The Rational Human Condition 3, Deep Freedom and Real Persons: A Study in Metaphysics, Section 2.6–Inverted Life, Suspended Life, and Non-Local Life: How Life Does Not Strongly Supervene on the Physical, and Why.

“The Human Condition,” by Thomas Whitaker/Prison Arts Coalition

THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION is a five-part, four-book series, including:

PART 1: Preface and General Introduction

PART 2: Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge

PART 3:  Deep Freedom and Real Persons: A Study in Metaphysics

PART 4: Kantian Ethics and Human Existence: A Study in Moral Philosophy

PART 5:  Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism: A Theological-Political Treatise

Its author is ROBERT HANNA:


THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, PART 1

PREFACE AND GENERAL INTRODUCTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section 1.0  What It Is

Section 1.1  Bounded in a Nutshell

Section 1.2  Rational Anthropology vs. Analytic Metaphysics, the Standard Picture, and Scientific Naturalism

Section 1.3  Philosophy and Its History: No Deep Difference

Section 1.4  Works of Philosophy vs. Philosophical Theories: Presentational Hylomorphism and Polymorphism

Section 1.5  Analytic Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, and Rational Anthropology

Section 1.6  What is a Rational Human Animal?

Section 1.7  An Important Worry and a Preliminary Reply

Section 1.8  The Biggest Windmills


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THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, PART 2 

COGNITION, CONTENT, AND THE A PRIORI: A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND KNOWLEDGE

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THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, PART 3

DEEP FREEDOM AND REAL PERSONS: A STUDY IN METAPHYSICS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Note on References

1.  Introduction: Freedom, Life, and Persons’ Lives  

1.0 Natural Libertarianism and Minded Animalism

1.1 Incompatibilistic Compatibilism

1.2 Deep Freedom and Principled Authenticity

1.3 The Central Claim of this Book, and Previews                                         

2.  Beyond Mechanism: The Dynamics of Life

2.0 Introduction

2.1 Immanent Structuralism

2.2 Natural Mechanism, Computability, and Anti-Mechanism

2.3 Kant’s Anti-Mechanism, Kantian Anti-Mechanism, Vitalism, and Emergentism

2.4 On the Representation of Life

2.5 Kantian Non-Conceptualism and the Dynamicist Model of Life

2.6 Inverted Life, Suspended Life, and Non-Local Life: How Life Does Not Strongly Supervene on the Physical, and Why

2.7 Conclusion                                                                                                                  

3.  From Biology to Agency          

3.0 Introduction

3.1 Two-Dimensional Rational Normativity

3.2 Kant’s Biological Theory of Freedom

3.3 Practical-Freedom-in-Life: Kantian Non-Intellectualism

3.4 The Rationality of the Heart: Principled Authenticity

3.5 Conclusion                                                                                                       

4.  Neither/Nor: The Negative Case for Natural Libertarianism

4.0 Introduction                                                                                                                 

4.1 The Intuitive Definition of Free Will

4.2 The Four Metaphysical Horsemen of the Apocalypse

4.3 The Three Standard Options, Natural Mechanism, and The Fourfold Knot of Free Agency

4.4 Three Arguments for Classical Incompatibilism, and In-the-Zone Compatibilism

4.5 Three Arguments for Local Incompatibilism with Respect to Natural Mechanism

4.6 Sympathy for the Devil: Compatibilism Reconsidered

4.7 Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death?

4.8 Too Hard to Live With: Strawson’s Basic Argument, Hard Determinism, and Hard Incompatibilism

4.9 Conclusion                                                                                                        

5.  Either/Or: Deep Freedom and Principled Authenticity          

5.0 Introduction

5.1 The Internal Structure of Deep Freedom

5.2 From Frankfurt Back to Kierkegaard: How to Have a Live Option, or Kierkegaardian Either/Or, Without Alternative Possibilities

