


# MLK was a Nonviolent Dignitarian Post-Capitalist

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(MLK, 2014)

In 2023, I published an essay in which I presented, defended, and strongly recommended a moral and sociopolitical doctrine I call *dignitarian post-capitalism*. Here is the pith-&-marrow of that doctrine.

Many have envisioned, or at least predicted, the end of the economic system and social institution of *capitalism*, and also the creation, or at least the existence, of a world after or beyond capitalism: *post-capitalism*. In “In Defence of Dignity,” I argued that humankind is worth saving from whatever might threaten it—especially including itself—by virtue of the concept and fact of human dignity (Hanna, 2023a). Presupposing the soundness of that earlier argument, in this essay I’ll also provide a detailed proposal for *how* humankind can save itself from itself, by describing, defending, and wholeheartedly recommending a new version of post-capitalism that I call *dignitarian post-capitalism*, aka DPC.

According to my broadly Kantian theory of human dignity (Hanna, 2018a, 2018b, 2023a, [2025a]: chs. 2-4), human dignity is the absolute, non-denumerably infinite, intrinsic, and objective value or worth of *human real persons* as ends-in-themselves, and human real personhood is grounded in a unified set of innate cognitive, emotional, and practical capacities present in all and only human animals possessing the essentially embodied neurobiological basis of those capacities. These capacities are (i) consciousness (i.e., subjective experience), (ii) self-consciousness (i.e., consciousness of one’s own consciousness, or second-order consciousness), (iii) caring (i.e., desiring, emoting, or feeling), (iv) sensible cognition (i.e., sense-perceiving, remembering, or imagining), (v) intellectual cognition (i.e., conceptualizing, believing, judging, or inferring), (vi) volition (i.e., deciding, choosing, or willing), and (vii) free agency (i.e., free will and practical agency). These seven capacities jointly constitute *rational human mindedness*. In other words, when rational human mindedness is essentially embodied in a suitably complex living organism, that constitutes the human real person (Hanna, 2018a: chs. 6-7). And the human real person has dignity, i.e., absolute, non-denumerably infinite, objective, irreducible, priceless value or worth, strictly by virtue of possessing those innate capacities. Why? —Because *it’s only by means of that unified set of capacities* that any sort of consciousness or subjective experience of *any* sort of value, *any* sort of recognition of any sort of value, *any* sort of self-consciousness of one’s own value, *any* sort of free action for the sake of any sort of value, and *any* sort of creative production of any sort of value, can ever occur. These innate capacities are natural, and human persons are natural, therefore human dignity is natural: no appeal to God or anything non-natural is required.

Now, let’s consider what I call *true human needs* (Maiese and Hanna, 2019: ch. 3). True human needs are opposed to merely *self-perceived and false human needs*. It might be that someone perceives within themselves an intense need to own a certain luxury automobile, even though they already own a car that is perfectly adequate to their true human needs. Therefore, it’s neither rationally unjustified nor immoral for us not to cater to this self-perceived and false human need. By a diametric contrast, some true human needs are such that their active satisfaction is a necessary condition of all human dignity.

I’ll call those *the first-level true human needs*. For example, among the lower-level true human needs are everyone’s needs for (i) adequate nourishment, adequate clothing, and adequate accommodation (provision), (ii) adequate physical and mental health, as

sustained by adequate healthcare, (iii) adequate access to a healthy natural environment, both local and global, (iv) adequate scope for human movement and travel across the earth, (v) adequate protection from coercion by others (safety), (vi) adequate access to human communication and human interaction, and (vii) adequate primary and secondary education for the development and exercise of the innate capacities that collectively constitute human real personhood (Hanna, 2018a: chs. 6-7). By “adequate” in each case, I mean *sufficient, in view of all relevant empirically well-supported tests that also fully conform to basic moral principles of human dignity* (Hanna, 2018b, 2023a). Since satisfying these first-level true human needs is a necessary condition for the continued existence of human dignity in individual rational human minded animals, then sufficient respect for human dignity morally demands that everyone, everywhere should always have enough of whatever it takes to satisfy their first-level true human needs.

