THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, PART 1

Preface and General Introduction

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2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section 1.0  What It Is

Section 1.1  Bounded in a Nutshell

Section 1.2  Rational Anthropology vs. Analytic Metaphysics, the Standard Picture, and Scientific Naturalism

Section 1.3  Philosophy and Its History: No Deep Difference

Section 1.4  Works of Philosophy vs. Philosophical Theories: Presentational Hylomorphism and Polymorphism

Section 1.5  Analytic Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, and Rational Anthropology

Section 1.6  What is a Rational Human Animal?

Section 1.7  An Important Worry and a Preliminary Reply

Section 1.8  The Biggest Windmills
The field of philosophy ... can be brought down to the following questions:

1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?
4. What is the human being?

Metaphysics answers the first question, morals the second, religion the third, and anthropology the fourth. Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of this as anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one. The philosopher must be able to determine

1. the sources of human knowledge
2. the extent of the possible and profitable use of all knowledge, and finally
3. the limits of reason.

The last [question, What is the human being?] is the most necessary but also the hardest.

--I. Kant (JL 9: 25)¹

Quarrels between professors are never entirely disconnected from larger quarrels. There was a hidden agenda behind the split between old-fashioned “humanistic” philosophy (of the Dewey-Whitehead sort) and the positivists, and a similar agenda lies behind the current split between devotees of “analytic” and of “Continental” philosophy. The heavy breathing on both sides about the immorality or stupidity of the opposition signals passions which academic power struggles cannot fully explain.

--R. Rorty²

For ... non-Kantian philosophers, there are no persistent problems—save perhaps the existence of Kantians.

--R. Rorty³

Here there is no place that does not see you. You must change your life.

--R.M. Rilke⁴
Section 1.0 What It Is

*The Rational Human Condition* is a five-part, four-book series, including—

1. *Preface and General Introduction*

2. *Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge*

3. *Deep Freedom and Real Persons: A Study in Metaphysics*

4. *Kantian Ethics and Human Existence: A Study in Moral Philosophy*

5. *Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism: A Theological-Political Treatise*

Each book in the tetralogy is a self-standing study in systematic philosophy, and they can be read in any sequence whatsoever. At the same time, they all share a common aim, which is my attempt to work out a true general theory of human rationality in a fully natural and thoroughly nonideal world. I call this philosophical project *rational anthropology*.

With this aim before me, I have been writing up various parts of *The Rational Human Condition* since 2005 or 2006. But there is also a very real sense in which I have been working, working, working on the very same project ever since I started thinking seriously about philosophical issues in the mid-to-late 1970s, like the proverbial hedgehog who—unlike the equally proverbial fox, who knows many things—knows only one big thing.
The Rational Human Condition in its most recent incarnation was originally intended as a sequel to Rationality and Logic (published in 2006). Then later, as the project steadily grew in breadth, depth, and scope, I began to think of it as a comprehensive sequel to Rationality and Logic and also to Embodied Minds in Action (co-authored with Michelle Maiese, and published in 2009). In short, it got bigger and bigger. For a few years, it was a single BIG book manuscript, weighing in at 1200+ pages, threatening to grow even BIGGER, like huge unfortunate Alice crammed up against the walls of her tiny room. But this one-book version, paradoxically, was at one and the same time both too long for anyone but a sleepless zealot ever to have the time and energy to read, and also too short to discuss everything that absolutely, positively, undeniably, and self-evidently needed to be discussed—not to mention its also being, as Henry James notoriously said of Dostoevsky’s novels, a “loose, baggy monster.”

So the long and the short of it is, that I ultimately split up the one loose, baggy big monster into four separate books, each of them a leaner, meaner, littler monster, and have been hedgehogging away at them all ever since.

Section 1.1 Bounded in a Nutshell

Bounded in a nutshell, The Rational Human Condition is my attempt to do some real philosophy. By “real philosophy” I mean authentic, serious philosophy, as opposed to inauthentic, superficial philosophy. Authentic philosophy is committed, wholehearted philosophy pursued as a calling or vocation, and as a way of life; and inauthentic
philosophy is professionalized, Scholastic, half-hearted philosophy treated as a mere job or a mere “glass bead game.” Serious philosophy is philosophy with critical, deep, and synoptic or wide-scope content; and superficial philosophy is philosophy with dogmatic, shallow, and narrow or trivial content.

In turn, I think that real philosophy is what I call rational anthropology.

In the 11th and most famous of his Theses on Feuerbach, Marx wrote that “philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it.” I completely agree with him that the ultimate aim of philosophy is to change the world, not merely interpret it. So Marx and I are both philosophical liberationists: that is, we both believe that philosophy should have radical political implications. But I also sharply disagree with him, insofar as I think that the primary aim of real philosophy, now understood as rational anthropology, and its practices of synoptic reflection, writing, teaching, and public conversation, is to change our lives. Then, and only then, can we act upon the world in the right way.

Section 1.2 Rational Anthropology vs. Analytic Metaphysics, the Standard Picture, and Scientific Naturalism

Rational anthropology is committed to what I call real, human-faced, or anthropocentric metaphysics. Real metaphysics in this sense starts with the primitive, irreducible fact of purposive, living, essentially embodied, conscious, intentional, caring, rational and moral human experience, and then reverse-engineers its basic
metaphysical theses and explanations in order to conform strictly to all and only what is 
phenomenologically self-evident in human experience.

By “phenomenologically self-evident” I mean this:

A claim C is phenomenologically self-evident for a rational human subject S if
and only if (i) S’s belief in C relies on directly-given conscious or self-
conscious manifest evidence about human experience, and (ii) C’s denial is
either logically or conceptually self-contradictory, really metaphysically
impossible, or pragmatically self-stultifying for S.

This leads directly to what I call the criterion of phenomenological adequacy for metaphysical
theories:

A metaphysical theory MT is phenomenologically adequate if and only if MT
is evidentially grounded on all and only phenomenologically self-evident
theses.