5.3 Psychological Freedom, Deep Freedom, and Principled Authenticity

5.4 Conclusion                                                                                                       

6.  Minded Animalism I: What Real Persons Really Are

6.0 Introduction

6.1 From Deep Freedom to Real Persons

6.2 Real Persons

6.3 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Real Personhood

6.4 Conclusion                                                                                                       

7.  Minded Animalism II: From Parfit to Real Personal Identity          

7.0 Introduction

7.1 Parfit’s Theory: Six Basic Claims

7.2 Against and Beyond Parfit 1: Two Reasons, and The Minded Animalist Criterion of Personal Identity

7.3 Against and Beyond Parfit 2: Four More Reasons

7.4 Conclusion   


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A NOTE ON REFERENCES

For convenience, throughout the five-part four book series, The Rational Human Condition—comprising 1. the Preface and General Introduction, 2. Cognition, Content, and the A Priori, 3. Deep Freedom and Real Persons, 4. Kantian Ethics and Human Existence, and 5. Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism—I refer to Kant’s works infratextually in parentheses. The citations include both an abbreviation of the English title and the corresponding volume and page numbers in the standard “Akademie” edition of Kant’s works: Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Königlich Preussischen (now Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. Reimer [now de Gruyter], 1902-). I generally follow the standard English translations, but have occasionally modified them where appropriate. For references to the first Critique, I follow the common practice of giving page numbers from the A (1781) and B (1787) German editions only. Here is a list of the relevant abbreviations and English translations:

BL       “The Blomberg Logic.” In Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic. Trans. J.M. Young. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992. Pp. 5-246.

C         Immanuel Kant: Correspondence, 1759-99. Trans. A. Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999.

CPJ      Critique of the Power of Judgment. Trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000.

CPR    Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997.

CPrR   Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. M. Gregor. In Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. Pp. 139-271.

DiS      “Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space.” Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992.  Pp. 365-372.

DSS     “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics.” Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770. Pp. 301-359.

EAT    “The End of All Things.” Trans. A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni. In Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. Pp. 221-231.

GMM  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. M. Gregor. In Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Pp. 43-108.

ID        “On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World (Inaugural Dissertation).” Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770. Pp. 373-416.

IUH     “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim.” Trans. A. Wood. In Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Eduction. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007. Pp. 107-120.

JL         “The Jäsche Logic.” Trans. J.M. Young. In Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic. Pp. 519-640.

LE       Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Ethics. Trans. P. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997.

MFNS Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Trans. M. Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.

MM     Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. M. Gregor. In Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Pp. 365-603.

OP       Immanuel Kant: Opus postumum. Trans.  E. Förster and M. Rosen. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993.

OT       “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” Trans. A. Wood. In Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology. Pp. 7-18.

Prol     Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Trans. G. Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.

PP       “Toward Perpetual Peace.” Trans. M. Gregor. In Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Pp. 317-351.

Rel       Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Trans. A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni. In Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology. Pp. 57-215.

RTL     “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy.” Trans. M. Gregor. In Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Pp. 611-615.

VL       “The Vienna Logic,” Trans. J.M. Young. In Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic. Pp. 251-377.

WE      “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” Trans. M. Gregor. In Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Pp. 17-22.


THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, PART 3

DEEP FREEDOM AND REAL PERSONS: A STUDY IN METAPHYSICS

Chapter 2  Beyond Mechanism: The Dynamics of Life

Section 2.6   Inverted Life, Suspended Life, and Non-Local Life: How Life Does Not Strongly Supervene on the Physical, and Why

As we saw in the last section, organismic life is not merely the occurrence of certain naturally mechanistic, Turing-computable behaviors, functions, or operations. More explicitly, organismic life is far-from-equilibrium, spatiotemporally asymmetric, complex, self-organizing, thermodynamic activity with intrinsic teleological dynamics, essential indexicality, and causal spontaneity. If this is correct, then organisms occupy unique spatial locations in their environments, take unique paths through them when they are motile, and in any case necessarily include intrinsic spatiotemporal asymmetries. For example, every animal’s body has right-left (top-bottom, front-back, etc.) asymmetries, and all metabolic processes are temporally irreversible processes. Moreover, as I argued above, it is plausible to hold that essential indexicality is the same as inherent context-dependency,[i] together with egocentric centering in a frame-of-reference, together with orientable space and irreversible time. Facts about self-organizing thermodynamic systems are therefore essentially indexical facts.

In The Conscious Mind, with his characteristic caution, Chalmers argues that indexical facts might not logically supervene on the fundamental physical facts:

Does indexicality pose a problem for reductive explanation? For arbitrary speakers, perhaps not, as the “fact” in question can be relativized away. But for myself, it is not so easy. The indexical fact expresses something very salient about the world as I find it: that David Chalmers is me. How could one explain this seemingly brute fact? …. The issue is extraordinarily difficult to get a grip on, but it seems to me that even if the indexical is not an objective fact about the world, it is a fact about the world as I find it, and it is the world as I find it that needs explanation. The nature of the brute indexical is quite obscure, though, and it is most unclear how one might explain it…. The indexical fact may have to be taken as primitive. If so, then we have a failure of reductive explanation distinct from and analogous to the failure with consciousness.[ii]

Here, Chalmers and I are in basic agreement. But I want also to go two steps further, and argue this:

(i) that indexical facts definitely do not logically supervene on the physical, and

(ii) that insofar as organismic life is an essentially indexical process, then it is not even strongly supervenient on the physical, much less logically supervenient.