Over and above the first-level true human needs, all other true human needs are those whose satisfaction most fully conform to the absolute, nondenumerably infinite, intrinsic, objective value of human dignity. Indeed, they’re *humanity-realizing needs*. More precisely, the satisfaction of such needs allows people to activate and to exercise their various capacities and realize their potentiality for being autonomous, for individually flourishing, and for collectively flourishing, in ways that also are fully compatible with and fully supportive of the agential autonomy, relational autonomy, individual flourishing (i.e., personal happiness), and collective flourishing (i.e., interpersonal or social happiness) *of everyone else*. I’ll call these *the second-level true human needs*, since (i) they presuppose the satisfaction of first-level basic human needs, (ii) their satisfaction most fully realizes the innate capacities of our human real personhood (Hanna, 2018a: chs. 6-7), and (iii) their satisfaction brings about individual and collective human flourishing. For example, among the second-level basic needs are everyone’s needs for (i) aesthetic enjoyment of all kinds, (ii) personal relationships of all kinds, for example, families, life-partners, lovers, close friends, a wider circle of friends, comrades, etc., (iii) social and political solidarity of all kinds, (iv) free thought and free speech of all kinds, (v) creative self-expression of all kinds, (vi) meaningful work of all kinds, (vii) higher education of all kinds, and (viii) spirituality of all kinds. Since it’s arguable that the ultimate goal, purpose, or meaning of human life is no more and no less than to pursue the satisfaction of second-level true human needs, then sufficient respect for human dignity also demands that everyone, everywhere, should always have enough of whatever it takes for them to be able to pursue their second-level true human needs (Maiese and Hanna, 2019: ch. 3).

Against the backdrop of the concept and fact of true human needs, I’ll now raise this hard question: Is *every* possible form of capitalism rationally unjustified and immoral? By way of answering that question, I think that it’s extremely important to compare and contrast capitalism, and especially neoliberal global technocratic corporate capitalism — with what I’ll call *dignitarian post-capitalism*, aka DPC, a social-institutional system in which there’s: (i) modest individual ownership of private property, sufficient for satisfying and sustaining people’s true human needs and individual tastes, (ii) non-commodifying, non-

exploitative, non-wage-enslaving (for example, under a larger system of truly generous universal basic income and universal basic eco-sensitive/sustainable jobs, aka *eco-jobs* [Hanna, 2018c: sections 3.3-3.4]), eco-sensitive/sustainable, small-scale business enterprises for the production of goods and the provision of services, sufficient for satisfying and sustaining people's true human needs and individual tastes, (iii) modest individual profit-making accumulation of wealth, sufficient for satisfying and sustaining people's true human needs and individual tastes, (iv) modest, non-commodifying, non-exploitative, non-wage-enslaving, collective profit-making and collective profit-sharing enterprises (aka cooperatives), sufficient for satisfying and sustaining workers' true human needs and individual tastes, and (v) a robust, worldwide *commons* system for interpersonal, public, and cosmopolitan sharing (Ostrom, 1990; P2P, [2026]).

Therefore, DPC is perfectly consistent with a social-institutional system in which human labor is not only *not* alienating, *not* commodifying, *not* exploitative, *not* wage-enslaving, and *non*-oppressive, but in fact creative, meaningful, and sufficiently human-dignity-respecting.

Correspondingly, I do think that Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (Proudhon, 1840)—the first philosopher to call himself an “anarchist” —and Marx (Marx, 1961) correctly identified *one* conception of private property—namely, the classical liberal, capitalist, Statist conception—and also that they were correct to see *that* kind of private property as *antithetical* to social institutions that make it really possible for everyone to satisfy their true human needs, and that sufficiently respect human dignity. But there are *other* possible conceptions of private property: for example, one according to which private property is an extension of *the essential embodiment of the human mind* (Hanna and Maiese, 2009) and constitutes *necessary personal equipment for satisfying true human needs*. I'll call this *dignitarian post-capitalist private property*, aka DPC private property. According to my broadly Kantian dignitarian moral theory and anarcho-socialist politics (Hanna, 2018b, 2018c), *everyone ought to have access to a minimally sufficient amount of DPC private property for satisfying their true human needs*; even owning a bit more post-capitalist private property than is minimally sufficient for satisfying your true human needs would be rationally justifiable and morally permissible; and only the ownership of so much more DPC private property than is minimally sufficient for satisfying your true human needs that it *thereby prevents* some *other* people from having the amount of DPC private property that's minimally sufficient for satisfying *their* true human needs, would be *theft* (Proudhon, 1840: p. 2), rationally unjustified, and morally impermissible. DPC private property, therefore, would be smoothly consistent with DPC per se and also with a broadly Kantian dignitarian moral theory and anarcho-socialist politics.