Real metaphysics therefore rejects the idea of any theoretically fully meaningful,
non-paradoxical ontic commitment or cognitive access to non-apparent, non-manifest,
“really real” entities that are constituted by intrinsic non-relational properties, i.e., to
“noumena” or “things-in-themselves.”6 Such entities are logically, conceptually, or
“weakly metaphysically” possible, but strictly unknowable by minded animals like us,
both as to their nature, and as to their actual existence or non-existence. In this sense,
real metaphysics is methodologically eliminativist about noumena. Therefore, real
metaphysics rejects all noumenal realist metaphysics, including contemporary analytic
metaphysics.7
In the first half of the 20th century, the new and revolutionary anti-(neo)Kantian, anti-(neo)Hegelian philosophical programs were Gottlob Frege’s and Bertrand Russell’s *logicism*, G.E. Moore’s *Platonic atomism*, and the “linguistic turn” initiated by Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*, which yielded The Vienna Circle’s *logical empiricism*, and finally its nemesis, W.V.O. Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Logical empiricism also produced a domestic reaction, *ordinary language philosophy*. Powered by the work of H.P. Grice and Peter Strawson, ordinary language philosophy became *conceptual analysis*. In turn, Strawson created a new “connective,” i.e., holistic, version of conceptual analysis, that also constituted a “descriptive metaphysics.” Strawson’s connective conceptual analysis gradually fused with John Rawls’s holistic method of “reflective equilibrium” and Noam Chomsky’s psycholinguistic appeals to intuitions-as-evidence, and ultimately became the current *Standard Picture* of mainstream analytic philosophical methodology.

Coexisting in mainstream contemporary analytic philosophy, alongside the Standard Picture, is also the classical Lockean idea that philosophy should be an “underlaborer” for the natural sciences, especially as this idea was developed in the second half of the 20th century by Quine and Wilfrid Sellars, as the reductive or eliminativist, physicalist, and scientistic doctrine of *scientific naturalism*, and again in the early 21st century in even more sophisticated versions, as “experimental philosophy,” aka “X-Phi,” and the doctrine of *second philosophy*. 
From the standpoint of rational anthropology and its real metaphysics, what is fundamentally wrong with the Standard Picture is its intellectualist, coherentist reliance on networks of potentially empty, non-substantive concepts, and above all, its avoidance of the sensible, essentially non-conceptual side of human experience and human cognition, which alone connects it directly to what is manifestly real.

Correspondingly, what is wrong with scientific naturalism/X-Phi/second philosophy is its reduction or elimination of the primitive, irreducible fact of human experience. Rational anthropology and its real metaphysics are all about the rational human condition, and not all about noumenal entities, coherent networks of concepts, or fundamentally physical, essentially non-mental, facts.

Section 1.3 Philosophy and Its History: No Deep Difference

Rational anthropology is a contemporary version of Kant’s philosophy.

In freely going back and forth between Kant’s philosophy and contemporary philosophy, I am applying the following strong metaphilosophical principle that I call The No-Deep-Difference Thesis:

There is no fundamental difference in philosophical content between the history of philosophy and contemporary philosophy.

In other words, in doing contemporary philosophy one is thereby directly engaging with the history of philosophy, and in doing the history of philosophy one is thereby
directly engaging with contemporary philosophy. And in real philosophy, there is no essential distinction to be drawn between the two.

What I mean by The No-Deep-Difference Thesis is that every authentic, serious philosophical work is a logically governed attempt to say something comprehensive, illuminating, and necessarily (or at least universally) true about the rational human condition and our deepest values, including our relationships to each other and to the larger natural and abstract worlds that surround us, and that in order to convey this basic content it does not matter at all when the work was created or when the work is interpreted.

If I am right about this thesis, then it cuts three ways: first, it means that everything in the history of philosophy also belongs substantively to contemporary philosophy; second, it means that everything in contemporary philosophy also belongs substantively to the history of philosophy; and third, it means that Quine was completely wrong when he (reportedly—there seems to be no published source for this) wickedly and wittily said that there are two kinds of philosophers: those who are interested in the history of philosophy, and those who are interested in philosophy. In fact, there is really only one kind of authentic, serious philosopher, and whether s/he likes it or not, s/he should be deeply interested in the history of philosophy. The subdiscipline called “History of Philosophy” is philosophy, as philosophical as it gets, and all philosophy is also History of Philosophy, as historical as it gets.
Those who on the contrary are Deep Differentists must hold that History of Philosophy is at best an enterprise in historical scholarship with a superficial philosophical inflection, but not philosophy as such, and that philosophy in effect always begins anew, from argumentative Ground Zero, with every new philosophical work that is created. This metaphilosophical occasionalism seems to me not only very implausible as a way of thinking about the relation between philosophy and its own history, but also apt to trivialize and undermine the very practice of real philosophy itself.

Section 1.4 Works of Philosophy vs. Philosophical Theories: Presentational Hylomorphism and Polymorphism

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant says that there are “aesthetic idea[s],” by which he means,

[a] representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible..., [and] [o]ne readily sees that it is the counterpart (pendant) of an idea of reason, which is, conversely, a concept to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate. (CPJ 5: 314)

In other words, an aesthetic idea is a non-empirical, metaphysical representation, like an “idea of pure reason,” but also non-discursive and non-conceptual, hence linguistically inexpressible by means of concepts, propositions, or Fregean “thoughts,” precisely to the extent that it is a product of human sensible imagination.
Kant himself does not make this point, but I think that the doctrine of aesthetic ideas has profound meta-philosophical implications: *philosophy need not necessarily be theoretically expressed*. Correspondingly, I think that there is a fundamental distinction between (i) works of philosophy and (ii) philosophical theories, such that the category of “philosophical works” is essentially wider and more inclusive than the category of philosophical theories—and more generally, philosophical theorizing is only one way of creating and presenting philosophy, as important as it is.

The aim of philosophical theories, according to rational anthropology, is to provide philosophical explanations that lead to essential, synoptic insights about the rational human condition, guided by the norms of propositional truth and logical consistency, by means of conceptual construction and conceptual reasoning. A similarly open-minded conception of philosophical theorizing, in the tradition of connective conceptual analysis, was developed by Robert Nozick in his influential book, *Philosophical Explanations*. But I think that Nozick’s conception is still too much in the grip of the deeply wrongheaded, *scientistic* idea that all philosophy *must* be modeled on natural science, mathematics, or logic.

According to rational anthropology, the aim of philosophical works, *as such*, is to present insights about the rational human condition and the larger world around us, with synoptic scope, and a priori/necessary character, tracking categorical normativity and our highest values, with the ultimate goal of *radical enlightenment*. But this can be
achieved even without concepts, propositions, arguments, or theories, in an essentially non-conceptual way, by presenting imagery, pictures, structures, etc., that have strictly universal and strongly modal implications, and categorically normative force. These essentially non-conceptual insights could also be called “truths,” if we use the term “truth” sufficiently broadly—as in “the truth shall set you free.”