Therefore physicalism about life, and correspondingly, natural mechanism about life, are both false.

Let us consider now the phenomenon of metabolism in living organisms, and the three following arguments.

Argument 1: Inverted Life

(1) Start with a representation of all the fundamental physical properties and facts about actual organismic metabolism. It is then representable, as a matter of conceivability, that actual organismic metabolism could be

either (i) enantiomorphically reversed in space,

or (ii) or have its “time’s arrow” systematically structurally deformed away from the classical time-model of continuous linear development (e.g. cyclical time, hyperbolic spiraling time, punctuated equilibrium time, etc.),

while also representing that all the fundamental physical properties and facts in the world are held fixed.

(2) We assume that Kantian Non-Conceptualism is true with respect to the representation of life.

(3) Therefore there is a real, objective instantiated or uninstantiated functional property “out there” in the world according to which, as a matter of conceivability, actual organismic metabolism could be 

either (i) enantiomorphically reversed in space,

or (ii) have its “time’s arrow” systematically structurally deformed away from the classical time-model of continuous linear development,

while also all the fundamental physical properties and facts in the world are held fixed.

(4) Therefore it is really possible that actual organismic metabolism could be 

either (i) enantiomorphically reversed in space,

or (ii) have its “time’s arrow” be systematically structurally deformed away from the classical time-model of continuous linear development,

while also all the fundamental physical facts and properties in the world are held fixed.

 (5) Therefore the strong supervenience of biological life on the physical fails.

 Argument 2: Suspended Life

(1) Start with a representation of all the fundamental physical properties and facts about actual organismic metabolism. It is then representable, as a matter of conceivability,  that actual organismic metabolism could be universally frozen in actual time and actual place—i.e., in a universal state of suspended animation without termination—while also representing that all the fundamental physical properties and facts in the world are held fixed.

(2) We assume that Kantian Non-Conceptualism is true with respect to the representation of life.

(3) Therefore there is a real, objective instantiated or uninstantiated functional property “out there” in the world according to which, as a matter of conceivability, actual organismic metabolism could be in a universal state of suspended animation without termination, while also all the fundamental physical properties and facts in the world are held fixed.

(4) Therefore it is really possible that actual organismic metabolism could be in a universal state of suspended animation without termination, while also all the fundamental physical facts and properties in the world are held fixed.

(5) Therefore the strong supervenience of biological life on the physical fails.

 Argument 3: Non-Local Life

(1) Start with a representation of all the fundamental physical properties and facts about actual organismic metabolism. It is then representable, as a matter of conceivability, that actual organismic metabolism could be spread over the universe in such a way that it lacks unique location and causal determinacy—as in non-locality and indeterminacy effects in quantum mechanics, e.g., Schrödinger’s cat paradox[iii]—while also representing that all the fundamental physical properties and facts in the world are held fixed.

(2) We assume that Kantian Non-Conceptualism is true with respect to the representation of life.

(3) Therefore there is a real, objective instantiated or uninstantiated functional property “out there” in the world according to which, as a matter of mere conceivability, actual organismic metabolism could be spread over the universe in such a way that it lacks unique location and causal determinacy, while also all fundamental physical properties and facts in the world are held fixed.

(4) Therefore it is really possible that actual organismic metabolism could be spread over the universe in such a way that it lacks unique location and causal determinacy, while also all fundamental physical properties and facts in the world are held fixed.

(5) Therefore the strong supervenience of biological life on the physical fails.

These three arguments, respectively, are relevantly analogous to Chalmers’s formulations of:

(1) the inverted qualia argument for the irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness, which entails the failure of the strict or logical determination of the specific character of phenomenal consciousness by the physical,

(2) the zombie argument for the non-reducibility of phenomenal consciousness, which entails the failure of the strict or logical determination of the existence of phenomenal consciousness by the physical, and

(3) the pan(proto)psychist argument for the possibility of universal proto-mentality in a physical world, which shows that some version of neutral monism is possible.

So if Chalmers’s three arguments are (arguably) sound, then, by the same token, so are mine.

