. Roughly speaking, letting your fingers do the walking, you send out your right hand for a long walk along the surface of the Möbius Strip, and it comes back as your left hand. Curiouser and curiouser!

But I think that this logical possibility is no objection to Kant's thesis. This is because, for Kant, it is a necessary condition of a proposition's being synthetically necessary that its denial be logically consistent and thus that its falsity be logically possible.[156] Thus his thesis is not that enantiomorphism can be correctly represented (or, equivalently, that mirror-reflected counterparts are incongruent, or topologically non-identical) in all logically possible spaces. For, as we have just seen, there are some logically possible spaces in which mirror-reflected counterparts are congruent. Instead, Kant's thesis is that enantiomorphism can be correctly represented in all and only humanly perceivable globally or locally Euclidean *orientable* spaces, and furthermore that if a single hand were to exist alone in

any possible world framed by such a space, then necessarily it would be either a left hand or a right hand.[157]

Kantian arguments from the existence or possibility of incongruent counterparts are all based on the fact of our primitive subjective experience, as minded animals, of enantiomorphic topological features of the natural perceivable world and our own living organismic bodies.[158] As I will show later, however, it is also arguable that there are

(i) precise *temporal* analogues of incongruent counterparts in our primitive subjective experience of *spacetime events* in the natural perceivable world, and also
(ii) primitive subjective experience of *complex thermodynamic processes* occurring either inside or outside our own living bodies.

Interestingly, Kant uses the argument from incongruent counterparts in four different ways.

First, he uses it in his pre-Critical period to disprove the relational theory of space—which says that space is nothing but a set of extrinsic relations that are supervenient on pre-existing things (for example, Leibnizian monads) and their intrinsic non-relational properties—and to establish the existence of absolute Newtonian space as a total unified space to which material bodies extended in space are intrinsically related, and also to demonstrate that the actual space of perceivable material bodies is intrinsically directional (namely, orientable) and egocentrically-centered.[159]

Second, he uses it at the very beginning of his Critical Period to prove that the representation of space is essentially intuitional and not conceptual.[160]

Third, he uses it in the middle of his Critical period to prove that space and time are transcendentally ideal.[161]

And fourth and finally, he also uses it in his post-Critical period to establish the thesis that all rational thinking requires an intuition-based "orientation" in order to be adequately grounded.[162]

Kant's fourfold use of the argument from incongruent counterparts is not only interesting: it is also philosophically important. One conclusion we can draw from it is that since his pre-Critical version of the argument entails Newtonian *realism* about space, while his Critical version of the argument entails transcendental *idealism* about space, these two arguments cancel out, and show us that the Kantian argument from incongruent counterparts is in fact *neutral* with respect to realism and idealism about space.[163] This is the clue I shall follow up directly in The THA. So while The THA has a distinctively Kantian provenance, I think that it is also defensible on grounds that are altogether logically independent of the much-controverted questions of precisely what Kant's transcendental idealism is, and whether it is objectively true or objectively false. Here, then, is The THA.

The Two Hands Argument

(1) Incongruent counterparts are logically and metaphysically possible. (Premise, supported by Kant's theory of incongruent counterparts and human geometrical intuition.)
(2) Incongruent counterparts, by definition, are enantiomorphs. This entails that they are perceivable mirror-reflected monadic-property-for-monadic-property spatial duplicates that have exactly the same shape and size, and correspond point-for-point. In short, incongruent counterparts are *qualitatively identical*. (From (1).)
(3) So by definition, there is no *descriptive* difference between incongruent counterparts. (From (2).)
(4) Either of my hands and its corresponding mirror-image are actual examples of incongruent counterparts, hence my own right and left hands are also, within an acceptable approximation, actual incongruent counterparts. (Premise, supported by Kant's theory of incongruent counterparts and human geometrical intuition.)
(5) Therefore there is no descriptive difference between either one of my hands and its incongruent counterpart. (From (3) and (4).)
(6) Therefore there is no material or formal conceptual difference (or, equivalently: there is no empirical or non-empirical conceptual difference) between either one of my hands and its incongruent counterpart. In particular, the exact and real difference between either one of my hands and its incongruent counterpart, and also my being able to pick out each one of them individually, could never be conveyed to someone else who was not actually directly confronted with these objects. (From (5) and the LCTC.)
(7) But I can directly and veridically perceive the exact and real difference between either of my hands and its incongruent counterpart, and I can thereby directly and veridically perceive the exact and real difference between my *right* hand and my *left* hand, and thus pick out each of them individually. (Premise, supported by Kant's theory of incongruent counterparts and phenomenological introspection.)
(8) In order to represent a complex state of affairs *as* complex, concepts are not generally required. For example, the egocentrically-centered primitive spatial difference between right and left, up and down, front and back, etc., and also the egocentrically-centered primitive temporal difference between earlier and later, now and then, etc., are immediately given as structurally-unified representations in pre-reflectively and non-self-consciously conscious experience. Hence these representations really can be given altogether without concepts. (Premise, supported by Kant's theories of spatiotemporal orientation, figurative imagination, and aesthetic vs. discursive cognition, phenomenological introspection, and empirical data in contemporary cognitive psychology.[164])
(9) At least some non-human animals and human infants directly and veridically perceive some real material objects that are incongruent counterparts, such as their right and left forepaws, right and left rear paws, right and left front hooves, right and left back hooves, right and left hands, etc. (Premise)
(10) The representational content of such perceptual states is altogether concept-free (where concepts are understood as per The LCTC). (From (9) and The LCTC.)
(11) Rational human cognizers who directly and veridically perceive real material objects that are incongruent counterparts share essentially the same representational content that

non-human animals and human infants have when they directly and veridically perceive those incongruent counterpart real material objects, even if phenomenal characters differ importantly across species-differences, and even if rational human cognizers also have representational content of a different kind in addition to that shared content. (From (10).)
(12) Therefore, whether in the intentional states of non-human animals, human infants, or rational human cognizers, some essentially non-conceptual content that is altogether concept-free (where concepts are understood as per The LCTC) really exists. (From (1) to (11).)

The essentially non-conceptual content whose existence I have just demonstrated in The THA is *material*, empirical, or a posteriori. This is because the existence and specific character of that content are necessarily determined by the total set of actual contingent macroscopic material sensory objects (including, of course, living body-parts), events, processes, and facts (including mental events, processess, and facts) in the world. Otherwise put, the nature of this particular essentially non-conceptual content is strongly supervenient on the total set of actual contingent macoscopic material sensory objects (including living body-parts) and actual contingent events, processess, and facts (including mental events, processes, and facts) in the world. So now generalizing over any mental content whatsoever:

> A mental content *C* is material, empirical, or a posteriori if and only if the existence and specific character of *C* are strongly supervenient on the total set of actual contingent macroscopic material sensory objects (including living body-parts) and actual contingent events, processess, and facts (including experiential mental events, processes, and facts) in the world.

Contrastively, if there were to be essentially non-conceptual content that is *formal*, non- empirical, or a priori, then its nature would have to be such that fixing the total set of actual contingent macroscopic material sensory objects (including living body-parts) and actual contingent events, processes, and facts (including experiential mental events, processes, and facts) in the world did *not* thereby necessarily fix its existence or specific character. Or again generalizing over any mental content:

> A mental content *C* is formal, non-empirical, or a priori if and only if the existence and specific character of *C* are not strongly supervenient on the total relevant set of actual contingent macroscopic material sensory objects (including living body-parts) and actual contingent events, processes, and facts (including experiential mental events, processes, and facts) in the world.

It is particularly to be noted that since the supervenience base for aposteriority already *includes* fundamental biological properties and fundamental mental properties, both of which I regard as fully non-reducible and causally efficacious kinds of properties, then it

follows that the strong supervenience relation which constitutes aposteriority is not a *reductive* supervenience. Supervenience is reductive only if

(i) the modal strength of the strong supervenience relation is *logical,*
(ii) the supervenience base is *essentially and exclusively one kind* of lower-level properties or facts, and
(iii) the lower-level kind of properties or facts is *causally closed* with respect to the higher-level properties and facts. [165]

But in fact none of those necessary conditions is satisfied by the strong supervenience that characterizes aposteriority. Hence aposteriority is an asymmetric strict determination relation *without* reduction.

Granting these definitions of materiality/empiricality/aposteriority and formality/non-empiricality/apriority with respect to mental content, I now want to extend the original THA to an argument for the existence of formal, non-empirical, or a priori essentially non-conceptual content. In order to do this, I will simply pick up from where the original THA left off.

The Extended THA

(13) Now consider the *rightness* of my right hand and the *leftness* of my left hand, as represented by essentially non-conceptual content, and conceive that any other actual contingent macroscopic or sense-perceivable material object (including any living body-part), as individuated by its qualitative properties, were uniformly substituted for either one of my hands, and also that any other contingent experiential mental event, process, or fact were substituted for my experience of my hands. (From (12), and conceivability according to the LCTC.)
(14) The essentially non-conceptual representation of that object's rightness or leftness, and the non-reducible difference between it and its incongruent counterpart, would not be in any way affected by any of those conceivable uniform substitutions. (From (13), and conceivability according to The LCTC.)
(15) Therefore the essentially non-conceptual representation of rightness or leftness is non-empirical, pure, or a priori. (From (14) and the definition of formality/non-empiricality/apriority with respect to any mental content.)
(16) Therefore formal, non-empirical, or a priori essentially non-conceptual content exists. (From (1) - (15).)

According to the original THA, the content of perceptual acts or states that pick out a perceivable natural object—such as a human hand—which has an actual or possible incongruent counterpart, is essentially non-conceptual. But it is clearly and distinctly conceivable according to the LCTC, and therefore logically possible, that any perceivable natural object, and also any external part of anyone's living body, has an actual or possible

incongruent counterpart. Here we need only imagine the natural object or living body-part placed in front of a mirror in order to recognize this possibility. This also inherently carries with it the possibility of "massive reduplication,"[166] such that necessarily, for any perceivable natural object and any finite set of such objects embedded in any actual local space in our orientable spatial world, a mirror reflection of that object or set of objects and the surrounding local space in which they are embedded is always possible. So the cognitive need for essentially non-conceptual content is ubiquitous in our world, in order for us to be able to discriminate between things and their actual or possible incongruent counterparts.

The main point I am making here is NOT that actual or possible incongruent counterparts are likely to be popping up all over the place, or even popping up just often enough to become a practical nuisance. The main point I am making here is just that conceptual content is inherently incapable of doing the topologically-sensitive representational job of either adequately accounting for direct singular reference or successfully mediating and guiding the perceptual cognitions and basic intentional acts of minded animals through orientable spaces, precisely because conceptual content necessarily underdetermines the essentially non-conceptual content that actually performs these representational jobs.

Of course it is true that some perceivable natural objects are *events* or *processes* and not merely static material substances. But every such event *E* or process *P* has two possible counterparts that are exactly the same event or process, only occurring either *earlier* or *later* than *E* actually occurs, or in the *reverse order* to that in which the sequential parts of *P* occur. So I will assume for the purposes of my argument here, as Edmund Husserl persuasively argued in his famous lectures on the phenomenology of time consciousness,[167] and also in *Experience and Judgment*, that time is primitively subjectively experienced by rational human animals as asymmetric in its direction of flow:

> This lawfulness [of temporal experience] concerns *all* phenomenological data, those which are truly passive, as well as [intentional] acts of the ego which make their appearance in the stream of consciousness. *Every [intentional] act of the ego*, for example every act of simple apprehension of an object, *appears in the temporal field as a temporally self-constituting datum*… With this, we are at the *place of origin of the first so-called "logical categories."* It is true, we can only begin to speak of logical categories in the proper sense in the sphere of predicative judgment, as elements of determination which belong necessarily to the form of possible predicative judgments. But all categories and categorical forms which appear there are constructed on (*bauen sich auf*) the prepredicative [temporal] syntheses and have their origin in them.[168]

Moreover, there are good reasons provided by contemporary natural science for thinking that real natural time has thermodynamic irreversibility.[169] Assuming these to be facts, we can then easily recognize how the earlier possible counterpart event *E*earlier is

the precise temporal analogue of one of my hands and the later possible counterpart event *Elater* is the precise temporal analogue of the incongruent counterpart of that hand. But, in real natural time as perceived by us, just which of the counterparts is earlier than *E* and just which is later than *E*, such that I could uniquely identify it as *happening before E* or as *happening after E*, cannot be determined by descriptive means alone—for example, I could not, even in principle, convey this to someone by means of language over the telephone, even assuming that all the previous-acquaintance conditions and ceteris paribus conditions of conceptual understanding and telephone usage had already been met. Similarly, with suitable appropriate changes made for differences between the cases, we can easily see how a process $P_{forward}$ that runs forward from its inception to its terminus, and its exact counterpart process $P_{backward}$ that runs backward from its terminus to its inception (think, for example, of time-lapse photography of a flower blossoming, and then imagine the film run in reverse back into its seed), are *thermodynamic process enantiomorphs* of one another, and therefore subject to the very set of same representability-facts that I rehearsed in The THA.

Therefore, all contentful mental states directed at actual or possible sense-perceivable natural things, whether they are representations of static material objects or facts, or whether they are representations of living body parts or natural events or processes occurring outside or within my own living body, must have essentially non-conceptual content. Generalizing now, we can see that essentially non-conceptual content is mental content that is inherently sensitive to the egocentrically-centered orientation, intrinsic topology, intrinsic thermodynamically irreversible temporality, and causal activities of actual macroscopic material objects, facts, events, processes, and living body-parts, and of actual essentially embodied minded animal subjects themselves in their perception of any distal natural object, fact, event, or process, or any part of their own living bodies, to the extent that it has an actual or possible incongruent counterpart. In turn, this generalization also enables me to generalize The Extended THA as follows.

The Generalized Extended THA

(17) Any conceivable actual or possible relevant variation of the monadic or qualitative properties of any contingent macroscopic material sense-perceivable object, fact, event, process, or living body-part that is represented by an essentially non-conceptual content, leaves the formal representation of its orientable spatial, irreversible temporal, or asymmetric thermodynamical properties unaffected. (From (16), and conceivability according to the LCTC.)

(18) Therefore, any essentially non-conceptual formal representation of an orientable spatial property, or irreversible temporal property, or asymmetric thermodynamical property of any contingent macroscopic material sense-perceivable object, fact, event, process, or living body-part is pure, non-empirical or a priori. (From (1) – (17), and the definition of formality/non-empiricality/apriority with respect to mental contents.)

If all this is correct, then it leads to an even more profound consequence of The THA. Because *only* essentially non-conceptual content—whether it be material/empirical/a posteriori, or formal/non-empirical/a priori—can accurately and therefore adequately represent the unique location, movement, change, and causal activities of actual contingent macroscopic material sense-perceivable objects, facts, events, processes, and living body-parts, of other essentially embodied minded animal cognitive and practical subjects, and of the essentially embodied subject herself and her living body-parts from the subject's own unique spatial and temporal standpoint, it then seems clearly true that *only* essentially non-conceptual content is structurally and functionally suited to the finegrained and hyper-finegrained sensorimotor control of the living body in human and non-human cognition and basic intentional action.

For example, it seems clearly true that only essentially non-conceptual content is structurally and functionally suited to mediate my ability to get my key quickly and smoothly out of my pocket and directly into the keyhole of the front door of my house—even in the dark. More specifically, essentially non-conceptual content inherently involves what Adrian Cussins calls "basic spatial and temporal tracking and discriminatory skills which are required to find our way around the environment," what Shaun Gallagher calls "body schemas," and what Noë calls —sensorimotor knowledge."[170] Indeed, there is now an impressively large amount of compelling empirical research which directly supports the thesis that sensorimotor activity in embodied cognition and intentional body movement is inherently pre- reflective, non-propositional, non-epistemic, and situated—in a word, essentially non-conceptual.

The fundamental point I am emphasizing here is that according to Kantian Non-Conceptualism, the primary psychological function of essentially non-conceptual perceptual content is uniquely and (more or less) accurately to locate and track

> either (i) causally efficacious, practically relevant or even usable, static or dynamic actual macroscopic material objects, facts, events, processes, or living body-parts, or other minded animal cognitive and practical subjects, that exist in the local or distal natural environment of the minded animal cognizer and practical intentional agent (*environmental location and tracking*),
> or (ii) the minded animal cognizer and practical intentional agent herself (*reflexive location and tracking*),

in their egocentrically-centered intrinsically spatiotemporal contexts, for the various normatively-governed purposes of cognition and practical agency.

But what ultimately *unifies* these capacities? I think that the answer to this question is delivered to us by the distinctively Kantian idea, developed in the Transcendental Aesthetic, that the representation of space and the representation of time are *necessary a priori subjective forms of sensibility*.[171] Obviously, I have already spelled out an

independent argument for the apriority of the representations of space and time in The Generalized Extended THA. So now the argument for their *phenomenological necessity*, and indeed for the phenomenological necessity of the essentially non-conceptual formal representation of any orientable spatial property or irreversible temporal property or asymmetric dynamical property of any contingent macroscopic material sense- perceivable object, fact, event, process, or living body-part, follows smoothly from the conclusion of The Generalized Extended THA:

The Generalized Extended THA + Phenomenological Necessity

(19) It is conceivable and thus possible tpo form any essentially non-conceptual formal representation of an orientable spatial property or asymmetric temporal property or irreversible thermodynamic property of any contingent macroscopic material sense-perceivable object, fact, event, process, or living body-part. (From (18), and conceivability according to the LCTC.)

(20) It is conceivable and thius possible that this essentially non-conceptual formal representation be removed from the essentially non-conceptual material representation of any contingent macroscopic material sense-perceivable object, fact, event, process, or living body-part. (From (19), and conceivability according to The LCTC.)

(21) It is then inconceivable and thus impossible that the essentially non-conceptual material representation of that contingent macroscopic material sense-perceivable object, fact, event, process, or living body-part would still exist. (From (20), and inconceivability according to The LCTC.)

(22) Therefore the essentially non-conceptual formal representation of an orientable spatial property or asymmetric temporal property or irreversible thermodynamic property of any contingent macroscopic material sense-perceivable object, fact, event, process, or living body-part is not only non-empirical/pure/a priori, but also phenomenologically necessary. (From (1) – (21).)

Here we must remember that for Kant the domain of sensibility or *Sinnlichkeit* includes not just sense perception, but also phenomenal consciousness or "inner sense," the imagination, pleasure and pain, and desire. So what I am saying is that we should think of the representation of space and the representation of time as necessary a priori subjective forms of essentially embodied, egocentrically-centered, conscious, intentional, caring rational human agency and non-rational or non-human animal intentional agency alike. For me, even if not explicitly for Kant himself, the representations of space and time do not in fact *exhaust* the set of necessary a priori subjective forms of animal sensibility. As I argue elsewhere in detail,[172] the representation of *biological life* is also a necessary a priori subjective form of sensibility, and so is the representation of *self-organizing complex thermodynamic systems* more generally. Even so, both the representations of biological life and of self-organizing thermodynamics still presuppose the representations of space and time.

Essentially non-conceptual content is either directly referentially accurate or else (to some degree) directly referentially inaccurate, and as I have claimed, also inherently poised for guiding and mediating the cognitive and practical intentionality of minded animals. Thus essentially non-conceptual content is inherently normative and practical. But in specifically *rational* and specifically *human* animals, or real human persons, essentially non-conceptual content is also inherently poised for use in logical cognition (including belief, judgment, inference, and theory-construction) and in self-conscious, deliberative, and morally responsible action. Therefore in rational human animals or real human persons, essentially non-conceptual content is inherently *proto-rationally* normative.

### Deep consciousness, blindsight, and batsight

I think there is a profound and also ironically apt connection between Kant's notion of "blind intuitions," interpreted in terms of The Blind Intuitions Thesis, aka Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism, and recent or contemporary work in cognitive psychology on the highly puzzling phenomenon of *blindsight*, in which subjects who report blindness in at least some parts of their their visual fields are also able to track the position and movement of objects in those blind parts of their visual fields at statistically much higher rates than would be consistent with mere guessing or uninformed hunches. According to the revisonist interpretation that I want to defend, the phenomenon of blindsight is most correctly interpreted as a pre-reflective, essentially embodied, essentially non-conceptual kind of *seeing*. I will call this The Revisionist Blindsight Thesis. If The Revisionist Blindsight Thesis is correct, then it also entails what I call The Deep Consciousness Thesis, which says that necessarily, every mental state whatsoever is conscious to some non-trivial degree or extent, even if only in a *pre*-reflective and *first*- order way, and not in a *self*-reflective, *self*-conscious, or *higher*-order way.

Now I will offer arguments for both of these theses, taking the second one first. Then I will use both of these theses as premises in order to argue for a third and final thesis—The Batsight Thesis.

Assuming that Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism is correct, here is another extremely important implication of The THA. This is that basic levels of mental activity and representation generally assumed to belong to "the cognitive unconscious"[173] are in fact *essentially non-conceptually conscious*. Otherwise put, on my view consciousness goes all the way down to the sensorimotor ground floor of cognitive and practical agency, via the vital cord of essentially non-conceptual content. This is what I call *The Deep Consciousness Thesis*. More precisely, however, The Deep Consciousness Thesis says this:

> Necessarily, whenever a creature with a consciousness like ours is in any sort of mental
> state, then it is also occurrently conscious in some definite way, even if only minimally. So

occurrent consciousness like ours penetrates into every aspect of our mental lives, including so-called "non-conscious" or "sub-personal" information processing.

If The Deep Consciousness Thesis is true, then this provides the beginnings of a solution to what Ray Jackendoff aptly calls *The Mind-Mind Problem*, which is how it is ever possible for there be genuine two-way causal or semantic interaction across the theoretical and normative gap between the Conscious Mind (or first-personal information processing) and the Computational Mind (or so-called "non-conscious" or "sub-personal" information processing).[174] The Kantian non-conceptualist solution to The Mind-Mind Problem, along with The Deep Consciousness Thesis, is that so-called non-conscious or *sub-personal* mental processing is still in fact inherently *first-personal*, conscious, proto- rational mental processing, even though it is essentially non-conceptual, pre-reflective, and non-self-conscious.[175] And since, as I am assuming, essentially non-conceptual content is inherently proto-rationally normative in rational human animals or real human persons fundamentally understood as cognitive and practical agents, then it follows that sensorimotor cognition and action in us is *also* inherently proto-rationally normative.

The Deep Consciousness Thesis, like other parts of my view, may initially seem shockingly radical and unorthodox. But properly understood, it is much less shocking than it might seem. One fundamental source of philosophical confusion in this area is that the very idea of a consciousness like ours, or "the first-personal," is deeply ambiguous as between

(1) self-consciousness or self-reflection,

which is the ability of a rational animal to have conscious propositional/conceptual meta-representational states, or self-describing conscious thoughts about itself, and what Evan Thompson aptly calls

(2) sensorimotor subjectivity,[176]

which is the more primitive and pre-reflective ability of rational (and also non-rational minded human or non-human) animals to have what Nagel also aptly calls a "single point of view."[177] In turn, I hold, this pre-reflective ability of a rational (or non-rational minded human or non-human) animal to have a single point of view is grounded in egocentrically-centered essential embodiment, and what I call *primitive bodily awareness*, which includes proprioception (the sense of the relative positioning of one's own body parts and limbs, at rest or in movement), kinaesthesia (the sense of bodily movement), the senses of orientation and balance (as intrinsic aspects of proprioception or kinaesthesia), bodily pleasures and pains, tickles and itches, the feeling of pressure, the feeling of temperature, the feelings of vitality or lethargy, and so-on.

It is important to note here not only that consciousness in this pre-reflective or sensorimotor- subjective sense necessarily includes *phenomenal character*, or Nagel's "subjective character of experience"—

> [F]undamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to *be* that organism—something it is like *for* the organism. We may call this the subjective character of experience.[178]

—but also that the non-reducible, non-dualist, non-supervenient fact of consciousness in minded human or non-human animals is far from being either captured or exhausted by phenomenal character.[179] On the contrary, according to the doctrine of consciousness developed by Maiese and me in *Embodied Minds in Action*, the psychological facts of point-of-view and primitive bodily awareness, whether taken separately or together, are massively richer psychological facts than that of mere phenomenal character, given their necessary involvement with spatial facts, temporal facts, biological facts, and complex thermodynamic facts more generally. It is equally important to note here that on my view even the notion of phenomenal character is *not* the same as the classical notion of *qualia*—indeed, on my view, which I share with other qualia-eliminativists, there simply are no such things as qualia.[180]

The really key point in the present context, however, is that self-consciousness or self-reflection requires sensorimotor subjectivity or pre-reflective consciousness, but sensorimotor subjectivity or pre-reflective consciousness does not require self-consciousness or self-reflection. For example, at least some non-human minded animals—for example, Nagel's bat—and all normal human infants have sensorimotor-subjective or pre-reflectively conscious states that are not also self-conscious or self-reflective.

Again, and despite the fact that I am a rational, self-conscious, and self-reflective animal, nevertheless, when I am skillfully driving my car and drinking hot coffee without spilling it, but also thinking intensely about philosophy, the conscious acts or states that skillfully control my driving and my coffee-drinking are sensorimotor-subjective or pre-reflectively conscious but not in any way self-conscious or self-reflective. If they were, then I would most probably spill the hot coffee all over myself, and drive off the road into the ditch. Since, presumably, everyone would agree that normal human infants and at least some non- human animals are conscious animals but not also self-conscious or self-reflective animals, and also that it is possible for rational, self-conscious, self-reflective animals like us skillfully to drive a car and at the same time drink hot coffee consciously and pre-reflectively but not self-consciously or self-reflectively, then at least implicitly everyone already concedes a distinction between sensorimotor subjectivity and meta-representational, self-conscious or self-reflective subjectivity. Hence it is not so very shocking after all for me to hold that all mental states, even "tacit" computational information processing states, are also occurrently conscious. All I am saying is that even

"tacit" computational information processing involves sensorimotor subjectivity, or pre-reflective consciousness, but *not* meta-representational, self-conscious or self-reflective subjectivity.