It's important to note that in the context of this essay, I intend the sub-term “post-” (meaning: *after* or *beyond*) in “dignitarian post-capitalism” and in “dignitarian post-capitalist private property” to be taken in an essentially *social-institutional* and *structural* sense, not a strictly *historical* sense. For I do think it's really possible that during the 4000

years prior to the earliest States, some social arrangements that are relevantly similar to DPC and DPC private property existed as open-textured but stable social institutions in nomadic pre-State life (Scott, 2017). But that's not necessary for my argument. All that's necessary for my argument is that it be really possible for DPC and DPC private property to exist in a *non-State* or *post-State* condition of humankind. Since the modern State is the social-institutional ground of capitalism, both of which are inimical to human dignity, then pure or unmixed DPC and DPC private property, both of which are inherently dignitarian, *cannot* exist in the modern capitalist State. But impure or hybrid versions of a non-State or post-State condition not only can but also actually do fly under the radar of the State apparatus, and not only can but also actually do exist in the shadowy interstices or obscure outlying areas of the State apparatus—where *the nobodies* live, move, and have their being (Hanna, [2025b])—under certain special conditions, for example, during *disasters* (Solnit, 2009), or by means of what J.C. Scott calls *weapons of the weak* (Scott, 1985), *even* in contemporary neoliberal nation-States with highly developed surveillance systems. Therefore it's also *really possible* that impure or hybrid versions of DPC and DPC private property not only can but actually do operate even in contemporary neoliberal nation-States. (Hanna, [2023b]: pp. 99, 106-110)

In 1967, Martin Luther King Jr delivered a lecture, later called “Nonviolence and Social Change,” in which, I strongly believe, he anticipated the basic tenets of dignitarian post-capitalism. Here is the text of that lecture in full.

There is nothing wrong with a traffic law which says you have to stop for a red light. But when a fire is raging, the fire truck goes right through that red light, and normal traffic had better get out of its way.... Or, when a man is bleeding to death, the ambulance goes through those red lights at top speed.

There is a fire raging now for the Negroes and the poor of this society. They are living in tragic conditions because of the terrible economic injustices that keep them locked in as an “underclass,” as the sociologists are now calling it. Disinherited people all over the world are bleeding to death from deep social and economic wounds. They need brigades of ambulance drivers who will have to ignore the red lights of the present system until the emergency is solved.

Massive civil disobedience is a strategy for social change which is at least as forceful as an ambulance with its siren on full. In the past ten years, nonviolent civil disobedience has made a great deal of history, especially in the Southern United States. When we and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference went to Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963, we had decided to take action on the matter of integrated public accommodations. We went knowing that the Civil Rights Commission had written powerful documents calling for change, calling for the very rights we were demanding. But nobody did anything about the Commission's report. Nothing was done until we acted on these very issues, and demonstrated before the court of world opinion the urgent need for change. It was the

same story with voting rights. The Civil Rights Commission, three years before we went to Selma, had recommended the changes we started marching for, but nothing was done until, in 1965, we created a crisis the nation couldn't ignore. Without violence, we totally disrupted the system, the lifestyle of Birmingham, and then of Selma, with their unjust and unconstitutional laws. Our Birmingham struggle came to its dramatic climax when some 3,500 demonstrators virtually filled every jail in that city and surrounding communities, and some 4,000 more continued to march and demonstrate nonviolently. The city knew then in terms that were crystal clear that Birmingham could no longer continue to function until the demands of the Negro community were met. The same kind of dramatic crisis was created in Selma two years later. The result on the national scene was the Civil Rights Bill and the Voting Rights Act, as president and Congress responded to the drama and the creative tension generated by the carefully planned demonstrations.