My basic point is that philosophy should be as much aimed at being inspiring and visionary, as it is at being argumentative and explanatory. Pivoting on that basic point, here is a proposal for five disjunctively necessary, individually minimally sufficient, and collectively fully sufficient criteria for something $W$—where $W$ is a “work,” any intentional human product, whether an object (material or intentional), or performance—to count as a “work of philosophy”—

(i) $W$ provides a philosophical theory or a visionary worldview (or both),

(ii) $W$ negatively or positively engages with earlier or contemporary philosophical ideas,

(iii) $W$ expresses and follows a philosophical method,

(iv) $W$ contains an explicit or implicit “philosophy of philosophy,” a metaphilosophy,

(v) $W$ deals with some topic or topics germane to the rational human condition, within a maximally broad range of issues, encompassing epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, history, culture, society, politics, aesthetics, art, formal and natural science, religion, and so-on.18

Given how I defined the term “work,” by my use of the term “works” in the phrase “works of philosophy,” I mean something as broad as its use in “works of art.”
So there is no assumption or presupposition whatsoever here that works of philosophy must be *written or spoken texts*, although obviously many or most works of philosophy have been and are written or spoken texts. Correspondingly, I want to put forward two extremely important metaphilosophical theses of rational anthropology: (i) the thesis of *presentational hylomorphism* in works of philosophy (PHWP), and (ii) the thesis of *presentational polymorphism* in works of philosophy (PPWP).

PHWP says:

> There is an essential connection, and in particular, an essential complementarity, between the presentational form (morphê) of philosophical works and their philosophical content (hyle).

“Content” here is *cognitive-semantic content*, but this content can be either (i) conceptual, or (ii) essentially non-conceptual, and also it can be either (iii) theoretical content or (iv) non-theoretical content, including, aesthetic/artistic, affective/emotive, pragmatic, moral, political, or religious content. Also, (i) and (ii) cross-cut with (iii) and (iv).

Hence there can be conceptual content that is either theoretical or non-theoretical, and there can be essentially non-conceptual content that is either theoretical or non-theoretical.

The *first* thing that PHWP implies, is the intimate connection between truly creative, ground-breaking works of philosophy, and truly creative, original forms of literary and spoken philosophical expression. Thus Socrates created philosophical works entirely by conversation; Plato did it by writing dialogues; Aristotle did it by
presenting (it seems) nothing but lectures; Descartes wrote meditations; Locke and
Hume wrote treatises; Kant wrote the Critiques; Kierkegaard wrote strange
pseudonymous books; Nietzsche wrote poetry and aphorisms; Wittgenstein wrote the
_Tractatus_ and the _Philosophical Investigations_, both of them completely original,
completely different, and equally uncategorizable; and so on.

The **second** thing that PHWP implies is that since all works of written and
spoken philosophy are essentially connected to their literary style and expressive
vehicles, then it is a mistake to impose a needlessly restrictive stylistic and expressive
straight-jacket on works of philosophy, e.g., the standard professional “journal essay,”
“200+ page book,” and “philosophy talk.”

And a **third** thing that PHWP implies is that since the standard view of
philosophical content in the analytic tradition—whether as logical analysis, linguistic
analysis, conceptual analysis, analytic metaphysics, or scientific naturalism—is that the
content of philosophy is exclusively conceptual and theoretical, then recognizing the
essential non-conceptuality and non-theoreticality of philosophical content, completely
opens up the way we should be thinking about works of philosophy, in three ways.

**First**, all written and spoken philosophy is in fact shot through with imagery,
poetry, rhetorical devices, and speech-acts of various kinds.

**Second**, philosophy need not necessarily be presented (exclusively) in written or
spoken form. There could be works of philosophy that are cinematic, diagrammed or
drawn, painted, photographed, musical (instrumental or voiced), sculpted, performed
like dances or plays, etc., etc., and perhaps above all, mixed works combining written or
spoken forms of presentation and one or more non-linguistic forms or vehicles.

Third, if philosophical content is as apt to be essentially non-conceptual or non-
thetical as it is to be conceptual or theoretical, then there are vast realms of
philosophical meaning that very few philosophers, even the most brilliant and great
ones, have ever even attempted to explore.

Therefore, in full view of PHWP, we also have PPWP:

**Philosophy can be expressed in any presentational format whatsoever, provided it satisfies PHWP.**

From the standpoint of rational anthropology, and looking towards the philosophy of
the future, this is a truly exciting thesis.

**Section 1.5 Analytic Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, and Rational Anthropology**

When I was a graduate student in the 1980s, I belonged to the first wave of
young philosophers who were taking it upon themselves to reject, overcome, and
transcend the seemingly fundamental difference, or Great Divide, between “analytic”
and “Continental” philosophy. Indeed, that was how I framed to myself my goal in
philosophy. So in my graduate school discussion- & research group we studied the
*Tractatus/early Wittgenstein*, Putnam on reference and meaning, Kripke on ditto,
Kaplan on ditto, Husserl against logical psychologism and on consciousness and
intentionality, Heidegger on existential phenomenology, Sartre on ditto, Merleau-Ponty on ditto, Gareth Evans on reference and intentionality, and Richard Rorty on everything. The *Logical Investigations*, *Being and Time*, the *Phenomenology of Perception*, *Varieties of Reference*, *The Linguistic Turn* (edited, with an amazing Introduction, by Rorty), and *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* were my bibles, each one at various times carried under my arm all day long, getting worn and sweaty, so that I could quote them chapter-and-verse.

At the same time, and later, I read Kant. Lots of Kant. Everything I could lay my hands on. And Frege, Russell, Moore, Carnap, Quine, Austin, Strawson, Grice, and Searle. Everything by them that I could lay my hands on. And then more Husserl, more Heidegger, more Sartre, more Merleau-Ponty.

The first half of my PhD dissertation was mostly historical, on Kant’s theory of judgment. The second half was systematic and original, on the semantics, philosophical psychology, and epistemology of singular “Russellian” propositions. Husserl and Evans were the primary inspirations of my thinking in that second half.