There is a very big, further difference between my arguments and Chalmers’s, however. This extra mega-difference lies in the fact that although, like Chalmers, I have grounded the inferential step to possibility on conceivability, nevertheless, because I am also assuming the truth of immanent structuralism about properties and also of Kantian Non-Conceptualism, it is thereby guaranteed that the irreducible essentially non-conceptual representation of life picks out real, objective, causally efficacious immanent structural functional properties of living organisms. Thus the real possibilities I have identified are sufficient to undermine the strong supervenience of organismic life on the physical, not merely its logical supervenience. By sharp contrast, Chalmers’s irreducibility arguments leave nomological or natural strong supervenience in place, and thereby pick out only epiphenomenal mental properties that are characteristic of either substance dualism or property dualism, metaphysically floating beyond or above the fundamental physical world.[iv] The epiphenomenalism problem, as Jaegwon Kim has repeatedly pointed out, is that all classically dualistic properties are causal-explanatorily excluded by the fundamental physical properties on which those dualistic properties nomologically or naturally strongly supervene, and as a consequence those classically dualistic properties are rendered causally and explanatorily inert.[v]

By sharp contrast, according to representational anti-mechanism and the dynamicist model of life, in a Kantian Non-Conceptualist framework, the essentially non-conceptual representation of life picks out a set of objective, real immanent structural thermodynamic properties of living organisms, and these living organisms are all causally efficacious. Indeed, in a sense, reductive physicalists about life completely agree with my thesis that biological life is causally efficacious, which is precisely why they attempt to reduce all the causal powers of organisms to the causal powers of fundamental physical properties, lest living systems be rendered causally inert. They merely disagree with my thesis that biological life, as organismic life, is necessarily underdetermined by and irreducible to fundamental physical properties.

Nevertheless, above all, as per the arguments from Inverted Life, Suspended Life, and Non-Local Life, the causally efficacious, objective, real fact of organismic life does not strongly or logically supervene on the Turing-computable deterministic or indeterministic causal behaviors, functions, operations, and/or states bound up with fundamental physical properties and facts. So Natural Mechanism is false. Correspondingly, and ironically, Chalmers is “dead wrong” about the reducibility of life to the physical, even though he is absolutely right about the actual irreducibility of consciousness and the possible irreducibility of indexicality—although not for the specific reasons he gave.

Essentially the same basic anti-mechanist philosophical points I have just made were also made by Hans Jonas in the mid-1960s:

Suppose that it is a living body, an organism, on which the gaze of the divine mathematician happens to rest. It may be unicellular or multicellular. What would the God of the physicists “see”? As a physical body the organism will exhibit the same general features as do other aggregates: a void mostly, crisscrossed by the geometry of forces that emanate from the insular foci of localized elementary being. But special goings-on will be discernible, both inside and outside its so-called boundary, which will render its phenomenal unity still more problematical than that of ordinary bodies, and will efface almost entirely its material identity through time. I refer to its metabolism, its exchange of matter with the surroundings. In this remarkable mode of being, the material parts of which the organism consists at any moment are to the penetrating observer only temporary, passing contents whose joint material identity does not coincide with the identity of the whole which they enter and leave, and which sustains its own identity by the very act of foreign matter passing through its spatial system, the living form….  [T]he object-view of the divine mathematician is less concrete and colorful than ours—but would we also grant it, as before, the possibility of being truer? Emphatically not in this case, and here we move on firm ground, because here, being living bodies ourselves, we happen to have inside knowledge. On the strength of the immediate testimony of our bodies we are able to say what no disembodied on looker would have a cause for saying: the mathematical God in his homogenous analytical view misses the decisive point—the point of life itself: its being self-centered individuality, being for itself and in contraposition to all the rest of the world, with an essential boundary dividing “inside” and “outside”—notwithstanding, nay, on the very basis of the actual exchange.[vi]

To be sure, Jonas formulates his points within the framework of existential phenomenology, and not (or at least not explicitly) within my favored and more inclusive framework of the dynamicist model of life, together with immanent structuralism, Kantian Non-Conceptualism, and the three non-reductive arguments from the conceivability of Inverted Life, Suspended Life, and Non-Local Life. But I do also think that this more inclusive dynamicist framework is fully receptive to the basic ideas of Jonas’s approach.

In any case, in this chapter I have worked out and defended a neo-Aristotelian and contemporary Kantian anti-mechanist, anti-physicalist, anti-dualist, dynamicist philosophy of biology, which says that, in view of non-equilibrium/complex system thermodynamics, the necessary and sufficient conditions of the real possibility of biological life are

(i) intrinsic teleological dynamics in organisms: their self-organizing intentionality, including reproduction, growth, motility, death, and evolution or natural selection,

(ii) essential indexicality in organisms: their inherent context-dependency, together with egocentric (although not necessarily conscious) centering in a frame of reference, together with orientable space and irreversible time, and

(iii) causal spontaneity in organisms: their efficacious metabolism, involving DNA, by means of epigenesis.