Of course, by now it is obvious that new laws are not enough. The emergency we now face is economic, and it is a desperate and worsening situation. For the 35 million poor people in America — not even to mention, just yet, the poor in the other nations—there is a kind of strangulation in the air. In our society it is murder, psychologically, to deprive a man of a job or an income. You are in substance saying to that man that he has no right to exist. You are in a real way depriving him of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, denying in his case the very creed of his society. Now, millions of people are being strangled that way. The problem is international in scope. And it is getting worse, as the gap between the poor and the “affluent society” increases.

The question that now divides the people who want radically to change that situation is: can a program of nonviolence—even if it envisions massive civil disobedience—realistically expect to deal with such an enormous, entrenched evil?

First of all, will nonviolence work, psychologically, after the summer of 1967? Many people feel that nonviolence as a strategy for social change was cremated in the flames of the urban riots of the last two years. They tell us that Negroes have only now begun to find their true manhood in violence; that the riots prove not only that Negroes hate whites, but that, compulsively, they must destroy them.

This bloodlust interpretation ignores one of the most striking features of the city riots. Violent they certainly were. But the violence, to a startling degree, was focused against property rather than against people. There were very few cases of injury to persons, and the vast majority of the rioters were not involved at all in attacking people. The much publicized “death toll” that marked the riots, and the many injuries, were overwhelmingly inflicted on the rioters by the military. It is clear that the riots were exacerbated by police action that was designed to injure or even to kill people. As for the snipers, no account of the riots claims that more than one or two dozen people were involved in sniping. From the facts, an unmistakable pattern emerges: a handful of

Negroes used gunfire substantially to intimidate, not to kill; and all of the other participants had a different target—property.

I am aware that there are many who wince at a distinction between property and persons—who hold both sacrosanct. My views are not so rigid. A life is sacred. Property is intended to serve life, and no matter how much we surround it with rights and respect, it has no personal being. It is part of the earth man walks on; it is not man.

The focus on property in the 1967 riots is not accidental. It has a message; it is saying something.

If hostility to whites were ever going to dominate a Negro's attitude and reach murderous proportions, surely it would be during a riot. But this rare opportunity for bloodletting was sublimated into arson, or turned into a kind of stormy carnival of free-merchandise distribution. Why did the rioters avoid personal attacks? The explanation cannot be fear of retribution, because the physical risks incurred in the attacks on property were no less than for personal assaults. The military forces were treating acts of petty larceny as equal to murder. Far more rioters took chances with their own lives, in their attacks on property, than threatened the life of anyone else. Why were they so violent with property then? Because property represents the white power structure, which they were attacking and trying to destroy. A curious proof of the symbolic aspect of the looting for some who took part in it is the fact that, after the riots, police received hundreds of calls from Negroes trying to return merchandise they had taken. Those people wanted the experience of taking, of redressing the power imbalance that property represents. Possession, afterward, was secondary.

A deeper level of hostility came out in arson, which was far more dangerous than the looting. But it, too, was a demonstration and a warning. It was directed against symbols of exploitation, and it was designed to express the depth of anger in the community.

What does this restraint in the summer riots mean for our future strategy?

If one can find a core of nonviolence toward persons, even during the riots when emotions were exploding, it means that nonviolence should not be written off for the future as a force in Negro life. Many people believe that the urban Negro is too angry and too sophisticated to be nonviolent. Those same people dismiss the nonviolent marches in the South and try to describe them as processions of pious, elderly ladies. The fact is that in all the marches we have organized some men of very violent tendencies have been involved. It was routine for us to collect hundreds of knives from our own ranks before the demonstrations, in case of momentary weakness. And in Chicago last year we saw some of the most violent individuals accepting nonviolent discipline. Day after day during those Chicago marches I walked in our lines and I never saw anyone retaliate with violence. There were lots of provocations, not only the screaming white hoodlums lining

the sidewalks, but also groups of Negro militants talking about guerrilla warfare. We had some gang leaders and members marching with us. I remember walking with the Blackstone Rangers while bottles were flying from the sidelines, and I saw their noses being broken and blood flowing from their wounds; and I saw them continue and not retaliate, not one of them, with violence. I am convinced that even very violent temperaments can be channeled through nonviolent discipline, if the movement is moving, if they can act constructively and express through an effective channel their very legitimate anger.