After I graduated and got a tenure-track job in 1989, I thought long and hard about all of this philosophical material, and in the early-to-mid 00s, wrote two books in the history of philosophy, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* (2001) and *Kant, Science and Human Nature* (2006), in order to work out the nature of the relationship between Kant’s philosophy and the analytic tradition.
Also in the mid-00s, I wrote a systematic, original book about the nature of logic, *Rationality and Logic* (2006), trying to come to grips with what I took to be the core theoretical foundations of the analytic tradition, namely, logic and analyticity. Along the way, I also attempted to explain logical knowledge in terms of irreducible consciousness and intentionality, which I took to be the core theoretical foundations of the Continental tradition. My basic idea was to ground them all (logic, analyticity, logical knowledge, consciousness, and intentionality) in the innately-specified a priori spontaneous capacities of rational human animals for constructing all logics, whether classical, conservatively non-classical, or deviant. Or in other words, my basic idea was broadly Kantian.

Finally, after all that philosophical soul-searching, in the late 00s, I published a paper in which I wrote this:

Twentieth-century philosophy in Europe and the USA was dominated by two distinctive and (after 1945) officially opposed traditions: the *analytic tradition* and the *phenomenological tradition*. Very simply put, the analytic tradition was all about logic and analyticity, and the phenomenological tradition was all about consciousness and intentionality. Ironically enough however, despite their official Great Divide, both the analytic and the phenomenological traditions were essentially continuous and parallel critical developments from an earlier dominant neo-Kantian tradition. This, by the end of the nineteenth century had vigorously reasserted the claims of Kant’s transcendental idealism against Hegel’s absolute idealism and the other major systems of post-Kantian German Idealism, under the unifying slogan “Back to Kant!” So again ironically enough, both the analytic and phenomenological traditions were alike founded on, and natural outgrowths from, Kant’s Critical Philosophy.

By the end of the twentieth century however, and this time sadly rather than ironically, both the analytic and phenomenological traditions had not only
explicitly rejected their own Kantian foundations and roots but also had effectively undermined themselves philosophically, even if by no means institutionally. On the one hand the analytic tradition did so by abandoning its basic methodological conception of analysis as the process of logically decomposing propositions into conceptual or metaphysical “simples,” as the necessary preliminary to a logical reconstruction of the same propositions, and by also jettisoning the corresponding idea of a sharp, exhaustive, and significant “analytic-synthetic” distinction. The phenomenological tradition on the other hand abandoned its basic methodological conception of phenomenology as “seeing essences” with a priori certainty under a “transcendental-phenomenological reduction,” and also jettisoned the corresponding idea of a “transcendental ego” as the metaphysical ground of consciousness and intentionality.

One way of interpreting these sad facts is to say that just insofar as analytic philosophy and phenomenology alienated themselves from their Kantian origins, they stultified themselves. This is the first unifying thought behind this paper, and it is a downbeat one. The second unifying thought, which however is contrastively upbeat, is that both the analytic and phenomenological traditions, now in conjunction instead of opposition, could rationally renew themselves in the twenty-first century by critically recovering their Kantian origins and by seriously re-thinking and re-building their foundations in the light of this critical recovery. Or in other words: Forward to Kant.20

My line in the late 00s, then, was that both analytic and Continental philosophy are nothing but outgrowths from and spins on Kantian philosophy: a series of footnotes to Kant. Or otherwise put, they are at bottom nothing but Kantalytic philosophy and Kantinental philosophy. So now it is time for everyone to recognize this and go forward to Kant! And I continue to think I am right about that.

But there is still an important leftover problem. Even supposing for a moment that I am indeed right that all philosophy since Kant is really all about Kant, then what explains the robustly persistent opinion amongst contemporary professional academic
philosophers that there is a genuine and important difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? Here is what I also wrote in that same paper from the late 00s, in an attempt to answer that question:

In Davos, Switzerland, from 17 March to 6 April 1929, an “International University Course,” sponsored by the Swiss, French, and German governments, brought together the leading neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer, famous author of the multi-volume *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1925, 1927, 1929), and the soon-to-be leading phenomenologist Martin Heidegger, famous author of *Being and Time* (1927), in an official and more or less explicit attempt to bring about a philosophical reconciliation between Marburg (or science-oriented) neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. The soon-to-be leading logical positivist Rudolf Carnap was there too, along with many other professors and students from across Europe. And a good time was had by all: “It appears that the Davos encounter itself took place in atmosphere of extraordinarily friendly collegiality.”

The key sessions at Davos were two lecture series by Cassirer and Heidegger, followed by a public disputation between them. Strikingly, both the lectures and the disputation dealt with the question of how to interpret the *Critique of Pure Reason* correctly. In other words, it was all about Kant and the neo-Kantian origins of phenomenology. Now for this reason it can be argued, and indeed has been argued, that the Davos conference was emblematic of the death-by-mitosis of the neo-Kantian tradition, during the 1930s, into two fundamentally distinct and irreconcilable philosophical traditions: the analytic tradition (whose paradigm case was logical positivism), and the phenomenological tradition (whose paradigm case was existential phenomenology).

According to this historical reconstruction, the basic disagreements between analysis and phenomenology were latent in the period 1900–30, during which … Moore, Russell, and Carnap all started their philosophical careers as neo-Kantians, went on to reject neo-Kantianism and Kant by means of foundational work in philosophical logic and the influence of the contemporary exact sciences, and then correspondingly worked out various new logically-driven conceptions of a priori analysis. And then, so the story goes, the latent eventually became manifest, and the post-Kantian stream of philosophical influence consisting of Brentano → Husserl/ Meinong → Heidegger was officially divided from the other post-Kantian stream consisting of Moore → Russell → Wittgenstein →
Carnap, basically because the phenomenologists rejected the Frege–Russell conception of pure logic while contrariwise the analysts affirmed pure logic. And never the twain shall meet.