So, in effect, I am proposing a real-metaphysical definition[vii] of biological life by means of the dynamicist model.

In this connection, however, it needs to be emphasized that I am fully aware that for many or most contemporary working scientists and philosophers of biology, there is no general consensus about the definition of life—although that could be finessed away as the normal professional academic condition of “scholarly disagreement”—and also, more importantly, that there are some of these who hold that, even in principle, no such thing as a philosophical definition of life is possible,

either (i) because the concept LIFE is merely a family-resemblance concept of some sort, with no inherent epistemic or semantic unity,

or (ii) because the concept LIFE is purely instrumental or pragmatic, and strongly relative to past, contemporary, or future scientific practices,

or (iii) because the very idea of a priori philosophical conceptual definitions, per se, is epistemically or metaphysically suspect.[viii]

On my view, however, the representation of life is not a concept at all, but instead an essentially non-conceptual content. Hence all of these worries about the concept LIFE, or conceptual definitions, even if they are correct, are strictly beside my main point. Indeed, in order for any of these worries to be directly relevant to my argument, a convincing demonstration of the truth of Conceptualism would already have to be in hand. But as I have already argued in detail and at length elsewhere, Conceptualism is false.[ix]

Finally, it needs to be re-reemphasized that this neo-Aristotelian and contemporary Kantian anti-mechanist, anti-physicalist, anti-dualist, dynamicist philosophy of biology is neither a version of substance vitalism, requiring an appeal to vital spirit or stuff of some sort, nor is it a version of property or functional vitalism, requiring an appeal to the nomologically supervenient, synchronic, static, “pop-out” emergence of essentially distinct vital properties and/or facts. On the contrary, it is entirely a real metaphysics of the immanent structures of non-equilibrium thermodynamic systems, and entails at most the non-strongly-supervenient, diachronic, dynamic emergence of certain inherently non-causally-nomologically-determined, uncomputable, necessary a priori, immanent structural dynamicist properties in living organisms, in a way that is also perfectly consistent with all the deterministic and indeterministic causal laws of nature, especially including the Conservation Laws. What is essential is simply that these dynamicist properties are not necessarily determined, or entailed, by these laws, together with all the settled quantity-of-matter-and/or-energy facts about the past, especially including The Big Bang.  As a consequence, I think that my view fully satisfies the scientifically-robust methodological constraints on teleological biological explanations famously spelled out by Ernest Nagel in “Teleology Revisited,”[x] while at the same time avoiding the errors of Natural Mechanism.

NOTES

[i] See, e.g., J.  Perry, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical,” Noûs 13 (1979): 3-21.

[ii] Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, p. 85.

[iii] See, e.g., Schrödinger, “The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics.”

[iv] See Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp. 150-156.

[v] See J. Kim, “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion,” in J. Kim, Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 237-264; J. Kim, “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism,” in Kim, Supervenience and Mind, pp. 265-284; J. Kim, “The Non-Reductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation,” in Kim, Supervenience and Mind, pp. 336-357; Kim, Philosophy of Mind, ch. 7; and J. Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005), chs. 2-3.

[vi] H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 75-76 and 79, texts combined.

[vii] Correspondingly, I am doing the real metaphysics of the manifest world, and neither the Analytic metaphysics of the noumenal world, nor analysis according to the Standard Picture, nor scientific naturalism/experimental philosophy/second philosophy. See section 1.0 above.

[viii] See, e.g., C. Cleland and C. Chyba, “Defining ‘Life’,” Origins of Life and Evolution of the Biosphere, 32 (2002): 387-393; C. Cleland and C. Chyba, “Does Life Have a Definition?, ” in C. E. Cleland & M. A. Bedau (eds.), The Nature of Life: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives from Philosophy and Science (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), pp. 326-339; C. Cleland, “Life Without Definitions,” Synthese, 185 (2012): 125-144; and E. Machery, “Why I Stopped Worrying about the Definition of Life…And Why You Should as Well,” Synthese 185 (2012): 145-164.

[ix] See Hanna, Cognition, Content, and the A Priori, ch. 2.

[x] See, e.g., E. Nagel, “Teleology Revisited: Goal-Directed Processes in Biology” and “Teleology Revisited: Functional Explanations in Biology,” Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977): 261-279 and 280-301; and for an application and extension of the “systems-property” explanatory model to action theory, see H. Frankfurt, “The Problem of Action,” in H. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 69-79.


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