But even if nonviolence can be valid, psychologically, for the protesters who want change, is it going to be effective, strategically, against a government and a status quo that have so far resisted this summer's demands on the grounds that "we must not reward the rioters"? Far from rewarding the rioters, far from even giving a hearing to their just and urgent demands, the administration has ignored its responsibility for the causes of the riots, and instead has used the negative aspects of them to justify continued inaction on the underlying issues. The administration's only concrete response was to initiate a study and call for a day of prayer. As a minister, I take prayer too seriously to use it as an excuse for avoiding work and responsibility. When a government commands more wealth and power than has ever been known in the history of the world, and offers no more than this, it is worse than blind, it is provocative. It is paradoxical but fair to say that Negro terrorism is incited less on ghetto street corners than in the halls of Congress.

I intended to show that nonviolence will be effective, but not until it has achieved the massive dimensions, the disciplined planning, and the intense commitment of a sustained, direct-action movement of civil disobedience on the national scale.

The dispossessed of this nation—the poor, both white and Negro—live in a cruelly unjust society. They must organize a revolution against that injustice, not against the lives of the persons who are their fellow citizens, but against the structures through which the society is refusing to take means which have been called for, and which are at hand, to lift the load of poverty.

The only real revolutionary, people say, is a man who has nothing to lose. There are millions of poor people in this country who have very little, or even nothing, to lose. If they can be helped to take action together, they will do so with a freedom and a power that will be a new and unsettling force in our complacent national life. Beginning in the New Year, we will be recruiting three thousand of the poorest citizens from ten different urban and rural areas to initiate and lead a sustained, massive, direct-action movement in Washington. Those who choose to join this initial three thousand, this nonviolent army, this "freedom church" of the poor, will work with us for three months to develop nonviolent action skills. Then we will move on Washington, determined to stay there until the legislative and executive branches of the government take serious and adequate action on jobs and income. A delegation of poor people can walk into a high official's office with

a carefully, collectively prepared list of demands. (If you're poor, if you're unemployed anyway, you can choose to stay in Washington as long as the struggle needs you.) And if that official says, "But Congress would have to approve this," or, "But the president would have to be consulted on that," you can say, "All right, we'll wait." And you can settle down in his office for as long a stay as necessary. If you are, let's say, from rural Mississippi, and have never had medical attention, and your children are undernourished and unhealthy, you can take those little children into the Washington hospitals and stay with them there until the medical workers cope with their needs, and in showing it your children you will have shown this country a sight that will make it stop in its busy tracks and think hard about what it has done. The many people who will come and join this three thousand, from all groups in the country's life, will play a supportive role, deciding to be poor for a time along with the dispossessed who are asking for their right to jobs or income—jobs, income, the demolition of slums, and the rebuilding by the people who live there of new communities in their place; in fact, a new economic deal for the poor.

Why camp in Washington to demand these things? Because only the federal Congress and administration can decide to use the billions of dollars we need for a real war on poverty. We need, not a new law, but a massive, new national program. This Congress has done nothing to help such measures, and plenty to hinder them. Why should Congress care about our dying cities? It is still dominated by senior representatives of the rural South, who still unite in an obstructive coalition with unprogressive Northerners to prevent public funds from going where they are socially needed. We broke that coalition in 1963 and 1964, when the Civil Rights and Voting Rights laws were passed. We need to break it again by the size and force of our movement, and the best place to do that is before the eyes and inside the buildings of these same congressmen. The people of this country, if not the congressmen, are ready for a serious economic attack on slums and unemployment, as two recent polls by Lou Harris have revealed. So we have to make Congress ready to act on the plight of the poor. We will prod and sensitize the legislators, the administrators, and all the wielders of power until they have faced this utterly imperative need.

I have said that the problem, the crisis we face, is international in scope. In fact, it is inseparable from an international emergency which involves the poor, the dispossessed, and the exploited of the whole world.