Sensorimotor subjectivity or pre-reflective consciousness is also an *essentially non-conceptual* consciousness, precisely because all sensorimotor-subjective, pre-reflectively conscious acts or states contain essentially non-conceptual information that necessarily includes direct singular reference, and which inherently guides and mediates them in their directedness to their intentional targets. By contrast, as Kant explicitly held in the Transcendental Analytic, self-consciousness or self-reflection is *a conceptual/propositional consciousness*, precisely because the capacity for self-consciousness or self-reflection is a subject's ability to make reflexive, reflective, meta-representational judgments about one's own mental acts and states, and thereby to possess (even if only in the weakest sense of concept-possession) a concept of oneself, by way of those self-directed judgments.

If we were sufficiently careful about the distinction between sensorimotor subjectivity or pre-reflective consciousness on the one hand, and self-consciousness or self-reflection on the other, then I think that the deeply puzzling and much-discussed phenomenon of *blindsight*—in which some brain-damaged subjects who introspectively report an inability to see are also able to point with some accuracy to objects in the self-professedly blind parts of their visual fields[181]—could be explained. For we can then say that not only the roughgrained sensorimotor ability manifest in actual blindsight, but also the finegrained or hyper-finegrained—respectively, in the thought-experimental cases of what Ned Block calls "superblindsight" and "superduperblindsight"[182]—sensorimotor connection between what blindsighters perceive in space, and their ability to point to it, discriminate it, or track it, is guided and mediated by the information carried by or contained in sensorimotor-subjective or pre-reflectively conscious vision, even though they lack self-conscious or self-reflective vision for that cognitive and practical task.

Otherwise put, I am proposing that in blindsight the frontline information-processing mechanisms of the eyes and related areas of the wider brain-body system (whose neural operations are, perhaps, localized in the parietal lobe) are relevantly and relatively undamaged and continue to transmit sensorimotor-subjective or pre-reflectively conscious visual information, even though the corresponding downstream mechanisms for processing self-conscious or self-reflective visual information (whose neural operations are, perhaps, localized in the temporal lobe) have broken down. Blindsighters, after all, *have their eyes open and are working under well-lit conditions*. Blindsighters would then be best and most coherently characterized as "sighted" in *one* sense of conscious vision, but also as "blind" in *another* sense of conscious vision, instead of being paradoxically characterized as being both "blind" and "sighted" in the *same* sense of conscious vision.

If that proposal is correct, then blindsighters subjectively experience self-conscious or self-reflective blindness via the more sophisticated "what"-sensitive downstream processing

mechanisms of the brain-body system, but also subjectively experience sensorimotor-subjective, pre-reflectively conscious sight via the simpler "where"-sensitive processing mechanisms of the eyes and related parts of the brain-body system. Blindsighted subjective experience, presumably, has its own unique sort of phenomenal character and thus its own unique "something it is like to be *for* the organism." Otherwise put, presumably, blindsight is a determinate kind of conscious perceptual experience, just as ordinary seeing is a determinate kind of conscious perceptual experience. The blindsighted person obviously is not unconscious, and therefore (it seems to me) obviously is consciously feeling and doing something in a determinately specific way when she "blindsees" an object.

Furthermore, the notion of a divided consciousness is already theoretically familiar from well-known experiments involving divided attention tasks and the dissociated cognitive abilities of neo-commissurotomy patients, and functionally similar agnosias. Most importantly for my purposes, there are the well-known Milner and Goodale data in favor of the hypothesis that there are two relatively distinct visual pathways of information processing, the *ventral stream* and the *dorsal* stream. The ventral stream is localized in the temporal lobe and supports so-called ─conscious‖—or as I would say, in correction of that crucially ambiguous term, *self-conscious* or *self-reflective*—visual perception. And the dorsal stream is localized in the parietal lobe and supports so-called "non-conscious"—or as I would say, in correction of that crucial misnomer, *nonself-consciously conscious* or *pre-reflectively conscious*—visual perception.[183] So what I am saying is that in blindsight the ventral stream, as the support for *one* kind of conscious vision, is significantly compromised, while the dorsal stream, as the support for the *other* kind of conscious vision, remains uncompromised.

This way of thinking about blindsight, in turn, would neatly avoid the further and even deeper paradox that in blindsight a brute, non-conscious, non-unified, purposeless mental processing somehow exerts roughgrained, finegrained, or hyper-finegrained control over our essentially embodied cognitive and practical intentional agency. If this were true, then blindsighters would be nothing but natural automata with respect to their blindseeing activities. But it seems to me more than just implausible to hold that blindsighted people are nothing but naturally mechanized puppets or robots in the blind areas of their self-conscious or self-reflective visual fields, but *otherwise* really free agents. On the contrary, it seems clear to me that blindsighted people are genuinely visually conscious in those areas, and also genuinely choose and act with *deep freedom of the will* under the relevant experimental conditions, such that they are *ultimate sources* of their own intentional body movements, which are thereby *up-to-them*, and such that they are also causally and morally *responsible* for their movements. The scientists in blindsight experiments are certainly not *overwhelming manipulators* like, for example, the evil cognitive scientist in *The Manchurian Candidate*.[184] Therefore, our intuitive, smooth attribution of responsibility-for-their-movements to the blindsighted subjects is good prima facie evidence *against* their being nothing but naturally mechanized puppets or robots in the blind areas of their self-

conscious or self-reflective visual fields, hence also good evidence *against* their being non-conscious cognizers in that domain.

Nevertheless, both blindsighted conscious experience and also blindsighted choosing and doing, occur in a way that is in some determinate respects sharply and intrinsically phenomenologically, semantically, and biologically/neurobiologically different from the visual consciousness and intentional visual activity of normal self-consciously or self-reflectively sighted people. So blindsighters have a sensorimotor-subjective or pre-reflective visual consciousness that is just like those of ordinary self-consciously or self-reflectively sighted people, but at the same time blindsighters simply differ determinately, specifically, and sharply from ordinary sighted people at the cognitive and practical level that is inherently guided and mediated by *conceptual* content. No one doubts that, other things being equal, blindsighters are operating normally as rational human agents during the course of the experiments. All I am saying is that blindsighters are rational human agents *all the way down*. Their higher-level self-conscious cognitive activity and their lower-level blindsighted cognitive activity are *not* two essentially separate processes—one causally closed inherently ghostly and immaterial process (pure rationality), and another causally closed inherently mechanical and material process (pure animality), as the Cartesian Substance Dualist picture implies. Rational animals are BOTH rational AND animal all the way through, and all the way down. Or in other words, and *specifically* with respect to their essentially non-conceptual blindseeing abilities, blindsighters are rational human animals *too*.

In this way, in blindsight, what Kant would have called "intuitions" or *Anschauungen* are literally blind in the self-conscious or self-reflective sense (the subject believes herself to be blind), yet intrinsically involve a sensorimotor subjectivity or pre-reflective consciousness in "inner sense" and are also directly referential conscious mental representations. The blindsighted subject authentically *blindsees* the world in a sensorimotor-subjective or pre-reflectively conscious and essentially non-conceptual sense, but also authentically *fails to see* the world in a self-conscious or self-reflective, thought-based, and conceptual sense. By an illuminatingly subtle comparison and contrast, while Nagel's bat is also blind, and therefore also fails to see, in a self-conscious or self-reflective sense, nevertheless the bat also has a sensorimotor subjectivity or pre- reflective consciousness (although neither, of course, a specifically human consciousness, nor a specifically rational consciousness), and also is capable of directly referential cognition and non-rational forms of intentional action, and therefore it also authentically *batsees the world*, via echolocation, in a sensorimotor or pre-reflectively conscious sense. I now want briefly to spell out and defend this thesis, which is even more philosophically important, and perhaps, correspondingly, even more philosophically shocking, than The Revisionist Blindsight Thesis.

In "What Is It Like To Be A Bat?," Nagel argued that unusual non-human animal perceivers like bats have subjective experiences and are therefore conscious, but their

consciousness contains phenomenal characters that cannot be adequately conceptually understood by us. I will call this *Nagel's Mental-Mental Gap Thesis*. I strongly agree with it.

But Nagel's Mental-Mental Gap Thesis is about the failure of *conceptual* understanding of non-human animal consciousness, *not* about the failure of understanding non-human animal consciousness as such. Hence even assuming that Nagel's Mental-Mental Gap Thesis is true, it remains possible for us to understand not only the consciousness but also the conscious intentional contents of non-human animals by means of a *simulationist* procedure involving pre-reflective, essentially embodied, essentially non-conceptual, immanently reflexive, first-order phenomenally conscious, veridical *emotional awareness*. I will call this *The Empathic Mirroring Thesis*.

Now if we conjoin The Blind Intuitions Thesis, The Revisionist Blindsight Thesis, The Deep Consciousness Thesis, Nagel's The Mental-Mental Gap Thesis, and The Empathic Mirroring Thesis, then we cannot correctly take normal *bat* blindness to be conceptually equivalent to the pathological phenomenon of *human* blindness, and it follows that normal bats, although being *really blind* in one intelligible and legitimate sense of that notion, also in fact *really see* in a pre-reflective, essentially embodied, essentially non-conceptual way, even despite the fact that normal bat sight occurs via *sonar* and not via *vision*. From this it follows directly that The Batsight Thesis is true.

In this connection, quite well-documented empirical evidence about *neural plasticity*, which shows that in blind humans conscious or subjectively-experienced uses of "Tactile-Visual Substitution Systems" (TVSS) are not only possible but also sometime actually occur[185] strongly suggests that in normal bats, for whatever evolutionary reasons, conscious or subjectively-experienced *Auditory*-Visual Substitution Systems have naturally emerged as standard sense perceptual capacities or modules. Thus blindsighters, normal bats, and blind humans using TVSS *are not so very alien to one another after all*.

### Facing up to our non-human animal "other"

Non-human minded animals are at once deeply familiar to us, yet, when presented to us, for example, as bats, rats, lizards, snakes, spiders, insects, sharks, giant squids, lions, tigers, or grizzly bears, they become deeply strange and menacing, concrete manifestations of the *horror mundi*, our abyss-confronting terror in the face of the external or physical world. This is a horror also invoked, for example, by caves and precipices. But non-human minded animals are the *original* "Other" in the existential sense, the snake meeting up face-to-face with Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, or the mesmerizing cobra that kills the innocent little boy Bogie in Jean Renoir's brilliant 1951 film, *The River*.

In the 19th century, Herman Melville's philosophico-literary masterpiece, *Moby Dick*, fully exploits this most amazing and deeply disturbing phenomenon of non-human animal Otherness. The terrifying white whale, Moby Dick, is the *Ding an sich* that Ahab cannot

either live with or live without. And in Franz Kafka's "The Metamorphosis," Gregor Samsa becomes *his own* terrifying non-human minded animal Other, a giant dung beetle. The creators of *The Wizard of Oz* discovered the terrifying potential of crossing monkeys with bats, and gave an entire generation of children, many of them now in their 80s, nightmares they still shiver to remember. And Hitchcock did the same thing with ordinary birds, for people now in their 50s and 60s. Comparatively speaking, Spielberg had an easy time of it in *Jaws*, terrifying the child-versions of the "millennials," people now in their 30s, drawing directly on Melville's *Moby Dick* and Louis Malle's *The Silent World*.

20th century Analytic philosophers finally began to recognize the phenomenon of non-human animal Otherness too, in the early 1970s, when Nagel, then at Rockefeller University, started talking to Donald Griffin, the pioneering cognitive ethologist. A few years later, Nagel, in the manner of all real philosophers, creatively connected his stimulating conversations with Griffin to his own thoughts about existential issues and to contemporary work in the philosophy of mind, and wrote "What Is It Like To Be A Bat?"

Bats are strange, fascinating, and in an existential sense—like Moby Dick, and Kafka's giant dung beetle, not to mention rats, lizards, snakes, sharks, giant squids, spiders, insects, lions, tigers, and grizzly bears—truly terrifying creatures. It is no wonder, then, that so many people have obsessions with or phobias about at least some of them: the self-same existential terror, the *horror mundi*, thereby manifesting itself in seemingly opposite violent emotions. In any case, we are all dimly or thrillingly aware of our existential terror about bats when viewing their visual representations in popular culture, all the way from vampyre-style horror movies to the Batman comics and movies, especially including the brooding Dark Knight series. But anyone who has ever felt a bat swoop close by at night, or has seen, in the light of day, the staring, shiny black, alien eyes, dracula-like fangs, tessellated ears, and convulsively collapsing wings of a frightened, trapped bat, knows what I talking about not just visually, but in the backs of their throats and in the pits of their stomachs. So Nagel chose his paradigmatic non-human minded animal exceptionally well.

If what I have argued so far in this section is correct, then as a consequence of it, philosophers of mind, cognitive psychologists, cognitive neuroscientists, medical neurologists, cognitive ethologists, and ordinary reflective non-scientific folk alike need to start thinking philosophically about non-human animal minds, and also about our cognitive, affective, and even moral relationship to non-human animal perceivers, in a radically different way. According to this new way of looking at the human/non-human relationship, the minds of non-human animal perceivers are at once

(1) *conceptually incommensurable* with our minds, in relation to our self-conscious awareness of the phenomenal characters of their perceptual states, via our necessarily failed attempts to form a correct Theory of Mind about them, and yet also

(2) *non-conceptually commensurable* with our minds, in relation to our pre-reflective, essentially embodied, essentially non-conceptual, immanently reflexive, first-order phenomenally conscious, veridical awareness of the phenomenal characters and intentional

contents of their conscious perceptual states, via our affect-based and emotion-based simulationist practices of Empathic Mirroring.

Or in other and simpler words, in our cognitive, affective, and moral encounters with non-human animal perceivers, we find that they are at once fundamentally *alien* forms of life (as regards our conceptual awareness of them), and yet also fundamentally *non-alien* forms of life (as regards our essentially non-conceptual awareness of them).

This radically mixed or striated and contemporary Kantian way of thinking philosophically about human and non-human animal perceivers and their relationship to one another comports very well with Tyler Burge's massive study in the philosophy of perception, *Origins of Objectivity*,[186] and also with Weiskrantz's classic study *Blindsight*, as well as with other specialized or more popular studies on the cognitive neuroscience, medical neurology, or phenomenology of *human blindness*, related *visual agnosias*, and *neural plasticity*,[187] and cognitive-ethological studies on *bat perception* too.

But what, more precisely, is the difference between human minded animals and non-human minded animals? The most salient difference is that, other things being equal, we are all either occurrently or potentially *real persons*, and again other things being equal, at least some of them, indeed most of them, are *non-persons*.

This brings me to the explicit metaphysical analysis of the concept and fact of a real person. According to The Minded Animalism Theory of personhood and personal identity that I work out and defend in *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, chapters 6-7, necessarily all real persons are minded animals, but not all minded animals are real persons. Furthermore, necessarily every real person is also a living organism belonging to some species or another,[188] but not every living organism within a species is a minded animal,

Now all sentient animals are fully minded animals, and conversely. But the notion of a minded animal is not *precisely* the same as the notion of a sentient animal, in that some minded animals are not, strictly speaking, *fully* minded animals. Fully minded animals are animals capable of consciousness. Consciousness, in turn, is the subjective experience of a suitably neurobiologically complex *S*-type animal, namely, a living organism within a species. Consciousness is "subjective" because it necessarily includes an ego or first person along with a capacity (whether merely first-order or also higher-order) for oriented reflexivity or self-awareness in space and time. I call this first necessary component of consciousness *egocentric centering*. So the subjective aspect of consciousness is that it is *egocentrically centered*.

Consciousness is also "experience," however, because it necessarily includes both representational content ("intentional content") as well as primitive bodily awareness and other sensations, emotions, feelings, and affects—particularly desires, and pleasure or pain—along with their specific phenomenal content ("phenomenal character"). I will call this second necessary component of consciousness *contentfulnes*s, where this notion is

broad enough to include both intentional content and phenomenal character. So the experiential aspect of consciousness is that it is *filled with content*.

In this way, fully minded animals—namely, sentient animals—are subjectively experiencing animals, animals with egocentric centering and contentfulness, hence animals capable of consciousness. For many theoretical purposes, the notions of consciousness, subjectivity, experience, and sentience can all be treated as necessarily equivalent. But as I have defined these notions, experience is not *precisely* the same as consciousness, since it seems clear enough that not every living creature capable of having experiences of some sort or another is also capable of having specifically *subjective* experiences, egocentrically-centered episodes with representational content and phenomenal character.[189] For example, it is plausible to hold that "simple minded" creatures like cephalopods, fish, insects, reptiles, and other non-vertebrates have at least proto-sentience, that is, a capacity for experiential, contentful, episodes of some minimal sort, yet lack egocentrically-centered mental acts or states.

By the "proto-sentience" of a "simple minded" animal, then, I mean a living creature's non-mechanical responsiveness to external stimuli, together with some proprioceptive capacity, some capacity to have desires, and some capacity to feel pleasure and pain. Although they clearly have proto-sentience, nevertheless cephalopods (for example, octopuses), fish (for example, salmon), insects (for example, mosquitoes), reptiles (for example, snakes), and other non-vertebrates all just as clearly lack the capacity for consciousness—unlike bats, bears, birds, cats, cows, dogs, horses, lions, mice, sheep, and wolves, who just as clearly have a capacity for consciousness and thereby share with us one of our constitutively necessary psychological capacities, "sentience full-stop," as it were.

In this way, proto-sentient, simple minded animals like cephalopods, fish, insects, reptiles, and other invertebrates are certainly *neither non-minded animals*—like, for example, amoebas, human zygotes, human infants with anencephaly, or human adults in a persistent vegetative state—*nor zombies in the philosophical sense*.[190] But at the same time the proto-sentient, simple minded animals are also *not*, strictly speaking, conscious, sentient, or fully minded. They also possess the minimal rudiments of minded animal agency, and thereby are proto-agents, capable of carrying out non-determined, non-indeterministic, non-mechanized, teleologically-driven, spontaneous, actively guided intentional body movements.[191]

Now according to The Deep Consciousness Thesis,[192] *any* sort of mentality or mindedness whatsoever includes at least a minimal degree of occurrent consciousness, which in turn entails at least a minimal degree of occurrent sentience. Therefore proto-sentient, simple minded animals are capable of *some sort of experience*, although they are *not* capable of subjective experience per se. Otherwise put, they have *some* psychological abilities or dispositions that effectively operate when appropriately triggered, which collectively do indeed add up to some kind of animal mindedness, although they do *not*

have the capacity for consciousness, or for any other capacity grounded on the capacity for consciousness, per se. A fascinating example is the octopus, a simple minded animal whose proto-sentient mind is almost *literally* spread out all over its body—insofar as its body is almost entirely *arms*, and the majority of the neurons in its body exist outside its brain.[193]

This distinction between simple minded animals and fully minded animals, and correspondingly, the distinctions between proto-sentience and sentience, and between proto-agency and agency, are all directly relevant to the distinction between non-persons and real persons, because they collectively tell us something crucial about the relation between non-persons and moral value. Real persons, as we know, are primary subjects of dignity and primary targets of respect. Sentient, fully minded non-person non-human animals are primary subjects of moral value and targets of moral concern—for example, bats, bears, birds, cats, cows, dogs, horses, lions, mice, sheep, and wolves. But the scope of moral value and moral concern also extends somewhat *beyond* sentient or fully-minded non-person non-human animals to proto-sentient, simple minded non-human animals—for example, cephalopods, fish, insects, reptiles, and other invertebrates. Proto-sentient, simple minded non-person non-human animals are all at the very least *experiencers* of moral value and targets of moral concern. In other words, even proto-sentience and simple mindedness in animals still matters morally, beyond the limits of real personhood and the capacity for consciousness.

Minded animals, as I have said, are conscious, intentional, caring living organisms. Now minded animals are always animals within some real species *S* or another, hence *S*-type (say, human, or feline, or canine, or equine, etc.) animals.

Within the human species—and also within a few non-human animals species—many or even most of the animals within that species can also become real persons within that species. The beginning of a real person's life for a given *S*-type animal is what I call the *neo-personhood* of that animal.[194] In the human species, as far as we currently know, the capacity for consciousness first manifests itself in normal fetuses between 25 and 32 weeks after conception or fertilization, hence roughly at the beginning of the third trimester.[195] My view is that this is when your very own life started—when you became a human neo-person. Prior to that, there also existed a living human animal that also eventually became you, but it was not yet you.

This distinction between *animals within a species S* on the one hand, and either *neo-persons* or *actualized real persons within a species S* on the other hand, is a deeply important difference, both metaphysically and morally. This can be seen in at two ways, with specific application to humans.

First, normal human fetuses before the emergence of consciousness at 25-32 weeks after conception or fertilization, are human animals *but not* real human persons, whether neo-persons or actualized real persons.

Second, anencephalic human infants[196] are human animals, but neither human neo-persons nor actualized real human persons. Obviously these two claims, if true, will have serious implications for the morality of abortion and infanticide.[197]

According to the view I call *Minded Animalism*, then, every real person is also an *S*-type animal, but not conversely. Therefore, being an *S*-type animal is a necessary although not a sufficient condition of real personhood. The rest of my metaphysical analysis substantively borrows from two different sources:

(i) Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical-desire theory of persons, and
(ii) Kant's rationality-based theory of persons.

As I just indicated, and perhaps at first unintuitively, Frankfurt's theory of persons is based on the notion of a desire. The fundamental connection here is that for Frankfurt, a person is essentially identified with the constitution of her will, which in turn is a set of desires immanently structured by the capacities for rationality and free agency, and inherently governed by the norm of "decisive identification wth effective first-order desires," that is, by the norm of authenticity or wholeheartedness. In a nutshell, that is my view of real persons too, although with a more explicitly and robustly Kantian twist, or rather, set of Kantian twists.

On my view a desire is a felt need for something, or a conscious going-for something. This is as opposed to an *actual* need for something—obviously not all felt needs are actual needs—and also as opposed to a mere pro-attitude towards something, a mere preference for something, or a mere wish for something. Frankfurt himself defines the notion of a desire somewhat more broadly, so as to include all pro-attitudes, preferences, and wishes; but in the present context, it is convenient to use my narrower and more conative notion of a desire. Desires in this sense are essentially equivalent with active, committed wants. So to desire *X* is actively and committedly to want *X*; and to desire to *X* is actively and committedly to want to *X*.

According to Frankfurt, some animals have not only what he calls *first-order desires*, which are ordinary direct desires for things, events, or real persons (for example, the infant wanting her mother), but also *effective first-order desires*. Effective first-order desires are desires that move (or will move, or would move) the minded animal all the way to action. An effective first-order desire is the same as a minded animal's *will* or *first-order volition*. First-order desires may or may not be accompanied by *second-order desires*: to want (not) to want *X*, or to want (not) to want to *X*. If so, then some of the second-order desires may be directed to the determination of precisely which first-order desire is to be the effective first-order desire, i.e., the minded animal's will and first-order volition; and such desires are *second-order volitions*.

Again according to Frankfurt, whatever the order-level of desires or volitions, they can be either conscious or non-conscious. For the purposes of my discussion, however, I will

concentrate exclusively on conscious desires and volitions. This is in part because I think that there is no such thing as a mental state, whether dispositional or occurrent, that is strictly non-conscious and not to some non-trivial degree occurrently conscious. This is The Deep Consciousness Thesis again. But in any case, and according to Frankfurt, all and only persons have second-order volitions, because all and only persons care about the precise constitution of their wills. By contrast to persons, creatures that are "wantons" have effective first-order desires, but they either lack second-order desires (hence they cannot care about the precise constitution of their wills because they lack self-conscious desires) or if they have second-order desires they nevertheless lack second-order volitions (hence even though they have self-conscious desires, they still cannot care about the precise constitution of their wills). Again, according to Frankfurt, all non-human animals, all human infants, and some human adults are wantons. Finally, for Frankfurt a person has freedom of the will if and only if she can determine, by means of a second-order volition, precisely which among her first-order desires is the effective one. This is also known as *identification* or *decisive identification*;[198] otherwise persons have unfreedom of the will. Wantons have neither freedom of the will nor unfreedom of the will, simply because they are not persons.

As I said above, I accept much of what Frankfurt has to say about persons and their wills, and correspondingly I want to apply much of what he says to *real* persons and *their* wills. Nevertheless, I also have substantive disagreements with him on two mid-sized (as opposed to either major or minor) points.

My first mid-sized point of substantive disagreement is that I doubt that Frankfurt's notion of personhood adequately captures the breadth or depth of my contemporary Kantian notion of real personhood, according to which some real persons have what I will call *higher-level or Kantian rationality*. This, in turn, is an innate complex capacity for strict-norm-guided logical or practical reasoning, for reflective self-consciousness, for autonomy or self-legislation, for authenticity or wholeheartedness, and for moral responsibility. A minded animal that also has higher-level or Kantian rationality can recognize necessary truths, judge or believe with a priori certainty, and choose or act wholeheartedly in accordance with desire-overriding non-instrumental, non-selfish, non-egoistic or non-self-interested, non-hedonistic, non-consequentialist, categorically normative reasons and duties, namely, those reasons and duties that inherently express the Categorical Imperative and the "categorical 'ought'."