But although this makes a conveniently neat story, it is at least arguably not quite true to the historico-philosophical facts. The highly collegial atmosphere at Davos was no polite put-on. Obviously there were some important differences and disagreements between logical positivism and existential phenomenology. Nevertheless Heidegger took Carnap very seriously as a philosopher well into the 1930s, and Carnap also took Heidegger very seriously as a philosopher well into the 1930s. (As did Wittgenstein, and as also did Gilbert Ryle at Oxford – who, according to Michael Dummett, “began his career as an exponent of Husserl for British audiences and used to lecture on Bolzano, Brentano, Frege, Meinong, and Husserl” throughout the 1920s and 1930s.) For his part, Heidegger was every bit as dismissive of traditional metaphysics as Carnap was. And while it is quite true that Heidegger significantly criticized the Fregean and Russellian pure logic of the Begriffsschrift and Principia Mathematica, and challenged its metaphysical commitments, so too did Carnap; after all, that is the main point of the Logical Syntax of Language. Furthermore, objectively considered, Heidegger’s existential phenomenology is not essentially more different from or opposed to pure logic, or logical positivism for that matter, than is Dewey’s pragmatism, which despite its radical critical philosophical implications … cohabited very comfortably with mainstream analytic philosophy in the USA after 1945. Nor, objectively speaking, is Heidegger’s existential phenomenology essentially more different from or opposed to either pure logic, or logical positivism, than is Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as expressed in his Philosophical Investigations (1953), which despite its equally radical critical philosophical implications, also cohabited very comfortably with mainstream analytic philosophy in the USA and England after 1945.

So it appears that the Great Divide between analytic philosophy and phenomenology did not actually happen in the 1930s. And it also appears that the Divide is not the consequence of any fundamental philosophical disagreements between analysts and phenomenologists about pure logic. On the contrary, it appears that the Divide happened almost entirely after 1945, and that it was the joint result of the three following factors:

1. The sharply divisive cultural politics of anti-fascism and anti-Communism in Anglo-American countries after World War II: Heidegger publicly and notoriously supported the Nazis in the mid-thirties; Vienna Circle exiles in the
USA were understandably very eager to avoid being persecuted during the McCarthy Communist-trials era for their pre-war radical-socialist and Communist sympathies, so were generally playing it safe (Carnap however being a notable exception) by not rocking the boat; and the leading French phenomenologists Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty were both closely politically associated with the radical Left.

2 The sharply divisive debate about the cultural-political significance and philosophical implications of the exact sciences after World War II; taking his cue from Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, but also reflecting on the worsening cultural-political situation in Europe, Husserl had seriously criticized the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the exact sciences in his *Crisis of European Sciences*; and then taking his cue directly from Husserl, Merleau-Ponty further deepened and developed this critique in his *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945).

3 The sharply divisive struggle for control of the major Anglo-American philosophy departments after World War II: given the aging and retirement of historically-trained philosophers, neo-Kantians, and neo-Hegelians, it was going to be either the analysts or the phenomenologists who took over, but not both.

In other words, I am suggesting that although the Great Divide between analytic philosophy and phenomenology is real enough, *nevertheless it didn’t happen until after 1945, and was essentially the result of cultural-political factors, together with one serious philosophical disagreement about the foundations of the exact sciences*.²³

Now what about that “one serious philosophical disagreement about the foundations of the exact sciences”? In an essay called “Wittgenstein and Kantianism,” this is what I have written about it:

As Quine,²⁴ Reichenbach,²⁵ and Sellars so clearly saw in the 1950s, after the successive downfalls of Logicism and Logical Empiricism/Positivism during the first half of the 20th century, Analytic philosophy became, essentially, a series of minor variations on the theme of *scientific philosophy*:

In the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not.”²⁶
This is philosophy in Sellars’s Scientific Image. But later Wittgenstein, following Kant’s lead, radically challenges and rejects this essentially scientistic conception of philosophy:

I cannot even assume God, freedom, or immortality for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason unless I simultaneously deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to extravagant insights; because in order to attain to such insights, speculative reason would have to help itself to principles that in fact reach only to objects of possible experience, and which, if they were to be applied to what cannot be an object of possible experience, then they would always transform it into an appearance and thus declare all practical extension of pure reason to be impossible. Thus I had to deny scientific knowing (Wissen) in order to make room for faith (Glauben). (CPR Bxxix-xxx)

It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific (wissenschaftliche) ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically ‘that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible think such-and-such’—whatever that may mean… And we may not advance any kind of [scientific] theory…. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in spite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known.

In this way, [rational] anthropometry as practised by Kant and Wittgenstein does not either seek a humanly impossible, absolutely justifying, pure rational insight into things-in-themselves, or draw Pyrrhonian skeptical conclusions from our inevitable and tragic failure to achieve a godlike ‘intellectual intuition’ of ourselves and the world (CPR B72), or fall into scientism. For all three of these philosophical projects, whether dogmatically rationalistic, destructively skeptical, or reductively naturalistic, are equally inherently self-alienating and ‘inauthentic’ in the Existentialists’ sense. Indeed, it is significant that even when, in 1986, [Peter] Hacker officially rescinds his earlier Kant-oriented interpretation of Wittgenstein from 1972, he still admits that
more than any other philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein were concerned with the nature of philosophy itself and sought to curb its metaphysical pretensions by clarifying its status and circumscribing what one may rationally hope for in philosophical investigation. Both saw philosophical and metaphysical pretensions of reason as at least a large part of the subject, and the eradication of such illusions as a major goal of their work.\(^{30}\)

Otherwise put, with a tragic sense of life, Kant and Wittgenstein both fully recognize that we must renounce every variety of the bad faith of reason in order to make room for an authentic, autonomous, rational human life, and in turn, in order to make room for an anthropocentric rationalist version of Kierkegaard’s ‘knighthood of faith’, as it were, the knighthood of rational faith, whereby you can radically change your life, or change the direction of your life—and this is the deepest lesson of [rational]\(^{31}\) anthropology.\(^{32}\)

So what I am saying here is that to the extent that there is any serious philosophical disagreement between analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy since 1945, it is actually a philosophical disagreement between scientistic philosophy and anti-scientistic Kantian,\(^ {33}\) Wittgensteinian philosophy. Scientistic philosophy, in turn, is very closely associated with “the military-industrial complex,” which has heavily funded and importantly controlled Anglo-American universities since 1945, and therefore it is highly unsurprising that scientistic thinkers would do extremely well, in an institutional sense, at Anglo-American universities in the post-1945 world.

What do I mean by that? In his farewell presidential address in 1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower said this:

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we
must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper together.  

In other words, the military-industrial complex is the unholy alliance and economic-political interlinkage of “an immense military establishment,” a “large arms industry,” and more generally multinational corporate capitalism, heavily influencing the legislative process via lobbyists and Political Action Committees. A perfect example would be the Lockheed Martin Corporation.  