Can a nonviolent, direct-action movement find application on the international level, to confront economic and political problems? I believe it can. It is clear to me that the next stage of the movement is to become international. National movements within the developed countries—forces that focus on London, or Paris, or Washington, or Ottawa—must help to make it politically feasible for their governments to undertake the kind of massive aid that the developing countries need if they are to break the chains of poverty. We in the west must bear in mind that the poor countries are poor primarily because we

have exploited them through political or economic colonialism. Americans in particular must help their nation repent of her modern economic imperialism.

But movements in our countries alone will not be enough. In Latin America, for example, national reform movements have almost despaired of nonviolent methods; many young men, even many priests, have joined guerrilla movements in the hills. So many of Latin America's problems have roots in the United States of America that we need to form a solid, united movement, nonviolently conceived and carried through, so that pressure can be brought to bear on the capital and government power structures concerned, from both sides of the problem at once. I think that may be the only hope for a nonviolent solution in Latin America today; and one of the most powerful expressions of nonviolence may come out of that international coalition of socially aware forces, operating outside governmental frameworks.

Even entrenched problems like the South African government and its racial policies could be tackled on this level. If just two countries, Britain and the United States, could be persuaded to end all economic interaction with the South African regime, they could bring that government to its knees in a relatively short time. Theoretically, the British and American governments could make that kind of decision; almost every corporation in both countries has economic ties with its government which it could not afford to do without. In practice, such a decision would represent such a major reordering of priorities that we should not expect that any movement could bring it about in one year or two. Indeed, although it is obvious that nonviolent movements for social change must internationalize, because of the interlocking nature of the problems they all face, and because otherwise those problems will breed war, we have hardly begun to build the skills and the strategy, or even the commitment, to planetize our movement for social justice.

In a world facing the revolt of ragged and hungry masses of God's children; in a world torn between the tensions of East and West, white and colored, individualists and collectivists; in a world whose cultural and spiritual power lags so far behind her technological capabilities that we live each day on the verge of nuclear co-annihilation; in this world, nonviolence is no longer an option for intellectual analysis, it is an imperative for action. (MLK, 1967/2018)

As Immanuel Kant (Kant, 1797/1996: pp. 363-506, Ak 6: 203-372) and Max Weber have correctly pointed out (Weber, 1994: p. 310), all States possess a territorial monopoly on the (putatively) legitimate control of the means and use of *coercion*; and as philosophical and political anarchists from 18<sup>th</sup> century William Godwin to 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century Peter Kropotkin and into the 21<sup>st</sup> century (e.g., Hanna, 2018c) have also correctly pointed out, States are also inherently *authoritarian*. By *coercion*, I mean: either (i) using violence (for example, injuring, torturing, or killing) or the threat of violence, in order to manipulate people against their will according to certain predefined purposes of

the coercer (*primary coercion*), or (ii) inflicting appreciable, salient harm (for example, imprisonment, termination of employment, or large monetary penalties) or deploying the threat of appreciable, salient harm, even if these are not in themselves violent, in order to manipulate people against their will according to certain predefined purposes of the coercer (*secondary coercion*). So all coercion is a form of *manipulation*, and proceeds by following a variety of strategies that share the same core characteristic: treating people as mere means or mere things. Correspondingly by *authoritarianism*, I mean the doctrine that telling people to obey commands and do things is legitimated merely by virtue of the fact that some people (the purported authorities) have *told* them to obey those commands or do those things—“it’s right just because we say it’s right!”—and are *also* in a position to enforce this by means of coercion, not on any rationally justified or objectively morally defensible grounds. Therefore, authoritarianism and coercion per se are non-synonymous and logically independent, because although all authoritarianism requires coercion, nevertheless the converse is not the case: coercion can occur without authoritarianism—for example, if you’re threatened or attacked by some random thug on the street.