By sharp contrast, what I will call *lower-level or Humean rationality* involves only the possession of innate capacities for conscious, intentional desire-based logical or practical reasoning, for more or less momentary or occasional occurrent self-consciousness, and for self-interested intentional agency. A minded animal that has lower-level rationality can recognize contingent truths, judge or believe with a posteriori certainty, and choose or act in accordance with instrumental egoistic, hedonistic, or consequentialist reasons and duties, or those that express at most the "hypothetical 'ought'."

All minded animals that possess an innate capacity for higher-level or Kantian rationality also possess an innate capacity for lower-level or Humean rationality, but not the converse. For example, it is arguable that normal, healthy Great apes and perhaps also dolphins[199] possess an innate capacity for Humean or lower-level rationality, but not a capacity for higher-level or Kantian rationality. This is of course not to say that Great apes or dolphins are "irrational" or "non-rational" in any sense. On the contrary, it is only to say that, relative to those animals that do possess an innate capacity for higher-level or Kantian rationality, the rational capacity of Great apes and perhaps also dolphins is somewhat limited in complexity and normative power. Minded animals with an capacity for rationality in the higher-level or Kantian sense are not only constrained in their intentional agency by the Categorical Imperative or at least by some strictly universal, non-instrumental, altruistic, non-hedonistic, and non-consequentialist moral reasons and objective principles, they are also capable of being moved wholeheartedly by the higher-order moral emotion of respect.[200] Or in other words, minded animals with a fully online capacity for rationality in the higher-level or Kantian sense are also capable of Kantian autonomy and principled authenticity.[201]

By contrast, minded animals that possess only an innate capacity for rationality in the lower-level or Humean sense are constrained in their intentional agency only by (at least some of) the axioms of rational choice theory, but not by strictly universal, non-instrumental, altruistic, non-hedonistic, and non-consequentialist moral reasons and objective principles. They are therefore not capable of Kantian autonomy or principled authenticity. Instead, they are at most capable of being moved non-authentically or non-wholeheartedly by the first-order moral emotion of *sympathy*.[202]

What is the moral-emotional difference berween respect and sympathy? One way of cashing out this difference is to say that

> (i) whereas someone who is being moved by respect will always and necessarily choose and act so as to heed or preserve the dignity of another real person, even if she does not find that other real person to be *in any way whatsoever* attractive, likeable, nice, tear-jerkingly pathetic, or pleasant—in short, even if she involuntarily finds that real person to be perfectly loathsome, nevertheless
>
> (ii) someone who is being moved merely by sympathy will choose and act so as to heed or preserve the dignity of another real person *only if* she finds that real person to be appropriately attractive, likeable, nice, tear-jerkingly pathetic, or pleasant.

In other words, mere sympathy cannot survive the apparent loathsomeness of other real persons: *mere sympathy* loses heart in the face of *involuntary disgust*. But respect inherently can and always does recognize dignity, even in the face of involuntary disgust. And this is not a superhuman, or "moral saint-like," moral attitude. For example, I imagine that a great many medical doctors, especially general practitioners, and nurses or nurse-practitioners, all of whom are "human, all too human," just like the rest of us, perfectly

illustrate the sharp moral difference between respect and sympathy almost every single day of their working lives. Indeed, some, like Camus's fictional Dr Rieux in *The Plague*, and the real-life Florence Nightingale, illustrate this even to the level of being real-world moral saints or "sinner-saints."

Real personhood in the Frankfurtian sense is a necessary and sufficient condition of real personhood, period, which includes all the more-or-less online basic capacities of free agents, hence it entails dignity. And real personhood in the Kantian sense both includes and significantly augments real personhood in the Frankfurtian sense, by including the fully online capacity for principled authenticity, at least partially or to some degree. Real personhood in the Frankfurtian sense, as we have seen, is based on the fully online capacity for having second-order volitions, which in turn contains several other distinct constituent fully online psychological capacities. Correspondingly but contrastively, real personhood in the Kantian sense is based on the fully online capacity for higher-level rational agency, which also contains several other distinct online psychological capacities. In order to display the internal complexity of the relationships between these capacities more fully, here is an explicit version of the two-level theory of real personhood that I have been developing, in the form of a three-part definition.

A Three-Part Definition of Real Personhood

Part I. $X$ is a real Frankfurtian person (person$_f$) if and only if $X$ is an $S$-type animal and $X$ has fully online psychological capacities for

(i) essentially embodied consciousness or essentially embodied subjective experience,
(ii) intentionality or directedness to objects, locations, events (including actions), other minded animals, or oneself, including cognition (that is, sense perception, memory, imagination, and conceptualization), and caring (that is, affect, desire, and emotion), especially including effective first-order desires,
(iii) lower-level of Humean rationality, that is, logical reasoning (including judgment and belief) and instrumental decision-making,
(iv) self-directed or other-directed evaluative emotions (for example, love, hate, fear, shame, guilt, pride, etc),
(v) minimal linguistic understanding, that is, either inner or overt expression and communication in any simple or complex sign system or natural language, including ASL, etc., and
(vi) second-order volitions.

Part II. $X$ is a real Kantian person (person$_k$) if and only if $X$ is a real person$_f$ and also has fully online psychological capacities for

(vii) higher-level or Kantian rationality, that is, categorically normative logical rationality[203] and practical rationality, the latter of which also entails a fully online capacity

for autonomy (self-legislation) and wholeheartedness, hence a fully online capacity for principled authenticity, at least partially or to some degree.

Part III. X is a real person if and only if *X* is either a real person$_f$ or a real person$_k$; and any other finite, material creature or entity *X* is a non-person.

Before going on to say more about real persons, there is a very important point I need to make about *non*-personhood. Just because a creature is a non-person, it does *not* follow that this creature is thereby without *any* moral value, namely, a "mere thing." It is true that non-persons are neither subjects of dignity nor targets of respect. But at the same time, all living things and all minded animals—even simple-minded animals with proto-sentience, for example, fish, insects, reptiles, cephalopods, and other invertebrates[204]—and all conscious or fully minded non-human animals, like bats, birds, cats, dogs, horses, lions, mice, bears, and wolves, are either *experiencers* or *subjects* of moral value, and *targets* of our moral concern, even if they are non-persons. This is because they share with us three constitutively necessary conditions of real personhood:

(i) organismic life,
(ii) the capacity for consciousness or sentience, and
(iii) the capacity for free volition or animal agency,

all of which have intrinsic moral value. But in any case, I have much more to say about these points in *Deep Freedom and Real Persons* and *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence*.

That brings me, finally, to my second mid-sized point of substantive disagreement with Frankfurt. This concerns his notion of a "wanton." Here I have two worries.

First, I think that it is false that all non-human minded animals are wantons. On the contrary, in view of strong evidence from cognitive ethology, it seems to me that at least some actual non-human minded animals—and in particular, Great apes and arguably also dolphins—are, at the very least, real non-human persons in the Frankfurtian sense. Hence, at the very least, they are metaphysically and morally equivalent to normal toddlers and other young children. On the opposing side, there seems to be some empirical neurobiological evidence in support of the claim that Great apes are not capable of non-instrumental, altruistic, non-hedonistic, and non-consequentialist thinking, feeling, and action.[205] But other primatologists would disagree with those skeptical primatologists, and I am on their side. It is one thing not to be capable of *sustained* non-instrumental, non-egoistic, non-hedonistic, and non-consequentialist thinking, feeling, and action. And this is perfectly consistent with being capable of brief moments of non-instrumental, non-egoistic, non-hedonistic, and non-consequentialist thinking, feeling, and action. Therefore, it is also perfectly consistent with the possession of all the basic innate capacities in such a way that some of them are not fully online. But it is categorically a different thing to lack those basic capacities altogether. My critical proposal is that those skeptical primatologists

who have claimed the latter, have done so via a fallacious direct inference from the former. So, assuming that my critical proposal is correct, the fact that Great apes are not capable of *sustained* non-instrumental, non-egoistic, non-hedonistic, and non-consequentialist thinking, feeling, and action, does not in any way undermine their fully online Humean or lower-level rationality, and therefore it does not in any way undermine the Frankfurtian real personhood of Great apes, or their dignity. Correspondingly, we do not think that toddlers and other young children lack real personhood or dignity just because they often or even usually feel, choose and act, well, *childishly*.

Second, while it is true that in some *extended* sense of the term there can be "rational wantons," it is false that they are not real persons. More precisely, on my view, so-called "rational wantons" are in fact real persons who do indeed have an online capacity for second-order volitions, hence for caring about their caring, but for reasons of their own, in some sontext or contexts, they simply refuse to manifest or realize this capacity. When thought through carefully, we can see that it is inconceivable that a rational animal could possess either non-autonomous, lower-level (Humean) or autonomous, higher-level (Kantian) rationality, and thus be capable of norm-guided logical and practical reasoning according to instrumental or non-instrumental principles, and yet also be *unable* to care about the constitution of its own will. This is because, for a creature to be inherently constrained by logical and practical norms in its reasoning, is necessarily *also* for it *to be able to care* about the difference between its freedom and its unfreedom. Otherwise, these norms would have no role to play in the conscious, intentional life of the creature: norms have to matter *to* and *fo*r the creature, and this cannot be if the creature cannot represent the difference between its own freedom and unfreedom.

Still, accepting that point, as a matter of fact, some rational human animals or real human persons simply *refuse to care* about their caring, in some context or contexts, even though they are *able* to do so. Take, for example, Meursault in Camus's *The Stranger* as a vivid fictional instance of what I think is a real-world personality type. Meursault murders an Arab seemingly for no reason other than that he just feels like doing it at that moment; and he does it without any compunction whatsoever. Given Camus's descriptions and the rest of the narrative, Meursault is clearly as close as one could ever get, inside fiction or outside in the real world, to being a so-called "rational wanton" in Frankfurt's sense. Nevertheless, Meursault is also, clearly, deeply morally responsible for murdering the Arab. And this is so, even despite its being true that, because Meursault is a murderer (*meurtrier*) who, seemingly without any premeditation whatsoever, leaps (*sauter*) into the evil act, it is quite hard to judge whether his act is a special sub-kind of *banal* evil, or *near-satanic* evil. In any case, from Camus's descriptions, it is clear not that Meursault *cannot* care about his caring—but rather that, although Mersault *can* care about his own caring, for whatever reason, in this context, he *refuses* to.

Therefore, a creature can be criticized and evaluated for her logical and practical deliberations, decisions, and choices only if it *can* matter to her which choices she makes.

Interestingly, although Frankfurt initially explicitly holds that there can be rational wantons,[206] he later corrects himself by asserting that rationality entails personhood, which for him entails non-wantonhood.[207] So in that respect, he eventually came over to my team. In any case, my view, by contrast, is that so-called "rational wantons" are indeed real persons, and therefore are *not constitutively wanton*, precisely because rational free agency entails at least a capacity for second-order volitions, even if, for some special reason or reasons intentionally adopted by a free agent in some context, that capacity is suppressed or non-operative in that context.

In view of what I have just argued in this section, so far, here is a fully-elaborated four-part definition of real personhood:

A Four-Part Definition of Real Personhood

Part I. *X* is a real Frankfurtian person (person$_f$) if and only if *X* is an S-type animal and *X* has fully online psychological capacities for:

(1) essentially embodied consciousness or essentially embodied subjective experience,
(2) intentionality or directedness to objects, locations, events (including actions), other minded animals, or oneself, including cognition (i.e. sense perception, memory, imagination, and conceptualization), desire-based emotions, and effective first-order desires,
(3) lower-level or Humean rationality, that is, logical reasoning (including judgment and belief) and instrumental decision-making,
(4) self-directed or other-directed evaluative emotions (for example, love, hate, fear, shame, guilt, pride, etc),
(5) minimal linguistic understanding, that is, either inner or overt expression and communication in any simple or complex sign system or natural language, including ASL, etc., and
(6) second-order volitions.

Part II. *X* is a real Kantian person (person$_k$) if and only if *X* is a real person$_f$ and also has fully online psychological capacities for:

(7) higher-level or Kantian rationality, that is, categorically normative logical rationality and practical rationality, the latter of which also entails a fully online capacity for autonomy (self-legislation) and wholeheartedness, hence a fully online capacity for principled authenticity.
Part III. *X* is a real person if and only if *X* is either a real person$_f$ or a real person$_k$, otherwise X is a non-person.

Part IV. If *X* is an actualized real person, then the neo-person of *X* is also a real person, where the neo-person of *X* is a given *S*-type animal *A* that manifests the psychological capacity for consciousness and the following counterfactual is also true of *A*:

> If A were to continue the natural course of its neurobiological and psychological development, then *A* would become *X*.

Given some familiar facts about human animals, it follows from The Four-Part Definition of Real Personhood that not all human beings are real persons. For example, normal, healthy fetuses prior to the emergence of full sentience (i.e., prior to approximately 25 weeks in the gestation period), anencephalic fetuses and infants, and human beings in persistent vegetative states, all lack a capacity for consciousness, and therefore are non-persons under both Part I and Part IV of the four-part definition of real personhood.

At the same time, however, in view of strong evidence from cognitive ethology,[208] then at least some non-human animals—and in particular, Great apes, other primates, and perhaps dolphins—are in fact real persons under Part I and Part III of the extended, four-part definition of real personhood. More precisely, at least some non-human animals, including Great apes, other primates, and perhaps dolphins, are real persons precisely because they are *Frankfurtian* persons or persons$_f$. There is good evidence that these non-human animals have online psychological capacities for consciousness, intentionality, lower-level or Humean rationality, self-directed or other directed evaluative emotions, minimal linguistic understanding, and second-order volitions. If so, then they are intentional agents who are thereby capable of what I call *free volition*,[209] even if they are not strictly speaking capable of what I call *free agency*—that is, the conjunction of free will and practical agency[210]—which includes the morally high-powered innately specified capacity for achieving principled authenticity, at least partially or to some degree. So, as far as the available evidence indicates, there are no non-human minded animals whose fully online capacities put them within reach of principled authenticity, even if at least some of them are rational minded animals or real persons possessing absolute, non-denumerably infinite, intrinsic, objective moral value, namely, dignity.

In this way, real persons who are also non-human minded animals are primary subjects of dignity and primary targets of respect because they fall directly under the Categorical Imperative, and therefore they must be both considered and treated as such, even though they belong to different species. It is impermissible to treat them as either mere means or as mere things, and without their actual or possible rational consent—that is, to treat them without respect—since this would harm them by violating their dignity. To treat a Great ape, other primate, or perhaps a dolphin as a mere thing or without its actual or possible rational consent would be just like treating a normal, healthy human toddler or other normal, healthy child as either a mere means or as a mere thing, and without her actual or possible rational consent. This is not to say that Great apes, other primates, or dolphins are neurobiologically or psychologically interchangeable or intersubstitutable with normal, healthy toddlers or other normal, healthy human children, but rather just that they do share with normal, healthy toddlers and other normal, healthy human children the same set of constitutively necessary psychological capacities, and the same moral specific character or

moral status. We are morally obligated to care morally about them in the same way, and to treat them in the same way, that we do normal, healthy toddlers and other normal, healthy human children.

Put somewhat trivially, but still relevantly and perhaps also vividly, this moral obligation accounts, for example, for the undeniable emotional and moral impact of the classic 1933 thriller *King Kong*.[211] You feel deeply sorry for The Big Ape, deeply sympathetic with his obvious love for the Fay Wray character Ann Darrow, and morally outraged by what they have done to him. In the context of the movie, it is clear that King Kong is a morally much better real person than the Robert Armstrong character Carl Denham, the ambitious and heartless promoter.

Less trivially now, real persons who are also non-human animals should not be used in any medical or scientific experimentation, unless they are the sorts of experiments we would morally permit normal healthy toddlers and other normal healthy human children to be used in. Other things being equal, we morally must not torture or vivisect normal healthy toddlers or other normal healthy human children in the name of Medicine or Science: neither should we torture or vivisect Great apes, other primates, or perhaps dolphins in the name of Medicine or Science, other things being equal. Furthermore, other things being equal, rational minded animals or real persons who are also non-human animals should not be kept in zoos, or in any other sort of captivity, unless it can be shown that this is what they naturally need or rationally want. Like normal healthy toddlers and other normal healthy human children, who both naturally need and rationally want to be looked after, it may be that rational minded animals or real persons who are also non-human animals may sometimes naturally need or rationally want to be looked after. Indeed, real human persons who are also fully higher level or Kantian real persons, or persons$_k$, sometimes naturally need and rationally want to be looked after too, for example, by their loved ones under normal conditions; in hospitals when they are sick; or in managed care apartments when they get old. But normal healthy toddlers and other normal healthy human children neither naturally need nor rationally want to be kept in zoos or other sorts of cages. Keeping a normal healthy toddler or other normal healthy human child in a zoo or a cage is clearly morally impermissible, and would be treating them like mere things, and without their actual or possible rational consent. That would be acting like a Nazi, or like an evil character right out of the fairly scary Brothers Grimm version of *Hansel and Gretel*, or the (to me) heart-stoppingly scary horror film, *The Blair Witch Project*.[212] Correspondingly, then, with appropriate modifications made for change of context, the same goes for real persons who are also non-humans.

As we have just seen, the available evidence strongly indicates that some non-human minded animals are real persons. But assuming that this is true, where does it leave all the other non-human minded animals? By Part III of the extended, four-part definition of real personhood, anything that is not a real person is a non-person. But are all non-persons the same, morally speaking? Are all non-persons equivalent to mere things? No. This is

because all mere things are merely natural mechanisms, whereas some non-persons are living, sentient organisms, that is, minded animals. So minded non-human animals that are also non-persons are *not* morally equivalent to mere things. All living organisms and all minded animals—even proto-sentient or "simple minded" non-human animals like fish, insects, reptiles, cephalopods and other invertebrates, but especially including all sentient and fully minded non-human animals like bats, birds, cats, cows, dogs, horses, lions, mice, sheep, bears, and wolves—are experiencers or primary subjects of moral value, and also primary targets of our moral concern, even if they are non-persons. According to what I call *existential Kantian ethics*,[213] moral values are in the world because minded animals are in the world, and all values necessarily depend on moral values as their essence. In other words, according to existential Kantian ethics, all minded living organisms must be considered individually, and each of them must be taken fully into account in our moral reasoning—even if they are not thereby morally considered or treated equally as members of the universal intersubjective moral community of real persons, The Realm of Ends. This moral concern for all minded animals is determined by the fact that they share with us two constitutively necessary conditions of real personhood, namely organismic life and (proto-)sentience, both of which are necessarily contained within, and thus partially constitutive of, essentially embodied consciousness.

### The grisly fate of the grizzly man

This same basic way of thinking philosophically about rational human minded animals and non-human animals has also been conveyed in cinematic form by Werner Herzog's stunning 2005 documentary *Grizzly Man*, about the strange life and grisly death of the grizzly bear enthusiast, Timothy Treadwell:

> *Grizzly Man* is a 2005 American documentary film by German director Werner Herzog. It chronicles the life and death of bear enthusiast Timothy Treadwell. The film includes some of Treadwell's own footage of his interactions with grizzly bears before 2003, and of interviews with people who knew, or were involved with Treadwell, as well as professionals dealing with wild bears.
>
> He and his girlfriend Amie Huguenard were killed and eaten by a grizzly bear on October 6, 2003. Treadwell's footage was found after his death. The bear that killed Treadwell and Huguenard was later encountered and killed by the group retrieving the remains of the victims.
>
> Jewel Palovak, co-founder of Grizzly People and a close friend of Treadwell's, had to give her approval for the film to be produced, as she controlled his video archives. The filmmakers had to deal with logistical as well as sentimental factors related to Treadwell's footage of his bear interactions. Grizzly People is a "grassroots organization" concerned with the treatment of bears in the United States. After her friend's death, Palovak was left with control of Grizzly People and Treadwell's 100 hours of archival footage. As his close

friend, former girlfriend, and confidante, she had a large emotional stake in the production. She had known Treadwell since 1985 and felt a deep sense of responsibility to her late friend and his legacy.

She said that he had often discussed his video archives with her. "Timothy was very dramatic," she once said. She quoted Treadwell as saying, "If I die, if something happens to me, make that movie. You make it. You show 'em." "I thought that Werner Herzog could definitely do that."[214]

Translated into my terminology, the existential tragedy of The Grizzly Man was that he catastrophically failed to see the difference between our *non-conceptual commensurability* with non-human perceivers and our *conceptual incommensurability* with them. As Herzog the narrator says in that amazing, deliberately cadenced, German-accented voice of his, "Timothy Treadwell crossed a line."

Precisely *which* line? In *Being and Nothingness*, *No Exit*, and other works, Jean-Paul Sartre argued, with characteristic exaggeration, that "hell is other people." Sartre was far too Cartesian in this respect, and failed to see that if our consciousness is essentially embodied, then the minds of other minded animals are directly present to us in their bodily expressions of feeling and emotion, via Empathic Mirroring. Other people are *not* essentially hidden inside their bodies, as a "nothingness" that is not only forever hidden from us, but also inevitably objectifies us, making us into mere lifeless objects of their Gaze. On the contrary, according to the essential embodiment view, we are always *alongside* and *with* other minded animals, whether in our own species or other species.

Nevertheless, there is still a fundamental cognitive divide between conceptual content and essentially non-conceptual content; and to pretend that this divide does not exist, is not only a fundamental fallacy about the nature of minded animal cognition, but also, in ethical and existential contexts, it can be genuinely tragic. Grizzly bears are *not* non-human real persons—or at the very least, they are not *Kantian* non-human real persons. But Timothy Treadwell had gone over to treating the grizzly bears he was studying as if they *were* Kantian non-human real persons, capable of caring about *him* in the same way that he cared about *them*. So although Sartre was wrong that hell is *other people*, Timothy Treadwell discovered, tragically, that sometimes hell is *other species*.

### 2.2.4  The Organicist Conception of the World: A Concluding Manifesto

The attempt to understand nature remains one of the basic objectives of Western thought. It should not, however, be identified with the idea of control. The master who believes he understands his slaves because they obey his orders would be blind. When we turn to physics, our expectations are obviously different, but here as well, Vladimir Nabokov's conviction rings true: "What can be controlled is never completely real; what is real can never be completely controlled." The [naturally mechanistic] classical ideal of

science, a world without time, memory, and history, recalls the totalitarian nightmares described by Aldous Huxley, Milan Kundera, and George Orwell.[215]

In 1929, the Vienna Circle published their justly famous Logical Empiricist/Positivist philosophical manifesto, "The Scientific Conception of the World."[216] Almost a century later, this concluding section is, in effect, an early 21ˢᵗ century *contemporary Kantian* philosophical manifesto offered in direct reply to the Circle's manifesto. And in particular, as I anticipated at the very beginning of this long essay, this final section spells out a specifically Kantian version of the "*single* science" predicted by Marx, the one that will unify the human sciences or *Geisteswissenschaften* and the natural sciences or *Naturwissenschaften*, that I have been calling *organicism*.

### Organicism, liberal naturalism, and natural mechanism

Organicism is a *liberally naturalistic* and *pro-scientific*, but also *anti-mechanistic* and *anti-scientistic* conception of the world, including ourselves.

Organicism is committed to the metaphysical doctrine of *liberal naturalism*. Liberal naturalism says that the irreducible but also non-dualistic mental properties of rational minded animals are as basic in nature as biological properties, and metaphysically continuous with them. More precisely, according to liberal naturalism, rational human free agency is an immanent structure of essentially embodied conscious, intentional, caring human animal mind; essentially embodied conscious, intentional, caring human animal mind is an immanent structure of organismic life; and organismic life is an immanent structure of spatiotemporally asymmetric, non-equilibrium matter and/or energy flows. Each more complex structure is metaphysically continuous with, and embeds, all of the less complex structures.

Again: human freedom is dynamically inherent in and dynamically emerges from essentially embodied conscious, intentional, caring human animal mind. And essentially embodied conscious, intentional, caring human animal mind is dynamically inherent in and dynamically emerges from life. Thus human freedom is dynamically inherent in and dynamically emerges from life. Moreover, life is dynamically inherent in and dynamically emerges from spatiotemporally asymmetric, non-equilibrium matter and/or energy flows. Therefore, human freedom, human mind, and life are all dynamically inherent in and dynamically emerge from spatiotemporally asymmetric, non-equilibrium, complex dynamic matter and/or energy flows. Here is a simplified diagram of the basic metaphysical continuities and structural embeddings, according to the liberal naturalist conception:

free agency → human animal mind → organismic life → asymmetric, non-equilibrium, complex dynamic matter/energy flows[217]

In view of liberal naturalism, to borrow an apt phrase from the later Wittgenstein, our rational human free agency is just our own "form of life," and free agency, as such, grows naturally in certain minded animal species or life-forms. Correspondingly, freedom grows naturally and evolves in certain species of minded animals, including the human species, precisely because minds like ours grow naturally and evolve in certain species of animals, including the human species.[218]

Another name for liberal naturalism is "objective idealism." Objective idealism is sharply distinct both from *subjective idealism*, which says that the world is nothing a phenomenal mental construction of an individual cognizer (as defended, for example, by Berkeley, the neo-Kantians, early Carnap, C. I. Lewis, and Nelson Goodman) and also from *absolute idealism*, which says that the world is nothing but a giant mind, its thought-forms, and its thought-processes (as defended, for example, by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel). As opposed to either subjective idealism or absolute idealism, liberal naturalism, aka objective idealism, says that rational human mindedness *grows naturally* in the manifestly real physical world, in organisms whose lives have an appropriately high level of non-mechanical thermodynamic complexity and self-organization. The manifestly real natural physical world necessarily includes our real possibility and is immanently structured for the dynamic emergence of lives like ours and minds like ours. Or in Nagel's lovely formulation, quoted twice already in this essay: "rational intelligibility is at the root of the natural order."[219]

Organicism is directly opposed to Natural Mechanism. Natural Mechanism says that all the causal powers of everything whatsoever in the natural world are ultimately fixed by what can be digitally computed on a universal deterministic or indeterministic real-world Turing machine, provided that the following three plausible "causal orderliness" and "decompositionality" assumptions are all satisfied:

> (i) its causal powers are necessarily determined by the general deterministic or indeterministic causal natural laws, especially including the Conservation Laws, together with all the settled quantity-of-matter-and/or-energy facts about the past, especially including The Big Bang,
> (ii) the causal powers of the real-world Turing machine are held fixed under our general causal laws of nature, and
> (iii) the "digits" over which the real-world Turing machine computes constitute a complete denumerable set of spatiotemporally discrete physical objects.