Now in order for Big Guns and Big Money and Big Influence to exist, Big Science is needed, which in turn is heavily funded by government-sponsored and multinational corporate grants. In turn, Anglo-American universities that have Big Science (e.g., Caltech, MIT, Cambridge, Harvard, Stanford, plus Oxford, Yale, and Princeton to a slightly lesser extent, and all the major state universities, especially in the California system) are all rich universities, with highly-ranked philosophy departments, all of which are analytic philosophy departments.  

This is not a coincidence. Scientism, as I mentioned above, is nicely captured by the Sellarsian epistemic and ontological thesis that “science is the measure of all things.” Now scientism is explicitly or implicitly presupposed by analytic philosophy.
Hence analytic philosophy, via scientism, fully supports the basic aims of Big Science, which fully services Big Guns, Big Money, and Big Influence, which in turn collectively heavily fund Big Science and analytic philosophy in the highly-ranked departments. Therefore, what I am saying is that (to borrow Rorty’s lovely formulations) the “hidden agenda” that “lies behind the current split between devotees of ‘analytic’ and of ‘Continental’ philosophy,” and, correspondingly, what adequately explains how the “heavy breathing on both sides about the immorality or stupidity of the opposition signals passions which academic power struggles cannot fully explain,” is that the real and continuing passion-driven difference between analytic and Continental philosophy is nothing more and nothing less than a rationally unjustified political difference. By this, I mean that it is nothing more and nothing less than a rationally unjustified difference in cultural, social, and economic power-relations, a false ideology, that all contemporary philosophers should clearly and distinctly expose, critically examine, cognitively resist, and then systematically subvert.

We need to do all this for the sake of the philosophy of the future, which I think is rational anthropology, and for the sake of our own cognitive liberation and self-fulfillment, which I think is our wholehearted pursuit of principled, authentic lives as rational human animals.
Section 1.6 What is a Rational Human Animal?

Rational human animals are what we really are and who we really are. More precisely, according to my account, rational human animals are individual living organisms in the human species, and also unique real persons who are innately and irreducibly capable of consciousness, intentionality, and caring, including affect, desire, and emotion, sense perception and imagination, memory and thought, logical and mathematical cognition and inference, empirical knowledge, a priori knowledge, reasons-sensitivity of all kinds, and above all, free agency and moral responsibility. Rational human animals are real human persons.

Rational human animals, real human persons, consciously care intensely about themselves, about one another, and also about other things that affect themselves and one another. They effectively desire things, and they thereby intentionally move their bodies, sometimes spontaneously, sometimes habitually, and sometimes self-reflectively and deliberatively. They consciously perceive things through their senses, they make judgments and have beliefs about things, and they know some things. They formulate and recognize reasons. On the basis of these reasons, they establish normative principles for themselves, which they then attempt to follow consistently and with appropriate generalizability. They try to justify themselves, both theoretically and practically. They can also deceive themselves, and they are very good at making mere
rationalizations. They can be insincere and lie. But even more importantly, and correspondingly, they can also be sincere and tell the truth.

Rational human animals, real human persons, have complete, finite, unique lives, in the sense that every such life has a definite beginning with the emergence of conscious experience, a definite middle in which human personhood is fully actualized and sustained, and then a definite ending in the destruction of their essentially embodied real human personal lives at death. They can intensely enjoy themselves. They can be enthralled or enthused. They can be amused or bemused. They can be embarrassed, frustrated, bored stiff, or deeply depressed. Hence they can also suffer intensely. They worry a great deal about dying. Sometimes, in despair, they deliberately take their own lives. And sometimes they are very wicked. They can torture others, and they can treat each other like mere garbage or offal. They can ignore each other, unfairly criticize each other, envy each other, betray each other, hate each other, and kill each other. They can also respect each other, trust each other, like each other, lust after each other, copulate with each other, love each other with all their hearts, jointly produce other rational human animals from inside their own bodies, live with each other as friends, partners, or families, and also look after each other compassionately until death finally parts them.

Rational human animals, real human persons, are aware of reasons, and they try to be moved by the highest reasons, which in turn express the Highest or Supreme
Good. They also want to be *happy* in all the senses of that equally deeply ambiguous and deeply morally important term. This includes, at least,

(i) human happiness as the egoistic “lower” or else “higher” pleasures (in John Stuart Mill’s terminology) and/or the reduction of pain or suffering,

(ii) human happiness as the egoistic or else public-minded satisfaction of desires and preferences,

(iii) human happiness as privately virtuous self-perfection,

(iv) human happiness as publicly virtuous flourishing,

(v) human happiness as wholehearted self-fulfillment, i.e., psychic coherence, active self-realization, and volitional self-sufficiency, i.e., authenticity,

and perhaps other distinct forms of human happiness as well.

Rational human animals, real human persons, can freely choose and act, and they can take causal and moral responsibility for their choices and acts. They can also take causal and moral responsibility for things over which they had no control. In this way, they have both Kantian autonomy in the robustly or strongly potential, dispositional sense of possessing an innate capacity for rational self-legislation, and also authenticity in the robustly or strongly potential, dispositional sense of possessing an online innate capacity for purity of heart, single-mindedness, or wholeheartedness. Together these innate capacities make really possible the fact of a free, self-legislating wholehearted adherence to one’s moral principles, including some absolutely general moral principles, together with sometimes taking causal and moral responsibility for brute contingent facts, at least partially and to some salient degree or extent, which I call
*principled authenticity*. Principled authenticity is morally better than human happiness alone, although of course human happiness is extremely good too, and also an intrinsic proper part of a completely good rational human animal’s life.

That rational human animals, real human persons, really do have lives in which there is both a Highest or Supreme Good (principled authenticity) and also a Complete Good (happiness guided by principled authenticity), and furthermore an at least partial achievement or realization, to some salient degree or extent, of these highest goods in their lives, even if they never can fully attain these highest goods, is the same as to say *that their lives have meaning*. Only creatures whose lives really do have meaning would be capable of intense suffering because they can, falsely and tragically, come to believe and feel in their hearts that their lives are meaningless. In this way, as rational human animals, real human persons, capable of principled authenticity, we are the animals with *meaningful lives*. We are always and inherently governed by reasons, and we are always and inherently looking for reasons. We crave grounding and validation, both contextual and ultimate.