The crucial takeaway point is twofold. **First**, all States are inherently *coercive* insofar as they claim the right to compel the people living within their boundaries to heed and obey the commands and laws of the government, in order to realize the instrumental ends of the State, *whether or not* those commands and laws are rationally justified or morally right on independently ethical grounds. And **second**, all States are also inherently *authoritarian* insofar as they claim that the commands and laws issued by its government are right *just because* the government says that they’re right and possesses the power to coerce, *not* because those commands or laws are rationally justified and morally right on independent ethical grounds. To the extent that what I call *the military-industrial-digital complex* (Hanna, 2025a: pp. 2, 51, 58, 70-72, 77, 81, 163, 173, 177-180, 182, 188-189) in fact controls *all* States in the contemporary 21<sup>st</sup> century world, then it now controls coercive authoritarianism everywhere.

Against that conceptual backdrop, then what I’ll call *non-violent dignitarian post-capitalist civil disobedience* flows naturally from dignitarian post-capitalism, together with Martin Luther King Jr’s views on *civil disobedience* in “Nonviolence and Social Change,” as per the following eight-step argument.

1. By *violence*, I mean the use of actually or potentially destructive force, and by *nonviolence* I mean the refusal to use actually or potentially destructive force.

2. In view of dignitarian moral theory, violence with respect to people is rarely if ever rationally or morally justified; indeed, except in last-resort cases of self-defense

against violent attack or in order to protect the innocent from violent attack, universal nonviolence with respect to people is rationally justified and morally obligatory.

3. Nevertheless, sometimes it's not only permissible, but even rationally justified and morally obligatory, to be nonviolent with respect to *people* yet also violent with respect to *private property*, if the relevant private property represents a basic and widespread source of violations of sufficient respect for universal human dignity—for example, if it's private property owned by technocratic global corporate capitalist conglomerates or corporations, that expresses and implements an inherently oppressive social system, such as the symbiotic combination of systemic racism, technocratic global corporate capitalism, and the coercive authoritarianism of the State (for example, of the police and the legal justice system of mass incarceration)—and the purpose of the violence with respect to private property of this kind is solely to change this inherently oppressive social system into something fundamentally better, in that it sufficiently respects universal human dignity.

4. Martin Luther King Jr (henceforth MLK), argues that massive nonviolent (with respect to people) civil disobedience is required in order to effect fundamental social change for the better in inherently oppressive social systems, and also that this nonviolent civil disobedience can include “direct action” such as the disruption of the daily operations of the inherently oppressive symbiotic social system of systemic racism, technocratic global corporate capitalism, and the coercive authoritarianism of the State, perhaps even including violence with respect to private property owned by technocratic global corporate capitalist individual magnates, conglomerates, or corporations (MLK, 1967/2018).

5. Although MLK does not explicitly draw this distinction, there's nevertheless a basic difference between (5i) *coercion*, which is either (5ia) imposing or threatening to impose violence on people or (5ib) imposing or threatening to impose salient although nonviolent harms on people, in order to compel those people to do various things, or heed various commands or demands, in order to bring about egoistic or publicly beneficial ends of the coercer, and (5ii) *noncoercion*, which is the refusal to engage in coercion.

6. Since coercion treats other people as mere means or mere things, and not as persons with dignity, it violates sufficient respect for human dignity; hence all coercion is rationally unjustified and immoral, *even if* it's beneficial for many people.

7. So only *nonviolent (with respect to people), noncoercive civil disobedience* is rationally justified and morally acceptable for the purposes of effecting fundamental social change

for the better in inherently oppressive social systems, and *only* nonviolent (with respect to people), noncoercive civil disobedient “direct action” or “disruption” is fully consistent with MLK’s overall moral and political philosophy and with dignitarian post-capitalism.

8. Therefore, nonviolent, noncoercive disobedient “direct action” or “disruption” *with respect to moral and sociopolitical oppression* is not only fully consistent with, but also entailed by, MLK’s overall moral and political philosophy when it’s conjoined with dignitarian post-capitalism. **QED**

Finally, it’s crucial to emphasize, re-emphasize, and re-re-emphasize that according to the doctrine of nonviolent dignitarian post-capitalist civil disobedience anticipated by MLK and shared by me, all civil disobedience must always and everywhere be (i) *nonviolent* (with respect to people), (ii) *noncoercive*, and (iii) *non-authoritarian*. MLK’s legacy of nonviolent, noncoercive, non-authoritarian radicalism lives on.

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