In direct opposition to Natural Mechanism, however, the world-conception of Organicism says that the causal powers of biological life (and in particular, the causal powers of living organisms, including all minded animals, especially including rational human animals) are neither fixed by, identical with, nor otherwise reducible to the Conservation-Law-determined, Big-Bang-caused, real-world-Turing-computable causal powers of thermodynamic systems, whether these causal powers are governed by general

deterministic laws or general probabilistic/statistical laws. So if the general thesis of Organicism is true, then anti-mechanism is true and Natural Mechanism is false.

### Organicism, natural piety, the formal sciences, and the natural sciences

As I argued in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, organicism is committed to the doctrine of what the early 20th century British philosopher Samuel Alexander—following the Romantic poet Wordsworth—called *natural piety*. As we have seen, according to Alexander:

> I do not mean by natural piety exactly what Wordsworth meant by it–the reverent joy in nature, by which he wished that his days might be bound to each other–though there is enough connection with his interpretation to justify me in using his phrase. The natural piety I am going to speak of is that of the scientific investigator, by which he accepts with loyalty the mysteries which he cannot explain in nature and has no right to try to explain. I may describe it as the habit of knowing when to stop in asking questions of nature.

> [T]hat organization which is alive is not merely physico-chemical, though completely resoluble into such terms, but has the new quality of life. No appeal is needed, so far as I can see, to a vital force or even an *élan vital*. It is enough to note the emergence of the quality, and try to describe what is involved in its conditions…. The living body is also physical and chemical. It surrenders no claim to be considered a part of the physical world. But the new quality of life is neither chemical nor mechanical, but something new.

> We may and must observe with care our of what previous conditions these new creations arise. We cannot tell why they should assume these qualities. We can but accept them as we find them, and this acceptance is natural piety.[220]

According to natural piety, *neither* are you alienated from nature (a Cartesian ghost-in-a-machine) *nor* are you a "lord and master" of nature (a Baconian/Cartesian technocrat). To believe both of these at once was Victor Frankenstein's tragic mistake, repeated endlessly and magnified infinitely in the deeply misguided epistemic and metaphysical doctrines, and scientistic-technocratic ideology, of Natural Mechanism:

> Learn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, how dangerous is the acquirement of [naturally mechanistic] knowledge, and how much happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he who aspires to become greater than his nature will allow.[221]

Organicism fully conforms to modern physics, and in particular to *non-equilibrium thermodynamics*, under the non-deterministic interpretation of it offered, for example, by Ilya Prigogine, and also to complex-systems, biologically-driven approaches to thermodynamics, as developed for example, by Stuart Kauffman. Correspondingly

Organicism fully conforms to modern chemistry, biology, and the cognitive neurosciences, insofar as these are all construed in terms of the non-deterministic interpretation of non-equilibrium thermodynamics and liberal naturalism. In other words, *organicism takes natural science seriously too*.

More specifically, it is not scientifically *un*serious to be a liberal naturalist and hold that non-equilibrium thermodynamics, comprehending both physics and chemistry, and biology, especially including organismic biology and ecosystemic biology, and finally cognitive neuroscience, are all anti-mechanistic. Why must all the basic sciences be interpreted in accordance with Natural Mechanism?

After all, Church and Turing show us that logical truth in every system at least as rich as classical first-order polyadic quantified predicate logic with identity, aka "elementary logic," cannot be determined by Turing-computable algorithms, and therefore cannot be naturally mechanized; and Gödel's incompleteness theorems show us that every mathematical system at least as rich as Peano arithmetic cannot be naturally mechanized.[222] Yet no one regards *elementary logic* and *Peano arithmetic* as somehow less than seriously scientific. If *formal* piety about logic and mathematics is intelligible and defensible, as they surely are, then by the same token, so too is *natural* piety about physics, chemistry, biology, and cognitive neuroscience.

So if one can be fully serious about logic and mathematics without holding Natural Mechanism about them, then one can fully serious about physics, chemistry, biology, and cognitive neuroscience without holding that Natural Mechanism is true about them, since all of the natural sciences presuppose logic and mathematics. In particular, if the non-deterministic interpretation of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, together with Church's and Turing's discoveries about logic, together with Gödel's incompleteness theorems, are all true, then Natural Mechanism is false even about *physics*, and yet we can still be fully serious about logic, mathematics, and physics.

Organicism, together with its doctrines of formal piety and natural piety, clearly meet this theoretical standard.

## The organicist revolution in philosophy

The contemporary British philosopher Helen Steward has remarked that

> [t]he task [of understanding free will and agency] requires some reflection on the organizational principles of living creatures, for it is only through such reflection … that we can start to understand where the difference really lies between, on the one hand those things that are true agents, and, on the other, mere machines, entities that nothing will ever be up to, however impressive they may be…. *I am exceedingly hopeful that the next few years will see the beginnings of a revolution in our conception of the human person, as philosophical and everyday conceptions of the scientific picture of the world are freed from*

*outdated Newtonian ideas and begin to take more note, both of the complexities of science as it really is and of the undeniable fact of our animal nature.*[223]

Indeed, along with Steward, I believe that we are at the beginning of an *Organicist Revolution* in philosophy that is fully comparable to Kant's "Copernican Revolution" in metaphysics.

Kant's Copernican Revolution says that in order to explain rational human cognition and authentic a priori knowledge, we must hold that necessarily, the world structurally conforms to our minds, rather than the converse. The Organicist Revolution, in turn, says that the real possibility of human consciousness, cognition, caring, rationality, and free agency, and *therefore also the "Copernican" necessary structural conformity of world-to-mind, provided that we actually do exist*, is built essentially into the non-equilibrium, complex-systems thermodynamics of organismic life, and necessarily underdetermined by naturally mechanical processes and facts. Hence the Organicist Revolution in philosophy that is implied by liberal naturalism and natural piety not only *includes* Kant's Copernican Revolution, but also goes one full revolutionary cycle *beyond* it. The Organicist Revolution is the *New* Coperican Revolution in philosophy.

Since the 17th century, philosophical revolutions have happened roughly every one hundred years, and each revolution takes roughly twenty years to unfold:

(i) *the late 17th and early 18th century anti-Scholastic Rationalist revolution*—Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, but also including Newtonian scientific mechanism, followed by an Empiricist reaction,

(ii) *the late 18th and early 19th century anti-Rationalist, anti-Empiricist Kantian Copernican Revolution and absolute idealism*—Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, followed by an anti-Hegelian reaction, including Kierkegaard and neo-Kantianism, then by Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and existential phenomenology,

(iii) *the late 19th and early 20th century anti-idealist Analytic philosophy revolution*—Frege, Russell, Moore, and early Wittgenstein, followed by Vienna Circle logical empiricism, later Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy, then by Quinean and Sellarsian scientific naturalism, then by Strawsonian conceptual analysis, and currently, Analytic metaphysics.

Now, in the late 2010s and early 2020s, it has been almost exactly 100 years since the early Analytic anti-idealist philosophical revolution. So if the historical pattern persists, then we are actually at the beginning of another philosophical revolution, a New Copernican Revolution, that will emerge over the next 20 years and run fully into the heart of the 21st century, although it may be difficult to see its precise shape because we do not have the benefit of historical hindsight, or of an adequate emotional and reflective distance from actual historical processes.

At the turn of the 20th century, in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and Henri Bergson, and then in the 1920s, in direct reaction to the cataclysmic devastation of World War I, there was in fact a short-lived *first wave* of the Organicist Revolution in philosophy: we can find this directly expressed, for example, in Henri Bergson's *Creative Evolution* in 1907, in Samuel Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity* in 1920, in John Dewey's *Experience and Nature* in 1925, and in A.N. Whitehead's "philosophy of organism" in *Process and Reality* in 1929.

At roughly the same time, there were also several closely related important dynamicist, organicist, conceptual developments in biology/ethology and physics, including C. Lloyd Morgan's *Emergent Evolution* in 1923, and, in 1944, Erwin Schrödinger's pioneering work on quantum mechanics and the nature of biological life, *What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell*. Schrödinger's book initiated *non-equilibrium thermodynamics* and *complex systems dynamics*, as developed by Prigogine and J.D. Bernal in the second half of the 20th century, and alongside this in the 1970s and 1980s, *the autopoietic approach to organismic biology* worked out by Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana, and most recently, the complex-systems approach to biology and thermodynamics worked out by Kauffman.

But except for some suggestive remarks in Wittgenstein's 1953 *Philosophical Investigations* about "forms of life," Hans Jonas's *Phenomenon of Life* in the mid-1960s,[224] and the short-lived Process Philosophy movement in the USA in the late 1960s and early 70s, the first wave of the Organicist Revolution merely crashed onto the barren, rocky shores of 20th century professional academic philosophy and was destroyed.

What accounts for the fifteen year gap between Whitehead's *Process and Reality* in 1929 and Schrödinger's *What is Life* in 1944? And what ultimately destroyed the first wave of the Organicist Revolution in philosophy?

The answer is obvious: the coming-to-power of the devilishly malevolent, totalitarian, imperialist Nazis in Germany in the 1930s, along with the rise of other forms of totalitarian, imperialist fascism in Japan and Italy, then the second global cataclysm of World War II, then post-war Stalinist Russian communist totalitarian imperialism in eastern Europe, and the Cold War, and then finally, since the fall of the Berlin Wall in the 1980s, almost complete world-domination by what I will call *The Four Horsemen of the New Apocalypse*:[225]

(i) global corporate *capitalism*, aka *big* capitalism,
(ii) the worldwide rise of political *neoliberalism*,
(iii) the *Americanization* of world culture via information technology and social media, and
(iv) an all-encompassing scientistic, technocratic philosophical conception of non-human nature and human nature alike, *Natural Mechanism*.

If I am correct, however, then in a direct reaction to the economic, political, sociocultural, and spiritual devastations of the New Apocalypse, we are now in the earliest stages of *the second wave of the Organicist Revolution*, aka the *New* Copernican Revolution, which will finally bring to completion what the most brilliant and radical philosophy of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century started, before fascism, World War II, the Cold War, and the New Apocalypse all so violently intervened. And because the first wave of the Organicist Revolution was ultimately destroyed by violently repressive, regressive, devolutionary politics, the second wave will also be necessarily accompanied by a liberationist, progressive, dynamacist politics.

### Organicism, scientistic Statism, and the sleep of reason

Nevertheless, there is currently a serious and widespread *cognitive wall* standing in the way of the second and decisive wave of the Organicist Revolution in philosophy, both inside philosophy itself and outside it, in the larger sociocultural and political world.[226] Clearly, Natural Mechanism and scientism are pervasive default assumptions of mainstream Logical Empiricist/Positivist and post-Empiricist/Positivist analytic philosophy, from 1929, when the Vienna Circle published the "The Scientific Conception of the World," through post-World War II Anglo-American philosophy, until today. But over that period, carried on the back of The Four Horsemen of the New Apocalypse, Natural Mechanism and scientism have also seeped like *poison gas* (the doomsday weapon of WW I) and exploded like *an atomic bomb* (the doomsday weapon of WW II) into the larger cultural and practical world, especially into the authoritarian politics of the modern State, encompassing not just contemporary Anglo-American culture or contemporary European culture, but also world-culture, and contemporary human life.

From the standpoint of organicism, we can clearly see that scientism and Statism play essentially the same functional role in their respective cultural domains, and that they also mutually support one another, indeed are symbiotic, each taking in the other's conceptual and practical laundry, and each making the other's existence and survival possible. On the one hand, the Natural Mechanism of scientism tells us that we are nothing but deterministic or indeterministic decision-theoretic "biochemical puppets"[227] or "moist robots."[228] And on the other hand, Statism tells us that we are obligated to obey the coercive commands of governments—powered by sophisticated exact science and its advanced technology, finance, and industry—no matter how absurd or immoral these commands might actually be, without ever daring to think or act or live for ourselves, lest we fall back into the chaotic, evil, pre-scientific, pre-statist Hobbesian "war of all against all" in the "state of nature,"[229] and lose the marvelous egoistic or collectivist benefits of life as decision-theoretic biochemical puppets or moist robots.

I call this tightly-circular, dyadic, and symbiotic conceptual and practical system that governs the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century sociocultural and political world, *scientistic Statism*.

Scientistic Statism is the real-world manifestation of Francisco Goya's all-too-true observation and warning in the *Los caprichos* (1797–99) that "the sleep of reason breeds monsters" (*el sueño de la razón produce monstruos*). Fritz Lang's presciently anti-scientistic and anti-Nazi films from 1922 and 1933, *Metropolis* and *The Testament of Doctor Mabuse*, and the genre of classic dystopian science fiction novels, especially including Yevgeny Zamyatin's 1920-21 *We*, Aldous Huxley's 1931 *Brave New World*, George Orwell's *1984* from 1949, Anthony Burgess's 1962 *The Clockwork Orange*, and Philip K. Dick's 1968 *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep*, and hundreds of films and novels since then, for example, James Cameron's *The Terminator* from 1984—ominous year!—jointly capture the soul-destroying and freedom-crushing spirit of scientistic Statism in its most blatantly authoritarian and totalitarian manifestations. Correspondingly, Hitler's totalitarian Nazi German State and Stalin's totalitarian Communist Russian State are, to be sure, scientistic Statism's most brutal, destructive, and horrific instantiations. Scientistic Statism is how The Enlightenment turned into The Terminator.

Nevertheless, throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, the very same monster-breeding, Terminator-creating symbiotic system of scientistic Statism has been and is fully at work worldwide, not merely in countries with blatantly authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, but also in big capitalist (neo)liberal democratic States, including the most scientifically-sophisticated and technologically-advanced, financially rich, and industrially powerful ones. Indeed, the richest and most powerful scientistic statist big capitalist (neo)liberal democratic state in the world, *the United States of America*, the so-called "Land of Liberty," dropped two atomic bombs on hundreds of thousands of Japanese non-combatants, co-authored the Cold War nuclear weapons build-up, supports capital punishment as well as the individual and collective right to bear arms, has one of the biggest economic-welfare gaps in the world between the richest and the poorest people, no universal system of free healthcare, and regularly invades other countries, all without rational or moral justification. Yes, big capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democracies do not fight wars against other big capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democracies: but that has not stoppd them from regularly initiating opportunistic wars against *other kinds of States*. And the USA *also* claims, backed up by coercive violence or the threat of coercive violence, that its citizens must mechanically obey its political authority over all these and many other rationally unjustified and immoral acts, decisions, and laws.

Now as we have seen, according to the Natural Mechanism of scientistic Statism, we are really nothing but "biochemical puppets" and "moist robots," nothing but highly complex natural automata, or natural machines, whose evolutionary and neurobiological mechanisms continually generate the cognitive illusion that we are free agents. But if this were true, then we would be in an even worse cognitive place than Pinocchio, a wooden puppet who longed to be a real boy. We would be nothing but "meat puppets,"[230] dreaming that we are real human persons.

Still, sadly, there is no philosophical view so crazy that it cannot be normalized under the right economic and political conditions. Hence some leading contemporary philosophers think that once we are liberated from the cognitive illusion of being free agents, we will see finally clearly see that we really are *nothing but* highly complex meat puppets *and* that "physics makes us free" in a deterministic, block universe.[231] Nevertheless, according to organicism, any philosophical doctrine which holds

(i) that we are really nothing but meat puppets, no matter how highly complex and amazing these meat puppets are, and

(ii) that "physics makes us free" in a deterministic, block universe,

is something straight out of Orwell's *1984* and *The Terminator*. Indeed, it is not hard to see the stomach-turning unintentional similarity between the scientistic slogan "physics makes us free," and the hideously sanctimonious slogan posted over the gates of Auschwitz, Dachau, and other Nazi concentration camps, *Arbeit macht frei*. How politically expedient it would be for any 21st century equivalent of "Big Brother" to be able to convince us that our being nothing but highly complex decision-theoretic, deterministic automata *and* our being "free" are the same thing.

On the contrary, then, it is a direct implication of the organicist conception of the world and of ourselves *that it is precisely those who believe and want to convince us that we are deterministic (or indeterministic) natural automata* who are in the grip of a serious cognitive illusion, *not* we who conceive of ourselves as purposive, living, essentially embodied, conscious, intentional, caring, really free rational and moral animals. Therefore, organicism finally awakens and liberates us from *the sleep of reason* that consists in Natural Mechanism, scientific naturalism, scientism, and scientistic Statism.

# ESSAY 2.3  MEMORY, "ALTERNATIVE FACTS," AND THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF COGNITION

"I am taking trouble with you, Winston," he said, "because you are worth trouble. You know perfectly well what is the matter with you. You have known it for years, though you have fought against the knowledge. You are mentally deranged. You suffer from a defective memory. You are unable to remember real events and you persuade yourself that you remember other events which never happened. Fortunately it is curable. You have never cured yourself of it, because you did not choose to. There was a small effort of the will that you were not ready to make. Even now, I am well aware, you are clinging to your disease under the impression that it is a virtue. Now we will take an example. At this moment, which power is Oceania at war with?"

"When I was arrested, Oceania was at war with Eastasia."

"With Eastasia. Good. And Oceania has always been at war with Eastasia, has it not?" Winston drew in his breath. He opened his mouth to speak and then did not speak. He could not take his eyes away from the dial.

"The truth, please, Winston. YOUR truth. Tell me what you think you remember." ….

O'Brien was looking down at him speculatively. More than ever he had the air of a teacher taking pains with a wayward but promising child.

"There is a Party slogan dealing with the control of the past," he said. "Repeat it, if you please."

"'Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past'," repeated Winston obediently.

"'Who controls the present controls the past'," said O'Brien, nodding his head with slow approval. "Is it your opinion, Winston, that the past has real existence?"

Again the feeling of helplessness descended upon Winston. His eyes flitted towards the dial. He not only did not know whether "yes" or "no" was the answer that would save him from pain; he did not even know which answer he believed to be the true one.[232]

In an interview on NBC's "Meet the Press,"[233] host Chuck Todd pressed Trump senior adviser Kellyanne Conway about why the White House on Saturday had sent Spicer to the briefing podium for the first time to claim that "this was the largest audience to ever witness an inauguration, period."

"You're saying it's a falsehood. And they're giving—Sean Spicer, our press secretary—gave alternative facts," she said.

Todd responded: "Alternative facts aren't facts, they are falsehoods."

Conway then tried to pivot to policy points. But later in the interview, Todd pressed Conway again on why the White House sent Spicer out to make false claims about crowd size, asking:

"What was the motive to have this ridiculous litigation of crowd size?"
"Y our job is not to call things ridiculous that are said by our press secretary and our president. That's not your job," Conway said.

Todd followed up: "Can you please answer the question? Why did he do this? You have not answered it—it's only one question."

Conway said: "I'll answer it this way: Think about what you just said to your viewers. That's why we feel compelled to go out and clear the air and put alternative facts out there."[234]

## 2.3.1 Introduction

In George Orwell's brilliant and famous dystopian science-fiction critique of totalitarianism, *1984*, Winston Smith is tortured and then made to "remember" all sorts of things about himself and the larger social and political world that never really happened, but that "Big Brother" and the authoritarian, totalitarian government of Oceania want him to remember. Meanwhile, in the real world, many or even most recent and contemporary

Hungarians have claimed that they can both "remember" and also "see" that the Roma people are dirty, unruly, and dangerous.[235] In 2015 and 2016, in the USA, extremely well-armed policemen who shot a non-trivial number of unarmed young black men to death, have claimed that they "saw" the victims engaging in life-theatening behavior towards them. In 2016, European and worldwide public sympathy for refugees was seriously compromised by the Paris and Brussels bombings, and by the Cologne New Year's Eve mob violence against women: since then, many people all over Europe and the rest of the world have claimed that they can "see" that all refugees are potential terrorists and that all young refugee men are potentially threatening to women. And, to top it all off with a breathtaking Orwellian flourish, in 2017, Kellyanne Conway, one of President Donald Trump's top advisors, in a tense television interview shortly after the US Presidential Inauguration on 20 January 2017, said that "we feel compelled to go out and clear the air and put alternative facts out there."

For philosophers and non-philosophers alike, this is all deeply disturbing. And, for a philosopher of mind and knowledge who is also a philosophical and political social anarchist, it is all deeply interesting too. Correspondingly, in this essay, I do three things.

First, I briefly sketch, and then just as briefly criticize, a widely-held contemporary theory of the nature of human memory, as specifically presented and defended in an influential essay by Felipe De Brigard, "Is Memory for Remembering? Recollection as a Form of Episodic Hypothetical Thinking."[236]

Second, I present the basics of a *radically naïve realist* theory of memory,[237] and indicate its parallels with a corresponding radically naïve realist theory of sense perception,[238] both of which have a grounding in *the Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualist theory of essentially non-conceptual mental content* that I have already spelled out somewhat, and argued for, in "Kant, Nature, and Humanity," essay 2.2 above.

Third, I apply the radically naïve realist theory of memory and the Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualist theory of essentially non-conceptual mental content to what I call *the political theory of memory*, which in turn is a sub-species of *the political theory of cognition*.[239]

For the purposes of this essay, the third thing drives the first and second things. I am deeply and fundamentally interested in explaining how memory and sense perception can be ideologically manipulated for political purposes, and also how the philosophy of cognition can be deployed to indicate and justify practical, effective cognitive strategies for resisting this manipulation and for ideological self-deprogramming and cognitive self-liberation when the manipulation has already occurred. My proposal is that the overall value of those cognitive theories will be made retrogressively manifest through their ability to provide fruitful and robust consequences for political theories and real-world political frameworks that emphasize *individual and collective free agency* and *radical enlightenment*.[240]

Or in other words, I am saying that the fruitful and robust radical political consequences of these cognitive theories *provide special good reasons for accepting those theories*, over and above the usual reasons for theory-acceptance in philosophy, having to do with the internal intelligibility and coherence of theories, their ability to explain empirical and phenomenological data, and their ability to provide overall better accounts than competing theories.

So in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, I'll present De Brigard's view and my critique of it, as well as my radically naïve realist theory of memory and sense perception, and its grounding in the Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualist theory of essentially non-conceptual content, as briefly and simply as I can, without providing either full-dress explications of those theories, or critical defenses of them against all or most possible criticisms, in order to proceed to the main political event in section 2.3.4.


## 2.3.2  Varieties of Memory


This is what De Brigard argues:

> Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering is typically thought to happen because our memory system malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory's malfunction, but rather as the normal result of a larger cognitive system that performs a different function, and for which remembering is just one operation. Building upon extant psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I offer a picture of memory as an integral part of a larger system that supports not only thinking of what was the case and what potentially could be the case, but also what could have been the case. More precisely, I claim that remembering is a particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the flexible recombination of different components of encoded traces into representations of possible past events that might or might not have occurred, in the service of constructing mental simulations of possible future events.[241]

I have three critical points to make about De Brigard's essay.

First, although I think that De Brigard's thesis is ingenious, I do also think it is in effect a *skeptical theory of memory*. What I mean is that it is basically an analogue of what John McDowell has called "highest common factor" theories of perception that start with the thesis that all perception is open to worries about illusion or hallucination, and then go on to claim perception is essentially an irreal mental construct of some sort. But other things being equal, we should prefer anti-skeptical, non-constructivist, realistic theories of human cognition to skeptical, constructivist, irrealist theories of it, since the former conform better

to common sense prima facie a priori rational intuitions about our own cognitive capacities, backed up by refined philosophical theories and corresponding authoritative a priori philosophical rational intuitions,[242] than do the latter. So that is an important meta-theoretical consideration against De Brigard's theory.

Second, even apart from that, how can De Brigard's theory, to the effect that episodic memory is really a mental simulation containing a hypothesis about the future, handle the phenomenon of nostalgia? Nostalgia is a memory-based longing for the past, *as* past. I'm not talking about mere sentimentalism about the past. What the truly nostalgic person longs for is *not* to experience, in the future, things that are similar to things experienced in the past, but instead *to re-live the actual past*. There is a huge modal-phenomenological difference here. There is one and only one actual past, but an indefinitely large number of possible future experiences with relevant similarities to any past experience. Does the nostalgic person want any of those? No. She intensely wants the actual world as she experienced it, *again*, or as the realist historian Leopold von Ranke put it, *wie ist eigentlich gewesen*, "as it actually happened." And how could that ever conform to De Brigard's future-oriented model of memory-content? So nostalgia is an important counter-example to his theory.

To be sure, De Brigard could respond by adopting a "debunking strategy" and/or "error theory" of nostalgia, according to which nostalgia is *actually* a mental simulation containing a hypothesis about experiencing things in the future that are similar to things experienced in the past, that is nevertheless so befuddled and self-deceived by strong emotion that it *seems to be* an intense desire to re-live the actual past as it actually happened, but *really isn't*.