This is not to say, however, that we ever actually manage to live up adequately to our own nature or to our own principles. We can feel, choose, and act as if we were nothing but complex machines or tricked-up puppets, and not living animals, not free, and not real persons, and therefore as if our lives were utterly without meaning. That is where the inauthenticity part comes in. Moreover, we can screw things up, and very
frequently we do screw things up, both colossally and trivially. That is where the evil and suffering part comes in. We can do horrendous, terrible things to one another, and/or to ourselves. Also, it can happen that either we are not what we want ourselves to be, or other people are not what we want them to be, or the world is not the way we want it to be. Any of these facts, or all of these facts together, can make us feel sick unto death. So we are, also, the animals capable of evil and suffering. That is the tragic side of us.

Nevertheless, as the necessary flip side of our innate capacities for inauthenticity, evil, and suffering, we are also essentially the animals innately capable of principled authenticity and happiness.

What I have just sketched is a working characterization of rational human animals, of real human persons, of ourselves. Let us suppose for the purposes of argument that it is actually true. It does not follow from this working characterization of our nature, however, that it is in any way easy to explain how this can be true, or as Kant would put it, to explain “the conditions of its real possibility.” Indeed, here are nine deep and difficult philosophical problems directly related to the nature of our nature:

(1) What accounts for the existence and specific character of conscious, intentional, caring, rational human animal minds in a natural, physical world? (the problem of the mind-body relation).

(2) What accounts for the causal relevance and causal efficacy of conscious, intentional, caring, rational human animal minds in a natural, physical world? (the problem of mental causation).

(3) What accounts for the identity of rational human animals, real human persons, over time? (the problem of personal identity).
(4) What accounts for the difference between the things that rational human animals, real human persons, consciously, intentionally, and caringly do, and the things that just happen to us? (the problem of action).

(5) How can rational human animals, real human persons, really and truly choose or do things with negative freedom, positive freedom, and responsibility in a natural, physical world? (the problem of free will).

(6) What accounts for the sufficient justification of true beliefs? (the problem of knowledge).

(7) What accounts for the sufficient justification of motivating reasons and moral principles? (the problem of practical agency and morality).

(8) Is it possible to prove that an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good being—i.e., God—exists, and if so or if not, then what? (the theological problem).

(9) Can the de facto coercive authority of the State over those who belong to it, to compel them to heed and obey the commands of its government, be rationally and morally justified or legitimated, and if so or if not, then what? (the problem of political authority).

Obviously these nine problems differ from one another in many important respects. But rational human animals, real human persons, are at one and the same time conscious, intentional, caring living organisms, and also complete, finite, unique individuals over time, whose intentional actions have both causal relevance and causal efficacy. They are capable of negative freedom, positive freedom, and moral responsibility in a deterministic or non-deterministic natural, physical world. They are also cognizers and practical agents capable of knowledge or sufficiently justified true belief. They are also capable of right action and of adopting sufficiently justified
motivating reasons and moral principles. They also think about the ultimate origins and ends of all creatures and things, and naturally wonder and worry about the provability of the existence or non-existence of God. And they all live alongside each other inside States or other state-like institutions that possess the coercive power to compel their compliance to the commands of governments, so they naturally wonder and worry whether the de facto coercive authority of these institutions over them has any rational and moral justification or legitimacy. Therefore there is at least one respect in which all nine philosophical problems, when specifically focused on rational human animals, real human persons, are ultimately the same deep and difficult problem:

What accounts for the existence and specific character of rational human animals, real human persons, and their complete, finite, and unique individual lives, lived alongside all the other rational and non-rational minded animals, all of us ineluctably embedded in this thoroughly nonideal world, both natural and social? (the problem of the rational human condition)

So The Rational Human Condition is nothing more and nothing less than my attempt to solve the problem of the rational human condition.

Section 1.7 An Important Worry and a Preliminary Reply

Here’s an important worry about what I am arguing and philosophically trying to do in The Rational Human Condition:

“So you are saying that reality must and does conform to the phenomenology of our conscious experience of ourselves as rational human animals, real human persons, and to the specific details of our fundamental self-conception? OK. But even if you are correct about the structure and details of our phenomenology and our fundamental self-conception, then obviously there is
no direct inference from our phenomenology and our fundamental self-conception to reality, since equally obviously we could be systematically deceived or mistaken about that. In other words, an ‘error-theory’ might well be true about our phenomenology and our fundamental self-conception: so reality need not and might not conform to them.”

Yes, clearly I need to say something in reply to this objection before getting the project of rational anthropology properly underway.

I agree completely that there is no logically valid inference from the phenomenology of our conscious experience of ourselves as rational human animals, real human persons, and from our fundamental self-conception, to reality as such. So as a matter of logical possibility, reality need not and might not conform to our phenomenology and to our fundamental self-conception. Nevertheless, I do regard our phenomenology and our fundamental self-conception as genuine, primitive, philosophical data and evidence, along with other kinds of data and evidence of course, especially including all the formal constraints and correct information provided by logic, mathematics, and the basic natural sciences. Then, in full view of those formal constraints and that correct information, my project in these four books is to say what both rational human animals and also the real world would have to be like if our phenomenology and our fundamental self-conception were to be truly indicative of reality.

This, in turn, allows me to transfer the burden of philosophical proof back to my critic:

“If my account is intelligible and coherent, and if it conforms to the formal and natural sciences at least as well as the other competing accounts do, and if
it provides cogent criticisms of the alternative competing accounts — then
which is a better overall explanation:

(1) my account, which faithfully preserves all the appearances, including all
our basic rational human animal and real-human-person-oriented values, or

(2) the theory that we are systematically deceived by or mistaken about reality
and about ourselves?

In other words, should we have the metaphysical, cognitive, epistemic, and
moral courage of our own convictions in our own rational human animality,
our own real human personhood, or should we be deflationists, nihilists, and
radical skeptics?”

I think it is gob-smackingly obvious that “impartial reason,” to the extent that this is
humanly possible, would strongly favor my account. This is because the “debunking
strategy” and/or “error-theory” alternative is itself clearly self-refuting, or at least clearly
self-stultifying. And although this self-refuting or anyhow self-stultifying character is not
generally true of debunking strategies and/or error-theories, it is nevertheless a gob-
smacking consequence of debunking strategies and/or error-theories about human
rationality.