The general problem with debunking strategies and/or error theories about human cognitive capacities—even those as specialized as the cognitive capacity for nostalgia—however, is that they tend towards self-stultification. What I mean is that if it were *true* that we are systematically self-deceived and mistaken about the nature of one or more of our cognitive capacities, then why would the debunking strategy and/or error-theory *themselves, as theories,* be any more likely to be correct than any other arbitrarily-chosen strategy and/or theory, given that the debunking strategy and/or error-theory are of course themselves the products of the operations of our cognitive capacities? So, just as, other things being equal, we should prefer anti-skeptical, non-constructivist, realistic theories of human cognition, so too, other things being equal, we should avoid debunking strategies and/or error theories about our cognitive capacities.

Third, I think that it is especially significant that the epigraph for De Brigard's essay is from Hobbes's *Leviathan*:

> So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse considerations hath diverse names. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 1.2.

The *Leviathan*, in turn, provides the philosophical foundations of the modern liberal political State; and Hobbes's theory of memory is an essential feature of that political philosophy. De Brigard's theory therefore presents itself as highly "scientific" and "disinterested," and therefore entirely innocent of political assumptions. But in fact, more or less covertly, it is significantly committed to various classical Hobbesian liberal or neo-Hobbesian (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic Statist assumptions about human nature in general and about human cognition in particular. I will come back to this critically important point later.

Now back to the human cognitive capacity for memory, as such. I think that Endel Tulving's classical distinction between

(i) episodic (1$^{st}$-person indexical, I-remembering ) memory, and
(ii) semantic (fact-based, 3$^{rd}$-personal or impersonal, remembering-that) memory,[243]

is basically a good one, well-supported by empirical work in cognitive science and phenomenology alike. But at the same time, this twofold distinction does not exhaust all the basic kinds of memory: there is also "skill-memory," or "implicit memory," that is, *memory-how*, as studied by Daniel Schacter and others,[244] and this extension beyond Tulving's breakthrough work has been generally accepted by contemporary memory theorists. Correspondingly, granting the threefold episodic memory vs. semantic memory vs. skill-memory distinction, there are two other extremely important memory phenomena here.

The first is the phenomenon of my 1st-person remembering things about myself and my life *in factual and indeed impersonal/3rd personal terms*, as if I were looking at my past self and my life from the outside—see, for example, Kant's notion of "empirical apperception" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and Sartre's notion of a reflective/self-conscious conceptually-constructed ego in *Transcendence of the Ego*. So, I think that Tulving did not sufficiently distinguish between these two sorts of memory-claims:

I remember being at my fifth birthday party. (*egocentric* episodic)
I remember that I was born in 1957. (*allocentric-semantic* episodic)

Both of these, in normal cases, have first-person epistemic authority. For example,

I remember where my right hand was just a moment ago.
I remember my own name.
I remember where I live.

And so-on. But in other ways, and above all phenomenologically, they are sharply different. For example, I could correctly remember being at my fifth birthday party, but misremember all sorts of first-personal facts about it—such as the actual location of my

birthday party, who actually attended my party, etc. Conversely, I could correctly remember all those facts, but also be remembering a confabulated dream I had about my childhood birthday parties much later in life—say, when I was a teenager—and not correctly remember being at my fifth birthday party.

A second memory-phenomenon that Tulving did not notice is the important difference between

(i) non-self-conscious/pre-reflective memory consciousness, and
(ii) self-conscious/reflective memory consciousness.

During waking life, most people's everday experiences are suffused with episodic, semantic, and skill-memories about their local environment and about themselves that they do not self-consciously or self-reflectively recognize as memories. Think, for example, about your daily, normal activities as you move around your bedroom and house shortly after waking up. You remember where your slippers and housecoat are, where the kitchen is and how to make coffee, how to brush your teeth, etc., etc., without in any way self-consciously or self-reflectively doing so. Typically, it is only if some special issue saliently arises, that calls for a special self-conscious or self-reflective act of remembering, that you self-consciously or self-reflectively remember something—for example, remembering your home address and telephone number when asked by someone else.

Therefore, to summarize this part of the discussion, there is an important distinction to be made between

(i) egocentric episodic memory, and
(ii) allocentric-semantic episodic memory,

and also an important distinction to be made between

(i) non-self-consciously/pre-reflectively conscious egocentric episodic memory, and
(ii) self-conscious/reflective egocentric episodic memory.

Moreover, since skill-memory, implicit memory, or memory-how is *also* egocentric, there is also an important distinction to be made between

(i)     non-self-consciously/pre-reflectively     conscious     skill-memory/implicit memory/memory-how, and
(ii) self-conscious/reflective skill-memory/memory-how.

Here is a real-world example that deploys several of these distinctions. I remember that I was born in 1957, that is, I have an allocentric-semantic episodic memory of that event with first-person epistemic authority. But I do not self-consciously or self-reflectively

remember being born in 1957, that is, I lack any self-conscious or self-reflective egocentric episodic memory of my being born. Yet, given a plausible view on the nature of real human personhood, to the effect that my own life extends at least as far back as my essentially embodied consciousness reaches,[245] therefore I must also non-self-consciously/pre-reflectively and veridically remember the trauma of being born. This non-self-consciously/pre-reflectively and veridically remembered trauma, in turn, not only affects my entire later life in various ways, but can also, at least in principle, under the right cognitive conditions, be self-consciously or self-reflectively recovered.

Or at least, this is so, *if* the Strong Non-Conceptualism and radically naïve realism about sense perception and memory that I will spell out in the next section are both correct.


### 2.3.3  Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism and Radically Naïve Realism About Sense Perception and Memory

There are two basic questions at issue between the contrary theses of Conceptualism and Non-Conceptualism in the philosophy of cognition:

> (i) whether human cognition is necessarily determined by our concepts and our conceptual capacities, yes or no, and
>
> (ii) whether human cognizers share a fundamental pre-conceptual/pre-intellectual or "purely sensible" capacity—or a set of such capacities—with non-rational or non-human animals, that operates in some substantive way independently of our intellectual/logical capacity for conceptualization, judgment, believing, etc., while still also being able to combine substantively with those latter capacities for the purposes of socially and linguistically-mediated "rational" cognition, yes or no.

Conceptualists, aka *intellectualists* about human cognition, say *yes* to (i) and *no* to (ii); but Strong Non-Conceptualists, aka *non-intellectualists* about human cognition, say *no* to (i) and *yes* to (ii).

For reasons that I present and defend at length in *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, especially chapter 2, and have also more briefly reprised in "Kant, Nature, and Humanity," essay 2.2 above—but in order to keep things fairly short-and-sweet, I will not *re*-present or *re*-defend in this essay—I hold the thesis of Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism. Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism, in turn, implies a fundamental distinction between *conceptual content* on the one hand, and *essentially non-conceptual content* on the other. Now by *conceptual content* I mean the inherently general, descriptive information that is expressed by one-place predicates in natural language, and correspondingly plays an essential role in logically-structured propositions, especially

analytic propositions, and inferences. Granting that, then here is the distinction between conceptual content and essentially non-conceptual content in a nutshell:

> The theory of rational human cognition, content, and knowledge that I am proposing … is, in part, a "bottom-up" theory about the nature of minded animals that anchors conceptual content in the primitive fact of essentially non-conceptual content. Essentially non-conceptual content … is a kind of mental content that is categorically different from conceptual content, in the sense that both its underlying semantic structure and also its characteristic psychological function or role are inherently distinct from those of conceptual content. Furthermore, essentially non-conceptual content is a kind of mental content that rational human animals or real human persons share with non-rational minded animals, whether non-human (e.g., cats) or human (e.g., infants), who, it seems, do not possess conceptual capacities. So essentially non-conceptual content epitomizes the specifically non-intellectual or *sensible*, embodied, perception-based, phenomenally conscious side of human mindedness, whereas conceptual content epitomizes the specifically *intellectual* or discursive, reflective, judgment-based, self-conscious side of human mindedness…. [B]y way of a preliminary or working characterization to have in front of us, I will say that essentially non-conceptual content is mental content that necessarily includes essentially indexical formal spatiotemporal and dynamic representations that are fully sensitive to complex thermodynamic asymmetries in perceptually manifest natural objects and processes, and also that the primary psychological function or role of essentially non-conceptual content is to account for directly referential cognition, and to guide and mediate the sensorimotor processes constitutive of finegrained intentional body movements in rational minded animals or real persons.[246]

How does Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism relate to what I call *radically naïve realism*? *Direct or naïve realism* about perception, in general, makes two claims:

> (i) rational and other minded animals stand in immediate, unmediated cognitive relations to external real objects that are consciously and correctly perceived by them, and
> (ii) these external real objects partially constitute those veridical perceptual acts or states.

*Radically* naïve realism, in turn, is direct or naïve realism *plus* a thesis called *disjunctivism*. What is that thesis? *Disjunctivism* about perception, which is both an intensification and also a specification of direct or naïve perceptual realism, posits a categorical or essential and mutually exclusive (that is, either-or, and not both) difference between direct, veridical perception on the one hand, and non-veridical conscious experiences—for example, complete or partial hallucinations—on the other hand. *Anti-disjunctivism* about perception, by an opposing contrast, claims that not only is there no categorical or essential difference between direct, veridical perception and hallucination, but also that there is something inherently shared in common between direct, veridical perception and non-veridical

conscious experiences like hallucination, such that the two either actually always are, or at least can be, *epistemically indiscriminable*.

Predictably, in the relevant philosophical literature there are different versions of disjunctivism, including epistemic and metaphysical versions, stronger and weaker versions, and so-on. But my specifically Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualist, radically naïve realist version of disjunctivism says that although direct, veridical perception and non-veridical conscious experiences are indeed sometimes, for various context-sensitive reasons, *undiscriminated*, nevertheless they are *in principle discriminable*.

The actual or possible epistemic *in*discriminability of direct, veridical and non-veridical conscious experiences like hallucinations, in turn, not only *requires concepts* but also is a necessary condition of classical Cartesian skepticism about perceptual knowledge. Hence a Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualist and radically naïve realist approach to sense perception is especially well-positioned to avoid classical Cartesian skepticism about perceptual knowledge.[247] More precisely however, my version of disjunctivism about sense perception makes the following three claims—

(Disjunctivism about Sense Perception 1): A consciously experiencing animal subject can be *either* perceiving directly and veridically, in which case the subject stands in an immediate, unmediated cognitive relation to an individual causally efficacious macroscopic material being that is consciously and correctly perceived by her in that context and which partially constitutes the mental content and phenomenal character of that direct, veridical perceptual act or state *or* else consciously experiencing in a non-veridical way (for example, a complete or partial hallucination), in which case the experiencing subject does *not* stand in a direct cognitive relation to an individual macroscopic being that is consciously and correctly perceived by her in that context, but *not both*.

(Disjunctivism about Sense Perception 2): Direct, veridical perception and non-veridical conscious experience, for example, hallucination, are categorically or essentially different, hence they share no mental content or phenomenal character whatsoever, and in fact share only whatever it extrinsically or non-essentially is that makes them sometimes undiscriminated, namely the variable abilities of the conscious animal subject to attend to the inherently different phenomenology of the experiences and to discriminate between these in different contexts.

(Disjunctivism about Sense Perception 3): Direct, veridical perception and non-veridical conscious experience, for example, hallucination, are inherently discriminable by a suitably attentive, self-conscious, and self-reflective conscious animal subject, even if not always discriminated by that subject, or indeed by any other such subject, at any given time, due to context-sensitive failures of the subject's ability to discriminate. This discriminative ability, therefore, is authoritative but not infallible.[248]

Now applying these Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualist, radical naïve realist ideas to the capacity for memory, my account of essentially non-conceptual egocentric episodic and skill-memory, as foundational and primitive, would start with what I call the essentially embodied *V-Relation* (namely, *veridicality relation*) that is loaded in basic sense perception, and then stretch it out over time, with updated content moment-by-moment, and correspondingly updated formal (spatio)temporal representations, in a way that it is substantially similar to Kant's threefold idea in the Transcendental Aesthetic section of the first *Critique* that our representation of time is the immediate form of inner sense, that our representation of space is the immediate form of outer sense, and that our representation of time, again, is the *mediate* form of outer sense. Correspondingly, here are the basics of a Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualist, radically naïve realist theory of memory.

First, egocentric episodic memory and egocentric skill-memory are grounded on essentially non-conceptual sense-perceptual content. In this way, there is a disjunctivism for memory that runs parallel to my version of disjunctivism for sense perception. According to the Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualist, radically naïve realist theory of memory I am proposing, then, the fundamental cognitive activity of memory is *preserving a V-Relation over (space)time, via essentially non-conceptual content*. By sharp contrast, any mental state that lacked the preserved V-Relation over (space)time wouldn't be real memory, but in fact only "false memory," even if it had some superficially similar features that allowed, in context, for failures of discrimination by the subject. So false memories are the analogues of perceptual hallucinations. Misremembering, correspondingly, is the analogue of perceptual illusions: preserved V-relations with significantly false conceptual/propositional content.

Second, allocentric/semantic episodic memory, and semantic memory more generally, are doubly grounded,

> on (i) egocentric episodic memory and egocentric skill-memory, hence on essentially non-conceptual content,
> and also on (ii) conceptual content.

To the extent that memory is grounded on conceptual content, it involves significant "cognitive penetration"—which is just a recent, newfangled term for the use of concepts in cognition under the thesis of Conceptualism. But to the extent that memory is grounded on essentially non-conceptual content, it is *inherently resistant to*, that is, *necessarily underdetermined by and cognitively autonomous from*, conceptualization and cognitive penetration.

In this way, then, what holds for the radically naïve realist theory of sense perception that I developed in *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori* must also hold for the radically naïve realist theory of memory I am sketching in this essay. Here, disjunctivism for memory says:

> EITHER I am in a veridical memory state, aka *real memory*, grounded on essentially non-conceptual content,
>
> OR ELSE I am in a categorically different state that may superficially resemble real memory in various ways, sufficient to fool me in certain contexts, but it is not really memory, rather it is only "fake memory," *and the difference between veridical, real memory and non-veridical, fake memory is in-principle epistemically discriminable*.

The in-principle epistemic discriminability of veridical, real memories and non-veridical, fake memories is crucially important in what follows.

### 2.3.4  The Political Philosophy of Memory

That finally brings me to the political philosophy of memory, as brilliantly explored in literary fiction by Orwell, and more recently, in cultural criticism, by Henry Giroux.[249]

It is clearly true that all memory, insofar as it contains a conceptual component, is somewhat fallible and unreliable. See, for example, the famous study on the unreliability of "flashbulb memories" done in the early 1980s by Ulric Neisser, and many other studies on misremembering done since then, cited by De Brigard. But those facts should be no more likely to make us skeptics and constructivists/irrealists about memory than the fact that all sense perception, insofar as it contains a conceptual component is somewhat fallible and unreliable, should make us skeptics and constructivists/irrealists about sense perception.

Nevertheless, obviously, just like sense perceptual illusions and hallucinations, concept-driven misremembering and non-veridical, fake memories *can be manipulated*. A prime mechanism of thought-control in coercive authoritarian States, especially totalitarian ones, is inducing misremembering ("illusions" of memory) or non-veridical, fake memories ("hallucinations" of memory) for coercive political purposes—as per the terrifying heyday of the Inquisition, as per the Nazi/fascist era of the 1930s and early 40s, and as per Orwell's *1984*, which is of course a dystopian sci-fi allegory of the late 1940s that comprehends both the totalitarian Nazi/fascist era and the post-World War II totalitarian Stalinist/communist era.

But the ideological manipulation of memory also fully applies to contemporary neo-Hobbesian, scientistic, technocratic, big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States. For example, suppose that you are exposed hour after hour, day after day, to movies, TV, music, social media, etc.,etc., that were subtly or not-so-subtly Statist, anti-communist/socialist, racist/anti-Arab, ultra-capitalist, ultra-patriotic, etc., etc., and suppose that this started when you were very young. Then, almost inevitably, you would have all sorts of misrememberings and/or non-veridical, fake memories, say, about 9-11,

about various American invasions of other countries, or about the crowd size at Trump's Inauguration—"we feel compelled to go out and clear the air and put alternative facts out there"—just as if you were living in a media-created version of *The Matrix*:

> A: "Are we at war with Russia (or North Korea, Syria, etc., etc.), or not? Dang. I can't remember now."
> B: "I don't know either! Better check Facebook and our Twitter feeds."

Indeed, I believe that a great many Americans have all sorts of ideologically-manipulated misrememberings and/or non-veridical, fake memories with significant political content and implications, about themselves, about history, and about the world in general. And, of course, not just Americans. In the larger context of contemporary neo-Hobbesian, scientistic, technocratic, big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States, and of course paradigmatically in classical totalitarian States like Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia or neo-totalitarian States like contemporary China, the ideological manipulation of human memory for economic and political purposes is virtually a universal phenomenon. Indeed, if you have ever gone to school, read a popular magazine or popular book, read a newspaper, looked at a billboard advertisement, watched TV and especially a newscast, watched a movie or streamed a video to your personal computer, listened to a radio, or to an iPod or MP3 player, downloaded podcasts to your handheld mobile device, used the internet, or used any kind of social media, or, like most of us, *all of the above*, then you have been dangerously exposed to it.

Moreover, not merely misremembering and non-veridical, fake memories *but also perceptual illusions and perceptual hallucinations* can be (and are constantly being) manipulated for political purposes, as per the Inquisition, as per classical or neo-totalitarian States like Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and contemporary China, and as per the contemporary political situation in neo-Hobbesian, scientistic, technocratic, big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States. That is a direct entailment of the "cognitive penetration" thesis—indeed, it is simply a direct entailment of the role of concepts in human cognition, interacting with contemporary social institutions, especially States and State-like institutions—even if most cognitive-science-oriented work on memory and sense perception that contemporary philosophers of mind pay any serious attention to, generally presents itself as completely innocent of social and political implications.

People who have had serious ideological disciplining start to see, hear, smell, feel, and taste the world, and to experience their own bodies, and other people's bodies, and to remember or seem to remember, in ideologically-determined, sociopolitically expedient ways. For example, perceptually stereotyping/framing people with a certain non-Hungarian ethnicity and social history as "dirty," perceptually stereotyping/framing young men who have dark skin and are wearing hoodies as "threatening to the police," or

perceptually sterotyping/framing refugees who have swarthy complexions and are wearing vaguely foreign-styled clothing as "potential terrorists" or "potentially threatening to women." And then of course there's that "alternative fact" about the crowd size at Trump's Presidential Inauguration.

For all these reasons, I strongly believe that we can all significantly learn, and also individually and collectively benefit, from the political philosophy of cognition. Moreover and above all, any *emancipatory political philosophy*—for example, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchism[250]—is also going to have to develop and deploy a political philosophy of cognition as an essential part of its theoretical and practical repertoire.

Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualism and radically naïve realism about memory and about sense perception are uniquely theoretically well-suited for providing an adequate explanation of such ideological manipulation, and also for developing phenomenologically robust and agentially effective strategies for cognitive resistance, ideological self-deprogramming, and cognitive self-liberation. This is for two reasons.

First, mainstream theories of cognition, like De Brigard's, are either content-monist, constructivist/irrealist, or functionalist/mechanistic, or any two of the above, or all three, and therefore cannot accommodate or account for

> either (i) first-person, conscious or self-conscious cognitive resistance to cognitive penetration,
> or (ii) first-person, conscious or self-conscious veridical cognition, as a realistic and in-principle epistemically discriminable standard against which misremembering (illusions of memory), perceptual illusions, and non-veridical, fake memories (hallucinations of memory), and perceptual hallucinations can always be directly and first-personally, as well as intersubjectively, tested,
> or (iii) first-person, conscious or self-conscious normatively-guided, free volitional control of cognitive activities.

In short, these mainstream theories cannot account for phenomenologically robust and agentially effective strategies for cognitive resistance, ideological self-deprogramming, and cognitive self-liberation *that we can freely try out and repeatedly practice ourselves, in public contexts,* in a process of critical, radically enlightening, mutual self-education in which students and critical educators are reciprocally learning from and teaching each other.[251]

Second, and sharply on the contrary, it follows that the Strong Kantian Non-Conceptualist, radically naïve realist approach to memory and sense perception *is* in a uniquely good position to explain the foundations of contemporary empirical research about cognitive bias, the persistence of misinformation, and the effectiveness of cognitive de-biasing. For example, diagrammatically represented, here is what Stephan Lewandowsky and his co-researchers propose:[252]

Figure 2. Techniques for successful cognitive debiasing.

To repeat: in view of the Strong Non-Conceptualism and radically naïve realism about memory and sense perception, it follows that *we can freely try out and repeatedly practice these techniques ourselves, in public contexts,* in a process of critical, radically enlightening mutual self-education in which students and critical educators are reciprocally learning from and teaching each other.

Therefore, sharply unlike what is entailed by mainstream theories of cognition like De Brigard's, according to the Strong Non-Conceptualist, radically naïve realist theory of memory and sense perception that I have just been arguing for, *we don't need* Government-funded or corporate capitalist-funded and Government-monitored or corporate capitalist-monitored men in white coats, cog-sci labs, machines, or drugs to be able to do this. *We can do it ourselves, without the funding and without the technocracy*. That is: *we don't*

*need* a little army of neo-Hobbesian, scientistic, technocratic, big-capitalist neoliberal democratic, university-based O'Briens in white coats to reverse-manipulate what some other O'Brien did to us. *We can do it ourselves, without being told what to do by the O'Briens*.

Moreover at this point, the more or less covert, significant social and political commitments of mainstream theories of cognition, including De Brigard's, should be self-evident: *follow the funding!*

## 2.3.5  Conclusion

In order to develop the politically resistant and emancipatory cognitive strategies I have been talking about, like the ones suggested by Lewandowsky and his co-researchers, embedded in political theories and real-world political frameworks that emphasize individual and collective free agency and radical enlightenment, and grounded on the Strong Conceptualist, radically naïve realist theory of human sense perception and memory, I hereby propose *that we creatively adapt* well-tested, effective techniques for resisting cult-indoctrination, military-prisoner thought-control, and kidnap-victim or terrorist-hostage-victim thought-control, especially including Stockholm Syndrome, *and then apply them ourselves, in public contexts*, in order to resist and reverse the ideological manipulation of human cognition for economic and political purposes.

Indeed, the Wikipedia article on "Mind Control" is a good starting-place for learning about these techniques.[253] An important and illuminating irony here, of course, is that the most practically-useful, hands-on accounts of these techniques have been recorded in classified, publicly-unavailable US security agency, military, and foreign service handbooks that have themselves been designed and written in the larger context of powerful, politically-expedient ideological cognitive manipulation, by the US government, of the very people who are required to study and master those handbooks as part of their highly demanding, rigorous, and thought-controlling training.[254]

But this is only one of many important, illuminating ironies in the political philosophy of cognition.

# ESSAY 2.4 THINKING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE FLY-BOTTLE: THE NEW POVERTY OF PHILOSOPHY AND ITS SECOND COPERNICAN REVOLUTION



Welche Thiere gleichen einander am meisten?

Kaninchen und Ente.

Figure 3. Duck-rabbit diagram.

The civil (*bürgerliche*) status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem.[255]

It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of words in unheard-of ways. For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But that simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear. The real discovery is one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* into question…. There is not *a* philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (*PI* para. §133, p. 51e)

What is your aim in philosophy? —To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. (*PI* para. §309, p. 103e, translation slightly modified)

Just as professionals engage in playpen creativity, innovating within the safe confines of an assigned ideology, so too they engage in playpen critical thinking. Their work involves judging whether or not the ideas of others are in line with the favored outlook, but does not involve developing their own, independent point of view. Hence professionals

tend to be what might be called "book review" critical, which is intellectually and politically safe because it doesn't involve developing or taking a stand for an independent outlook. Professionals generally avoid the risk inherent in real critical thinking and cannot properly be called critical thinkers. They are simply ideologically disciplined thinkers. Real critical thinking means uncovering and questioning social, political and moral assumptions; applying and refining a personally developed worldview; and calling for action that advances a personally created agenda. An approach that backs away from any of these three components lacks the critical spirit. Ideologically disciplined thinkers, especially the more gung-ho ones, often give the *appearance* of being critical thinkers as they go around deftly applying the official ideology and confidently reporting their judgments.[256]

He who has properly **learned** a system of philosophy, for example, the Wolffian system, although he has in his head all of the principles, explanations, and proofs together with the division of the entire theoretical edifice, and can count everything off on his fingers, still has nothing other than **historical cognition** of the Wolffian philosophy; he knows and judges only as much as has been given to him. If you dispute one of his definitions, he has no idea where to go to get another one. He has formed himself according to an alien reason, but the faculty of imitation is not that of generation, i.e., the cognition did not arise **from** reason for him, and although it was certainly was objective cognition, subjectively, it is still merely historical. He has grasped and preserved well, i.e., he has learned, and is a plaster cast of a living human being. (*CPR* A836/B864, boldfacing in the original)

Now, the power to judge autonomously—that is, freely (according to principles of thought in general)—is called reason. So the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to adopt, or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by the government. (*CF* 7: 27)

[N]ormally a teacher of philosophy would be the last person to whom it would occur that philosophy could in effect be dead earnest, just as the most irreligious Christian is usually the Pope. Hence it is among the rarest cases that a genuine philosopher is at the same time a lecturer in philosophy…. I have already discussed the fact that *Kant* represented this exceptional case, together with the grounds and consequences of this.[257]

### 2.4.1  Introduction

Karl Marx's 1847 book, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, a scathing attack on the economic and political ideas of the French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, is notable primarily for its wickedly witty title, which brilliantly flips the title of Proudhon's 1846 book, *The Philosophy of Poverty*. In a 1956 review of an English-language edition of Marx's book, the economist Joan Robinson wrote:

The entertainment value...is not great. There is no wit in *The Poverty of Philosophy* apart from its title; Proudhon's ideas were confused enough to begin with, and Marx's presentation of them makes them totally unseizable, so that there is little sport to be got out of following the argument.[258]

So much for Marx for the purposes of this essay—except for one passing reference in section 2.4.7. Here, I want only *to re-cycle Marx's most excellent title* in order to formulate and defend two metaphilosophical theses.

The first thesis is I what I call *The New Poverty of Philosophy*, which says:

So-called "hard" problems in philosophy are actually institutional artifacts of Anglo-American professional academic philosophy since 1912—the year in which Russell's immensely influential book, The Problems of Philosophy, first appeared—and in particular, they are institutional artifacts of the ideologically disciplined social-institutional structure of Anglo-American professional academic philosophy since the end of World War II.

And the second thesis is what I call *Philosophy's Second Copernican Revolution*, which says this:

In order to end and reverse the new poverty of philosophy, instead of assuming that philosophy is really possible only *inside* the professional academy, we postulate that philosophy is really possible only *outside* the professional academy.

My conception of "the new poverty of philosophy" is a way of reinterpreting and updating Wittgenstein's deep insight that philosophy as he knew it by the end of World War II—that is, professional academic philosophy—is, in a cognitive, emotional, moral, and political sense, just like a fly buzzing around and around, forever trapped inside a fly-bottle. Correspondingly, my conception of "ending and reversing the new poverty of philosophy" is also a way of reinterpreting and updating Wittgenstein's deep insight that

[t]he real discovery [about "the philosophical problems"—cf. Russell's *The Problems of Philosophy*] is one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. –The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* into question.

And finally, my conception of "philosophy's second Copernican revolution" is a metaphilosophical way of embedding those reinterpreted and updated *Wittgensteinian* ideas within a broader and deeper (hence also first-order philosophical) *contemporary Kantian* context that also fully incorporates what, in the Preface and General Introduction,

I called *rational anthropology*, and also, in essay 2.2 above, I called the *New* Copernican Revolution in philosophy, namely, *organicism*.

### 2.4.2  Wittgenstein and the Fly-Bottle

In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (henceforth, in this supplementary essay, abbreviated in internal citations as *TLP*) the early Wittgenstein wrote:

> The general form of propositions is: Such-and-such is the case.[259]

And in the *Philosophical Investigations* (henceforth, in this supplementary essay, abbreviated in internal citations as *PI*) the later Wittgenstein wrote:

> (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 4.5): "The general form of propositions is: Such-and-such is the case." —That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature ove and over again, and one is merely tracing around the frame through which we look at it. A *picture* held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. (*PI* para. §§114-115, p. 48ᵉ, translation slightly modified)

This cognitively enslaving philosophical "picture," in turn, is essentially bound up with *the sublimity of logic*, that is, the idea that philosophically-driven mathematical logic is a *super-science* yielding a priori certainty and noumenal ontological implications:

> In what sense is logic something sublime? For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth—a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences and is not meant to concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that. —It takes its rise, not from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to understand causal connections: but from an urge to understand the basis, the essence, of everything empirical. (*PI* para. §89, p. 42ᵉ)
>
> Thought is surrounded by a halo. —Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact, the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of *possibilities*, which must be common to both world and thought. But this order, it seems, must be *utterly simple*. It is *prior* to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it—It must rather be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the *hardest* thing there is (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, No. 5.5563). (*PI* para. §97, p. 44ᵉ)

Philosophy conceived as *logical analysis*, in the tradition of Frege, early Russell, and the author of the *Tractatus*, outright asserts or in any case presupposes the sublimity of logic. Correspondingly, according to Wittgenstein's own highly original *Tractarian* version of philosophy,

> (i) philosophy is the activity (not the theory) of the logical clarification of thoughts, consisting essentially of analytic elucidations, without predetermining the completion of analysis (*TLP* prop. 4.112, p. 77), and
> (ii) all philosophy is "critique of language" in that it displays the senselessness of most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters (*TLP* prop. 4.003, p. 63), and asserts only the propositions of natural science, then recognizes its own propositions as senseless and ends in mystical silence, thereby ending philosophy and at the same time radically transforming one's own life (*TLP* props. 6.54-7, p. 189).

Importantly, Wittgenstein's conception of logical analysis as having this basic structure, namely—

> logically clarifying activity→critique of language→ending philosophy→radically transforming one's own life

—also has the theoretical virtue of being able to avoid *the paradox of analysis*. According to the paradox of analysis, if an analysis is true, then it must be uninformative because merely definitional, hence trivial; but if an analysis is non-trivial and informative, then it must be non-definitional, hence false; so analysis is either trivial or false. But if analysis is essentially a logico-philosophical *process* and not a logico-philosophical *product*, like a proposition or theory, then strictly speaking it is never true or false, so the paradox is avoided. Nevertheless, if the later Wittgenstein's argument against the sublimity of logic and its intimately associated "pictures" of logic, language, mind, and thought, is sound, then philosophy as logical analysis, whether Fregean/earlyRussellian *or* early Wittgensteinian, is impossible.

So what, according to the later Wittgenstein, does philosophy become *after* the collapse of logical analysis? In fact, the later Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the *Investigations* has essentially the same basic structure, namely—

> logically clarifying activity→critique of language→ending philosophy→radically transforming one's own life

—as in the *Tractatus*, but now *without the sublimity of logic*. Here are some of the most important texts that spell this out:

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (*PI* para. §109, p. 47ᵉ)

The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. (*PI* para. §119, p. 48ᵉ)

A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about." (*PI* para. §123, p. 49ᵉ)

Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is. (*PI* para. §124, p. 49ᵉ)

It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs *before* the contradiction I resolved. (And this does not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty.) The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed, That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules. This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e., get a clear view of). It throws light on our concept of *meaning* something. For in those cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: "I didn't mean I like that." The civil (*bürgerliche*) status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem. (*PI* para. §125, p. 50ᵉ)

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. --Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions. (*PI* para. §126, p. 50ᵉ)

The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose. (*PI* para. §127, p. 50ᵉ).

If one tried to advance *theses* in philosophy, it would never be possible to question them, because everyone would agree to them. (*PI* para. § 128, p. 50ᵉ)

It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of words in unheard-of ways.

For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But that simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear. The real discovery is one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. –The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* into

question…. There is not *a* philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (*PI* para. §133, p. 51ᵉ).

> What is your aim in philosophy? —To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. (*PI* para. §309, p. 103ᵉ)

> In philosophy we do not draw conclusions. "But it must be like this!" is not a philosophical proposition. Philosophy only states what everyone admits. (*PI* para. §599, 156ᵉ)

To summarize, then, for the later Wittgenstein, here is what a philosopher does—s/he:

> (i) displays and diagnoses the dialectical structure of existing "hard"problems, especially including the cognitively enslaving pictures that hold philosophers captive,
> (ii) which are themselves *social-institutional* problems, each one displaying "the civil (*bürgerliche*) status of a contradiction," then
> (iii) describes, unpacks, compares, and contrasts the concepts implicit in our various ordinary uses of language and states various truisms about them, and then,
> (iv) having thereby purged her/himself of bad, cognitively enslaving pictures, thus "show[ing] the fly the way out of the fly-bottle," finally
> (v) s/he stops doing philosophy and at the same time radically transforms her/his own life.

For my purposes here, the essential thing about Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy—whether in the *Tractatus* or in the *Investigations*, but especially in the *Investigations*—is that according to this conception, philosophy is emphatically *not* any kind of super-powered natural or formal science, and especially *not* a super-powered kind of mathematical logic, *nor* is it any kind of intellectual appendage or underlaborer to the natural or formal sciences, but instead it is *fundamentally practical, existential, and social-institutional*. This, I take it, is precisely what Wittgenstein means when he writes:

> The civil (*bürgerliche*) status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem. (*PI* para. §125, p. 50ᵉ)

> It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of words in unheard-of ways. For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But that simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear. The real discovery is one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* into question…. There is not *a* philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (*PI* para. § 133, p. 51ᵉ)

> What is your aim in philosophy? —To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. (*PI* para. §309, p. 103ᵉ, translation slightly modified)

### 2.4.3  Gaps, Knots, and Philosophical Pictures

In this and the next section, using later Wittgenstein's practical, existential, and social-institutional conception of philosophy as a jumping-off point, I'm going to reinterpret it by generalizing it and also update it by placing it in a larger historical context.

In this reinterpretative generalization, a classical or typical "hard" philosophical problem, epitomized by the sort of problem discussed in Russell's immensely influential *Problems of Philosophy*, has a three-part structure, as follows—

> (i) There is an *explanatory gap* between some set of basic facts and another set of basic facts.

For example, in the classical mind-body problem: "how is consciousness or subjective experience, which is fundamentally mental, possible in a fundamentally physical world?" The first set of basic facts are subjective, non-mechanical facts about consciousness (the mind), and the second set of basic facts are objective, mechanical facts about physical processes (the body). So there is an explanatory gap between mind-facts and body-facts.

> (ii) There is a *conceptual knot*, or theoretical puzzle, that needs to be untangled before there can be any significant progress in philosophical understanding.

For example, in the classical mind-body problem, it seems impossible to understand how something that is fundamentally mental could ever arise through fundamentally physical processes. This conceptual knot is also known as "Cartesian conceptual dualism."

> (iii) There is a *philosophical picture*, that is, a critically-unexamined presupposition, or set of critically-unexamined presuppositions, being made by all participants in the existing debate.

For example, in the classical mind-body problem, it is being uncritically presupposed by all philosophical participants in the existing debate that mental facts are inherently non-physical and essentially exclude physical facts, and also that physical facts are inherently non-mental and essentially exclude mental facts.

Significant progress on, for example, the classical mind-body problem, can be made only by identifying the explanatory gaps, conceptual knots, and philosophical pictures, critically questioning the unexamined presuppositions, and then proposing a new, "outside-the-fly-bottle" way of conceptualizing the basic facts. Indeed, it is possible to reject the philosophical picture/critically-unexamined presupposition of Cartesian conceptual dualism, and propose that that mental facts and physical facts are *not* mutually exclusive, and that in fact both mental facts and physical facts arise from *a single third domain of*

*more basic facts that are neither fundamentally mental nor fundamentally physical.* So far, however, we have only gotten as far as *neutral monism*, which, to the extent that it usually has physicalist motivations–say, as per Spinoza or Russell–is still trapped inside the fly-bottle of Cartesian conceptual dualism. But a radically different third domain would be primitive facts about immanently-structured non-equilibrium complex thermodynamic systems–flows of actual and potential energy, and/or matter–especially including organismic living systems. This genuinely new, truly "outside-the-fly-bottle" way of conceptualizing the basic facts about the mind-body relation is known as *organicism*, as I've spelled it out and defended it in "Kant, Nature, and Humanity," essay 2.2 above, and elsewhere.[260] Historically speaking, you might call it "whiteheading the russell," in view of Whitehead's breakthrough, brilliant—and since the late 1970s, much neglected—1929 organicist treatise, *Process and Reality*.[261] Exploring the organicist option, therefore, involves truly "thinking outside the fly-bottle" of Cartesian conceptual dualism.

Nevertheless, the great majority of contemporary professional academic philosophers cannot even *see* the organicist option; or if they are exposed to it, they instantly reject it as "crazy," thereby dismissing anyone who seriously holds it, shut their eyes, put plugs in their ears, take another Tylenol PM, roll over, and fall back into Goya's "sleep of reason" again. And *the very same three-part structure and associated pattern of cognitive pathology* can be found in the free will problem, the problem of knowledge, the realism/idealism problem, the personal identity problem, the problem of moral skepticism, the problem of God's existence or non-existence, the problem of political authority, etc., etc., etc.

### 2.4.4  Where Do All the Fly-Bottles Come From?

In an important recent article, Joel Katzav and Krist Vaesen argue, compellingly, that the mid-20th century emergence of Analytic philosophy in the USA consisted in an institutional take-over of leading philosophy departments and leading journals by Analytic philosophers, in or around 1948-1950.[262] Then, immediately thereafter, leading Analytic philosophers engaged in a systematic professional exclusion of alternatives to Analytic philosophy, especially including speculative philosophy and the earlier American pragmatic tradition, on the way towards the systematic exclusion of Continental philosophy a little later on. Katzav and Vaesen are fairly guarded about the political dimension of this story, and say that there is no empirical evidence for a direct causal connection between McCarthyism and the institutional take-over of, for example, *The Philosophical Review*, by Analytic philosophers between 1948 and 1950. But that's not terribly surprising:

"Dear Readers of *The Philosophical Review*,

> We just wanted to inform you that we're institutionally taking over and professionally pushing Analytic philosophy down your throats now, because we're scared—*really, really scared*—by The House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, aka HUAC, and by McCarthyism in America.
>
> And this works out *really, really well for US*, even if *not for YOU*, because Analytic philosophy is not only inherently politically conformist, given its commitment to the fact-value dichotomy and its methodological value-neutrality, its Scholastic formalism and logic-worship, and its scientism, but also fully complicit in the post-World War II military-industrial complex.
>
> Yours calculatingly,
> The New Editors"

–Obviously, nothing like this would ever happen, except in a *Monty Python's Flying Circus* world.

Nevertheless, in the very next paragraph and in the concluding paragraphs of their essay, Katzav and Vaesen also say explicitly that their argument *is smoothly consistent with* John McCumber's critically edgy thesis, worked out in his books *Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era* and *The Philosophy Scare: The Politics of Reason in the Early Cold War*,[263] to the same effect, namely,

> (i) there is an elective affinity between McCarthyism and the fact-value dichotomy and value-neutrality, the Scholastic formalism and logic-worship, and the scientism, of Analytic philosophy, such that
> (ii) McCarthyism and Analytic philosophy in mid-20th century America, together did indeed actually produce a style of professional academic philosophy that is not only inherently politically conformist but also fully complicit in the post-World War II military-industrial complex.

Not only that, but in order for McCarthyism and Analytic philosophy to do this together, leading Analytic philosophers had to carry out the systematic exclusion of American pragmatism and also Heidegger-inspired and Sartre-inspired Continental philosophy, insofar as

> (i) earlier pragmatists like Dewey had been explicitly *socialists*,
> (ii) pre-War Heidegger had been a *Nazi*, and
> (iii) post-War Sartre was a *Communist*.

No dogs, philosophical socialists, philosophical Nazis, or philosophical commies allowed! All things considered, I think that McCumber is absolutely correct; and, correspondingly, I also think that Katzav's and Vaesen's argument is smoothly consistent with McCumber's thesis.

Now, what about contemporary professional academic philosophy, especially including, but not restricted to, Analytic philosophy? The central line of argument in Jeff Schmidt's compelling, radical 2000 book, *Disciplined Minds*, says that through various subtle and not-so-subtle means, most members of the professional academy are selected for their tendency *to obey*, by conforming to the ideological discipline of their professional academic field. Evidence includes subtleties like biases in tests like the Graduate Record Exam, aka the GRE , which emphasize the ability for rule-following and disciplined memorization over deeper critical thinking; less-subtle selection methods like graduate school comprehensive exams, which again emphasize disciplined study/memorization over independent thinking; and even less-subtle selection methods like hiring practices that are clearly ideologically/politically driven by departmental politics, profession-wide politics, higher-administrative university politics, and straight-up local, state-level, or national-level governmental politics.

Question: Why specifically *these* types of gates-of-entry to the professional world?

Answer: Because it's what the bosses/masters/administrators/rulers want in their employees/wage-slaves/administrees/subjects.This fully includes employees/wage-slaves/administrees/subjects like professional academics, including of course professional academic philosophers. Schmidt's best case for this involves his own field, physics, a field driven by its corporate and military applications, therefore driven by its connections to the unelected national and global power elite that runs the US government, *the military-industrial-university-digital complex*. But professional academic philosophy, especially mainstream Analytic philosophy, lives, moves, and has its being, by buzzing around and around, forever trapped inside essentially the same kind of fly-bottle. For example, the *scientism* that afflicts and infects contemporary professional philosophy, especially mainstream Analytic philosophy,[264] does so in ways that are completely out of proportion to the at-most moderate influence that natural and formal science *ought* to have on philosophical practice.

Philosophers do extremely well on the GRE, it has been empirically shown. Only engineers, mathematicians, and physicists do better on the quantitative part, but philosophers *do best overall*, when the analytical-reasoning and verbal-comprehension parts are taken into account. More generally, then, professional academic philosophers are obedient specialists *par excellence*. The multi-leveled problem of obedient specialization in professional philosophy is fundamentally what later Wittgenstein calls a "civil" problem, that is, a *social-institutional* problem, and indeed a *political* problem, because endemic, obedient, forced early-specialization, and hyper-specialization flow naturally from the deep but all-too-often unacknowledged influence of larger sociocultural and political mechanisms of *big capitalism, scientism, Statism and scientistic Statism* (see section 2.2.4 above) on professional academic philosophy. So the role played by *language* and *civil society* in later Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy can be updated and replaced by *social institutions more generally, especially political ones*. And this updating and

substitution is entirely natural, since language itself, according to the later Wittgenstein's own conception of it, *just is* a social institution, since social institutions are collective human actions under shared norms, and since language for later Wittgenstein *just is* a fundamental form of collective human action under shared norms.[265]

Now by a *bad philosophical picture* I mean a set of interlinked unarticulated, unargued presuppositions that consistently yields significant conceptual blindness/blinkeredness and conceptual confusion in philosophy. And by a *disastrously bad philosophical picture* I mean a bad philosophical picture that is so gripping and so severely mistaken it that covertly drives philosophy into a conceptual cul de sac or vicious loop, consisting of endless insoluble antinomies and/or radical skepticism, in effect killing real philosophy, and then generating from its death throes only arid, narrow, pointless, busy-busy-busy bee philosophical scholasticism and sophistry. --In other words, a philosophical *fly-bottle*. You know, the very sort of thing that the *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Philosophical Investigations* were written to diagnose, undermine, and overcome?

Sadly, there are all-too-many examples of how endemic, forced early-specialization and hyper-specialization, in the context of ideological discipline and obedient culture in contemporary professional academic philosophy, covertly induce or outright produce new fly-bottles, disastrously bad philosophical pictures—like the fly-bottle of Cartesian conceptual dualism. So in other words, then, all the fly-bottles, or disastrously bad philosophical pictures, that grip and haunt contemporary professional academic philosophy are covertly induced or outright produced by

(i) the GRE-driven pre-selection of obedient, formally adept, rule-implementing people by PhD programs in philosophy, especially in the most highly-ranked departments, and
(ii) endemic, forced early-specialization and hyper-specialization.

Hence the reason that professional academic philosophers cannot think outside their disastrously bad philosophical pictures, their fly-bottles, is simply that powerful mechanisms of ideological discipline in contemporary professional academic philosophy induce or produce in them an ideologically-manipulated, obedient state of cognitive blindness/blinkeredness about the genuine space of conceptual options actually open to them.

In short, so-called "hard" problems in recent and contemporary philosophy are actually *institutional artifacts* of Anglo-American professional academic philosophy since 1912, and in particular, they are institutional artifacts of *the ideologically disciplined social-institutional structure* of Anglo-American professional academic philosophy since the end of World War II. The great philosophers of the past, up through the end of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century, prior to the publication of Russell's *Problems of Philosophy* in 1912, never formulated or understood these "hard" problems in just this way. Of course, those earlier philosophers were engaging and struggling with some or all of the

same basic facts, explanatory gaps, conceptual knots, and philosophical pictures. But the pictures hadn't yet *hardened* into fly-bottles in the way they did after early Russell. No wonder, then, that early Wittgenstein was so intensely annoyed and enervated by early Russell and his logico-philosophical work up to the beginning of World War I,[266] and no wonder that Wittgenstein's critical metaphilosophy unfolded as it did. –And similarly it's no accident, as far as *organicism* is concerned, and as far as "whiteheading the russell" is concerned, that Whitehead *wasn't* a professional academic philosopher.[267]

Of course, it wasn't really *all* Russell's fault. Indeed, Russell had his own Close Encounter with the coercive moralism of the professional academy, higher university administration, and British government during World War I, being jailed for pacifist, social-anarchist activism, then having his Trinity fellowship rescinded (plus, the fellowship ouster also had something to do with Russell's "scandalous" personal life), and it all radically changed his philosophical and political life after World War I and into the 1920s,[268] and beyond. It was just that by the end of World War I and into the 1920s, the juggernaut of professional academic philosophy was already on the move, and by the end of World War II, it had pretty much conquered 20th century (and now early 21st century) philosophy, by means of the social-institutional triumph of Russell's more or less unintentionally created Frankenstein monster, Analytic philosophy—

(Fade to black. Then the big screen lights up, and the Coming Attractions start.)

It's Amazing! It's Stupendous! It's Philosophy Like You've Never Seen It Before!

Yes folks!, in the soon-to-be released movie version of the history of early 20th century Analytic philosophy, *Russell's Monster*, based in part on the uncensored 1931 movie version of *Frankenstein*, directed by James Whale, G .E. Moore plays Fritz/Dwight Frye to Russell's Dr Frankenstein/Colin Clive.

(Deafening crashes of thunder, blinding flashes of lightning, and cacaphonously *Sturm und Drang*-ish music.)

Russell in 1912 to Moore: "It's alive! It's alive! In the name of God! Now I know what it feels like to *be* God!"

By the time of the publication of the *Philosophical Investigations* in 1953, at the height of the McCarthy era, the hegemonic social-institutional structure of Anglo-American professional academic philosophy, by means of the triumph of Russell's more or less unintentional creation, Analytic philosophy, was not merely a juggernaut, and not merely a Frankenstein monster, *it was a Frankenstein-Leviathan megamachine monster*. This is especially true in the USA, where professional academic philosophy was a proper part of the larger post-World War II military-industrial-*university* complex; and from the end of

the Cold War, it was also a proper part of the *(neo)liberal majoritarian representaive democratic* military-industrial-university complex; and nowadays, professional academic philosophy is also a proper part of the (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic military-industrial-university-*digital* complex, aka The Deep(er) State. —I say "*Deep(er) State*," because contemporary and future digitalization provide deeper, more terrifying, and all-pervasive dystopian-science-fiction-becomes-reality kinds of opportunities for coercion, hegemony, and constant surveillance than even the classical military-industrial complex ever imagined. So in other words, and to mix and stack my metaphors even more wantonly, the social-institutional structure of contemporary Anglo-American professional academic philosophy is nothing more and nothing less than the all-inclusive early Russellian *fly-bottle* that is the otherwise empty *skull-box* of the Frankenstein-Leviathan megamachine military-industrial-university-digital monster that more or less covertly runs the governments of (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democratic States. And that's what I mean by *The New Poverty of Philosophy*.


## 2.4.5  Philosophy's New Poverty and the University

In the face of the new poverty of philosophy, philosophers all over the world are struggling with the following fundamental metaphilosophical problem:

How is philosophy really possible inside *the professional academy*, aka *the university*?

Here, for example, are fourteen articles that provide six different national perspectives on the problem: American, British, German, Japanese, Japanese/Latin-American, and Latin American—

*** 

1. An American Perspective
Robert Frodeman and Adam Briggle, "Socrates Tenured: The Argument in a Nutshell"[269]

2. A British Perspective
Alexis Papazoglou, "Philosophy, Its Pitfalls, Some Rescue Plans and Their Complications"[270]

3. A German Perspective
Wolfram Eilenberger, ""Die deutschsprachige Philosophie ist in einem desolaten Zustand. Woran liegt das?"[271]

4. Japanese Perspectives

Jeremiah Alberg, "Being on the Ground: Philosophy, Reading and Difficulty"[272]

Wolfgang Ertl, "Home of the Owl? Kantian Reflections on Philosophy at University"[273]

Yasuhira Yahei Kanayama, "The Birth of Philosophy as 哲學 (Tetsugaku) in Japan"[274]

Yasushi Kato, "The Crisis of the Humanities and Social Sciences in the Age of 'Innovation': Philosophy as a Critical Facilitator toward a 'Civic Turn' of the University"[275]

Yuko Murakami, "Philosophy and Higher Education in Japan"[276]

Yuji Nishiyama, "What Remains of Philosophers' Reflections on University?"[277]

5. A Japanese/Latin American Perspective

Hirotaka Nakano, "Is There Japanese/Latin American Philosophy? : A Reflection on Philosophy in University"[278]

6. Latin American Perspectives

Marcelo D. Boeri, "The Presence of Philosophy in Latin American Universities"[279]

SK, "An Insider's View of the Brazilian Philosophical World, Or, How to Build a Really Totalitarian System"[280]

Manuel Vargas, "On the Value of Philosophy: The Latin American Case"[281]

Manuel Vargas, "Real Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, and Metametaphilosophy: On the Plight of Latin American Philosophy"[282]

*\*\*\**

I will not stop to summarize the articles—you can read them yourself; my point here is simply to demonstrate that I am far from being the only contemporary philosopher grappling with this fundamental metaphilosophical problem. Without further ado, then, what I want to do in the next two sections is to present and defend a radical response to the problem of new poverty of philosophy, *Philosophy's Second Copernican Revolution*.

## 2.4.6  Philosophy's Second Copernican Revolution

Now *back to Kant*. (Of course, I'm shamelessly punning on the philosophical call-to-arms of 19th century neo-Kantianism.)