What I mean is that if it were true that we are systematically deceived and
mistaken about the nature of reality and about ourselves as rational human animals,
real human persons, then why would the debunking strategy and/or error-theory
themselves, as theories, be any more likely to be correct than any other arbitrarily-chosen
strategy and/or theory, given that the debunking strategy and/or error-theory are of
course themselves the products of human rationality? Indeed, the debunking strategy
and/or error-theory projects as applied to human rationality simply make no sense at the end of the day. For they presuppose and use a metaphysically, epistemically, and normatively robust human capacity or power for cognitive and practical rationality in order to attempt to prove the metaphysical, epistemic, and normative bankruptcy of human rationality. So they are trying to prove rationally that we are really incapable of rationally proving anything. This is just cognitive suicide, or at the very least, cognitive self-stultification. Hence it is even more than merely “impartially reasonable” to hold that any debunking strategy and/or error-theory as applied to human rationality is self-refuting or self-stultifying—it is also epistemically, metaphysically, morally, and vitally imperative for us to debunk the debunking strategies and/or error-theories by demonstrating their vicious circularity.

As I noted in passing earlier, Kant wrote in the B edition Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason that “I had to deny scientific knowing (Wissen) in order to make room for faith (Glauben)” (CPR Bxxx). He was not talking about so-called “blind faith,” if by that one means a rationally unjustified faith. What he meant was that he had to deny the putatively unbounded scope of scientific knowledge, in order to make room for moral certainty (CPR A828-829/B856-857). Kantian moral certainty, moreover, is not merely the kind of purely ethical moral certainty that flows from practical freedom and autonomy, but also, and perhaps more surprisingly, the kind of religious moral certainty that Pascal was seeking to induce or trigger by means of his so-called “Wager,” and that
Kierkegaard also called “the leap.” Similarly, we must ourselves deny the debunking strategies and/or error-theories in order to make room for human reason’s moral certainty about its own rationality-project, in all its dimensions. That sort of cognitive and practical circularity, whereby human reason freely and fully commits itself to itself and its own fundamental rational human project, is entirely benign, indeed self-supporting, and flows from our own nature.

Section 1.8 The Biggest Windmills

Socrates said “know thyself.” Rational anthropology says: “know the world by knowing yourself; then change your life; and then change the world too.”

My goal in writing the *The Rational Human Condition* is to launch rational anthropology by working out a true general theory of rational human animals in a thoroughly nonideal world, both natural and social. But there is a hitch. Even if, as I argued in section 1.7, the error-theory project is rationally self-refuting or at least self-stultifying, nevertheless it remains at least logically and metaphysically possible that a true general theory of the nature of rational human animals is simply a humanly impossible philosophical goal. Perhaps, then, I am engaged in a Quixotic task.

If so, alas.

Yet on the other hand, even though it is logically and metaphysically possible that this philosophical goal is humanly impossible, on the other hand, perhaps it is actually not a humanly impossible goal. Perhaps, in fact and on the contrary, it is
humanly really possible. Consider the simple yet compelling epistemic principle, “it takes one to know one,” meaning, “we have prima facie epistemic authority where our own individual lives and our own kinds of lives are concerned.” This is a principle so simple and so compelling that even children can spin off it as a joke. Hence it does seem to me really possible that a conscious, intentional, caring rational human animal, a real human person, prima facie, would be capable of working out a true general theory of the nature of her own kind of life. Assuming, of course, that she worked at it hard enough and long enough, and did not mind breaking a few logical lances, or taking the occasional dusty tumble off her philosophical horse.

Which leads me into a directly relevant side-passage, by way of concluding this philosophical beginning—I mean this Preface and General Introduction.

Like a great many other admiring readers of Miguel de Cervantes’s lovely, massive Don Quixote, I see it as a truly amazing novel that started out to be nothing but a picaresque parody of misguided ideals of chivalry, and ended up being a sublime early statement of literary Existentialism. It teaches us that, paradoxically, ridiculously tilting at windmills, on a ragged horse, with a broken lance, can be something well worth spending a lifetime doing. Now at any rate, as for me, I would far rather spend my life that way, and risk all the risible dusty tumbles, than play the glass bead game. So even if I am just ridiculously tilting at philosophical windmills, at least they are the biggest windmills I can imagine.
At the same time, however, what Wittgenstein wrote at the end of his Preface to the *Tractatus* is also entirely apt:

I am conscious that I have fallen far short of the possible. Simply because my powers are insufficient to cope with the task. — May others come and do it better. 39
NOTES

1 For convenience, I cite Kant’s works infratextually in parentheses. The citations include both an abbreviation of the English title and the corresponding volume and page numbers in the standard “Akademie” edition of Kant’s works: *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Königlich Preussischen (now Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. Reimer [now de Gruyter], 1902-). For references to the first *Critique*, I follow the common practice of giving page numbers from the A (1781) and B (1787) German editions only. Because the Akademie edition contains only the B edition of the first *Critique*, I have also consulted the following German composite edition: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. W. Weischedel, Immanuel Kant Werkausgabe III (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968). I generally follow the standard English translations of Kant’s works, but have occasionally modified them where appropriate. Here is a list of the abbreviations and English translations I’ve used:


17 See note 5 above.

18 I’m grateful to Otto Paans for proposing this basic list of criteria in e-mail discussion.

19 See note 14 above.


24 See, e.g., P. Hylton, *Quine* (London: Routledge, 2007), esp. chs. 9 and 12.


29 In that essay, I call it “transcendental anthropology,” but it is essentially equivalent to rational anthropology as I am developing it here.

As per note 29 above.


See, e.g., Lockheed Martin’s online site at URL = <http://www.lockheedmartin.com/>.


Many thanks to the undergraduate participants in the 2009 Colorado Summer Seminar in Philosophy, for forcefully pressing this objection. Only the four-book project as a whole can offer a fully compelling response to it. But given the importance of the worry, a preliminary reply is needed too.

The allusion is to Hermann Hesse’s Das Glasperlenspiel, aka The Glass Bead Game, first published in 1943. In the novel, the glass bead game is an all-absorbing, ultra-high-powered, intellectual pastime—as it were, a cross between Japanese Go, the Encyclopedia Britannica, and Frege’s Begriffsschrift—created and practiced by the highly intelligent, geographically isolated, morally and socially inept, and politically irrelevant inhabitants of the fictional, futuristic land of Castalia, somewhere in Central Europe. The parallels with 19th, 20th, and 21st century professional academic philosophy are obvious.