In social, cultural, or intellectual history, a "Copernican Revolution" is a fundamental conceptual, emotional, or practical *Gestalt* shift: a change of worldview. In *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Thomas Kuhn aptly likens such changes of worldview to our

subjective experience of classic, multistable visual perceptual figures like "duck-rabbit."[283] The first Copernican Revolution *in modern philosophy* was Kant's, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant said: Instead of assuming that our minds conform to the world-in-itself, we should postulate that the world as it appears to us conforms to the non-empirical structure of our minds (*CPR* B xvi-xviii). In this way, the ducks of classical Rationalism and classical Empiricism became the rabbit of Transcendental Idealism. But at the same time, Kant also more or less unintentionally initiated *professional academic philosophy*. As Schopenhauer pointed out in his exceptionally edgy essay, "On University Philosophy," Kant was the first—and according to Schopenhauer, the *last* and indeed the *only*—professional academic who was also a truly great philosopher.

Now I said, "Kant *more or less unintentionally* initiated professional academic philosophy." This is because he actually formulated two extremely important, fateful, and also in an unintended sense, *fatal* metaphilosophical claims about professional academic philosophy, in the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" in the first *Critique*—right at the back of the book, the part that no one ever reads, not even most Kantians–and in *The Conflict of the Faculties*, another book that not even most Kantians ever read. Perhaps Kant should have also foreseen the dire consequences of these claims as likely side-effects, in view of the fact that he was the most famous and important philosopher in the world: but he didn't, and that's really too bad. Or if he *did* actually recognize these likely side-effects, he didn't explicitly point them out, which is even worse, because then he was being disingenuous on top of indirectly creating dire consequences for philosophy.

In any case, Kant's first metaphilosophical claim is that *real philosophy*, that is, *authentic, serious* philosophy by means of *autonomous reasoning from a priori principles*, is one thing, and *School philosophy* is another thing altogether, and that to confuse the two is an intellectual disaster. Indeed, he explicitly says that the School philosopher is someone who "has grasped and preserved well, i.e., he has learned [a system of philosophy]," but he is not someone who does philosophy "from reason" and is in fact is nothing but "a plaster cast of a living human being" (*CPR* A836/B864). You can easily see Kant's prima facie good intention here: he wanted to liberate real philosophy from the inauthentic, superficial, dogmatic, hegemonic, Leibnizian-Wolffian School philosophy of his day. But the unintended dire consequence of this was *to stigmatize the history of philosophy and to alienate philosophy from its own past*.

Kant's second metaphilosophical claim is that the philosophy faculty, as a social institution inside a university, must have critical autonomy from the other faculties—law, medicine, and especially *theology*—and also from the government. Again you can easily see Kant's prima facie good intention: he wanted to liberate philosophy from the coercive moralism and hegemony of the theology faculty, acting as mouthpieces for the authoritarian, religiously conservative political regime of his day, commanded by Frederick William II, all of whom were chanelling the censorious religious zealots of contemporary Pietism. But by focusing exclusively on philosophy's critical autonomy

from *theology*, Kant also unintentionally *enslaved philosophy to the dogmatism and hegemony of the natural and formal sciences*.

Moreover, and sadly, Kant's claim that the philosophy faculty is critically autonomous from *the government* is, in fact, bullshit. This is because Kant also explicitly says, both in *The Conflict of the Faculties* and in "What is Enlightenment?," that anyone who has either been officially appointed by the government, or *de facto* is in a position to speak out in public from behind some sort of pulpit or lectern, falls directly under the jurisdiction of the government—so if s/he *publicly argues against the government or is taken by the government to be teaching dangerous things*, then "[s/he] would be inciting the people to rebel against the government" (*CF* 7: 29) and thereby would be directly subject to censorship, reprimand, loss of his position, or prison. The *most* s/he can do is "*argue* as much as you like about whatever you like, *but obey!*" (*WiE* 8: 37). But all university professors, including all philosophy professors, are either appointed by the government, or at the very least, as lecturers in a public or private university, they are in a position to speak out in public from behind a lectern—hence they fall under the direct jurisdiction of the government. Therefore, no matter how much philosophy professors argue, and no matter what they argue about, if they publicly argue against the government or are taken by the government to be teaching dangerous things, then they are not only inciting the people to rebel against the government, and are thereby directly subject to censorship, reprimand, loss of their positions, or prison, but they also must ultimately obey. Thus an even more dire unintended consequence of Kant's second metaphilosophical claim was *to entrench philosophy as a faculty or department within the university, and thereby cognitively enslave philosophy to the coercive dogmatism, hegemony, and constant surveillance of the university and its administrators, the State and its government, and of the Deep(er) State, alike*.

This troika of fateful Kantian oversights—stigmatizing the history of philosophy and alienating philosophy from its own past; cognitively enslaving philosophy to the natural and formal sciences; and entrenching philosophy as a department within a university, thereby cognitively enslaving philosophy to the university and its administrators, to the State and its government, and to the Deep(er) State—has manifested itself in four corresponding ways in 20th and 21st century professional academic philosophy:

    (i) scientism,
    (ii) ideologically-disciplined academic professionalism,
    (iii) Statism in contemporary big capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian representative democracies, and
    (iv) all-pervasive digitalization.

Now taking scientism, ideologically-disciplined academic professionalism, Statism, and all-pervasive digitalization in contemporary big-capitalist (neo)liberal majoritarian

representative democracies together, more generally, we get *the military-industrial-university-digital complex, aka the Deep(er) State*. Then, applying these to professional academic philosophy specifically, and specifically including the stigmatization of the history of philosophy and the alienation of philosophy from its own past, we now have the following *completely fucked-up situation* in the early decades of the 21st century:

> professional academic philosophy, especially as it is practiced at the leading universities and in the leading departments, is nothing but the most alienated, abstract, and abstruse intellectual arm of the military-industrial-university-digital complex, aka the Deep(er) State.

—In other words, the new poverty of philosophy.

That being so, what is to be done? My proposal is *Philosophy's Second Copernican Revolution*:

> Instead of assuming that philosophy is really possible only *inside* the professional academy, we postulate that philosophy is really possible only *outside* the professional academy.

In a non-trivial sense, Philosophy's Second Copernican Revolution is a contemporary, radical update of Diogenes of Sinope's Cynic rejection of the *Academicization* of philosophy under Plato. But in any case, I am saying that *only* in this way can philosophy re-connect with its own past, be critically autonomous from the military-industrial-university-digital complex, and become *real* (that is, authentic, serious) philosophy again. In concrete, practical terms, this means

> (i) that we must engage in a serious critique of professional academic philosophy—for example, *Against Professional Philosophy*,[284]
> (ii) that we must exit departments of philosophy, and, if it is also humanly and practically possible, also exit universities, *altogether*, and
> (iii) that *il faut cultiver notre jardin*:[285] that is, we must create and sustain a new social institutional framework for the real philosophy of the future—for example, *borderless philosophy*.[286]

But here's an amazingly difficult problem. Seriously pursuing (i) and (ii) are extremely likely to make you *unemployed*, and—if not literally *homeless* and living in a barrel that you roll around with you, like Diogenes—then at least *a complete outsider* to the contemporary intellectual Establishment, aka *the intelligentsia*, which, of course, is relentlessly dominated and jealously protected by professional academics. So if you're unemployed and either literally homeless or at least a complete intellectual outsider, then how can you ever make (iii) happen?

In *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant says:

> In addition to … *incorporate*d scholars [i.e., professional academics], there can also be scholars at large, who do not belong to the university but simply work on part of the great content of learning, either forming independent organizations, like various workshops (called academies or scientific societies), or living, so to speak, in a state of nature as far as learning is concerned, each working by himself, as an amateur and without public precepts or rules, at extending and propagating [his field of] learning. (*CF* 7: 18)

Translated out of Kant's quaint terminology, "scholars *at large*," that is, *un*incorporated scholars, are nothing more and nothing less than *anarcho-scholars* aka *borderless scholars*, that is, *truly independent scholars*, and, as philosophers, *anarcho-philosophers*, aka *borderless philosophers*, that is, *truly independent philosophers*. Therefore, the most important and urgent task of contemporary philosophy, *precisely because the fate of the real philosophy of the future depends on it*, is to figure out how to make anarcho-philosophy/borderless philosophy/truly independent philosophy really possible.

### 2.4.7  Some Follow-Up Thoughts and A Hopeful, Upbeat Conclusion

Admittedly, what I have argued so far, especially in section 2.4.6, is pretty radical and somewhat telegraphic: hence some natural objections or worries about my two core theses and their justification might naturally arise. So here are some follow-up thoughts, by way of further elaboration.

First, the parallel philosophical and metaphilosophical trajectories I'm tracing in the work of Wittgenstein and Kant, in support of *The New Poverty of Philosophy* thesis, obviously need more elaboration and defense than I can provide here—but in fact I've already done that elsewhere, in "Wittgenstein and Kantianism."[287]

Second, the parallel between what I'm arguing in support of my *Philosophy's Second Copernican Revolution* thesis, and Kuhn's ideas about "Copernican revolutions" in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, is also extremely important. Put in Kuhnian terminology, I think that the largely implicit, unselfconscious, and pre-reflective guiding presupposition or *paradigm* that has dominated philosophy since the late 18th century, which says that philosophy is really possible only inside the professional academy, has finally played itself out, and is now in a fatal *crisis* phase. Therefore, it is not that I disqualify and reject everything that has been done or is being done inside professional academic philosophy, or consider the best of that work to be in any way unintelligent or less than extremely clever—just as, from the Copernican or Newtonian standpoint, looking back at pre-Copernican or pre-Newtonian physics, or from the relativity/quantum standpoint, looking back at Copernican or Newtonian physics, one wouldn't in any way disqualify and reject everything that was done inside earlier scientific paradigms or

consider the best of that work to be in any way unintelligent or less than extremely clever. Far from it. "Normal science" inside the Newtonian scientific paradigm, for example, clearly is often extremely clever, even brilliant. So too, "normal philosophy" inside the professional academic paradigm clearly is often extremely clever, even brilliant.

Moreover, I think that Kuhn, or at least early Kuhn, *over*emphasized the sharpness of the breaks created by revolutionary scientific paradigm shifts and also the supposed rational incommensurability (whether metaphysical, semantic, epistemic, emotional, moral, or political) between the different scientific paradigms or worldviews. On the contrary, there's a significant background of conceptual and non-conceptual continuity, and many shared higher-level assumptions, even across genuinely revolutionary shifts between scientific paradigms or worldviews. Correspondingly, there's a significant background of conceptual and non-conceptual continuity, and many shared higher-level assumptions, across the first revolutionary philosophical paradigm-shift from pre-Kantian to Kantian philosophy; and the same is the case with the revolutionary metaphilosophical paradigm-shift I'm proposing from professional academic philosophy to post-professional, post-academic, post-neoliberal, post-Statist, post-Deep(er)-Statist *anarcho-philosophy*, aka *borderless philosophy*. Nevertheless, Copernican paradigm-shifts in natural science are still genuinely revolutionary, and so is the Copernican paradigm-shift I'm proposing in philosophy. As in our subjective experience of the *Gestalt* shift between the duck-figure and the rabbit-figure in the multi-stable "duck-rabbit," the *duck* of professional academic philosophy becomes the *rabbit* of anarcho-philosophy/borderless philosophy.

Third, both *The New Poverty of Philosophy* thesis and *Philosophy's Second Copernican Revolution*, even allowing for their importantly Wittgensteinian provenance, and their more distant re-enactment of the anti-Academic, anti-Athenian-Establishment practices of Diogenes the Cynic, are really and truly *Kantian* theses, in that they rely heavily for inspiration on Kant's ideas about critical, autonomous rationality. I think that Kant more or less unintentionally initiated what we now know as professional academic philosophy, but that there were some serious oversights in Kant's own views about the role of the professional academy in relation to philosophy, that have in fact eventually proved fatal for real philosophy under the professional academic paradigm, namely: the stigmatization of the history of philosophy and the alienation of philosophy from its own past; cognitive heteronymy under scientism; cognitive, emotional, moral and political heteronymy under professional academic ideological discipline; and cognitive, emotional, moral, and political heteronymy under the Deep(er)-State-controlled government in contemporary big-capitalist neoliberal majoritarian representative democratic states.

—In a word again, then, this is the new poverty of philosophy: professional academic philosophy's alienation from its own history, and its cognitive, emotional, moral, and political slavery under the military-industrial-university-digital complex; and Kant himself is partially to blame.

Moreover, it's *not* that I think that there aren't all sorts of bullshit, alienation, and cognitive, emotional, moral, and political slavery *outside* the professional academy, and that philosophy couldn't be heteronymous *in relation to those*, if it weren't constantly raising critically autonomous questions and worries. It's just that I think that the "peculiar institution" of the professional academy in neoliberal majoritarian representative democratic states under big capitalism and all-pervasive digitalization is actually killing real philosophy; and that Kantian philosophy, aided and primed by a bracing shot of the spirit of Diogenes, can help us end and reverse this crisis.

Fourth, like Kant's first Copernican Revolution hypothesis in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Philosophy's Second Copernican Revolution* is another philosophical *hypothesis*, not a dogmatic pronouncement. I'm saying: since the professional academic paradigm in philosophy has played itself out and is now in a fatal crisis phase, *let's try a change in worldview about the nature of philosophy, and see what happens*.

Fifth, nothing I've said *fundamentally contradicts* Kant's first Copernican Revolution. Indeed, I think that we're still fully within the scope of that first-order philosophical revolution. It's just that we haven't yet realized its full potential for real philosophy, not by a long shot, for example: what I called the *New* Copernican Revolution in first-order philosophy, namely, *the organicist conception of the world* I spelled out in "Kant, Nature, and Humanity," section 2.2.4; or what I call *rational anthropology* in the Preface and General Introduction; or some other Promethean attempt to do *philosophy unbound*.[288]

And as to *Philosophy's Second Copernican Revolution* itself–well, Marx famously *turned Hegel on his head*, so I'm saying: *Let's turn Kant on his head* by liberating Kantianism from the self-alienated cognitive, emotional, moral, and political prison that is the professional academy in contemporary neoliberal majoritarian representative democratic states under big capitalism and all-pervasive digitalization.

Sixth, all in all then, what I'm saying is

(i) that here and now in the late stages of the second decade of the 21st century, the only way forward for real philosophy is to *break out of* the professional academic philosophy paradigm, which is in fatal crisis,

(ii) that this way forward is a radicalized version of classical Kantian philosophy, aided and primed by the spirit of Diogenes—whether one calls it *Left Kantianism*,[289] *anarcho-philosophy*, or *borderless philosophy*—and

(iii) that by way of inspiration it envisions a new historically-sensitive, post-scientistic, post-academic, post-professional, post-neoliberal, post-Statist, post-Deep(er)-Statist, existential Kantian cosmopolitan social anarchist paradigm for the philosophy of the future.

Or as a simplified philosophical call-to-arms, spinning off the famous 19th century call-to-arms of neo-Kantianism:

*Forward and leftward to Kant beyond the professional academy*, and *back to real philosophy!*

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The one amazingly difficult problem that remains, as I noted at the end of section 2.4.6, is to figure out how to implement Left Kantianism, anarcho-philosophy/borderless philosophy in the face of likely unemployment and banishment by the contemporary intellectual Establishment, aka the intelligentsia, which, of course, is so relentlessly and jealously controlled by professional academics. One real-world attempt at a solution to this seemingly insoluble problem is a collective project called *Philosophy Without Borders*,[290] which, fourteen months into its existence, is currently being supported by a few generous, visionary patrons, to the tune of a fabulous USD $105.00 per month.

—No, that's not a typographical error. So, to be sure, leaving aside for a moment the generosity and vision of these patrons, and looking sideways with anger and disdain at the military-industrial-university-digital complex in all its Frankenstein-Leviathan megamachine monster glory, but also with an appropriate measure of gallows humor, it's a laughably, pathetically small amount with which to fund a philosophical revolution.

But at the same time, *it's a beginning.* So I'll leave you with that rationally hopeful, upbeat conclusion.

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[2] R. Rorty, "Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida," in Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, pp. 90-109, at p. 93.

[3] R.M. Rilke, "Archaic Torso of Apollo," trans. S. Mitchell, in R.M. Rilke, *Selected Poetry and Prose of Rainer Maria Rilke* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), pp. 60-61, lines 13-14.

[4] The allusion is to Hermann Hesse's *Das Glasperlenspiel*, aka *The Glass Bead Game*, first published in 1943. In the novel, the glass bead game is an all-absorbing, ultra-high-powered, intellectual pastime—as it were, a cross between Japanese *Go*, the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and Frege's *Begriffsschrift*—created and practiced by the highly intelligent, geographically isolated, morally and socially inept, and politically irrelevant inhabitants of the fictional, futuristic land of Castalia, somewhere in Central Europe. The parallels with 19th, 20th, and 21st century professional academic philosophy are obvious.

[5] See, for example, R. Hanna, "Radical Enlightenment: Existential Kantian Cosmopolitan Anarchism, With a Concluding Quasi-Federalist Postscript," in D. Heidemann and K. Stoppenbrink (eds.), *Join, Or Die: Philosophical Foundations of Federalism* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), pp. 63-90.

[6] The Minimal Law of Non-Contradiction says that *not every statement is both true and false*. See Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, ch. 5.

[7] See, for example, R. Hanna, "Kant, the Copernican Devolution, and Real Metaphysics," in M. Altman (ed.), *Palgrave Kant Handbook* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 761-789.

[8] The leading figures of analytic metaphysics include David Lewis, David Chalmers, Kit Fine, Ted Sider, and Timothy Williamson; and some of its canonical texts are Lewis's *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Sider's *Writing the Book of the World* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011); Chalmers's *Constructing the World* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012); and Williamson's *Modal Logic as Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013).

[9] See R. Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001).

[10] See P.F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London: Methuen, 1959); and P.F. Strawson, *Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford Univ.Press, 1992).

[11] See, for example, F. Jackson, *From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998).

[12] On the crucial distinction between *science* and *scientism*, see "Kant, Nature, and Humanity," essay 2.2 below; and also S. Haack, *Science and its Discontents* (Rounded Globe, 2017), available online at URL = <https://roundedglobe.com/books/038f7053-e376-4fc3-87c5-096de820966d/Scientism%20and%20its%20Discontents/>.

[13] See, for example, W.V.O. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," in W.V.O. Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 69-90; W. Sellars, *Science, Perception, and Reality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963); and P. Maddy, *Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007).

[14] See also P. Unger, *Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2014).

[15] See Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, esp. chs. 1-3.

[16] See R. Hanna and M. Maiese, *Embodied Minds in Action* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009).

[17] See R. Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1981).

[18] See note 5 above; and Hanna, *Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism*, part 2.

[19] I'm grateful to Otto Paans for proposing this basic list of criteria in e-mail discussion.

[20] See note15 above and also "Kant, Nature, and Humanity," essay 2.2 below, esp. section 2.2.3.

[21] See, e.g., Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, chs. 2, 7, and 8.

[22] R. Hanna, "Kant in the Twentieth Century," in D. Moran (ed.), *Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 149-203, at pp. 149-150.

[23] M. Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2000), p. 5.

[24] M. Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1993), p. ix.

[25] Hanna, "Kant in the Twentieth Century," pp. 174-176.

[26] See, for example, P. Hylton, *Quine* (London: Routledge, 2007), esp. chs. 9 and 12.

[27] See H. Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1951).

[28] W. Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in W. Sellars, *Science, Perception, and Reality* (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), pp. 127-196, at p. 173.

[29] See W. Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in Sellars, *Science, Perception, and Reality*, pp. 1-

40.

[30] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (3rd edn.; New York: Macmillan, 1953), §109, p. 47e.

[31] In *that* essay (see note 34 below), I call it "*transcendental* anthropology," but it is essentially equivalent to rational anthropology as I am developing it here.

[32] P. Hacker, *Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein* (revised edn.; Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), p. 207.

[33] As per note 31 above.

[34] R. Hanna, "Wittgenstein and Kantianism," in H.-J. Glock (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2017), pp. 682-698, at pp. 696-697.

[35] See, for example, R. Hanna, *Kant, Science, and Human Nature* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006); and "Kant, Nature, and Humanity," essay 2.2 below.

[36] See Wikipedia, "Military-Industrial Complex," available online at URL =
< http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military%E2%80%93industrial_complex>, underlining added.

[37] See, for example, Lockheed Martin's online site at URL = <http://www.lockheedmartin.com/>.

[38] See also R. Peels, "A Conceptual Map of Scientism," *Academia.edu*, available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/12366886/A_Conceptual_Map_of_Scientism>.

[39] Many thanks to the undergraduate participants in the 2009 Colorado Summer Seminar in Philosophy, for forcefully pressing this objection. Only the five-volume project as a whole can offer a fully compelling response to it. But given the importance of the worry, a preliminary reply is needed too.

[40] L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. C.K. Ogden (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 29.

[41] Matthew 22:20-22, *King James Bible*.

[42] S. Pinker, *Enlightenment Now* (New York: Viking, 2018).

[43] See Hanna, "Radical Enlightenment: Existential Kantian Cosmopolitan Anarchism, With a Concluding Quasi-Federalist Postscript"; and Hanna, *Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism*, part 2.

[44] M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. E. Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2002).

[45] See, e.g., H. Frankfurt, "On Bullshit," in H. Frankfurt, *On the Importance of What We Care About* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 117-133, also available online at URL = <http://www.stoa.org.uk/topics/bullshit/pdf/on-bullshit.pdf>.

[46] See, e.g., R. Louden, "Argue but Obey? Questioning Kant's Enlightenment," in R.V. Orden Jiménez et al. (eds.), *Kant's Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2016), pp. 284-300.

[47] See Hanna, *Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism*, section 2.2.

[48] See, e.g., S. Harris, *Free Will* (New York: The Free Press, 2012). Harris and Steven Pinker are the most widely-known contemporary proponents of Enlightenment Lite. See also note 42 above.

[49] S. Žižek "Liberalism as Politics for a Race of Devils," *ABC Religion and Ethics* (22 November 2011), available online at URL = <http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2011/11/22/3373316.htm>.

[50] See, e.g., P. Guyer, "Kant's Deductions of the Principles of Right," in M. Timmons (ed.), *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 23-64; Press; T. Pogge, "Is Kant's Rechtslehre a 'Comprehensive Liberalism'?," in Timmons (ed.), *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays*, pp. 133-158; A. Ripstein, "Authority and Coercion," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 32 (2004): 2-35; M. Willaschek, "Right and Coercion: Can Kant's Conception of Right Be Derived From His Moral Theory?," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 17 (2009):49-70; and A. Wood, "The Final Form of Kant's Practical Philosophy," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 36 (1997): 1-20.

[51] See, e.g., L. Finlayson, *The Political is Political: Conformity and the Illusion of Dissent in Contemporary Political Philosophy* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).

[52] See, e.g., A. Honneth, *Pathologies of Reason*, trans. J. Ingram et al. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2009).

[53] See, e.g., M. Kazin, *American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation* (New York: Vintage, 2012), chs. 6-7.

[54] A.Wood, "General Introduction," in Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, p. xx.

[55] A few; but not many professional academic philosophers. See C. Bradatan, *Dying for Ideas: The Dangerous Lives of the Philosophers* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).

[56] R. Solnit, *A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities That Arise in Disaster* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2009). I'm grateful to Mark Pittenger for drawing my attention to this important book.

[57] See, e.g., B. Nyhan and J. Reifler, "When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions," *Political Behavior* 32 (2010): 303-330, available online at URL =
<https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/teaching/articles/PolBehavior-2010-Nyhan.pdf>; and S. Lewandowsky et al., "Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and Successful Debiasing," *Psychological Science in the Public Interest* 13 (2012): 106-131, available online at URL = <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1529100612451018>.

[58] T. Bridges, "Why Are People So Averse to the Facts?," *Sociological Images* (27 February 2017), available online

at URL = <https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2017/02/27/why-the-american-public-seems-allergic-to-facts/>.

[59] See Hanna, "Kant, Nature, and Humanity," THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 1, essay 2.2 below; and Hanna, *Kant, Agnosticism and Anarchism*, section 3.14.

[60] Many thanks to Lucas Lazzaretti for pointing this out to me—he had, specifically, Adorno's elitist, snobbish music criticism in mind.

[61] Available online at URL = <https://www.amazon.com/Paradise-Built-Hell-Extraordinary-Communities/dp/0143118072>, underlining added.

[62] Many thanks again to Mark Pittenger, this time for drawing my attention to the very powerful aesthetico-political impact of radical music, in some ways even more powerful than radical books and radical movies. The same basic point is made by Kazin in *American Dreamers*. Kazin also notes the sad irony that since the collapse and downward spiral of the American Left in the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, radical music, books, and movies are virtually *all* that remain of genuinely radical politics in the USA, at "the nadir of the historical left" (p. 276). But in view of the sudden emergence of the Democratic Socialists of America, aka the DSA, in 2018, as a significant political movement, alongside the creation of the Black Rose/Rosa Negra Anarchist Federation in 2017, this *might* be changing.

[63] K. Marx, *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology & Social Philosophy*, trans. T.B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 70 (*Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* [1844], MEGA I/3, p. 123; translation modified slightly).

[64] L. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, trans. P. Winch (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 56e.

[65] M. Rukeyser, "The Speed of Darkness," verse IX; available online at URL = <http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/245984>.

[66] T. Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), p. 17.

[67] R. Hanna, "Directions in Space, Non-Conceptual Form, and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism," in D. Schulting (ed.), *Kantian Nonconceptualism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 99-115.

[68] Hanna, *Kant, Science, and Human Nature*, esp. chs. 3-4.

[69] See, for example, Hanna, "Kant, the Copernican Devolution, and Real Metaphysics."

[70] See, for example, R. Hanna, "Forward to Idealism: On Eckart Förster's *The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy*," *Kantian Review* 18 (2013): 301-315.

[71] See., for example, J. Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992); A. Cohen, *Kant on the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology, and History* (London: Palgrave, 2009); and R. Zuckert, *Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007).

[72] There is also a corresponding attitude of *formal* piety in the *formal* sciences of logic and mathematics, flowing from the Church-Turing thesis and Gödel's incompleteness theorems. See section 2.2.4 below.

[73] J. Mensch, *Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of the Critical Philos*ophy (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2013).

[74] Ibid, pp. ix-x.

[75] Ibid, p. 1.

[76] Ibid, pp. 27-28.

[77] Ibid, p. 29.

[78] Ibid, p. 50.

[79] Ibid, p. 36.

[80] Ibid, p. 61.

[81] Ibid, p. 64.

[82] The standard criticisms of Nagel (when they aren't simply ad hominem) are (i) that he is ignorant of recent and contemporary work in evolutionary biology, and (ii) that he completely overlooks the distinction between reductive and non-reductive biological (or more generally, scientific) naturalism. I think that these worries are nothing but philosophical red herrings, intentionally or unintentionally employed in order to avoid facing up to the deep anti-mechanist/organicist-idealist/liberal naturalist point that Nagel is trying to make. See, for example, R. Hanna, "Nagel & Me: Beyond the Scientific Conception of the World," *Academia.edu*, available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/4348336/Nagel_and_Me_Beyond_the_Scientific_Conception_of_the_World>.

[83] Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos*, p. 123.

[84] See, for example, R. Hanna, "Kant and Nonconceptual Content," *European Journal of Philosophy* 13 (2005): 247-290; R. Hanna, "Kantian Non-Conceptualism," *Philosophical Studies*, 137 (2008): 41–64; R. Hanna, "Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 19 (2011): 323–398; and Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, ch. 2.

[85] R. Hanna, "Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and the Gap in the B Deduction," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 19 (2011): 399–415; R. Hanna, "Kant's Theory of Judgment," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2017 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), available online at URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/kant-judgment/>, supplement 1; R. Hanna, "Kant, Hegel,

and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content," *Hegel Society of Great Britain Bulletin* 34 (2013): 1-32; and R. Hanna, "Kantian Madness: Blind Intuitions, Essentially Rogue Objects, Nomological Deviance, and Categorial Anarchy" *Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy* 1 (2016): 44-64, available online at URL = <http://www.cckp.space/#!Kantian-Madness-Blind-Intuitions-Essentially-Rogue-Objects-Nomological-Deviance-and-Categorial-Anarchy/cmbz/576018190cf2c6c572641509>.

86 See Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man."

87 Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," p. 173.

88 See, for example, Hanna and Maiese, *Embodied Minds in Action*; and Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*.

89 See, for example, J-J Rousseau, *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, trans. R. Goulbourne (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011). The cited translations are by P. Harrison, available online at URL = <http://www.pantheism.net/paul/history/rousseau.htm>, seventh revery. Thanks to Ericson Falabretti for reminding me about Rousseau's important influence on Kant's philosophy of nature, both human and non-human.

90 W. Wordsworth, "My Heart Leaps Up," available online at URL = <http://www.poets.org/poetsorg/poem/my-heart-leaps>.

91 P. Shelley, *Alastor*, available online at URL = <http://www.online-literature.com/shelley_percy/2778/>.

92 M. Shelley, *Frankenstein; Or, the Modern Prometheus*, 1818 edn., available online at URL = <http://www.rc.umd.edu/editions/frankenstein>, vol. 1, ch. 3, underlining added.

93 S. Alexander, "Natural Piety," in S. Alexander, *Philosophical and Literary Pieces* (London: Macmillan, 1939), pp. 299-315, at pp. 299, 310-311, and 306, underlining added.

94 See, for example, B. Olivier, "Nature, Capitalism, and the Future of Humankind," *South African Journal of Philosophy* 24 (2005): 121-135, available online at URL= <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.4314/sajpem.v24i2.31420>.

95 See, for example, F. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, available online at URL = <https://archive.org/stream/baconsnovumorgan00bacouoft#page/n3/mode/2up>.

96 See R. Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences," in R. Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. J. Cottingham et al. (3 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), vol. 1, part 6, p. 142/AT VI, 62.

97 See, for example, The Vienna Circle, "The Scientific Conception of the World," available online at URL = <http://evidencebasedcryonics.org/pdfs/viennacircle.pdf>.

98 See note 65 above.

99 See, for example, J.C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1999).

100 See also Olivier, "Nature, Capitalism, and the Future of Mankind," pp, 120-121.

101 Shelley, *Frankenstein; Or, the Modern Prometheus*, vol. 1, ch. 3.

102 Wordsworth, "My Heart Leaps Up."

103 See, for example, (*DSS* 2: 315-373), (*CPR* A567-704/B595-732), and (*Rel* 6: 151-202).

104 See, for example, notes 77-78 above; Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, ch. 2; and section 2.2.3 below.

105 See Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, section 3.3.

106 Ibid.

107 See Hanna, *Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism*, part 2. As to the Shelleys, Godwin, and Wollstonecraft: the connections-of-influence here are closely personal, as well as intellectual. Mary Shelley was married to Percy Shelley, also the daughter of Godwin and Wollstonecraft, and conceived the basic idea of *Frankenstein* on a visit to Byron's villa on Lake Leman, near Geneva, in 1816.

108 Cf. Laurence Sterne's eponymous novel, published in 1768, the same year as Kant's breakthrough proto-Critical essay, "Directions in Space." The "Directions in Space" essay, in turn, is essentially linked, by way of its basic philosophical content, to Kant's Inaugural Dissertation and the Transcendental Aesthetic. See Hanna, "Directions in Space, Non-Conceptual Form, and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism."

109 See section 2.2.1 above; and Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, esp. chs. 2, 4, and 5.

110 See J. Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975), "Epistle to the Reader."

111 See Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," p.173.

112 See, for example, Bacon, *Novum Organum*; and Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences," vol. 1, part 6, p. 142/AT VI, 62.

113 See, for example, Olivier, "Nature, Capitalism, and the Future of Humankind"; and section 2.2.3 above.

114 See Hanna, "Directions in Space, Non-Conceptual Form, and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism."

115 I defend a contemporary Kantian version of categorical epistemology in Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, esp. chs. 3 and 6-8. Interestingly, and only 235 years later, contemporary Analytic philosophers are now also rediscovering categorical epistemology. See, for example, C. Littlejohn, "The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology," in J. Dunn and K. Ahlstrom-Vij (eds.), *Epistemic Consequentialism* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming), available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/16904384/The_Right_in_the_Good_A_Defense_of_Teleological_Non->

Consequentialism_in_Epistemology>.

[116] See R. Hanna, "Freedom, Teleology, and Rational Causation," *Kant Yearbook* 1 (2009): 99-142.

[117] See Hanna and Maiese, *Embodied Minds in Action*, ch. 8.

[118] I owe this extremely insightful mathematical analogy to Tim Dolch, and also the basic idea about the non-reductive life-in-matter-&/or-energy metaphysical continuity.

[119] See also S. Kauffman, *At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996).

[120] See note 118 above. Immanent structural integration can occur between cognitive-semantic contents, and between theories, as well as between worldly properties, facts, events, processes, systems, etc.

[121] I. Prigogine, *The End of Certainty: Time's Flow and the Laws of Nature* (New York: Free Press, 1997).

[122] S. Kauffman, *Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993).

[123] See note 119 above.

[124] S. Kauffman, *Investigations* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002).

[125] S. Kauffman, *Humanity in a Creative Universe* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2016).

[126] L. Weiskrantz, *Blindsight* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), p. 140, underlining added.

[127] T. Nagel,"What Is It Like To Be A Bat?," in T. Nagel, *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 165-180, at p. 168, underlining added.

[128] Wikipedia, "Timothy Treadwell," available online at URL =<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy_Treadwell>.

[129] See Hanna, *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence,* ch. 6.

[130] J. Hawkins and R. Allen (eds.), *Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), p. 52.

[131] See Hanna and Maiese, *Embodied Minds in Action*; and Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*.

[132] See, for example, J. Bermúdez and A. Cahen, "Nonconceptual Mental Content," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/content-nonconceptual/>; G. Evans, *Varieties of Reference* (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford Univ. Press, 1982), esp. chs. 4-6; and Y. Gunther (ed.), *Essays on Nonconceptual Content* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).

[133] See, for example, J. McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1994); J. McDowell, *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2009); S. Sedivy, "Must Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Non-conceptual Content?," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 26 (1996): 413-431; and B. Brewer, *Perception and Reason* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999).

[134] See, for example, R. Heck, "Nonconceptual Content and the 'Space of Reasons'," *Philosophical Review* 109 (2000): 483-523; R. Heck, "Are There Different Kinds of Content?," in J. Cohen and B. McLaughlin (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 117-138; T. Crowther, "Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism," *Erkenntnis* 65 (2006): 245-276; D. Laurier, "Nonconceptual Contents vs. Nonceptual States," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 68 (2004): 23-43; and J. Speaks, "Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content?," *Philosophical Review* 114 (2005): 359-398.

[135] I see no reason to think that content-bearing mental episodes or events must be mental states exclusively and cannot also be mental acts. Indeed, given my emphasis on cognitive and practical intentional agency, it seems to me that the primary bearers of content are intentional acts, and that intentional states derive their contents from act-contents. To keep things relatively simple however, I won't argue for that thesis here, or tinker with standard formulations in the secondary literature; but it remains true, that every occurrence of "states" should really be understood to mean the same as "acts or states."

[136] See Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, ch. 3.

[137] All of these arguments are covered in Gunther (ed.), *Essays on Nonconceptual Content*.

[138] See also R. Hanna, "Direct Reference, Direct Perception, and the Cognitive Theory of Demonstratives," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 74 (1993): 96-117.

[139] Speaks, "Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content?"

[140] Gunther, "Introduction," in Gunther (ed.), *Essays on Nonconceptual Content*, pp. 1-19, at p. 1.

[141] Hanna, "Kant and Nonconceptual Content."

[142] See Hanna, "Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and the Gap in the B Deduction"; and Hanna, "Kantian Madness: Blind Intuitions, Essentially Rogue Objects, Nomological Deviance, and Categorial Anarchy."

[143] T. Williamson, *The Philosophy of Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 16-17.

[144] See Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, section 2.2.

[145] See also Bermúdez and Cahen, "Nonconceptual Mental Content," section 7.

[146] See R. Hanna, *Rationality and Logic* (Cambridge: MIT Press, chs. 4-6).

[147] See, for example, K. Koslicki, *The Structure of Objects* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008).

[148] Hanna, *Rationality and Logic*, esp. chs. 1-4 and 6-7.

[149] See also J. Bermúdez, *Thinking without Words* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003). Like Bermúdez, I hold that there are non-linguistic concepts and thoughts; but unlike Bermúdez, who is a state non-conceptualist, I do not identify non-conceptual content with the content of mental states not necessarily involving concept-possession.

[150] See also P. Carruthers, *Language, Thought, and Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998). Like

Carruthers, I hold that there is a substantive connection between conceptual thought and language; but unlike Carruthers, who is a higher-order thought theorist about consciousness, I do not think that the substantive connection between conceptual thought and language inherently constrains the nature of consciousness, which has a non-conceptual basis in sensorimotor subjectivity.

[151] See, for example, G. Frege, "On Sense and Meaning," in G. Frege, *Collected Paper on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy*, trans. M. Black et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 157-177.

[152] See, for example, B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1995), chs. V-X.

[153] Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, ch. 3.

[154] In other words, essentially non-conceptual content is normatively governed by an ideal standard of accurate direct reference, and can still be directly referential when it is more or less inaccurate.

[155] See, for example, J.V. Buroker, *Space and Incongruence: The Origins of Kant's Idealism* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981); and J. Van Cleve and R. Frederick, *The Philosophy of Right and Left: Incongruent Counterparts and the Nature of Space* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1991).

[156] See Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, ch. 4; and Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori,* ch. 4.

[157] See (*DS* 2: 383); and G. Nerlich, "On the One Hand: Reflections on Enantiomorphy," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 73 (1995): 432-443.

[158] One can also use the possibility of incongruent counterparts as a special kind of phenomenal inversion in order to argue for failures of materialist supervenience. See G. Lee, "The Experience of Right and Left," in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006), pp. 291-315.

[159] See (*DS* 2: 377-383); and Hanna, *Kant, Science, and Human Nature*, ch. 1.

[160] See (*ID* 2: 385-419).

[161] See (*Prol* 4: 285-286); and Hanna, *Kant, Science, and Human Nature*, ch. 6.

[162] See (*OT* 8: 131-147).

[163] This formulation needs some qualifications that do not directly affect the main line of argument in the text, and I think would also only muddy the waters there. Strictly speaking, however, the neutrality of the argument from incongruent counterparts (namely, the THA) is as between noumenal realism about space and strong transcendental idealism about space, according to which space is identical to (or logically supervenient on, hence "nothing more than") the conscious representation of space. My own view is that noumenal realism about space is demonstrably false, that the classical Two World theory of Kant's transcendental idealism is also demonstrably false, and that the neo-classical Two Standpoints theory version of transcendental idealism is also demonstrably false. Nevertheless, in addition to these philosophically unacceptable views, there is also, in my opinion, a fully intelligible and defensible version of transcendental idealism that I call Weak or Counterfactual Transcendental Idealism (WCTI), which says:
(i) Things-in-themselves (aka "noumena," or Really Real things, i.e., things as they could exist in a "lonely" way, altogether independently of minds or anything else, by virtue of their intrinsic non-relational properties) are logically possible; but at the same time it is necessarily unknowable and unprovable whether things-in-themselves exist or not, hence for the purposes of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, they can be ignored (= methodological eliminativism about things-in-themselves).
(ii) It is a necessary condition of the existence of the natural world that if rational human minded animals were to exist, then they would be able to know that world directly both a posteriori through direct sense perception and basic empirical judgments and also a priori through rational intuition, as well as indirectly through non-basic empirical judgments, theories, and inferential reasoning (= the counterfactual conformity thesis).
(iii) The natural world has at some earlier times existed without rational human minded animals to know it, and could exist even if no rational human minded animals existed to know it, even though some rational human minded animals now actually exist who do in fact know it directly both a posteriori and a priori, however imperfectly (= the actual existence thesis).
See, for example, Hanna, *Kant, Science, and Human Nature*, chs. 1-5; and Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, section 7.3.

[164] See Hanna and Maiese, *Embodied Minds in Action*, ch. 2.

[165] See, for example, D. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996), ch. 2; Hanna and Maiese, *Embodied Minds in Action*, esp.chs. 6-7; and Kim, *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough*, esp. chs. 4-6.

[166] See P.F. Strawson, *Individuals* (London: Methuen, 1959).

[167] E. Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, trans. J.S. Churchill (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press, 1964).

[168] E. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, trans. J.S. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 111 and 115, texts combined and translation modified slightly.

[169] See, for example, I. Prigogine, *Being and Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences* (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1980); and S. Savitt (ed.), *Time's Arrows Today* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995).

[170] See A. Cussins, "Content, Conceptual Content, and Nonconceptual Content," in Gunther (ed.), *Essays on Nonconceptual Content*, pp. 133-163, at 147; S. Gallagher, *How the Body Shapes the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford

Univ. Press, 2005), chs. 1-6; and A. Noë, *Action in Perception* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).

[171] See Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy,* ch. 4; Hanna, "Kant and Nonconceptual Content," sections IV and V; Hanna, *Kant, Science, and Human Nature*, chs. 2 and 6; Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori,* ch. 2.

[172] See Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, ch. 2.

[173] See, for example, J. Kihlstrom, "The Cognitive Unconscious," *Science* 237 (1987): 1445-1452.

[174] See, for example, R. Jackendoff, *Consciousness and the Computational Mind* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

[175] See J. Bermúdez, "Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States," in Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content, pp. 184-216. Bermúdez holds that subpersonal states have non-conceptual content, but denies that they are also conscious.

[176] See E. Thompson, "Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 4 (2005): 407-427.

[177] Nagel, "What Is It Like To Be A Bat?," pp. 166-167.

[178] Ibid, p. 166.

[179] See Hanna and Maiese, *Embodied Minds in Action*, ch. 2.

[180] Ibid, section 2.3

[181] See note 126 above.

[182] N. Block, "Concepts of Consciousness," in D. Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 206-218, at 211.

[183] D. Milner and M. Goodale, *The Visual Brain in Action* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995).

[184] (Dir. J. Frankenheimer, 1962).

[185] See, for example, S. Hurley and A. Nöe, "Neural Plasticity and Consciousness," *Biology and Philosophy* 18 (2003): 131-168.

[186] T. Burge, *Origins of Objectivity* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2010).

[187] See, for example, O. Sacks, *The Mind's Eye* (New York: Knopf, 2010).

[188] It is also true that necessarily, every real person has one and only one living animal body, and conversely, necessarily, every living animal body of a real person is lived by one and only one real person. See Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, section 6.2. As of 2018, new biomedical evidence suggests that all women who are capable of becoming pregnant are in fact *totipotent* and *chimeras*, in that their DNA changes when they become pregnant, fusing with the DNA of the zygote and fetus, so that their biological individuality is not fixed until they have become either pregnant or else incapable of becoming pregnant. See K. Rowland, "We Are Multitudes," *Aeon* (11 January 2018), available online at URL = <https://aeon.co/essays/microchimerism-how-pregnancy-changes-the-mothers-very-dna>. If that is correct, then many or even most women do not have a unique living animal body until several decades after they are already real persons. This is a serious problem for Standard Animalism, which identifies people with individual living animal bodies, since it would then follow that many or even most women are not people for much of their lives—which is clearly absurd. But it is not a problem for Minded Animalism, which identifies people with each and all stages of their minded animal lives. See Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, chs. 6-7.

[189] See D. DeGrazia, *Taking Animals Seriously* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996); D. Dennett, "Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why," in D. Dennett, *Brainchildren* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 337-352; and D. Dennett, *Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness* (New York: Basic Books, 1996).

[190] For the "natural zombie" view, see S. Allen-Hermanson, "Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies?," *Journal of Philosophy* 105 (2008): 389-415.

[191] See also H. Steward, *A Metaphysics for Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), ch. 4, where she explicitly argues that spiders and earthworms can be (in my terminology) proto-agents.

[192] As per the immediately preceding sub-section; and see also Hanna and Maiese, *Embodied Minds in Action*, chs. 1-2.

[193] See, for example, P. Godfrey-Smith, *Other Minds: The Octopus and the Evolution of Intelligent Life* (New York: Collins, 2017); and A. Srinivasan, "The Sucker, the Sucker!," *London Review of Books* 39 (September 2017): 23-25, available online at URL = <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n17/amia-srinivasan/the-sucker-the-sucker?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=3917&utm_content=usca_subs>.

[194] See also Hanna, *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence,* sections 3.1-3.3.

[195] See D. Boonin, *A Defense of Abortion* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), ch. 3. For an earlier study that puts the emergence of consciousness$_{lo}$ at between 22-26 weeks, see *British Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology Notes* 94 (1997). URL = <http://www.parliament.uk/post/pn094.pdf>.

[196] A famous example is the real-world case of Baby Theresa. See J. Rachels and S. Rachels, *The Elements of Moral Philosophy* (6th edn., New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010), pp. 1-5.

[197] See Hanna, *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence*, ch. 3.

[198] See Frankfurt, "Identification and Externality," in Frankfurt, *The Importance of What We Care About*, pp. 58-68; and Frankfurt, "Identification and Wholeheartedness," in Frankfurt, *The Importance of What We Care About*, pp. 159-176.

[199] See D.R. Griffin, *Animal Minds* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2001); M. Bearzi and C. Stanford, *Beautiful Minds: The Parallel Lives of Great Apes and Dolphins* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2008); and S. Savage-Rumbaugh and R. Lewin, *Kanzi: The Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind* (New York: Wiley, 1994). Savage-Rumbaugh's research is highly controversial. For an alternative view, see M. Tomasello and J. Call, *Primate Cognition* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997), esp. pp. 375-379. My own view, which I spell out and defend in *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence*, ch. 4, says that Great apes and perhaps also dolphins are *non-autonomous persons* who are morally equivalent to normal human toddlers and other young children. This in turn suggests an argument strategy for those who seek to extend person-based legal rights to Great apes and dolphins: Since normal human toddlers and other young children *clearly* have real personhood and dignity, and since Great apes and (perhaps also) dolphins possess the same psychological capacities that ground real personhood and dignity, then it follows Great apes and (perhaps also) dolphins *also* have real personhood and dignity, and therefore *should also* be accorded the same person-based legal rights. See, e.g., C. Siebert, "Should a Chimp Be Able to Sue its Owner?," *New York Times* (23 April 2014), available online at URL = <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/magazine/the-rights-of-man-and-beast.html?emc=eta1&_r=0>.

[200] See Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, sections 3.3 and 3.4.

[201] Ibid.

[202] See, for example, D. Hume *Treatise of Human Nature* (2nd edn., Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), books II and III.

[203] See Hanna, *Rationality and Logic*, esp. chs. 6-7.

[204] See also Hanna, *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence*, ch. 4.

[205] See, for example, Tomasello and Call, *Primate Cognition*; and Tomasello, *Why We Cooperate*.

[206] Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," p. 17.

[207] Frankfurt, "Identification and Wholeheartedness," p. 176.

[208] See, for example, C. Allen and M. Bekoff, *Species of Mind* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997); Bearzi and Stanford, *Beautiful Minds*; Griffin, *Animal Minds*; D.R. Griffin, *Animal Thinking* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984); D.R. Griffin, *The Question of Animal Awareness* (New York: Rockefeller Univ. Press, 1976); and Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, *Kanzi: The Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind*.

[209] See Hanna, *Deep Freedom and Real Persons*, section 1.0.

[210] Ibid, chs. 3 to 5.

[211] (Dir. M.C. Cooper and E.B. Schoedsack, 1933).

[212] (Dir. D. Myrick and E. Sánchez, 1999).

[213] See Hanna, *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence*, esp. ch. 1.

[214] Wikipedia, "Grizzly Man," available online at URL = <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grizzly_Man>.

[215] Prigogine, *The End of Certainty*, pp. 153-154.

[216] See note 98 above.

[217] See also Prigogine, *The End of Certainty*; Kauffman, *The Origins of Order*; Kauffman, *At Home in the Universe*; Kauffman, *Investigations*; and Kauffman, *Humanity in a Creative Universe*. Kauffman puts more emphasis on quantum mechanics than either Priogine or I do: for me, non-equilibrium thermodynamics is the larger, more inclusive theoretical framework.

[218] For a detailed development, defense, and elaboration of the "mind-in-life" thesis, see E. Thompson, *Mind in Life* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2007).

[219] Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos*, p. 17.

[220] Alexander, "Natural Piety," pp. 299, 310-311, and 306.

[221] Shelley, *Frankenstein; Or, the Modern Prometheus*, vol. 1, ch. 3.

[222] See, for example, G. Boolos, and R. Jeffrey, *Computability and Logic* (3rd edn.; Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989).

[223] Steward, *A Metaphysics for Freedom*, pp. 198-199, italics added.

[224] H. Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology* (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966).

[225] The Four Horsemen of the biblical Apocalypse were *Conquest*, *War*, *Famine*, and *Death*.

[226] See Hanna, *Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism*, section 3.11.

[227] See, for example, S. Harris, *Free Will* (New York: Free Press, 2012).

[228] See J. Schuessler, "Philosophy That Stirs the Waters," *New York Times* (29 April 2013), available online at URL = <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/books/daniel-dennett-author-of-intuition-pumps-and-other-tools-for-thinking.html?emc=eta1&_r=0>.

[229] Here it is not irrelevant to remember that Hobbes was Galileo's friend, and later Francis Bacon's private secretary. So the symbiotic connection between scientism and Statism was also present at the very origins of the historical period we now call "The Enlightenment."

[230] See, for example, the edgy 90s rock band, The Meat Puppets, "We Don't Exist," available online at URL = <https://search.yahoo.com/yhs/search?p=the+meat+puppets+we+don%27t+exist+youtube&ei=UTF-8&hspart=mozilla&hsimp=yhs-003>.

[231] See, for example, J. Ismael, *How Physics Makes Us Free* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2016).

[232] G. Orwell, *1984* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1949), part 3, ch. 2, available online at URL = <http://www.george-

orwell.org/1984>.

[233] (23 January 2017), available online at URL = <http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/conway-press-secretary-gave-alternative-facts-860142147643..

[234] E. Bradner, "Conway: Trump White House Offered 'Alternative Facts' on Crowd Size," *CNN Politics* (23 January 2017), available online at URL =
<http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts/index.html>.

[235] See, e.g., J. Interlandi, "What Drives Subconscious Racial Prejudice? A Study of Anti-Roma Bias in Hungary Seeks to Identify the Roots of Subliminal Bias," *Scientific American MIND Guest Blog* (11 May 2015), available online at URL =
<https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/what-drives-subconscious-racial-prejudice/>.

[236] F. De Brigard, "Is Memory for Remembering? Recollection as a Form of Episodic Hypothetical Thinking," *Synthese* 191 (2014): 1-31.

[237] See also J. Russell, and R. Hanna, "A Minimalist Approach to the Development of Episodic Memory," *Mind and Language* 27 (2012): 29-54, also available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/1352637/A_Minimalist_Approach_to_the_Development_of_Episodic_Memory>.

[238] See Hanna, *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori*, esp. chs. 1-3.

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[240] See Hanna, "Radical Enlightenment: Existential Kantian Cosmopolitan Anarchism, With a Concluding Quasi-Federalist Postscript"; and Hanna, *Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism*.

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# INDEX